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Abstract 
This is a sociological study of the views of officers in the Swedish Army and its 
Amphibious Forces on tactics in Irregular Warfare (IW), in particular, 
Counterinsurgency (COIN). IW comprises struggles, where the military weaker part 
uses an indirect approach with smaller units and integrates the civilian and military 
dimensions in a violence spectrum including subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare 
and infantry actions. IW is the main armed warfare style in insurgencies. COIN is the 
combined political, military, economic, social and legal actions in counter insurgencies.  
Data has been collected by means of interviews with almost all (n =43) officers, who 
were either commanding battalions or rifle and manoeuvre companies while undergoing 
training for general warfare and international operations. The main theoretical and 
methodological inspiration is the traditional one for research on social fields, 
inaugurated by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. The statistical technique used is 
Multiple Correspondence Analysis. As a background and context base, an inquiry 
inspired by the Begriffsgechichte (Conceptual History) tradition explores the genesis 
and development of understandings of the term Irregular Warfare. The research question 
is outlined as; “how can contemporary Swedish military thought on tactics in Irregular 
Warfare be characterized using descriptive patterns, mapped in relation to background 
factors and normative standards?  
The most significant findings are that there are two main opposing notions separating 
the officers’ views on tactics in Irregular Warfare: (1) a focus on larger, combat oriented 
and collectively operating military units versus smaller and larger, more intelligence 
oriented and dispersed operating units, and (2) a focus on military tasks and kinetic 
effects versus military and civilian tasks as well as “soft” effects. The distribution of 
these views can be presented as a two-dimensional space structured by the two axes. 
This space represents four categories of tactics, partly diverging from normative 
military standards for Counterinsurgency. This social space of standpoints shows 
different structural tendencies for background factors of social and cultural character, 
particularly dominant concerning military backgrounds, international mission 
experiences and civilian education. Compared to military standards for 
Counterinsurgency, the two tactical types characterized by a Regular Warfare mind-set 
stands out as counter-normative.  
Signs of creative thought on military practice and theory, as well as a still persistent 
Regular Warfare doxa are apparent. Power struggles might thus develop, effecting the 
transformation to a broadened warfare culture with an enhanced focus also on Irregular 
Warfare. The result does not support research results arguing for a convergence of 
military thought in the European transformation of Armed Forces. The main argument 
goes beyond tactics and suggests sociological analysis on reciprocal effects regarding 
strategy, operational art, tactics as well as leadership, concerning the mind-set and 
preferences for Regular, Irregular and Hybrid Warfare.  
Keywords: Bourdieu, military thought, tactics, Irregular Warfare, Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis, field theory, sociology, War Studies. 
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1 Point of departure for the study 
1.1 Introduction to the chapter 
The following chapter introduces the study with a discussion of problems connected to 
contemporary transformation of military capabilities. The aim of the research is 
presented and the work is summarised. The background is discussed and an overview of 
the research situation is presented, followed by a problem discussion and outlining of 
the research question. The research design is then described and the chapter ends with a 
presentation of demarcations and disposition. 
1.2 Introduction, aim and summary of the research work 
What happens when Armed Forces with a traditional and cultural focus on Regular 
Warfare between symmetrical state enemies are additionally tasked to be equally 
prepared for Irregular Warfare?1 What challenges might this mean for the transfer of 
knowledge and understanding between and within areas of tactics and strategy? If 
different preferences exist, what challenges does that imply for the modern officer’s 
leadership in general? I argue it is important to gain knowledge of the current character 
of tactical thought in order to contribute to the development of tactical thinking, 
understanding and overall transformation of the Armed Forces. During 2011, this view 
was presented for the Swedish General Inspector of the Army and approved by him. 
Another aim is to contribute to the development of the academic subject of War Studies 
for Swedish officer education. For Swedish officers already taking part in multinational 
operations such as the NATO ISAF Counterinsurgency Operation in Afghanistan, the 
situation is not new, but seen from the perspective of the whole of Swedish strategy, 
traditions and war fighting capability, it is a new and different paradigm that challenges 
the military doxa. 
                                                 
1 The term “Irregular Warfare” was defined 2008 in the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publications JP 1-02, 12 April 
2001, (As amended 17 October , 2008) as; “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular Warfare favours’ indirect and 
asymmetrical approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order 
to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Also called IW”. In Sweden the term appeared in 
governmental writings from 2008 as in; Försvar i användning, Ds 2008:49 [A Useful Defence] 
(Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 2008), p. 32; ”A majority of the conflicts in recent years have been 
characterized by Irregular Warfare, i.e. Guerrilla Warfare, armed  gangs, terrorist network systems, and 
the employment of fighting units in smaller groups. Many actors are non-governmental. There are no 
signs that this pattern of conflict will change in the foreseeable future. Potential adversaries can, 
however, be structured and possess modern and qualified equipment, but act in an irregular context”. 
The new Swedish Military Strategy doctrine; Militärstrategisk doktrin 2011 med doktrinära grunder 
(MSD 12), p. 27, writes a similar definition;”warfare, usually between states and non-state actors, or 
only between non-state actors, seeking legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular 
Warfare is based primarily on indirect and asymmetric attack that avoids confronting the opponent's 
military forces. It can cover the spectrum from subversion, open Guerrilla Warfare to (lower) tactical 
(ground forces) units that use regular tactics. The struggle is political rather than military, and it aims to 
wear out the opponent's will, influence and power. Civilians are included to the largest possible extent” 
(author’s translation from Swedish).  
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Since 2010, The Swedish Armed Forces have been in transformation from a Regular 
Warfare conscript defence, to a professional military capability for Regular Warfare and 
primarily, in a multinational role, in Irregular Warfare environments. This is also stated 
in the latest Swedish Military Strategy Doctrine2. Results from the present study have 
been used in this doctrine to describe a broader view of the conflict spectrum3.At the 
core of the military profession, I argue, lie tactics, generally meaning, how to use 
military means and methods according to strategy.4 In order to be able to understand 
politics and to provide realistic military decision support, the officer has to understand 
and explain what risks and possibilities might be at stake, also in Irregular Warfare. 
Knowledge, understandings and articulation of tactics in theory and practice are argued 
to be even more important when systematically entering unfamiliar and new areas, such 
as the demands currently being expressed. Military tactics per se and standpoints on 
tactical thought are however, an area of limited research in Sweden. So are even 
sociological studies connected to tactics.  
This limited interest in studies concerning thought on practical military problem-solving 
might be seen as strange, looking at an organization structured clearly by groupings of 
people working in different sub-cultures. This background is the main motive for this 
study, aiming to map standpoints and background factors in order to identify indications 
of clustering trends. The goal is to be able to present a model of tactical thought in 
Irregular Warfare in 2011, possible to be discussed in comparison with normative texts, 
such as western doctrines and field manuals. The study focuses on battalion and 
company commanders in Swedish field units with mainly tactical aspects for the light 
infantry parts of infantry. Mechanized infantry, mechanized and ranger units are 
addressed as these are considered to be the main body of Irregular Warfare and 
Counterinsurgency Operations5. 
I argue that this group in particular has to deal with tactics for planning and direct 
execution of tasks, with one leg in military practice and the other in military theory. The 
above mentioned commanders’ thoughts as expressed standpoints are therefore viewed 
to be unique, compared to other categories, either in higher echelons lacking the 
practical context, or in lower lacking the theoretical connection.  
                                                 
2 Militärstrategisk doktrin 2011 med doktrinära  grunder (MSD 12),(2011) , p. 5, as in several sections in 
the text.  
3 Ibid. p. 38. The Conflict Spectre, figure 2:9. 
4 Definitions of the word “tactics” vary in Swedish military literature, still, in general terms, it means 
accomplishing tasks (traditionally combat oriented but today, including all kinds of tasks). The 
Reglemente för Markoperationer, (RMO), remiss 3 [Field Manual for Ground Forces Operations] 
(Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2009), p. 38 declares that tactics means “different means and methods, 
applied/coordinated”. Markstridsreglemente, Manöverbataljon (MSR 6) [Field Manual for Ground 
Forces Manoeuvre Battalion, pre-edition] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, förhandsutgåva, 2010), p. 39 
says more explicitly; “Tactics is the art of consciously choosing and coordinating means and methods in 
a given situation in order to reach a decided goal. Tactics is applied in a limited area and during a 
limited time in order to determine (win) a combat/battle or other activity to one’s own advantage”. These 
definitions do not mention strategy; still, I have chosen to more precisely connect tactics to strategy.  
5 Counterinsurgency (COIN) is defined in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency 
Operations, Allied Joint Publications (AJP) – 3.4.4, 2011, Part II - terms of definition; “The set of 
political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to 
defeat Insurgency and address any core grievances”.  
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The empirical data involves almost all the 2011 population of officers commanding 
battalions and rifle (or equivalent) companies of infantry, motorized, mechanized, 
ranger and intelligence & security arms, also including the amphibious battalion within 
the Royal Swedish Navy, (n= 43)6 The main method is sociological prosopography, 
meaning collecting and analysing data concerning standpoints on tactical issues and 
background factors. The results are the analyses of a space of tactical thoughts and 
preferences in Irregular Warfare. The investigation covers thought expressed during 
2010-12. An underlying assumption experienced during my service in the Swedish 
Armed Forces concerns a traditional disinterest in Irregular or Small War fighting 
capabilities, so as not to disturb thinking of the “big, real war”. Such a view, as a part of 
my horizon of experiences, is an aspect that has been reflected on during this work. 
Another view is that there are arguably differences in requirements for skills, training 
and education, especially if focus is on combat or reconnaissance/intelligence activities. 
This character of pre-understanding has motivated an approach of context 
objectification in order to counter an unconscious desire for results to be suitable for the 
researcher’s viewpoint.  
An initial literature study from a collection of argued influence sources has provided a 
theoretical starting point in the form of an empirical generalization of the meaning in 
general of the so-called Irregular Warfare phenomenon. That result, validated by a 
survey, has guided interviews with several open and alternative answer questions. 
Applying an adapted field theory approach and Multiple Correspondence Analysis 
method, a filter is claimed to have been arranged positioning the researcher out of direct 
unwanted influence. An inductive approach, letting the data speak, has resulted in 
identification of standpoints and background factor structures, leading towards a model 
of standpoints. This approach is argued to provide a transparent method where specific 
questions can be identified and discussed.  
In a time of increasing demands for knowledge and skills in traditional Regular Warfare 
as well as in various forms of Irregular or Hybrid Warfare, with few available ground 
force units and limited larger scale field exercises, tactical development is argued to be 
favoured with knowledge of the current state of standpoints ("from what") as well as 
end state formulations ("to what"). This study aims to provide knowledge of a starting 
point for various types of further analyses. The study concludes with a discussion of the 
possible implications of the results per se, also linked to strategy and operational art. 
                                                 
6 The sample consisted of officers positioned in 2011 as Battalion and Company commanding officers 
(Rifle Coys and equivalents) and consisted of eleven Battalion Commanding officers (BnCO), thirty Rifle 
Company Commanding Officers (CoyCO) and three Armoured Coy Commanding officers = 43 officers. 
One Bn CO was not available and some second-in-command officers were interviewed, resulting in an 
almost full population of representatives from all units concerned. 
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1.3 Background to the research focus 
The following part describes my thoughts, articulations and motives for the research 
focus. It is a reflection of biases habituated during over 30 years in military service. The 
text describes an ambition to take on what is considered a classic military problem, 
experienced in practice, and outlines a narrative sketch covering the time period 1980 to 
2008. An ambition to elucidate the dangers and possibilities of Small Wars during this 
period has, in general, been experienced as an up-hill road to travel.  
Then suddenly, after 2007, the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare emerged unexpectedly 
and was unavoidable to relate to, from strategy to tactics, in practice and theory. The 
time had come for an attempt to gain a new and deeper knowledge approach in order to 
contribute to the military thought on war fighting. To characterize the researcher’s 
perspective of the research object, poses certain challenges and whatever result, the 
question of truth becomes hard to measure. Human thinking, in particular one’s own 
summaries of events and thinking from the past to now, is a question of memory, will 
and intentions. My first intention is however, to describe my view of the inner meaning 
of being an officer. Such a meaning is argued to be that tactical knowledge, 
understandings and thought are the cornerstones in the officer profession.  
However, this meaning does not convey anything if not communicated and put into 
practice. The other way around, if practices are not reflected upon and returned to 
military theory, tactical thought will hardly develop. Risk for disruption of the 
connection to strategy is also thought to be imminent. Depending on internal and 
external political and strategic circumstances, different requirements as consequences 
emerge in relation to existing military tactics. Life and the world are not static, nor are 
thoughts of the same. Doxa and paradigms on the other hand are long-lived. The 
officer’s mastery of tactics, and even more importantly, of mental and practical adaption 
to other needs than what has been predicted, prioritized and selected to be current 
tactical principles, is argued to be a trademark of an officer’s skill. Recurrent situations 
occur that fall outside what articulated military tactics can handle and that obviously 
applies to the strategy domains to an equal extent.  
During my time as an officer, I learned about tactics according to the doctrine of 
national invasion defence. Subsequently, I had to think totally differently about tactics 
during the submarine violations of Swedish territorial waters in the 1980-90s. That 
experience fundamentally challenged my and several other officer colleagues’ mental 
picture of what an opponent could do, and what we could or could not do to defend 
ourselves. The image and idea that previous knowledge had obvious limitations 
mentally and practically, meant that the meaning of a duel was given a new character 
when the enemy was hard to be found. However, this insight was for some, of a more 
temporary character, such as a strategically-tactical anomaly, probably not to be 
encountered again and therefore of a more limited interest. The duel with an enemy that 
was hard to find, or acting in a way contemporary tactical paradigms had not described, 
gave insights of the need for further tactical thought.  
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From this anomaly during the national defence era, the next tactical anomaly occurred 
with the many years of operations in the Balkans, resulting in new requirements of long-
term tactics with the character of Stability Operations of a police-related nature. In 
practice, the task for commanders was to provide security amongst the people, in the 
words of Rupert Smith.7 A task related more to security intelligence activities and to 
support arrests of subversive elements and war criminals, than to arrange attack or 
defence operations against a traditional mechanized enemy. Tactics for Regular Warfare 
during that time was to be a lesser studied area.  
It was however, still supposed to be the obvious foundation for basic military thinking 
and practical tactical ability. Training activities of the Swedish Armed Forces were then 
subsequently limited in symbiosis with the Armed Forces’ reductions. The conceptual 
tactical anomalies; an opponent who was hard to be found or was not acting according 
to the Regular Warfare principles, became a hard to solve challenge. Subsequently, a 
period began of an imagined future of being able to predict targeting with great 
accuracy and of long distance combat. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was 
supposed to change military life. The next, quite unexpected development from the 
imagined one, was the war in Iraq and Afghanistan leading to one of modern times’ 
equally unexpected and unwanted debate; a focus on requirements and understanding of 
tactics in Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency. This was in parallel with the 
declining understanding and knowledge about tactics in Regular Warfare due to western 
defence cuts.  
In my view, a double challenge had therefore emerged. Regaining understanding and 
knowledge of Regular Warfare, and for this generation of officers, new thinking on the 
not wanted area of strategy and tactics in Irregular Warfare. Against that background, 
the need for a greater and deeper understanding and knowledge of a broader and deeper 
tactical sphere; the question "from what perspective?" emerged in my mind. Without 
comprehending the starting point, I argue that understanding and development of 
strategy and tactics in practice and theory might very well be too diffuse to be 
comprehended and managed wisely.  
A question of the characteristics of contemporary Swedish thought on tactics of 
Irregular Warfare developed a concern of how to contribute to creating the ability to 
think beyond the known tactical mental images. What can be done to expand a tactical 
mind and what helps to promote tactical approaches aimed to increase tactical 
capability? A difference in the nature of thought of Irregular Warfare among senior and 
younger officers in general has been noticed, where younger officers seem to think more 
about this situation than the older officers on the whole. Few, regardless of age, 
however, currently seem to have the time to think about tactics. Time seems to be 
running out because of extensive management work and a general process-oriented and 
organizational mind-set. 
 
                                                 
7 Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2007). 
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I have thus, a picture of a tactical mind-set that can be characterized by a declining 
knowledge of Regular Warfare, and a slight but unstable increase of fragmentized 
knowledge of Irregular Warfare, yet little reflected and fragile in survival strengths. My 
preconception includes an opinion that Swedish military thought on tactics has 
limitations in knowledge, understanding and interest, regarding means and methods 
against adversaries that do not follow the traditional paradigm of Regular Warfare. 
Impressions over a long-time of producing fighting power rather than experiences of 
fighting power in real life operations might be a reason that draws the attention and 
interest away from the subject of tactics.  
Also, it is well known that western military interest in Irregular Warfare or conflicts has 
been low during the 20th century. The result of the study “Following up Frank Kitson´s 
direction” implies that the until now limited interest in Counterinsurgency and Irregular 
Warfare has hampered understanding, education and practical capabilities in general in 
the western world.8 Currently, the need for deeper understanding and better fighting 
power for irregular conflicts is recognised by the Swedish Armed Forces as well. But 
how to think tactically beyond a paradigm of Regular Warfare if not trained for it, 
educated in it, or over time, encouraged to do so? I have experienced several 
conversations on Irregular Warfare hardly possible to understand due to the confusion 
of definitions and beyond this, still a belief that understanding is imminent and adaption 
possible.  
From my point of view, such a belief is unconsciously framed using a Regular Warfare 
mind-set and specific “glasses” through which the actual problem is observed. I have 
also experienced a focus on strategy discussions and criticism on how 
counterinsurgency has been understood in the new era.9 I have developed a view that 
Swedish thought on tactics would benefit from not only a broader view of tactics but 
also in particular, concerning how tactics is imagined as well as thought about. These 
personal thoughts, experiences and opinions are of course incomplete and may also 
prove to be incorrect in several ways, still, they do give a picture of the researcher’s 
position when embarking upon this study in 2010. The following chapters will reveal 
deviations as well as adherence to this starting point. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Michael Gustafson, ´I Frank Kitsons Fotspår´, Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och 
Tidskrift, Nr 2/2010. 
9 Octavian Manea , ´Learning From Today’s Crisis of Counterinsurgency´ by Octavian Manea, Small 
Wars Journal 2013, 8 October. Discussion with Dr. David H. Ucko and Dr. Robert Egnell about their 
book Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare (Columbia University 
Press, October 2013). 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
7 
 
1.4 The research situation 
The overall situation regarding research on Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgencies 
can be characterized as maturing after the strong re-expansion starting 2007. The 
publishing of the American Army and Marine Corps Field Manual FM 3-24 
Counterinsurgency marked a paradigm shift regarding interest for Small Wars in the 
western countries.10  
The interest was intense in America during the Vietnam War and the research 
production at RAND vast.11 A drastic reduction in research accompanied the end of that 
war and the following period until the Afghanistan War after 9/11. After the Vietnam 
War, the research interest for Irregular Warfare reached a low water mark in the western 
world outside the world of Special Operations and Special Operations Forces. Several 
writings, often possible to be characterized as personal accounts and experiences, were 
however published during this period. The new and unexpected period of interest and 
research since 2006/07 has matured with numerous articles, reports and books.  
A new era also began at RAND, again turning to Irregular Warfare, as can be 
exemplified with War by Other Means (2008).12 This extensive report was ordered by 
the Office of the Secretary of Defence early in 2006, building on an examination of 
eighty-nine insurgencies from World War II. The bulk of the research efforts have 
arguably, not surprisingly, focused on the major challenge of the diffusion or 
deconstruction of the military and civilian structural borders, indeed strategic questions. 
More extensive research efforts seem however, to have begun first after the speedy 
military production of doctrines and field manuals during 2007-2010.  
The research world could be said to have been in the unwanted forced situation of trying 
to catch up instead of delivering research inputs built on previous empirical collection, 
subsequently, building an understanding and foundation on which the political and 
military approaches could be based. An intense focus became directed to questions of 
definitions and ways of dealing with the military and civilian intermingling sectors. The 
character of violence, now including low-level threats such as subversion and terrorism 
also became key interests, as well as regarding how to relate to post-colonial 
experiences in a new globalized context.  
                                                 
10 U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual FM 3-24, Marine Corps 
Warfighting Publications (MCWP) 3-33.5, December 2006. 
11 Melvin Gurtov and Konrad Kellen, Vietnam: Lessons and Mislessons, P-4084, (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, June, 1969), p. 7; “Few who are familiar with the expensiveness of the research 
undertaken on Vietnamese would quarrel with the view that this war has produced the vastest 
accumulation of information about the enemy in the history”. The author’s discussion about the problem, 
despite extensive research, of how to be able to understand what lessons can be learned and what should 
be unlearned, also to accept when no lessons exist to be used further. They argue that the latter is the most 
important lesson from the Vietnam War (p. 22). After the Vietnam War it seems that all sorts of lessons 
concerning COIN were forgotten in the western world. Since 2008, the situation changed, RAND started 
to re-publish old and produce several new works on the subject (author’s comments). 
12 David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, War by Other Means – Building complete and balanced 
capabilities for Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defence Research Institute, 
2008), pp. vi-vii informs of several other works in progress or produced. 
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Influential thought on new traits of Irregular Warfare was produced by several authors; 
David Kilcullen, with The Accidental Guerrilla (2009) and Counterinsurgency (2010) 
promotes a new academic standard.13 John Mackinlay highlights a dilemma within the 
previous western focus on non-military terrorism, now to be also met in 
counterinsurgencies, as discussed in The Insurgency Archipelago (2009).14  
Together with Alison Al-Baddawy, Mackinlay suggests new approaches in Rethinking 
Counterinsurgency (2008).15 Great efforts have been put into strategic research, and on 
the other hand at the field level, regarding how to deal with the not expected evolution 
of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). However, research strictly on tactical thought 
and building new theories has not been prominent.16 Anthony James Joes in Resisting 
Rebellion – The history and politics of Counterinsurgency (2004) delivers a historical 
exposé on so-called Guerrilla Insurgency, focusing primarily on strategy but also 
including tactics.17 John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring in Uncomfortable Wars, 
Revisited (2008) develop an earlier and influential theory now drawing on a theoretical 
strategy study from 2006.18  
A quantitative methodology derived from political science is applied to almost seventy 
cases of intrastate wars. The theory Manwaring and Fishel propose is however of a 
purely strategic character delivering fewer results with a tactical view. A genre of a 
more anthological character with introductory and summarizing aims can be 
exemplified by Strategy in the Contemporary World (second edition, 2007)19 and 
Understanding Modern Warfare (2008).20  
                                                 
13 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla – Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). Kilcullen analyses from an anthropological view, as well as from his own 
extensive military experiences.  David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
14 John Mackinlay, The Insurgency Archipelago (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
15 John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, Rethinking Counterinsurgency, RAND Counterinsurgency 
study, Volume 5 (Santa Monica CA: RAND National Defence Research Institute, 2008). 
16 Discussion with Jan Ångström, professor in War Studies, Swedish National Defence College, 
particularly regarding Military Strategy, 2013-09-02. Ångström has since 2002 researched and pursued 
the area of Small Wars and Irregular Warfare. Ångström has published several books and articles on the 
subject. 
17 Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion – The history and politics of Counterinsurgency (Kentucky: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), pp. 243 – 246 (a total of 257 pages). 
18 John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring, Uncomfortable Wars – Revisited (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2008), pp. xi – xvi. The foreword by Edvin G. Corr describes the so-called Manwaring 
Paradigm with the SWORD model as a social science theory on insurgencies, also leaning on historical 
views from Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. 
19 John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray and Eliot Cohen (ed), Strategy in the Contemporary World – 
an introductory to Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, first edition 2002), p. 276; 
Stephen Biddle argues for the need of tactical, close combat skills in modern Irregular Warfare, p. 181; 
James Kiras claims that most theorists assess specialist units such as Special Operations Forces or Special 
Forces to be needed to defeat irregulars at their own game. 
20 David Jordan, James D. Kiras, David J. Linsedale, Ian Speller, Cristopher Tuck and Dale C. Walton, 
Understanding Modern Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, first printing 2008), 
chapter 5. ´Irregular Warfare´ by James D. Kiras, pp. 224-292. 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
9 
 
Other examples are Understanding Counterinsurgency (2010)21 and Understanding 
Contemporary Strategy (2012), the latter of a clearly more offensive view   than the 
previous examples.22 Writings such as these, mainly with a strategic focus, do 
sometimes also include tactical aspects, not surprisingly as the two aspects do affect 
each other in general and especially in Irregular Warfare environments. However, 
discussions on tactics are not to be automatically regarded as actual research on tactical 
thought. Criticism of tactics and strategy has however been common. One of the earliest 
critiques of the strategic understanding of Counterinsurgency was delivered by James 
Corum in 2008.23 Affecting tactics as well as strategy, the area of operational art is 
analysed by Justine Kelly and Mike Brennan in Alien (2009). They deliver a highly 
recommendable account of the development in military thought during the 20th century, 
and in particular in the light of the Irregular Warfare context.24 In 2010, Beatrice Hauser 
produces an impressive historical account on strategic thinking in The Evolution of 
Strategy.25 Hauser also deals with thought on Small Wars and Counterinsurgency with 
the conclusion that a common shared view exists, namely that only a clear focus on the 
people will eventually bring some victory and peace.26  
In her literature considerations, Hauser claims there was a prominent tactical view from 
writers on war until the early 20th century and thereafter, the emergence and increased 
writing on Strategic Studies, gradually exponentially after the Second World War.27 I 
share that opinion, particularly in Sweden, where academic studies on tactics have been 
rare, especially in the post-Cold War era. The first wave of knowledge building on the 
subject of Irregular Warfare was mainly founded on a re-interpretation of the COIN 
classics from the 1950s and 60s, where previously scarcely read works by David Galula, 
Frank Kitson, Robert Thompson and Roger Trinquier were again focused on.  
The extensive doctrine production in the west from 2007-2010 can be said to have 
largely rested on experiences and military thought extricated from these writings, 
arguably not supported by any substantially new scientific research body. The reason 
for this seems obvious when no such research body existed; the reappearance of such 
problematic conflicts was not on the political and military horizon of expectations or 
acceptance. Turning to tactics and tactical thought for land forces, the sociological 
research of Antony King deserves to be highlighted.  
 
                                                 
21 Thomas Keaney and Thomas Rid (ed.), Understanding Counterinsurgency (Oxon: Routledge, 2010). 
Tactics are addressed indirectly in the section “operational aspects” and in the final part; “challenges”, pp. 
73-171, still with no special section dedicated to tactical challenges. 
22 James D. Kiras, ´Irregular Warfare´, in David Jordan, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonesdale, Ian Speller, 
Cristopher Tucker and C. Dale Walton, Understanding Modern Warfare (2008), and in Kane, M. Thomas 
M. Kane and David J. Lonsdale, Understanding Contemporary Strategy (Oxon: Routledge, 2012). 
23 James Corum, Bad Strategies, (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2008). 
24 Mike Brennan and Justin Kelly, ALIEN – How Operational Art devoured Strategy (Carlisle: Strategic 
Studies Institute (SSI), 2009), pp. 85 – 98. 
25 Beatrice Hauser, The Evolution of Strategy – Thinking war from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
26 Ibid. pp. 387 – 441. regarding Small Wars and Counterinsurgency, pp. 436 – 437; Conclusions  
27 Ibid. p. 33. 
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In his recommendable account on combat performance in The Combat Soldier (2013), 
King claims a profound attribute has become drills and training for the professional 
armies and platoon structure.28 This is argued to be in contrast to the common 
presumptions that citizen armies rely on appealing to masculinity, nationalism and 
ethnicity. Staying within the individual sphere and connecting to leadership experiences 
in Irregular Warfare, Mark Moyer argues in A Question of Command (2009) that the 
quality of leadership plays a far larger role in the outcome of such conflicts than 
normally is acknowledged.29  
Culture and ways of seeing war and warfare are in close conjunction with leadership. 
John Lynn in Battle (2003) argues against some sort of western way of warfare with 
technological primacy, still retaining the notion of Regular Warfare primacy, leading to 
situations where classic conventional armies called upon to fight in a Guerrilla War try 
to turn the struggle into a conventional one.30 Struggles that can take place regarding 
both strategy and tactics in an Irregular Warfare environment, eventually recognized as 
such, are described by Thomas E. Ricks in The Gamble (2009), giving an example of 
what can happen when junior commanders view events differently than the senior 
leaders.31  
In The Echo of Battle (2007) Brian McAllister Linn discusses the intellectual traditions 
regarding what constitutes the army way of warfare.32 Not only Linn, but several other 
writers have called upon the argued importance to view possible impacts of existing 
military culture when entering Irregular Warfare environments. The vast volume of 
writing in the western countries on Irregular Warfare mainly as Counterinsurgency 
raises a warning of possible neglect of experiences by non-western countries and 
armies. An examination of Sumit Ganguly’s and David P. Fidler’s; India and 
Counterinsurgency (2009) does however give credit to several experiences that can be 
found in most current western doctrines.33 The close link between tactics and strategy in 
Irregular Warfare is commonly underlined in several writings and discussions. Still, 
theoretical approaches on tactical thought or preferences per se, and/or on the relation 
between tactics and strategy seem less explored so far.  
                                                 
28 Antony King, The Combat Soldier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). An interesting historical 
account of the development of modern tactics is delivered in pp. 129-163. 
29 Mark Moyer, A Question of Command, Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq , foreword by 
Donald Kagan and Fredric Kagan (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009). The Appendix; 
pp. 287-301 describes interesting results on leadership questions to 131 veteran officers (captains to 
colonels with Iraq and Afghanistan experiences) in the US Army and Marine Corps in 2008. 
30 John A. Lynn, Battle, A History of Combat and Culture (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004, revised and 
updated edition, first printed in 2003), p. 342. 
31 Thomas E. Rick, The Gamble, General Petraeus and the untold story of the American Surge in Iraq, 
2006-2008 (London: Allen Lane, an imprint of Penguin books, Penguin Books, 2009). 
32 Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle – The Army´s way of warfare (London: Harvard University 
Press. 2007). 
33 Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (ed), India and Counterinsurgency, lessons learned (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2009), p. 227. The conclusion highlights, for example, small unit tactics contrary to larger unit 
manoeuvre warfare; still, the book primarily deals with strategy. 
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One way for new theoretical articulations, according to Aki Huhtinen and Jari 
Rantapelkonen in Messy Wars (2008), consists of combining philosophical and practical 
as well as macro and micro issues as postmodern thinking of 21st century conflicts.34 
The logic in such thinking seems apparent, even with empirical challenges. This study 
on tactical thought gives one possible entrance for such an attempt, regarding strategic 
thought versus tactical thought for various samples. A practical approach, giving the 
very same warning for consequences of unlinked strategy and tactics, not least 
concerning military culture, is provided by Frank Ledwidge in Losing Small Wars 
(2011) regarding how to examine the current British way of acting in an Irregular 
Warfare environment.35 As a broad summary of writings on the Irregular Warfare 
phenomenon, a forward looking view is delivered by Nils Marius Rekkedal etc. al in 
Winds of Change – On Irregular Warfare (2012).36 Rekkedal summarizes and discusses 
the development of thought, mostly regarding strategy and Operational art perspectives,  
still with tactical issues addressed. A view is offered of a possible ending to a second 
COIN era following the renaissance after 2006.37 
In 2009, long-term serving former officer Jim Storr delivers an interesting account on 
tactics and the argued fundamental human aspect of combat and war.38 In the book, The 
Human Face of War (2009), Storr presents arguments for Historical Analysis (HA), 
pragmatism and empiricism as being important theoretical choices when studying 
combat and tactics. Storr argues against positivism and natural science bases when 
examining unpredictable and truly human enterprises such as tactics. However, despite 
highlighting the human dimension, Starr neglects to discuss the possibilities of 
sociology or psychology as research bases. This omission is surprising as he refers to 
Dixon’s famous On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (1977), at the time, a book 
also in use in Sweden for the senior officer leadership course.39 Regardless of the strong 
focus on the human aspect, we find as late as 2009, once again, a historical dominance 
compared to the possibilities of sociological exploration. 
An interesting part of Storr’s work concerns a development of the American historian 
Archer Jones’ work with a generic model of troop types.40 Storr uses four different 
types of troops - missile, raiding, heavy infantry and shock troops- positioned in a two-
by-two model. The model is structured using two dimensions or aspects; less or more 
mobile and missile or close combat troops. The model is developed by Storr with 
relationships between these types of troops regarding who generally defeats who.  
                                                 
34 Aki Huhtinen and Jari Rantapelkonen, Messy Wars (Helsinki: Finn Lectura, 2008), p. 142. 
35 Frank Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars, British Military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2011). 
36 Nils Marius Rekkedal et.al, Winds of Change – On Irregular Warfare (Tampare: National Defence 
University of Finland, Department of Military History, 2012, Publication series 2, N:o 18, 2012). 
37 Ibid. pp. 383 and 393-401. 
38 Jim Storr, The Human face of War (London: Continuum UK, Birmingham War Studies, 2009). 
39 Ibid. 202. Storr refers to Norman F. Dixon, On The Psychology of Military Incompetence (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1977). 
40 Ibid. pp. 65-71. Storr refers to Archer Jones, The Conduct of War in the Western World (London: 
Harrap, 1998). 
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This pursuit of modelling different types of tactics in relation to each other to determine 
combat superiority, leads rather more to historic or positivistic thinking than to some 
sort of permanent truth. Clearly missing is the work and result of standpoint and 
background factor positions seen from a sociologic view, especially as the title of the 
book denotes the human perspective. Another, but different future view of strategy, 
operational art and clearly tactical concepts in land force units is given by Antony King 
in The Transformation of Europe´s Armed Forces (2011).41 This research is one of the 
few that has been found studying tactical concepts and implementations from a 
sociological perspective. The argument presented outlines a development in which 
concentrated nodes of military power are emerging at the operational and tactical level 
in each country and coming into a closer transnational relationship with each other to 
fulfil their missions. King seeks to connect detailed changes at the tactical and cultural 
levels to wider transformations of the military and political institutions in Europe. 
Current staff procedures at the operational level are scrutinized, as are the formations 
and use of the so-called empowered brigades (with organic combat support and combat 
service support) as a particular tactical development and even transformation.42  
A concentration and transformation of the operational and tactical capabilities is argued 
to be taking place within the European Armed Forces.43 King describes a development 
of common understandings and working procedures in the new operational staffs and 
the emergence of a new form of tactical structures; the empowered brigades, 
characterized as  joint resources with a hybrid content, meaning not mostly light 
infantry but also including special forces, elite units as paratroopers now mobile with 
light vehicles, and an enhanced intelligence function, capable of high mobility, air 
power coordination and dispersed operations with smaller units over vast areas.44 King 
argues a new form of tactical paradigm is emerging, dependent on the outcome of the 
Afghanistan operation. A characteristic is offered as “a convergence towards common 
patterns”.45  
                                                 
41 Antony King, The Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces: from the Rhine to Afghanistan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). The presentation of the book says; “This 
research plots the trajectory of Europe’s armed forces. Focusing on Britain, France and Germany, as the 
major European powers, and NATO as the institutional framework in which development is occurring. 
He has conducted research on their rapid reaction brigades (3 Commando Brigade, 16 Air Assault 
Brigade, 9 Brigade Légèr Blindée de Marine and Division Spezielle Operationen), staff colleges (Joint 
Services Command and Staff College, Führungs Akademie, College Interarmee de la Defence, NATO 
School) and operational headquarters (including ISAF HQ in Kabul the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, 
France’s new Rapid Reaction Corps at Lille Einsatzführungs Commando and Joint Forces Headquarters 
Brunssum”.  
42 Ibid. p.163. 
43 Ibid. pp. 16-17. King even discusses the possibility that the dynamics of this concentration and 
transformation might be applied to a much wider scope; the process of European integration. See also pp. 
268-271. 
44 Ibid. pp. 176-177. 
45 Ibid. p. 177. 
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The very obvious difference in strategic and operational culture is discussed, but not 
regarding the status of tactical culture and preferences.46 However, the importance of 
the tactical development is stated as “central to any account of European military 
development”.47 The research is an interesting work on operational and tactical 
capabilities that clearly relates to strategic and operational culture with possible frictions 
as grounds for development. King puts it; ”the three major military powers in Europe 
demonstrate profoundly different profession culture and strategic orientations which 
obstruct their cooperation. Of course, these differences are multiplied if other European 
forces are considered”. However, such a consideration of possible differences in tactical 
culture and standpoints is not a part of King’s work. Such knowledge is, as said before, 
argued important, especially in relation to the view of King regarding a development of 
a growing transnational horizontal collaboration at lower levels. Relational structures of 
some nations’ homogenous or heterogeneous tactical thought will obviously provide 
different transnational thought and standpoint structures.  
Turning to research in Sweden on Irregular Warfare, and in particular tactical 
preferences in such conflicts, it has not been a substantial part of the officer education 
supported by War Studies research before 2008. Nils Marius Rekkedal, working as a 
professor in War Studies at the Swedish National Defence College (2002-2008), 
introduced the subject on a broader scale later on. Still, it was not until 2008, a year 
after the publication of the U.S. Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, that a change in 
the officer education syllabus was decided upon, with the introduction of a 5-week 
course in Irregular Warfare for the basic officer course. Subsequently, in 2010, a course 
in contemporary operations was devoted fully to Joint Counterinsurgency operations.  
Moreover, work with a summary of military thought on war and warfare, for officer 
education, as well as support to doctrinal work, resulted in Jerker Widén’s and Jan 
Ångström’s book Militärteorins Grunder (2005), containing descriptions of “theories 
on ground operations in “Small Wars”.48 Here, a summary of Irregular Warfare and 
Counterinsurgency theories is included. Rekkedal´s previously mentioned Winds of 
Change (2012) includes a description of Swedish military views and preferences in 
general on Irregular Warfare, with notably historical traditions of ranger warfare, as 
well as with the overarching and strong Regular Warfare mind-set and priority.49 
“In general, the current debate on the whole in Sweden regarding military activities 
cannot be said to involve any substantial discussions and thinking concerning Irregular 
Warfare. Some examples of thinking can be found in the Royal Academy of War Science 
Proceedings.50 In addition, the subject has been viewed with more interest in the theses 
                                                 
46 King, The Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces: from the Rhine to Afghanistan (2011), pp. 256, 
274 and 281. 
47 Ibid. p. 149. 
48 Jerker Widén & Jan Ångström, Militärteorins Grunder (Stockholm, Försvarshögskolan, 2005), pp. 
194-208. A revisited version in English is to be published; Contemporary Military Theory – The 
Dynamics of War (Oxon; Routledge, 2015). 
49 Rekkedal et al., Winds of Changes (2012), pp. 402-405; Gustafson; ´A Swedish view on Irregular 
Warfare´. 
50 Michael Gustafson. ´Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency, Modern Irregular Warfare and 
Counterinsurgency, Perspectives on War Studies and Irregular Warfare´, Särtryck ur Kungl 
Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, 5. häftet,  2008, 1. och 2. häftet 2009. 
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written at the Defence College since 2008. Regarding research however, one can notice 
quite a change. Since 2009, several academic approaches (both from individuals and 
orders from the Defence Force) have seen the light; quite contrary when compared to 
the earlier academic interests the years before. Regarding military writings from 
officers, there is rather a limited interest for Irregular Warfare thinking.  
This can be said especially regarding tactics and operational art in Irregular Warfare, 
even if the Multinational Experimentation series, during 2008-09 focused on Irregular 
Warfare. This focusing more on military strategy, or strategy, and less to the core of the 
military profession, tactics and operational art, can be said to have been common in 
Swedish military thinking since the end of the Cold War.”51  
The research efforts in Sweden regarding thinking on Irregular Warfare can currently be 
said to be in progress.52 However, after a short period of interest for Irregular Warfare, 
2008 – 2012, Sweden is again focusing on rebuilding knowledge and skills for Regular 
Warfare. Even recognizing the need for Irregular Warfare knowledge, research interest 
and funds seem more directed at Regular, or Hybrid Warfare challenges. According to 
long-time experienced researchers and teachers at the War Studies Department, the 
interest for the subject of tactics has been low, as for the area of Irregular Warfare 
during the Cold War up to around 2008.53 The tide water of interest for Irregular 
Warfare and tactics for such environments seems to have turned again accompanying 
the withdrawal from Afghanistan, echoing what happened after the Vietnam War.  
Two recent Swedish doctoral theses can however be noticed with connections to the 
context of Irregular Warfare; Marco Nilsson, War and Unreason. Bounded Learning 
Theory and War Duration54 and Kersti Larsdottir, Military Interventions in Internal 
Wars: The Study of Peace or the Study of War55? Nilsson questions offensive-defence 
theorists assuming that war is shorter and more difficult for states to create security 
within. When military technology favours the offensive, attacking is easier than 
defending. Larsdottir's thesis aims to increase the understanding of how to conduct 
successful military interventions in internal wars, such as in Afghanistan, focusing on 
knowledge production from research in different disciplines. Both theses deal with 
strategic and tactical issues. 
                                                 
51 Rekkedal et. al, Winds of Changes (2012), p. 405 (grammar corrections have been made compared to 
the original text). 
52 From around 2009, the Swedish Armed Forces start to request research work on Irregular Warfare from 
the Swedish National Defence College. 
53 Discussions 2013-09-10 with LtCol (Ret) Anders Cedergren, who worked as a teacher and researcher 
in War Studies for several years. Cedergren was also head of the section for ground operations during the 
early 21st century. The opinion is shared by LtCol Ove Pappila, also a long-time researcher and teacher of 
Tactics. Cedergren and Pappila have worked at the Swedish National Defence College for a long time, 
Land Forces Operations section. 
54 Marco Nilson, ´War and Unreason. Bounded Learning Theory and War Duration´, Doctoral Thesis 
from the University of Gothenburg, 2010, http://hdl.handle.net/2077/21522  
55 Kersti Larsdottir, ´Military Interventions in Internal Wars: The Study of Peace or the Study of War?´,  
Doctoral Thesis from the University of Gothenburg, 2011, http://hdl.handle.net/2077/24073 
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An overview of academic writings in general furthermore, shows a marginal interest for 
subjects such as tactics in Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency. The Swedish data 
base “avhandlingar.se” contained 48,877 doctoral theses from Swedish colleges and 
universities 56. Searching for “tactics” resulted in forty-three hits, none however 
concerning ground forces tactics. Regarding “military tactics” there were five hits; none 
however with a similar focus to this work on Land or Ground Forces in Irregular 
Warfare. The combination “War Studies, ground forces tactics” resulted in nil 
references.  
Another Swedish data base; “uppsatser.se” contained 146,168 essays of which 38,256 
were university essays. 57 Searching for “tactics” resulted in 126 hits, but only two 
regarding “military tactics”. Searching for “COIN” resulted in twenty essays in English, 
of which only two related to the military discourse. Sixty-five essays were however 
reported in Swedish where some, mostly written by cadets undergoing basic officer 
training, dealt with problems and challenges in contemporary COIN operations.  
One essay in particular; Robin Sääsk, SNDC, The Effect of Strategic Culture upon 
COIN Writing58 delivers an interesting critical approach regarding the background 
aspects of influential writers on COIN. Another interesting essay focuses on distributed 
operations; Alexander Hecksén, SNDC, Distributed Operations: A capability or a 
method?59  Several other essays have been written by officers undergoing education 
during the last two to three years. Still, such essays often have quite limited influence in 
general; nevertheless, they contribute to the discourse of tactics. In summary, the picture 
of the current interest for research on Irregular Warfare can be seen as, on the one hand, 
matured and more developed compared to the situation at the beginning of the 21st 
century.60 On the other hand, academic and empirical research on tactics still seems 
inadequately developed. Several reasons for this can be discussed, such as a tradition of 
prioritizing Regular Warfare while not being familiar with Counterinsurgency 
operations abroad before the Afghanistan mission. However, traditions in Small Wars 
tactics have existed in Sweden for a long time, despite not having been a subject for 
research efforts other than mainly with a military history focus. Sweden has also had a 
long tradition of technological military development and with that comes a strong 
technological research tradition.  
This overview of the research situation of Irregular Warfare and tactics in such 
environments, points to several areas not yet examined. In particular, this concerns 
tactics regarding standpoints, views and preferences in themselves, in combination with 
similar studies regarding strategy and operational art. Also, the very understanding of 
the meaning of the label Irregular Warfare cannot be said to have reached a stable 
common understanding yet.  
                                                 
56 http://www.avhandlingar.se (2013-04-17).  
57 http://www.essays.se/ (2013-04-24) Swedish university and college essays 
58 http://fhs.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:328574 
59 http://fhs.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:273633 
60 Jan Ångström, Swedish National Defence College, professor of War Studies (Strategy) points at 
expanding empirical possibilities and also, compared to the previous interest era during the Vietnam 
Wars, incomparably more advanced software tools supporting analysis and global sharing possibilities 
promoting higher research quality (discussions at The Swedish National Defence College, 2013-09-02). 
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Returning to Anthony King and his view of an ongoing convergence of knowledge and 
transformation of Armed Forces, not only concerning the three major powers in Europe, 
I argue a need to examine the character of tactical thought, and this from a sociological 
perspective. The transformation of Armed Forces, within Sweden and within Europe as 
a whole, is an ongoing process and different outcomes are possible, obviously also 
depending on tactical culture and thought. Thus the following work aims to contribute 
to the research situation with deeper examination of the character of tactical thought and 
contextual understanding, complementing and possibly questioning King’s work 
claiming knowledge convergence within the European transformation.  
1.5 The problem and research question 
The result from the overview of the research situation supports a claim of needing to 
analyse the character of tactical thought in Irregular Warfare. Another claim is a need to 
analyse interactions between tactical thoughts and strategic preferences. Viewing the 
subject of War Studies as a social science brings forward several questions when a 
paradigm shift occurs, such as the Irregular Warfare phenomenon.  
Due to military traditions, own operational experiences, education and content in officer 
training, views emerge that have certain characteristics regarding what are thought to 
have tactical relevance, and what need to be developed or abolished. The emergence of 
the “Irregular phenomenon” indeed questions how to think of war and warfare at all. It 
soon becomes an ontological and, especially in the education of war and warfare, 
epistemological question. Conceptual, physical and moral factors might possibly be 
thought of and articulated in different ways, if officers have a mere Regular Warfare 
mind-set, compared to officers with experience and education in Irregular Warfare. 
Imagined capabilities and utility in Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency are parts 
of the education of officers, also the development of tactics, operational art, leadership 
and the command & control function; all areas important for adapting to strategy.  
Priorities in turn, have links to what are held as core values and thus what are seen as 
military professional imperatives and what to strive for in leadership profiles, unit 
status, general officer attitudes and soldier or warrior ethos as well. The area of thought 
on Irregular Warfare can thus be examined with a plenitude of possible perspectives. 
The broad span of duties from traditional military combat-associated tasks, also 
including traditional police-related tasks or support to civilian security areas, and even 
non-combat related civil affairs tasks are particularly connected to COIN operations. 
Such a breadth of tasks for the modern officer incurs growth of different solutions and 
different kinds of thinking and challenges. New views of tactical solutions and opinions 
of a suitable mind set for such environments have to be expected.61 A reality that can be 
seen consisting of a new breadth of strategy and tactics which subsequently can be 
approached in several ways; inductive or deductive.. As an exploratory approach is 
argued to be in place, I have chosen an inductive approach, not to let pre-understanding 
take more space than necessary.  
                                                 
61 Moyer, A Question of Command, Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (2009), pp. 259-286. 
describes challenges for contemporary leadership in a leadership survey on 131 U.S. Army and Marine 
Corps veterans (mostly captains to colonels) of Iraq and Afghanistan during 2008. 
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Experiences live or narrated or increased theoretical thinking on a nucleus area in the 
officer profession articulated as standpoints, are argued vital to be included in the study 
of warfare. A sociological view connecting background factors is also argued to be 
important to study; especially as such an approach is uncommon or non-existent. 
Possible relational structures in tactical standpoints as well as in background factors are 
argued to be an interesting multi-disciplinary approach for Military Science and War 
Studies. Instead of choosing an argued interesting area within tactics, I have found it 
more stimulating to examine how it might be possible to articulate the character of 
thought at all, as no such research tradition exists in the Swedish approach to War 
Studies.  
The research question has therefore been worded as; how can contemporary Swedish 
military thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare be characterized using descriptive 
standpoint patterns, mapped in relation to background factors and normative 
standards?  
1.6 The research design 
The research design is built on rather a broad problem setting and research question. In 
focus, there has been an urge to explore characteristics of tactical thought and methods 
for such investigations. An initial literature study, based on textual and context analyses, 
resulted in a theoretical generalization aiming to objectify the context. A survey is used 
to validate the generalization. That result is used further as guidance for the interviews 
with the officers. The data obtained builds the empirical material, subsequently analysed 
in several steps. First; a general view of the preferences of tactics per se and regarding 
tactics in Irregular Warfare, is obtained by a qualitative analysis of open-ended 
questions. The interesting differences in tactical preferences are then analysed using 
Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) in order to present a model of the space of 
statements.  
A collection of background factors is subsequently also analysed with MCA, aiming to 
characterize sociological structures in the space of statements. This result is then 
discussed using the capital and field concepts. Finally, the model of the space of 
standpoints is compared with normative doctrines. The result in total is presented and 
the research question is answered. A discussion and a reflection of the result and the 
work in general end the presentation. The design is outlined in the following figure.  
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Figure 1. The research design. 
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1.7 Demarcations  
Tactics as an area of War Studies is strongly connected to operational art and strategy, 
particularly from the perspective of command levels.62 A connection exists from a 
purely rational and practical sense; one has to have the tools and methods suitable for 
certain tasks so as to fulfil strategic goals at hand. In turn; they need to be organized by 
operational art over the whole operational area.  
However, the study does strictly focus on tactical thought and preference, involving 
operational art and strategy first in the discussion part of the study. The motive for the 
focus on tactics is the limited research in this area. The current view of declining 
knowledge and coherent understanding of tactics in the Swedish Armed Forces 
contributes to making this area particularly interesting to investigate.  
A scientific result of the character of tactical thought is regarded as yet another missing 
dimension, important to include in the more frequent discussions and critiques regarding 
strategy. Operational art is seen as a highly interesting and challenging area in Irregular 
Warfare, different from within a Regular Warfare context, not least for the absence of 
mechanized warfare. Certain aspects of operational art are highlighted in the discussion 
part; nevertheless, such focused research is regarded necessary for dealing with this vast 
area. The focus for investigating tactical thought has been on articulations of tactics 
from land force and amphibious force field unit commanding officers. These officers 
are argued to be the very ones that most profoundly have to understand and deal with 
military theory, parallel with the ability to command units in the most practical way, 
when choosing tactical concepts in different conflict contexts. They are therefore 
viewed as representing the unity of military theory and practice in the military trade 
craft. Command levels below company command are argued to deal less with theory, 
whereas levels above battalion command are argued to deal less with practice, 
according to my experience.  
A demarcation regarding the historical framing has been made with a start from the 
early part of 1800. The motive has been that Clausewitz is commonly understood and 
recognized as an icon of the start of relatively modern thought and philosophy on war 
and warfare. Irregular Warfare, seen as a particular form of warfare to be used in 
combination with one’s own regular troops, or as an Insurgency or Counterinsurgency 
method, can however be argued to have been an extensive area of modern military 
thought and practice already during the 17th and 18th century.63  
                                                 
62 Michael James Brennan and Justine Kelly, Alien – How Operational Art devoured Strategy (Carlisle 
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2009). The authors present a sharp critique on 
how Operational Art, which they argue is wrongly interpolated from military theory, has been developed 
since 1982 diverging and splitting strategy from tactics. 
63 Johan Ewald, Treatise on Partisan Warfare, transl. and annot. Robert Selig and David Curtis Skaggs, 
(Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1991), Introductory Essay, p. 14. In 1692, the French introduced the 
first experiences of light troops drawn from Eastern Europe, p. 12; a first account of this form of modern 
Irregular Warfare tactics is addressed to Antoine de Villes, Memoires sur la Guerre from 1711. 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
20 
 
Military thought in general, containing principles of Irregular Warfare can already be 
found in Sun Tzu’s writings as well.64 Still, Clausewitz is recognized to be the 
commonly most known warfare philosopher and has therefore been chosen for the start 
of the literature investigation.  
1.8 Disposition  
The disposition consists of five main parts. The first chapter describes the point of 
departure where the general background for the study is outlined. Nine sections deal 
with an introduction and the aim of the research, the background to the research focus 
and the assessed research situation. Also included is a discussion of the problem and the 
research question, the research design and demarcations.  
The second chapter presents theoretical perspectives, methodological choices and 
descriptions. The chapter ends with an overview of the empirical material. The 
following third chapter presents the study work introductory part; a literature study. The 
result is described in the form of an empirical generalization of how the phenomenon of 
Irregular Warfare has been understood and described during the 19th and 20th centuries. 
This generalization provides the study with an objectification of the context, which has 
been used in the interviews in order to harmonize the respondents’ focus on what type 
of conflict the questions of tactics are supposed to be a part of.  
The main part of the study is chapter four, answering the research question. Here the 
study of standpoints and background factor structures regarding Battalion and Company 
commanding officers is presented. After an introduction, the results from the data 
collection are presented and analysed qualitatively by Multiple Correspondence 
Analysis (MCA), thereafter to be discussed using capital and field concepts. The result 
is presented as a model of the space of standpoints on tactical thought in Irregular 
Warfare. Thereafter, a descriptive normative analysis is described, referring to 
contemporary COIN doctrines and field manuals. The section ends with the answer to 
the research question.  
The fifth and final chapters present discussions of the validity and reliability of the 
results per se, possible consequences in relation to strategy and operational art such as 
signs of disruptions and challenges, and finally regarding transformation and possible 
knowledge convergence departures. A scientific reflection is outlined regarding field 
potentiality and general reflections of the work as a whole are described. Suggestions 
presented on further research efforts including methodological development for War 
Studies ends this section. The final parts consist of a reflective discussion of the work as 
a whole, followed by the main conclusions; viewing thought on tactics as an obvious 
and not separate part of warfare in general, possibly to be perceived as diverging 
thoughts, fuelling the ongoing military transformation. 
                                                 
64 Sun Tzu, Krigskonsten, 383 maximer om att segra och besegra, translation, Theo Hartman (Stockholm: 
Den Svenska Marknaden i samarbete med Sellin & Blomquist Förlag AB, 1989). 
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2 Theory, methodology and empirical material 
2.1 Introduction to the chapter 
The following chapter discusses theoretical perspectives in general and the inspiration 
of field theory together with capital concept. The methodology choices are presented 
and the main statistical method; the Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) is 
introduced and described. Finally, the empirical material from literature, doctrines and 
interviews is presented. 
2.2 Theoretical perspectives 
Articulations of warfare and tactics belong to experiences, explanations, expectations 
and thoughts, clearly wider than a particular scientific discourse65. Military culture and 
tradition often view tactics as a practice, or even as an art.66 Tactics may be understood 
as ways to solve military problems within a limited part of the operational environment, 
and is one of three parts of the scientific subject of War Studies in Sweden, also 
including military strategy and operational art. The subject is young and under 
development.67 The discussions on what to include and exclude dwell on the 
problematic border between theory and practice; how to prioritize the study of war in 
relation to the practice of warfare. Such a challenge is observed by David Lonsdale, 
citing David Jablonsky; “a true scientific product is not possible from the study of 
strategy”.68 Lonsdale recognized a complex relationship between theory and strategic 
practice.69  
It can be argued that this is equally complex regarding tactics, if the latter is viewed 
beyond mere capability comparisons and action processes. Both parts can be 
approached from a scientific basis and methodology suitable for different research 
questions. Choices do however inflict consequences that can be interpreted differently 
among military and civilian academics. An ongoing debate on the development of 
Swedish War Studies bears clear marks of an intellectual struggle of interests, possibly 
– if not yet applied - to be viewed sociologically. This means that the development of 
theoretical and methodological questions and limitations has many choices. However, 
the fundamental goals are enhanced knowledge and more profound explanation for the 
development of officer training and education. A contribution to new thinking regarding 
theory and methods has therefore been of interest for this study.  
                                                 
65 I use an explanation of the term discourse from Michel Foucault; ”Discourse, the scientific order of 
conversation characterizing the scientific writings, education och exchange of thoughts within a certain 
area of research during a time period”, p. 12. in Michel Foucault, Vansinnets historia under den 
klassiska epoken translation to Swedish by Carl G. Ljungman (Lund: Arkiv förlag, 1983). 
66 Markstridsreglemente, Manöverbataljon (MSR 6) [Field Manual for Ground Forces Manoeuvre 
Battalion, pre-edition] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, förhandsutgåva, 2010), p. 39; definition of tactics. 
67 War Studies as a scientific subject has been under establishment and development since the beginning 
of 2000. The first modern scientific publication on basic military theory was written in 2005 and taken 
into the education of officers; Widén & Ångström, Militärteorins grunder (2005).  
68 David Jordan et al., Understanding Modern Warfare (2008), chapter 1. Strategy, p. 18. 
69 Ibid. p. 20. 
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The research question focuses on human thinking and articulations in order to uncover 
standpoints and structures. In other words, the search for some truth does not involve a 
direct approach i.e. what “are” tactics in Irregular Warfare for Swedish officers? 
Instead, it is the opportunity to generate a model of contemporary thought that is in 
focus. Such an empirical approach is unusual in Swedish War studies, which have a 
tradition closer to textual and contextual analysis of written materials. A tradition, also a 
common basis for strategy studies in general, where the sources according to Beatrice 
Heusser can be divided into historiography, practical instructions such as field manuals 
and analyses of war.70  
Historical influences on contextualization are commonly regarded as important to be 
observed in the analysis of warfare and tactics concerning strategy, not least for an 
understanding of spaces of experiences and horizons of expectations, according to 
Reinhart Kosselleck.71 A tradition of discussing, studying and writing on tactics and 
warfare has strong links to military history traditions in Sweden. The scientific approach 
in War Studies is also often referred to as a social science; with more hermeneutic links 
than merely positivistic bases. A specific challenge lies in the striving for an 
understanding of historical influences parallel with understandings of contemporary 
conflicts, all under the limitations of time available for the researchers to produce 
relevant results, primarily for officer education. In the paradigm shift and 
transformation, as one can argue that the Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency 
rebirth from around 2006 meant, such parallel challenges became obvious as academic, 
military and political interests for developing scientific theories and methods on such 
subjects which had been a “no” question in the western world since the end of the 
Vietnam War. 
I argue that the officer corps and my empirical data providers, can be broadly 
characterized by a mind-set traditionally and militarily/culturally striving for 
measurable control and knowledge of phenomena mostly existing independently of 
human beings, and thus can be seen and related to, at least, as the effects can be noticed. 
In many ways, such a mind-set has been applied to warfare questions and education of 
officers. An endeavour to measure effects outlined by NATO and a Swedish attempt at 
making staff processes as comprehensive as the reality is assumed to be, are examples 
of this.72 A measuring and procedural primacy can be argued to have promoted and 
habituated a mind-set and striving for structuralism with positivistic bases, even for the 
immeasurable.  
                                                 
70 Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy – Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (2010), p. 29. and 32. 
71 Reinhart Koselleck Erfarenhet, tid och historia – Om historiska tiders semantik [Vergagene Zukunft. 
Zur Semantik eschichtlicher Zeiten], translation Joachim Retzlaff, (Uddevalla: Daidalos AB, 2004, 
Frankfurt am Main: Surkamp Verlag, 1979). 
72 For the endeavour at measuring, see NATO Operations Assessment Handbook, Interim Version 1.0, 
2011 and regarding staff work, see NATO, Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations 
Planning Directive: COPD Interim version 1.0, 2010 , and the Swedish interpretation; Svensk COPD 2.0 
(Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2012). 
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Even war and warfare are argued to be possible to be understood by systems thinking.73 
At the same time, confessions on the importance of “understanding”, echo frequently 
and parallel concerns do admit the existence of phenomena that are of non-material 
character and difficult to measure, such as frictions and intuition, particularly frequent 
in combat. Clausewitz’s description of frictions in war is probably the most famous 
theoretical influence concerning this aspect.74 The technological focus that has 
characterized warfare during the 19th and 20th centuries has traits of positivism and 
rationality with strong links to natural science.  
Tactics, as well as military strategy and operational art, are however, also possible to be 
seen as constructions of mental images and explanations for aspects that are immaterial. 
Such images are thereby interpretable to a great extent and can be seen as ways to think 
of truth and reality, and as such, as different forms of constructions. The current 
situation can be described as an emerging acceptance for discussing phenomena such as 
constructions for many officers during education; however, for some officers in the 
Armed Forces it is not a common mind-set. As can be recognised, historical 
descriptions of military subjects clearly matter in general, within the military collective; 
nonetheless, a tradition of positivist thinking exists, as does recognition of the 
problematic immeasurable aspects of warfare.  
Since neither tactics nor Irregular Warfare and strategy can be limited to physical 
phenomena, they can be seen as expressions of phenomena that are difficult to define 
and measure with precision. Thought and articulations can be seen as constructions of 
representations, objects or phenomena that exist and can be identified dialectically 
between people and society. What is then possible to consider, discuss and think is thus 
understood in so-called constructionist terms. Such results however, do not exist in 
splendid isolation; particularly in the military milieu traditions, where experiences are 
held high (at least that is a strong narrative) thus also influencing expectations when 
thinking about tactics. A linkage exists between the milieu, the society, the military 
society and thought on subjects. Through social activities, such as a military background 
in certain units or mission experiences, knowledge about the world, particularly 
regarding the non-material world is constructed, subsequently leading to real 
consequences from effects of these constructions. Thus, certain perspectives or 
representations constitute the world as we know it. Such an approach in general 
corresponds to my own thinking and experiences of certain military phenomena, for 
example war and warfare. For a study on Swedish officers with scarce experiences of 
tactics in reality with battalion size units, the constructionist approach seems suitable to 
apply as a scientific base for the examination of tactical thought.  
                                                 
73As for a presentation of system thinking and system theory, see Harold W. Lawson, A journey through 
the systems landscape (London: College Publications, 2010) and Peter M. Senge, The fifth discipline: the 
art and practice of the learning organization (London: Random House Business, 2006), rev. and updated 
ed. The Swedish approach to system analysis is outlined in Försvarsmakten, Svensk COPD 2.0 (2012). 
The introducer of systems analysis to Strategic Studies was Bernard Broadie, later to call for the 
integration of politics and history into a more suitable scientific approach for Strategic Studies, Jordan et 
al., Modern warfare (2008), pp. 18-19. 
74 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976, David Cambell Publisher Ltd. Everyman’s Library, 1993, originally 
published in German 1832), pp. 138-140; Chapter Frictions in War. 
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Before turning the attention to a discussion on methodological choices, we will discuss 
theoretical approaches connected to the context within which tactical thought is 
assumed to be articulated; the Irregular Warfare environment. The choice of addressing 
the context with the label Irregular Warfare is first to be motivated. Several other 
approaches could have been chosen with labels such as Asymmetric Warfare, Small 
Wars or Counterinsurgency Warfare, just to mention a few others, for contexts short of 
traditional mechanized operations. The main motive has been a view that the term 
Irregular Warfare, by the time of 2010 was not in use in the Swedish Armed Forces as a 
normative defined phenomenon. Neither were labels such as Counterinsurgency or 
Small Wars in use either. However, internationally and in the Anglo-Saxon military 
vocabulary, the label Irregular Warfare had existed for a long time, as an overarching 
umbrella label and was strongly beginning to be in use again. A need was therefore 
argued to exist to be able to develop the understanding of the phenomenon; not with an 
ambition of developing a theory, but rather recognizing the need for an empirical 
generalization as a base for following developments in military theory. It seemed also 
suitable to address the phenomenon as a sort of warfare, not necessarily limited to a 
insurgency or Counterinsurgency scenario.  
The term Irregular Warfare is nowadays common when addressing contemporary 
conflicts and it is closely linked to the war in Afghanistan and earlier operations in Iraq 
since the beginning of this century. The term is however still in general understood to be 
vague and elusive, clearly different compared to the term Regular Warfare.75 
Internationally, a vast production of studies, discussions, literature and military 
doctrines has since 2007 seen the light. Nevertheless, that does not mean that 
knowledge and reflection still have to become standard and engrained in ordinary 
military life. For Sweden it might not be too unfair to say that the term still relies on 
limited spaces of experiences and diffuse horizons of expectations for the whole 
military organisation. There exist however, several clearly experienced units, officers 
and soldiers in different parts of the Armed Forces.  
Until recently, the subject of Irregular Warfare has not been a recognised or prioritized 
part of military theory education or military training in general in the Swedish Armed 
Forces. It was not until 2011 it was articulated, defined and discussed in field manuals 
and doctrines76. This challenges discussions and communication, both from current and 
historical perspectives, regardless of whether the subject is seen as strategy, operations, 
tactics or war-fighting capability production. Historically, one can argue that terms like 
Small Wars, Limited Wars, Insurgency, Revolutionary War, Counterinsurgency, 
Irregular threats and Hybrid threats have been invented, soon to be replaced by other 
terms. Examples of such labels are Four Block Wars, Low Intensity Operations, Hybrid 
War and Compound War, leaving no solid ground for firm and stable explanations as 
opposed to the way we understand and can conceptualize terms such as Regular War 
and Warfare.  
                                                 
75 Jordan et al., Understanding Modern Warfare (2008) p. 229, the author of the chapter Irregular 
Warfare: James D. Kiras discusses argued problems with definitions of Irregular Warfare. 
76 Minor parts in the Reglemente för Markoperationer, (RMO), remiss 3 [Field Manual for Ground 
Forces Operations] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2009), but rather substantial parts in the Swedish 
Military Strategy Doctrine MSD 12 (2012) and in the Army Battalion Field Manual (Manoeuvre 
Battallion 2010) address for the first time aspects of both Irregular Warfare and COIN.  
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Compared to definitions of so-called “Partisan Warfare” during the beginning of the 
Cold War, contemporary conceptualization is more difficult to capture and make 
commonly understandable.77 One reason for the supposed difficulty to explain and 
understand the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare might be the previous limited study 
and education efforts, both in the military and research ranks and also in political 
circles. But there might also be other reasons for the difficulties in thinking of and 
acting on violence not organized as our society traditionally and culturally assumes. The 
regular style of warfare arguably exists in a vast amount of commonly understood 
narrative principles, where violence is contained and regulated in predetermined ways 
having social and cultural acceptance worldwide; army, navy, air force and combat units 
of different types.  
It can be said that for over a hundred years, a common truth existed of what warfare 
means or how it should be understood by people in general. As such, the concept of 
Regular Warfare represents the common perception and doxa of how armed violence is 
interpreted, despite the fact that wars and conflicts in reality commonly have forms of 
Irregular Warfare included.  
By this, it is meant that there are prominently two principles or even paradigms. First; 
the involvement of civilians in the struggles on different level with different types of 
violence. Secondly; the use of indirect approaches avoiding confrontation with any 
military strength. The first and arguably most important of these paradigms implies that 
armed violence, instead of being regularly contained by law and social norms & 
traditions within predefined structures and organizations such as military forces, 
includes the people who are encouraged, threatened or persuaded to take an active part 
in the violence parallel with the armed violence from regular forces. Such a principle is 
by no means new; still, it provides a new context for military units trained according to 
the narrative of Regular Warfare, to engage in. The picture of the horrible, but clearly 
understandable regulated way of warfare, becomes disordered and disintegrates when 
the context includes a civilian dimension.  
Theoretical approaches in writings on Irregular Warfare are several. Historical examples 
are James S. Corum’s strong criticism of major western Counterinsurgency 
approaches78 and James D. Kiras’ historical contextualizing, highlighting the various 
forms which violence can take79. Strategic study approaches can be exemplified by 
Colin S. Gary, with extensive writings on Irregular Warfare, particularly denoting the 
political aspect80 and also by Beatrice Heuser with her inclusive descriptions on 
development of Small Wars.81  
                                                 
77 Eike Middeldorf, Taktik på Östfronten [Taktik im Russlandfeldzug], translation by Sture Palm 
(Stockholm: Studentlitteratur AB, 2002, Nordstedts Akademiska Förlag, 2010, originally published in 
English 1956), chapter 5.Partisan Warfare, pp. 233-243. 
78 James S. Corum, Bad Strategies (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2008). 
79 Jordan et al., Understanding Modern Warfare (2008).), chapter 5, Irregular Warfare, written by James 
D. Kiras, pp. 68-76. 
80 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century, Future Warfare ( London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), p. 
229. 
81 Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy (2010), pp. 387-437. 
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A mixed sociological, strategic and military perspective analysis approach is used by 
Anthony King, suggesting a noticeable transformation process of the armed forces in 
Europe, due to the new kinds of threats that Irregular Warfare scenarios contain.82 Quite 
another and unusual approach, a postmodern perspective, is delivered by Aki Huhtinen 
and Jari Rantapelkonen, suggesting a new theoretical approach to capture the 
information age challenge of understanding emotional aspects, particularly apparent in 
Irregular Warfare.83 A large bulk of the studies and writings has a historical or Strategic 
Study approach.  
Constructionism and sociology in combination do not stand out as common research 
approaches, despite the common understanding that Irregular Warfare, to a large extent, 
concerns contexts where civilians fight amongst the military. As warfare is about 
violence, that aspect is interesting to discuss in Irregular Warfare, regardless of views of 
reality, narratives, symbolic thinking or non-experienced mental constructions. The term 
Irregular Warfare might be seen as an indicator or symbolic language for violence 
within and from the people, opposite to the view of structured, contained and 
controllable violence monopolized within the military paradigm. From a philosophical 
aspect, this hard to define phenomenon, in contrast to the regulated phenomenon, 
creates challenges. 
When trying to define those activities aimed for maximum creativity and imagination, it 
seems easier to define what it is not, than to define what Irregular Warfare is.84 An 
interesting example of a theory discussion with a constructionist approach regarding the 
term “National Interests” by Jutta Weldes, with references to Alexander Wendt, has 
been used to mirror similar thought a step further, concerning the elusive term Irregular 
Warfare .85 The content of Irregular Warfare, it might be argued, is produced in or 
emerges out of a process of representations through which state officials (among others) 
make sense of their international context. The term can be argued to have been 
constructed and created to be a meaningful object, out of more or less shared meanings, 
through which the world, particularly certain conflicts in the international system can be 
understood.86 However, a problem with the concept of Irregular Warfare is that in 
realism terms it might be understood too broadly, too generally or too vaguely, and too 
all-inclusively to explain military/armed actions.  
 
                                                 
82 King, The Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces: from the Rhine to Afghanistan (2011). The 
presentation of the book reads (extract); “Paralleling European football, the military is currently 
undergoing a process of trans nationalisation. Concentrated nodes of military power are emerging at the 
operational and tactical level in each country and are coming into closer transnational relationship with 
each other to fulfil their missions. The project seeks to connect detailed changes at the tactical and 
cultural levels to wider transformations of the military and political institutions in Europe.” 
83 Huhtinen and Rantapelkonen, Messy Wars (2008). 
84 US Department of the Army, Headquarters, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual FM 3-24, Marine Corps 
Warfighting Publications (MCWP) 3-33.5, December 2006 and US Department of the Army, 
Headquarters, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-24.2 (FM 90-9, FM 7-98), 
March 2009. 
85 Jutta Weldes, ´Constructing National Interests´, European Journal of International Relations, SAGE 
Publications, Vol. 2(3), 1996, pp. 275-318.  
86 Ibid. p. 277. 
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Also, if the term is differently understood as sometimes only as an aggressor activity, 
and sometimes as what happens for both the attacker and the defender, different 
concepts come to mind. Weldes refers to Alexander Wendt´s constructivist view which 
suggests a way to overcome realist limitations on conceptualization. His argument, here 
applied to the term Irregular Warfare, is that self-interested, security-oriented 
conceptions of state/military interest are not produced by or deducible from the systemic 
conditions of Irregular Warfare; instead “Irregular Warfare is what the states make of 
it”. What is argued to be needed to explain Irregular Warfare and thus state actions and 
military tactics, referring to Wendt’s reasoning, is a theory that accounts for “the 
intersubjective constructed structure of identities” of states87, here outlined as “the 
intersubjective constructed structure of the term Irregular Warfare”.  
With this view of such a theory, or more modestly, an empirical generalization, the aim 
for an objectification of the term Irregular Warfare has been chosen and approached for 
an initial literature study. The result has been used to guide the data collection, 
regarding standpoints of tactical issues and the goal has been to provide “an 
intersubjective constructed structure of the space of statements of thought on tactics in 
Irregular Warfare”. This view of articulating the principal perspective for the study is 
used for describing the character of results in the later presented answer to the research 
question. The theoretical and methodological choices for such an operation will be 
presented further on. Before that, connecting to the previous views of the importance of 
history and experiences, a historical theoretical perspective will be discussed; with a 
constructionist approach in general to the research; the results do not exist in a vacuum. 
Historical influences have always played a particular role in military thinking with a 
clear aim of transforming experiences into guiding principles for the future. Concepts of 
history, experiences and expectations seem therefore suitable as aspects for discussing 
and framing results regarding written and orally stated articulations of Irregular Warfare 
and tactics.  
The German historian and professor of historical theory, Reinhart Koselleck’s work on 
the semantics of historical times has been chosen for a theoretical view.88 The historical 
changing ways of experiencing and representing time are argued to be decisive together 
with the relations between the concepts of experiences and expectations. A summary of 
Koselleck’s views relate an asymmetry between the concepts of “space of experiences” 
and “horizon of expectations”. They are argued to be what characterize the “modern 
time”, where the latter, unlike in pre-modern societies, no longer is fixed and shaped 
strictly by the former. Such a view, with an accelerating “now”, is argued to have been 
developed during 1750-1850; a time span corresponding to the era when the modern 
view of war and warfare developed; today commonly associated with Clausewitz´s 
military philosophical and theoretical landmark.  
 
                                                 
87 Weldes, ´Constructing National Interests´, European Journal of International Relations, SAGE 
Publications, Vol. 2(3), 1996,  p. 279. referring to Alexander Wendt; 1992:401. 
88 Koselleck, Erfarenhet, tid och historia – Om historiska tiders semantik (2004). A summary of 
Koselleck´s views and arguments is presented on the back of the paperback edition. 
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A new and different view of “history” as a phenomenon developed, according to 
Koselleck, and the old view of history as a collection of examples that could be learnt 
from for the current situations was replaced by a view of history as a process, a 
movement, even accelerating, where experiences quickly lose their relevance. 
Arguments such as; ”each generation has to look up on and once again explain the 
history”89 forms a foundation, according to Koselleck, where a critical analysis of the 
past is based on the same views that open the future for progress.  
An anthropological asymmetry is argued to exist between the space of experiences and 
the horizons of expectations, expressed by the invention of the concept of “progress”. 
Progress is exemplified by all events springing from the French revolution90; a 
description used to frame the era during the “new time” exploding in the French 
revolution. Koselleck argues that the political-social world of expectations, previously 
always tied to the results of generations, thus was torn apart. Eruptions in a non-
continuous sequence of happenings and actions, also driven by different aspects 
combined with technological development, are argued to have set a scene where the 
difference between the experiences and expectations grows during the “new time”. The 
concept of acceleration, as a historical knowledge category, is argued to replace the 
concept of progress. The situation and challenges of today for officers belonging to the 
Regular Warfare ontology can be described as being able to handle experiences not 
possible to have been drawn from the hitherto existing experiences, and to be able to 
formulate expectations not yet expected.  
Since the beginning of the 21st century, confrontations with Irregular Warfare, in theory 
and in practice, beyond the horizon of expectations have suddenly become an important 
space of experiences, or a way of gaining them. My experiences from Armed Forces’ 
work, both in field unit tactics and Headquarters’ long-term strategic planning 
processes, include continuous discussions of the importance of experiences and also a 
common view of the difficulties to predict future events.  
One can describe a common view of the requirement for a deep and broad space of 
experience making a wide horizon of expectations possible; contrary to limited practical 
combat and field unit experiences (beyond company level), financial restrictions and 
general priorities. A narrow and shallow space of tactical experience might however, 
result in narrow horizons of expectations. I find this historical theoretical approach with 
the experience and expectation concept suitable for a discussion of the investigation in 
the first part, the literature study, and for the discussion of the answer to the research 
question. The scientific perspective in general can thus be summarized as 
constructionist with a historical theoretical perspective for framing the context 
objectification and the answer to the research question.  
                                                 
89 Koselleck, Erfarenhet, tid och historia – Om historiska tiders semantik (2004), pp. 184-85; referring to 
George Friedrich Creutzer, Die historiche Kunst der Greichen in ihren Ensttehung und Fortbildung 
(Leipzig, 1803). 
90 Ibid. p. 184. referring to Karl Ludwig Woltman, Geshichte und Politik, Eine Zeitschrift (Berlin 1806), 
p. 3; “For the world,  the French revolution was a phenomenon that seemed to scoff/deride all historical 
wisdom, and through it developed daily phenomena that were more and more problematic to ask the 
history of advice on”. 
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The next decision concerns theoretical and methodological approaches for the key 
investigation, the analysis of standpoints of tactics. The aim of presenting an 
intersubjective structure of a space of statements and a standpoint analysis in relation to 
the background factor influences became an interesting approach for me. The 
combination of the hitherto limited sociological approaches in Swedish War Studies and 
an interest for Pierre Bourdieu, led to the field theory with field and capital concepts and 
their possibilities. These concepts and tools for sociological examinations of standpoints 
and background factor structures deserve a presentation, as they are not yet common in 
War Studies. 
2.3 Standpoints and background factors viewed with an approach 
to field and capital concepts 
Starting with the term “field”, somewhat different explanations exist, even if the overall 
meaning is commonly agreed on. Donald Broady writes; “a field is a system of relations 
between positions occupied by persons and institutions in a struggle for something with 
a common interest”.91 An example of a definition of a particular field, the field of 
power, is given by Hjellbrekke et al.; “a field of power is defined whenever agents 
located in dominant positions in several fields are engaged in struggles that effect 
power relations within and between different fields”.92 By field is thus meant, and here 
speaking of a social field, something that exists when certain groups of people and 
institutions are in interest conflicts over something in common.93 However, every social 
interest or value sharing does not define a field. It requires investments such as 
standpoints on important questions at stake and specific properties such as e.g. 
recognitions, rank and command roles.94  
As was presented earlier, the context of Irregular Warfare can be understood and 
thought of, as for tactics in many ways. A currently narrowing space of experiences in 
tactics in the Swedish Land Forces might contain and develop different ways of 
thinking and valuing tactics. Differences and relations are thus argued important aspects 
to analyse. If however, particular struggles on the subject of tactics in fact exists or not, 
is not the question here; rather, if indications of potentialities for struggles of interest are 
characteristic of thought and preferences. In the case of standpoints on tactics, one 
might be strongly affected by the military social and cultural milieu and values, and that 
is where background factors might come in play.  
                                                 
91 Donald Broady, Kulturens fält, (ed), (Göteborg: Diadalos, 1998), pp. 11-26; Inledning: en verktygslåda 
för studier av fält, p-98-kulturens-falt-inledn-o-frontmatter.pdf, p. 1. 
92 Johs. Hjellbrekke, Brigitte Le Roux, Olav Korsnes, Frédric Lebaron, Lennart Rosenlund & Henry 
Rouanet, ´The Norwegian Field of Power, Anno 2007´, European Societies, 9:2, 2007, pp. 245-273. 
93 Donald Broady, Sociology and Epistemology, Om Pierre Bourdieus författarskap och den historiska 
epistemologin (Stockholm: HLS Förlag, 1991), p. 26. a mini-definition of the term field is outlined as;  “a 
system of relations between positions possessed by specialized agents and institutions in the struggle for 
something in common” (author’s translation from Swedish).  For an overview and explanation of field 
theory; see also Pierre Bourdieu, Praktiskt förnuft [Raisons practiques. Sur la théori de l´action], 
translated by Gustaf Gimdal and Stefan Jordebradt (Uddevalla: Daidalos, 1995, Editiones du Seuil, 1994), 
pp. 11-24.  
94 Ibid. p. 266. 
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Being an officer, my own experience is that one is affected both by experiences, 
exercises, and expectations from influential and charismatic colleagues and senior 
officers as well. Bourdieu´s field theory, an empirically oriented, and social-culturally 
structured analytical approach, delivers a tool box for these kinds of investigations. The 
term field should be seen as a tool given meaning by its use in examinations and 
research work. An examination of a field, or merely a social space, initially means to 
construct the system of relations that connect positions.95 That is the key approach in 
this study, using standpoints and background factors.  
Of particular interest is to bring focus on characteristics and possible consequences of 
relations between different groups of standpoints attributed with the agent’s background 
factors96. The approach focuses on outlining a certain structured space of statements, on 
identification of positions and distribution of properties in the space. After this first 
phase which leads to a construction of a space of statements with possible structures of 
background factors, a multitude of further analyses is possible, if proper data is at hand. 
Some examples are; types of investment demands by the agents, in order to be 
recognized and operated in the space, possible strategies, systems of dispositions of the 
agents and possible connections of the space or actual field to other fields.97  
Field theory can be described as a “model of an approach in Sociology”.98 It is 
however, about epistemology, not a social theory, which focuses on practical reasoning 
and a methodological toolkit based on empirical data collection of different human 
categories. The model was developed by Bourdieu and his associates in the late 1950s 
through the 60s to 80s. Striving to renew the philosophy and to develop sociology was a 
fundamental driver of Bourdieu. Results came under attack in established circles and 
were interpreted differently in different countries. A challenge for the field theory have 
however been to consistently make it understandable and transparent relative to 
prevailing philosophical traditions and everyday logical thinking. Moreover, sharp 
criticism was directed by Bourdieu to that part of the academic community who were 
not, according to him, overwhelmingly interested in self-criticism and reflection. Terms 
such as applied rationalism, pragmatic relativism, and constructionism, have appeared 
as descriptions of Bourdieu’s scientific perspective, although he himself was strongly 
opposed to being recognized as a social constructionist.99 The term post structuralism 
has also been used, and more commonly than the term social constructionist.100 Field 
theory can be characterized as theory building in sociology, a form of knowledge 
building enterprise, where the relationship between the researcher and the research 
object (e.g. in the form of concepts, obstacles and challenges) are put in the centre. The 
purpose is to illustrate graphs in the form of so-called field diagrams within a space of 
standpoints on certain issues.  
                                                 
95 Broady, Sociology and Epistemology, (1991), p. 267. 
96 Bourdieu, Praktiskt förnuft, bidrag till en handlingsteori (2004), p. 8. 
97 Broady, Sociology and Epistemology (1991), p. 267. 
98 Ibid. pp. 575-582. 
99 Donald Broady, discussions at Uppsala University, the course “Capital and Field”, spring 2011. 
100 Discussions on Bourdieu with Håkan Gunneriusson (PhD), Swedish National Defence College, 
SNDC, War Studies Department, Section for Land Forces Operations, spring 2010. Gunneriusson is the 
leading Bourdieu expert at the SNDC. 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
31 
 
An image is provided, which describes how the space is structured in at least two 
dimensions, and where different standpoint clusters might be positioned. A landscape of 
standpoints is unveiled, where the difference between standpoints is what is sought. 
Subsequently, the focus is directed to analysis of how background factors might be 
distributed or structured in the space. This is where the sociology is brought in. A 
particular standpoint with the theories of Bourdieu is an effort for a relational view, 
putting relations before the individual or constructional focus, each on their own 
merits.101 Objective relations cannot be seen, but have to be conquered and validated by 
research work. This philosophy departs from the possibilities given by the agents as a 
group and the structure of the situations in which the agents act according to the 
relations between them.  
Bourdieu argued that people are born in and characterized by different discourses, and 
therefore positions in spaces of statements according to social and cultural backgrounds. 
I do not fully agree with this part when it comes to officer standpoints on their 
tradecraft, unless they come from families with very strong officer or soldier traditions. 
For the current sample however, such heritage has been very unusual. Nevertheless, 
when considering the impact of military backgrounds, I do agree on impact having 
habituating effects. The use of field theory with unique research adaption was clearly 
encouraged by Bourdieu. Such an approach demands creative construction work 
adapted to the unique investigation, seemingly appropriate to a research area such as 
thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare. 
The population chosen for the investigation might however be viewed rather 
sociologically uniform, regarding social heritage and military rank levels. This could 
lead to limited expectations for findings of social background factor differences 
connected to tactical thinking. On the other hand, differences might very well be 
influenced by different practical experiences, such as international missions and combat. 
The task for this chosen theoretical approach can be outlined as providing a foundation 
for an understandable and intersubjective constructed structure or model. Such a model 
aims to disclose categorized groupings, possible to further analyse for internal and 
external comparisons and hypothesis generation, particularly regarding what practical 
consequences might be expected.  
Can some consequences for practice, education and training tactics in Irregular Warfare 
be argued to be observable in relation to social structures that can be linked to different 
value identifications? There are however challenges when adopting a field theory and 
method approach. Can an area such as tactical thought in Irregular Warfare be viewed 
as a field at all, or at least belong to a possible existing field, or one under development? 
The examination actually only addresses a part of tactics: tactics in Irregular Warfare, 
with obvious and intermingled links to strategy and operational art. Several more actors 
exist with opinions on tactics, others than battalion and company commanders. 
Obviously, officers at the Headquarters, military schools and in other units have to be 
included, even personnel at the Ministry of Defence. Moreover, several principal 
requirements exist for a space, in order to be recognised as autonomous.  
                                                 
101 Bourdieu, Praktiskt förnuft, bidrag till en handlingsteori (2004), pp. 7-9. 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
32 
 
Such are exemplified by Donald Broady´s nine thumb rules for accessing a degree of 
autonomy; a specific art of capital, a certain structure of polarities, a certain space of 
possibilities, certain recognitions and value systems, certain beliefs (called doxa by 
Bourdieu), certain drivers (“illusio” according to Bourdieu), certain instances which 
produce and manifest the doxa (“consecration instances” according to Bourdieu) and 
mechanisms for transforming imported themes and discussions to their own logic.102 
From these principles it is possible to define a theoretical field of military thought, 
containing tactics as well as strategy co-existing and mutually affecting each other. As 
previously described, traditions of warfare principles (as doxas) exist and can be 
consecrated in military education and doctrines. Relational structures exist, for example, 
regarding how to actually solve the military problem of different conceptual solutions.  
Obvious examples are the different structures, traditions and cultures within the army, 
air force and naval forces, as well as within the different services of the army. A further 
look at the field theory informs us that three dimensions or aspects are said to affect a 
field's present character, its structure, agents' choices, the existing opportunities. 
Bourdieu’s view of the future of a field is interesting; “a field's future is at every 
moment inscribed in its structure, agent’s ability to realize the objective potentials as 
determined by the relationship between agents' abilities and the opportunities that are 
objectively inscribed in the field.”103 Such a discussion is interesting for the final result 
of the space of thought structure.  
A possible field-like space must be seen in light of the military and strategic culture and 
the production within a larger field in its entirety, such as defence politics. The agents' 
positions and relationships to a field of military thought, could thus be seen as 
belonging to a possible subset in the total area of preferences that incorporate aspects of 
both Regular, Irregular, and Hybrid Warfare, or in short; warfare. The main interest for 
this examination is thus to be able to argue for how the thought of a certain category of 
officers can be described; homogenous or heterogeneous, and in such a case, in what 
areas or aspects certain relations can be identified. Bourdieu´s Les regles de l’art (1992) 
is a comprehensive presentation that can be viewed as a research programme and as a 
method book with extensive descriptions regarding field theory.104 Descriptions cover, 
for example, social struggles, epistemology and criticism of other scientific traditions 
such as Gadamer’s Hermeneutics105. Bourdieu embraces the logic; "To understand the 
logic of this social universe",106 “and the sense, however subordinate to mind; to allow 
for amor intellectualis rei”; meaning is based “on the understanding love of the 
thing”107. Such a mind-set, combining and integrating logic and emotions seems to me 
relevant and interesting when investigating officers’ preferences of tactics.  
                                                 
102 Broady, Kulturens fält (1998), p. 6. 
103 Bourdieu, Praktiskt förnuft, bidrag till en handlingsteori, (2004), p. 13. 
104 Bourdieu, Konstens Regler – Det litterära fältets uppkomst och struktur [Les règles de l’art] 
translation to Swedish by Johan Stierna (Stockholm: Stenhag, Brutus Östlings Bokförlag Symposium, 
2000, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1992, 1998), p. 18.  
105 Ibid. p. 30. 
106 Ibid. p. 35. 
107 Ibid. p. 34. 
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In military culture, status and preferences for certain units and tactics, according to my 
own experience, it is not always easy to separate logic from emotions. In summary, a 
field theory approach has been chosen for the investigation. However, the question of a 
military field or part of such a possible field will be discussed, as to the possible effects 
it might have as a result of this examination. It is the theory of relational structures, 
possibly conflicting with values and interests that is argued to be of importance and a 
new approach. Field theory is thus applied in order to indicate field-like or at least 
relational structures. A field per se is therefore not considered to be analysed in this 
study. Connected to the area of values and interests which might be found opposing 
different grouping of standpoints, the concept of capital has its place.  
Capital is defined as symbolic and tangible assets in general. Capital is a tool that allows 
very different phenomena to be kept together, otherwise often separated in social 
sciences or humanities.108 Symbols, material and informational resources are examples 
of capital. As a label of a certain kind of value that is recognised, the term Symbolic 
Capital is used.109 Viewing the military community as a social group, several areas exist 
that are regarded as particularly valuable, requiring funds and recognition The 
hierarchical structure of the officer corps, with particular education and knowledge, 
ranks, insignias and expected skills and performances, can be said to exemplify a social 
group with a special and unique assignment. A common interest is established in the 
area of military skills, however, concepts for producing the required skills and views of 
how to implement them, through tactics, vary.  
However, Bourdieu uses different forms of capital. The so-called Cultural Capital can 
generally be seen as a subset of the more general concept of Symbolic Capital.110 One 
adapted example is the traditional preference in the armed forces for mechanized 
warfare and a manoeuvre culture, leading to a culturally lower status of other units in 
general. Combat experience, such as international experience, is another example of a 
culturally highly recognized property in the Cultural Capital class.111 A third form is 
Social Capital, which can be seen as aspects that involve both assets; affiliation to 
different social networks in reality and perceptions of these compared to other assets, 
which is a relational activity.112 Rank is an obvious example. We find however, a 
division hard to follow when certain properties, for example, affiliation to units, 
international missions, and combat experiences, generate values that might be argued to 
belong to both the cultural capital and social capital classes. The term Symbolic Capital 
is therefore used for discussions of social structures in the space of standpoints. This 
combined approach of standpoints and background factor structures and value relation 
analysis caught my interest for several reasons.  
 
                                                 
108 Donald Broady ´Kapitalbegreppet som utbildningssociologiskt verktyg´, Skeptron Occasional Papers, 
No 15, Uppsala Universitet, Uppsala, 1998, p.15. 
109 Broady, Socilogi och Epistemologi (1991), p. 169. 
110 Ibid. p. 169. 
111 Ibid. p. 174. The examples are adapted as Bourdieu referred more to educational values, ”high culture” 
and ”noble/aristocratic”; aspects of more limited use for the study of contemporary officers in Sweden.  
112 Ibid. p. 15. 
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First, my experience is that a single officer can have a strong impact on the military 
system as a whole. Secondly, my interest in Bourdieu can be traced to his background in 
Algeria during the insurgency in the 50s; his critics in the academia were mostly 
uninterested in deeper self-reflection and criticised his endeavours in the practical use of 
academic research. My experience of a limited interest in military sociology in Swedish 
officer education and my interest in methodological development for War Studies can 
also be traced to the encounter with Bourdieu. I believe that it is important to analyse 
relations between the standpoints and background factors, for example, officers' roles, 
rank, unit affiliation and education. I believe that such an approach is important to be 
incorporated in the thinking for research development of War Studies research.  
In summary, the above reasons and motives applied to my thinking in general, and I 
decided to proceed with an adaption of the Bourdieu approach of field theory. To 
summarize the theoretical basis; I have a constructionist approach with my ontological 
perspective. Regarding the literature study; a Begriefsgesichte approach is discussed 
with Koselleck’s experience and expectation concept. Finally, the empirical analysis of 
standpoints and background factors are discussed with a field theory approach. With 
these theoretical notions, we now turn to the methodology descriptions. 
2.4 Methodology  
The study uses three methodological approaches. First; a qualitative textual and content 
analysis of a conceptual history approach for the literature study. Secondly; interviews 
with open-ended questions and multi-choice answers for data collection from the 
officers.113 Finally, the main method for the investigation is a so-called sociological 
prosopography, meaning, collecting and analysing data concerning the structured 
pattern of officers’ standpoints and background factors.114 Concepts, such as capital and 
field developed by Bourdieu and his collaborators and followers, are used as tools in the 
work. 
The textual analysis is described in the appendixes presenting the literature study and 
the normative doctrine analysis.115 The sociological prosopography analysis of 
standpoints, background factor positions and relational structure has been done using 
Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). MCA is a method particularly suitable for 
analysis, combining different kinds of aspects as they do here, i.e. relational structures 
of standpoints and background factors.  
 
 
                                                 
113 Appendix 2. The Interview Guide. 
114 Donald Broady, ´French prosopography. Definition and suggested readings´, Poetics Volume 30, 
Issues 5-6, October-December 2002, pp. 381-385, digital version at 
http://www.skeptron.uu.se/broady/sec/p-broady-0605-frenchprosop.htm 
115 Appendix1. The Literature Study and Appendix 8. Results from a Doctrine study on tactics in COIN. 
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MCA is a method of analysis that belongs to a family of methods for data analysis. 116 
Originating in the French mathematician Jean-Paul Benzécris’ mathematical methods, 
data-sets are represented as clouds of points with geometrical relational calculations of 
every data. Other names are French Data Analysis and Geometric Data Analysis 
(GDA). Various other associated paradigms exist according to Le Roux and Rouanet.117 
In short, MCA according to Henke Roose at al. can be said to be a modelling technique, 
which discloses underlying structures in categorized data. This is done by representing 
both modalities (answer alternatives) of questions as well as individuals in a 
multidimensional Euclidian space, similar to Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for 
nominal data.118MCA has a relational approach, which I believe suits an area such as 
tactical thought and preferences contextually expanded by the introduction of Irregular 
Warfare as a new area for the Swedish Armed Forces. MCA focuses on tables of 
individuals and categorized variables.119 As in Principal Component Analysis (PCA), 
the individuals possess the information. The overarching principle is inductive, outlined 
as “letting the data speak”.120  
MCA seeks to array a range of variables (modalities) in a geometric space and the focus 
is on the most important properties, where the distribution of the data clouds is adjusted 
to axes in a diagram in order to be easier to interpret. The essence of MCA lies, 
according to Francois Denord et al., in the definition of the distance between individuals 
created by the variables for which their responses are different.121The goal and a major 
feature of this method is the visualizing of data, making interpretations easier compared 
to rows of numbers, common in traditional statistics. In order to visualize the data, it is 
common to use the two or three combinations of properties (axes) that explain most of 
the distribution of data. One has to bear in mind that this will only be a generalized two 
dimensional picture and not the complete multidimensional result. The visualization of 
results, used for exploratory work during the research, as well as for presentations of the 
results, permits that a variety of factors simultaneously can be illustrated and discussed.  
 
                                                 
116 For an extensive presentation and guide of MCA, se Brigitte Le Roux  and Henry Rouanet, Geometric 
Data Analysis (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 2004), preface; pp. ix-x and pp. 1-20 and 
particular sections for specific areas when assuming MCA work. A shorter description can be found in 
Brigitte Le Roux’s and Henry Rouanet’s, Multiple Correspondence Analysis (London: SAGE 
publications, 2010), chapter 3 The Method of Multiple Correspondence Analysis, pp. 34-67. Another 
summary is found in Hjellbrekke et al. ´The Norwegian Power Field`Anno 2007, pp. 269-272. For a 
shorter and general introduction and description of MCA in Swedish, see Sverker Lundin, 
Korrespondansanalys – rapport från en kurs, med förord av Anna-Karin Petersen, Rapport nr. 4, ESEP: 
Ethos in Society, Education and Practices (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 2005), pp. 7-10. 
117 Le Roux & Rouanet, Geometric Data Analysis (2004), p. 11. 
118 Henk Roose, Koen van Eijk Koen and John Lievens, ´Culture of distinction or culture of openness? 
Using a social space approach to analyse the social structuring of lifestyles´, Poetics 40, August, 2012, 
pp. 491-513.  
 (SciVerse Science Direct), p. 498. 
119 Le Roux & Rouanet, Geometric Data Analysis (2004), p. 11. 
120 Ibid. p. 10. 
121 Francis Denord, Johs. Hjellbrekke, Johs., Olav Korsnes, Fréderic Lebraon and Brigitte Le Roux, 
´Social capital in the field of power: the case of Norway´, The Sociological Review, 59:1, 2011, p. 92. 
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Of particular interest are different positions of standpoints giving relational 
characteristics, for example, conceivable frictions and struggles or development 
potentiality of something, or conversely, the lack of incentives for potential struggles or 
creative development.  
This type of result can be used to present and analyse connections of standpoints and 
different properties. An orthogonal transformation (without correlation) of the data is 
used. The method allows constructing a social space.122 The more the individuals differ 
on a number of questions and on modalities, the more they become distant from each 
other in the resulting multi-dimensional clouds. This cloud, the central object in GDA, 
is projected on the orthogonal axis according to the criteria of maximizing variance 
along the axis. The related clouds are then studied using relative contributions of 
questions and modalities to the axes. Both clouds of individuals and clouds of 
modalities can be studied. Finally, supplementary elements, such as further questions, 
can be projected onto the space.  
This process makes it possible to interpret the axes depending on what kind of 
additional factors appear to be related with the space. It allows assessment on how 
similar or different the standpoint answer categories are, in terms of a range of relevant 
attributes, such as background factors. The possibility to also see clusters of very 
different aspects provides an opportunity to build understanding and knowledge of 
previously unknown or at least not verified patterns. This means that I have been 
searching for clusters that can be interpreted in tactical terms, giving military logic and 
possibly linking to military paradigms. For example, it is usually militarily logical to 
have tactical thought which connects small units’ actions with intelligence gathering, 
versus thought that connects larger units with combat tasks or operations. 
 It is also logical to think of tactics and non-kinetic effects, if one focuses on civilian 
tasks, which is important in Counterinsurgency operations. MCA can be seen as a way 
to combine qualitative data, transformed to quantitative elements for presentation, 
finally used for qualitative sociological analysis. The interpretations used here depend 
on the first encoding, thus avoiding violation of the original data and risk of over-
generalizations or biases from the researcher. This level of interpretation, possible to be 
criticized not going further with deeper analysis, is common in how MCA works. 
However, the aim of the analysis is an initial view of clustering trends and patterns, in 
order to construct a social space of tactical thought. The MCA is used as a tool to make 
patterns emerge from data, a geometric model that provides a frame for descriptive 
analysis.123  
                                                 
122 Le Roux & Rouanet, Geometric Data Analysis (2004), p. 14. This principle is argued to be a statistical 
practice in sharp contrast to the conventional in social science; numerical indicators producing a 
sociology of variables. The GDA principle allows and aims for a construction of a social space, which is 
the purpose of the analysis for this study. 
123 Le Roux & Rouanet, Geometric Data Analysis (2004). p. 10. 
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MCA is based on an iteration of coding, recoding and new interpretations, not distant to 
the principles of hermeneutical analysis, here, with results in a graph and visual 
patterns. I consider such graphs to suitably provide a new pedagogical way of viewing 
and thinking of data results, compared to what usually is at work in War Studies, in the 
form of traditional statistical diagrams and textual descriptions. The MCA work has 
been performed with the French data programme Coheris SPAD; Data Mining and 
Predictive Analytic Software.124  
The MCA, which has been a main method of Bourdieu and his followers' work125, has 
however its application primarily on large samples. Still, I argue that the present volume 
of informants, character of questions and numbers of answer categories, provide a 
suitable base for MCA.126 Usefulness, also on small samples, is therefore suggested, 
when the aim is to identify clusters of standpoints in relation to certain background 
factors. With this presentation of the MCA as the key analytical method for the study, 
the other methods can be summarized as; textual and contextual analyses of conceptual 
historical approaches of written sources, and finally, interviews organized with open-
ended and closed questions.127  
The capital and field concepts are applied to a standpoint analysis with MCA 
techniques128. The result is interpreted as a model of the space of standpoints. 
Background factors are analysed for structural indications, followed by a capital 
discussion, also in relation to a larger field of military thought. The descriptive result; 
the model of the space of statements is then compared with normative texts on tactics in 
Counterinsurgency operations129. The results from these analyses form the bases for the 
answer to the research question. The next section presents an overview of the empirical 
material. 
2.5 Empirical material and sources; an overview 
This section broadly describes the empirical material. More detailed descriptions are 
presented in the respective sections and appendixes. The main body of empirical 
material consists of two major parts; the first part is a collection of literature on the 
subject of Irregular Warfare. The second part consists of data from the interview study 
of Swedish army and amphibious officers. The literature on western thinking and 
thought on military issues relating to Irregular Warfare has been sought among two 
main categories.  
                                                 
124 Information on the SPAD software can be found at; 
http://www.coheris.fr/uploads/filemngr/anglais/brochures-produits/Coheris-SPAD_EN.pdf 
125 Le Roux & Rouanet, Geometric Data Analysis (2004), p. 15. 
126 The question of usefulness of MCA for this study with more limited empirical material has been 
discussed, with positive results, with Mrs. Brigitte Le Roux, one of the current leading representatives and 
developers of GDA, during the MCA course at Rosersberg Castle autumn 2012, and in more detail during 
a seminar at the Swedish National Defence College in January 2013. Mrs Le Roux argued that the main 
point at issue was the character of the questions, not the volume of informants. 
127 For methodology in the literature study; see Appendix 1, pp. 5-7 (78). 
128 For an example of the work at an earlier stage not yet applying MCA, see The Baltic Defence and 
Security Review, vol 14, issue 1, 2012, pp. 152-180. 
https://www.bdcol.ee/files/files/BSRD%20VOL14(1)%20(2)%20(1).pdf 
129 Appendix 8. Results from a tactical COIN doctrine study, pp. 1-16 (16). 
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Primarily; military doctrines such as NATO130, American131 and British132 doctrines 
have been chosen, supposedly the most influential military normative writings of the 
western world. For comparative examples of earlier military definitions, two American 
sources have been used; the US Army FM 31-15 Operations against Irregular 
Forces133 and Small Wars Manual, US Marine Corps.134 For a compilation with a 
contemporary Swedish governmental view, the source Försvar i användning 135 has 
been used.  
Secondly, selected literature has been included, such as classic military thought and 
practice on the subject, influential writings from the post Second World War period, 
primarily between 1950 and 1970; finally, writings from the beginning of 2000 to 2010. 
Literature has been studied from three time periods; period one; “From Clausewitz to 
the Second World War”, containing writings from Carl von Clausewitz, Charles 
Callwell and Thomas Edward Lawrence, period two; “Second World War to the 70s” 
with descriptions on Irregular Warfare by David Galula, Werner Halhweg, Frank 
Kitson, John J. McCuen, Robert Thompson and Roger Trinquir, and the third period, 
labelled; “From 9/11 to 2010”, comprising selected books written by James Corum, 
Colin S. Gray, Thomas X. Hammes, David KilCullen, James D. Kiras, John Mackinlay 
and Gil Merom. 
The empirical material from the interviews consists of data collected from 43 officers in 
the Swedish Armed Forces Army and Amphibious Forces, assigned during 2011 as 
battalion or company commanding officers. The units they were commanding 
comprised so-called manoeuvre battalions, containing various numbers and types of 
mechanized/armoured vehicles, two intelligence/security battalions, one ranger battalion 
and one amphibious battalion.  
                                                 
130 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, Allied Joint Publications 
(AJP) -3.4 (A), second study draft 2008, NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency Operations, 
Allied Joint Publications (AJP) – 3.4.4, study draft 2008. 
131 U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual FM 3-24, Marine 
Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP) 3-33.5, December 2006, US Department of the Army, 
Headquarters, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-24.2 (FM 90-9, FM 7-98), 
March 2009, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgency Operations, Joint Publication 
JP 3-24, 05 October 2009,  
U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, Joint Publications JP 1-02, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 17 October 2008), US 
Department of the Army, Headquarters, Army Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations, Field 
Manual No. 3-05.130, September 2008. 
132 UK Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, Volume 10, Part 10, Combined Arms 
Operations, Countering Insurgency, Draft, 2009, UK Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and 
Doctrine Centre, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, 
November 2009. 
UK Ministry of Defence, British Defence Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, third edition, August 
2008. 
133 U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Army Operations against Irregular Forces, Field Manual 
No. 31-15, May 1961. 
134 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington D.C.: US Governmental printing Office, 1940; a 
new printing of the original US Marine Corps manual by Sunflower University Press, 1996 pavilion 
Press, 2004 and Cosimo Reports, 2010) also http:/www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/swm/index.htm. 
135 Försvar i användning, Ds 2008:49 [A Useful Defence] (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 2008), 
chapter 3. 
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The motive for choosing this category of officer was that I argue they come closest to 
practical tactics, still with a need for military theoretical understanding and 
consideration before, during and after the practical, tactical execution of action. The 
study involves nearly the whole population of relevant officers (n= approximately 43). 
The total population consisted of approximately 45 officers, depending on the status in 
each unit, due to the on-going transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces. Not all 
units had been activated during 2011 and one battalion commander was not possible to 
interview.  
A further, but more limited set of empirical material consists of Swedish, American, 
British, Canadian and French doctrines or field manuals for tactics in 
Counterinsurgency Operations.136 This material was used for the normative comparison 
with the descriptive result of the space of statements of thought on tactics in Irregular 
Warfare. We will now proceed with a presentation of the first part of the study; the 
literature study, with the aim of providing a generalization of the characteristics to be 
found in a large amount of literature and military doctrines covering this type of 
warfare. 
                                                 
136Appendix 8. Results from a Doctrine study on tactics in COIN, pp. 1-16 (16).  
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3 How can so-called Irregular Warfare be understood? 
3.1 Introduction to the chapter 
This chapter presents a summary of the background, questions, results, validation and 
discussion from the initial literature study137 The aim is to contextualize the 
phenomenon of Irregular Warfare in a way where general perspectives and aspects are 
derived. A qualitative textual and content analysis of a collection of literature and 
military doctrines results in an empirical generalization, argued to grasp a common 
thread of 200-year descriptions on the traits of this kind of warfare, also in contrast to 
traditional Regular Warfare. The result is to be seen as an objectification of the context 
in which tactical thought is to be mirrored, and which has been used as directive 
guidance for the construction of the interview questions. The empirical generalization 
was used in the introduction of each interview in order to enhance the understanding of 
the context. The chapter presents a validation of the result by a survey and closes with a 
discussion on understanding as well as consequences of the interpretation of Irregular 
Warfare.  
3.2 Background and questions 
When describing traits of thought in Irregular Warfare, I view it as a way of 
characterizing the context where tactics are to be executed, giving results corresponding 
to a political strategy. The context is approached from a deductive angle with a 
qualitative text analysis on how the term has been explained and articulated in argued 
influential writings of military theory and practice. Texts are included from the early 
parts of 1800 to the year of 2010. This period can be said to cover modern military 
theory mainly devoted to Regular Warfare, but also intermittently to intensive writings 
and discussions of Irregular Warfare. 
Some periods have shown the need for handling Small Wars against non-state enemies, 
e.g. during the 1950s and 60s, and the paradigm situation after the Iraq and Afghanistan 
operations in 2003. A new interest rose, not predicted in late 2006 with the issuing of 
the American Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 COIN Counterinsurgency.138 
However, Irregular Warfare, regarding definitions has been seen as a problematic part 
of military theory according to many experts such as Bernard Fall139 and Frank 
Kitson140 from the Cold War era to contemporary thinkers such as Colin Gray141.  
                                                 
137 Appendix 1. The Literature Study. The full study with design, methodology and results is presented in 
this appendix. 
138 U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual FM 3-24, Marine 
Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP) 3-33.5, December 2006. 
139 Bernard B. Fall, Last reflexions on a war, Bernard B. Fall`s Last Reflections on a War, Preface by 
Dorothy Fall, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), p. 210. 
140 Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping (St. Petersburg, 
Fl: Hailer Publishing, 1971, London: Faber & Faber, 1971, new printing by Hailer Publishing, 2008), p. 
2. 
141 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), pp. 212-215. 
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However, today´s experts in the field, for example, David KilCullen142 are moving more 
rapidly beyond the framing of definitions and focusing on sub-definitions. Another 
example is David Ucko143, who in a few words gives rather a clear picture of sub-labels, 
such as Counterinsurgency, Counterterrorism and Stability Operations, among others. 
Colin S. Gray delivers a comprehensive view to the question of what Irregular Warfare 
is and how it differs from Regular Warfare; especially in relation to western military 
culture.144 The straight forward view is that war is war, although the character of 
activities in the operational environment differs. An earlier comprehensive academic 
view of a definition of Small Wars can be viewed in Roger Beaumont’s “Small War: 
Definitions and Dimensions” from 1995.145 For the Swedish Armed Forces, with few 
discussions and no definitions on the subject until 2011, the situation changed with the 
issuing of a new Military Strategy Doctrine.146 This doctrine included such texts, which 
however must be considered as a first step on a long way to a deepening of existing 
military theory.147  
The term Irregular Warfare was not commonly used in military discourse of the western 
world during the 20th century, and military education mostly dealt with Regular, or 
conventional and traditional military warfare theory and practice. The research situation 
can also be characterized as limited from the end of the Vietnam War up to 2007. The 
following three questions have been in focus, leading forward to an empirical 
generalization.  
“How is the form of warfare, labelled Irregular Warfare, defined and explained?”  
“What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms of warfare?”  
“What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?”  
 
The sources chosen are assessed to have been, or are, influential on military 
understanding of the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare148. Also included as study 
appendixes are summaries of views from Clausewitz and Frank Kitson, containing 
information assumed not commonly known.149 The purpose is to include views and 
articulations on the subject that might be used for further analysis, and reflections on the 
differences and similarities as regards western thought on Irregular Warfare. 
                                                 
142David KilCullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. xvii-xix. 
143David H. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2009), pp. 9-12. 
144 Colin S. Gray, ´Irregular Warfare - One Nature, Many Characters´, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 
2007 Strategic Studies Quarterly, 2007, pp. 35-57. 
145 Roger Baumont, ´Small Wars: Definitions and Dilemmas´, The ANNALS of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, Vol. 541,  No. 1, September, 1995, pp. 20-35. 
146 Militärstrategisk doktrin 2011 med doktrinära grunder (MSD 12) [Swedish Military Strategy 
Doctrine] (2011). 
147 Parts of the texts on Irregular Warfare in the Swedish Military Strategy Doctrine MSD 12 are based on 
the results from the Literature study. 
148 Appendix 1. Literature study, Sources; p. 8 (76). 
149 Appendix 1.1 Clausewitz writing on Small Wars – a collection of views , pp. 1-7 (7), and Appendix 
1.2 General Sir Frank Kitson´s views on Irregular Warfare 2010 – a collection of thoughts, pp. 1-2 (2). 
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3.3 Background regarding the term Irregular Warfare 
As a kind of warfare, which is more or less connected to Regular Warfare, Irregular 
Warfare has been articulated and discussed since long ago, using various labels such as; 
Guerrilla Warfare, Low-intensity conflicts, Revolutionary Warfare, protracted warfare 
and perhaps the first modern and more comprehensive, although diffuse, label Small 
Wars, particularly linked to Charles Caldwell’s epos Small Wars, their principles and 
practice originally from 1896150.  
The most prominent military thinker in western countries since the 19th century, Carl 
von Clausewitz, addresses the phenomenon as “People’s warfare” or “People’s 
Armament”, in his famous epos On War from 1830.151 Clausewitz mostly wrote on “the 
big war” from a philosophical and military theoretical angle, and the interest for Small 
Wars can be interpreted as limited, which is evident in his views and short descriptions 
in On War. However, Clausewitz was also interested in Small Wars, or Kleinkrieg, 
teaching and writing on the subject during the early years of 1800.152  
Callwell’s writings concern the small war from a truly practitioner perspective with a 
style not far from a tactical field manual. Still, both writers catch and articulate different 
characteristics for Small Wars compared to traditional Regular Warfare. Temporary 
periods of needing to handle Small Wars to a greater extent against non-state enemies, 
occurred primarily during the 1950s and 60s, later to be low priority areas of theory and 
practice in the wake of the Vietnam War. The phenomenon and resulting aspects in the 
USA were thereafter moved away from the army in general to the backyards of Special 
Forces. 
From then to the first decade of the 21st century, when the U.S. Armed Forces started to 
acknowledge Small Wars, with expressions such as Counterinsurgency and Irregular 
Warfare in the doctrine and field manual FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, as an equally 
important form of warfare as traditional or Regular Warfare, the subject has been of 
generally limited interest for western military concepts, education and training. This is 
noted by James Kiras in his introduction to the chapter of Irregular Warfare in the 
second edition of Strategy in the Contemporary World153, as also stated by Widén and 
Ångström in Militärteorins Grunder from 2004.154  
                                                 
150 Charles Edward Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, Third Edition, with an 
Introduction by R. Douglas Porch (1996), The first edition from 1896 can be argued to present theories of 
Irregular Warfare with, in certain aspects, relevance even today, according to Widén and Ångström in 
Militärteorins grunder (2005) p. 196. 
151 Clausewitz , Om Kriget (1991), pp. 478-483; the sixth book, chapter 26, “People at Arms”. 
152 The Literature study Appendix 1. Clausewitz writings on Small Wars – a collection of views; pp. 1-7 
(7). Clausewitz refers to Johan Ewald’s writings as one of the two most important thoughts of Small 
Wars, see p.7 (7). 
153 Baylis et al., Strategy in the Contemporary World, Second Edition (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 200), p. 165; chapter Irregular Warfare. 
154 Widén och Ångström, Militärteorins grunder (2005), p. 37. 
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The same can be said for interest from historians according to Ian Becket in his 
overview of the subject in Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies155. The 
changing paradigm situation started around 2006 and was linked to the Iraq and 
Afghanistan operations, with the recurring requirement for military capabilities to have 
a broader spectrum of activities than just combating equally conceptualized armed 
forces. The term Irregular Warfare became accepted and started to develop, despite 
being more diffusely used in various forms, compared to the more specifically labelled 
Counterinsurgency (COIN).156  
COIN can be seen as a particular type of Irregular Warfare related to an insurgency 
scenario. Other terms strongly linked to the irregular field are so-called Hybrid 
wars/warfare/threats. Here, the meaning in general is a combination, in parallel with 
traditional symmetrical enemies and irregular adversaries. One key characteristic of the 
subject of how to explain and understand Irregular Warfare is that less common 
understandings and fewer explanations exist, compared to the term Regular Warfare.  
One reason for this might be significant, and that is that the phenomenon of Irregular 
Warfare has not been prioritized in either historical research157 or by the military 
establishment158.  
The task of grasping the essence of Irregular Warfare is challenging and can be 
approached from many different directions and scientific perspectives. A main character 
of every irregularity is that it has to be different in some way to the opposite of 
regularity; here speaking of armed activities linked to the execution of political power 
or political violence. Here, the fog of war is very much lingering on, in the ability to 
explain and understand in a way that can last over time. Today’s use of the term 
Irregular Warfare, as some sort of umbrella term for warfare against primarily non-state 
actors, could be argued to face the same difficulties as yesterday’s difficulties of 
framing a common clear understanding and definition of the term Small Wars. The 
analysis only focuses on the term Irregular Warfare or that which is considered as 
warfare, different from what is generally and universally understood as the main content 
of traditional and conventional military warfare, such as it has been developed since the 
Napoleonic Wars. Sub-terms such as Guerrilla Warfare and alike are not analysed per 
se, but are understood as definitions in use today.  The method is textual analysis of 
both a systematic and critical examination character. Chosen sources have been 
examined for, primarily, qualitative aspects addressing variables which have been 
extracted from Clausewitz´s On War, book six, chapter 26.159  
                                                 
155 Ian W. F. Becket, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 
viii-ix. 
156 The term COIN is defined in the Swedish Military Strategy Doctrine MSD 12 (2012), p. 28. as 
political, economic, civilian, psychological, social, judicial and military activities undertaken within a 
comprehensive political Strategy to counter an Insurgency (author’s translation from Swedish).  
157 Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, Guerrilla and their Opponents since 1750 
(2001), pp. viii-ix, “Surprisingly, Insurgency and, especially, Counterinsurgency have enjoyed relatively 
little attention from historians”. 
158 Lynn, Battle – A History of Combat and Culture (2004), see chapter Epilogue: Terrorism, pp. 317-
369. with descriptions of the problem of military organizations not willing to include Irregular Warfare in 
their culture, thus with the result of recurring ad hoc reactions when such capabilities are needed again.   
159 Clausewitz, Om Kriget (1991), pp. 478 – 483. Regarding the variables, see Appendix 1. p. 7. 
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Despite the limited number of pages, Clausewitz arguably characterizes Irregular 
Warfare from several aspects to be useful as variables, regardless of the time 
perspective of a subject to be analysed.  
The reason for using Clausewitz to define variables in the actual subject is thus two-
fold. First, On War is universally well-known in western military discourse and has 
influenced thinking and understanding of war and warfare since the 19th century, and 
still does. Secondly; several factors and areas of activities described by Clausewitz in 
the actual chapter can be argued to be normally used when theorizing military activities, 
thus easily understood and generally accepted as useful and common description 
categories.  
3.4 The results of the questions on described characteristics 
The Literature study addressed three questions dealing with the subject from a military 
theoretical or practical perspective. The questions and results were the following.160 
The first question; “How is the form of warfare, labelled Irregular Warfare, defined 
and explained?” is answered as; Conflicts and/or warfare principles characterized by 
strategy, operational art and tactics with a focus on, and from, the lower violence 
spectrum (subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare) between state and non-state entities. 
These sorts of conflicts include insurgency strategies, where political and civilian 
perspectives dominate and the will and support of the people is of vital importance. 
Irregular Warfare is sometimes meant to address either the irregulars´ struggle or 
sometimes also includes the counter irregular party as well. From time to time this sort 
of warfare has been understood as being different in conceptual terms, a specific form 
of warfare different from Regular Warfare, not seeking decisive battles but during 
extended time eroding the will to fight the enemy and thus, as such, being a natural 
complement. 
The second question; “What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms of 
warfare?” is answered as; A conceptual difference not built on distinct physical 
formations, moral goals that are a part of the mind and will of the people, limited 
physical military power, extensive knowledge and the use of concepts difficult to detect 
(covert, clandestine and low visibility) for existing, organizing and activating armed 
operations and activities. Terror and subversion as key competences and activities are 
often used, as are criminality and other actions differing in moral/legal/ethical aspects 
and behaviour, compared to western and traditional views and conduct of Regular 
Warfare. Also, a generally low military interest exists, compared to the interest in 
Regular Warfare skills and competences. 
The third question; “What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?” is answered 
with the following aspects of traits (seen from the aggressor’s perspective); A military 
weakness leads to a continuous need for integration with people and society. The main 
goal to control the people and their support leads to a political and civilian focus on the 
fight.  
                                                 
160Appendix 1. The Literature study, p. 74 (76). 
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Fluid and highly adaptable and flexible networks of influence/combat groupings use 
what is supposed to bring desired results, regardless of western views of humanism and 
moral/ethical norms. Military strategy, operational art and tactical skills from 
subversion to mobile (manoeuvre) warfare with light ground forces are also typical 
characteristics. 
The answers to these three questions will be discussed in the next section, aiming to 
describe an empirical generalization as a military theoretical sketch of the historically 
intermittent, highlighted phenomenon of Irregular Warfare. 
3.5 Conclusions and an empirical generalization  
We are dealing with conflicts and/or warfare principles characterized by strategy, 
operational art and tactics, focused on a starting point at the lower violence spectrum 
(subversion, terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare). However, different forms of military 
operations and also joint operations can be included. Violence is thus not restricted to, 
and conceptualized only by the traditional military structures common for states. 
Violence from, and between non-state actors against a state are such examples. These 
sorts of conflicts include Insurgency strategies, where political and civilian perspectives 
dominate and the will and support of the people are of vital importance. Irregular 
Warfare is sometimes meant to address either the irregular struggle or sometimes also to 
include the counter irregular activities, similarly using military force. From time to time, 
that sort of warfare has been understood as being different in conceptual terms; a 
specific form of warfare compared to Regular Warfare and also as such, a natural 
complement. 
The conceptual difference with Regular Warfare is characterized by limited, physical 
structures and greater mental goals and drivers, the endurance and will of the people, 
limited physical military power, extensive knowledge and use of concepts difficult to 
detect, requiring skills and capabilities for covert, clandestine and low visibility 
operations. Terror and subversion as key competences and activities are often used in 
what is culturally effective against the opposing actor and culturally and traditionally 
acceptable as standards by the opposing actor. The use of criminality and other activities 
different and unacceptable to what is morally and ethically accepted in Regular Warfare 
might be used.  
Fluid and highly adaptable and flexible networks of influence or combat elements are 
important and even necessary organizational parts. The use of what is supposed to bring 
desired results, regardless of western views of humanism and moral/ethical norms is one 
characteristic. A military weakness leads to continuous needs for integration, for control 
of and support by the people and society. The main goal of controlling the people and 
their support leads to a political and civilian focus on the fight. A low military interest 
has from time to time characterized such forms of conflicts and warfare, compared to 
capabilities, skills, competence and education as characteristics of Regular Warfare.  
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Describing the term Irregular Warfare and to summarize, a further narrowed articulation 
is possible; the will and capability of using violence for political reasons, even outside 
the military context and in ways that contradict cultural, traditional, judicial and social 
norms, values and constructions characterizing the western world and democracies. The 
contradiction lays both in a focus on attacks in the civil domain, of such character that 
they exceed the capacity of police and civilian capabilities, at the same time as they stay 
outside the role and fundamental democracy perception of the military function.  
Irregular Warfare as a phenomenon can be seen as different from Regular Warfare in 
philosophical and conceptual ways of controlling violence. In the first place, violence is 
also used outside the paradigm of military containment and monopoly; it integrates with 
society. In Regular Warfare the violence is separated from society into a particular 
structure that in itself is clearly separate from everyday life. Trying to counter such 
irregular attacks and threats will obviously challenge various social perspectives, from 
considerations of violence containment (ontology of military and police), to 
employment of, for example; legal, structural, organizational and different power 
structures.  
Irregular Warfare might also be seen as a phenomenon which when used, crushes the 
social structures/constructions. When defending against Irregular Warfare, the defenders 
have to adapt new or modified social structures/constructions. The irregular attackers 
might be said to push and move social constructions, which becomes difficult for the 
defenders to adapt to. Turning away from theoretical explanation challenges, there are 
some aspects (or social constructions) derived and condensed from the empirical 
generalization that might be used as focus areas because they all have something in 
common; i.e. that they truly challenge traditional social and military perception and as 
such should be included in military thinking of Irregular Warfare.  
They are as follows;  
“Broaden the violence spectrum with lower end bases” 
“Diversity in actors’ rules of warfare” 
“Political struggle based on society’s acceptance/support – not military victory” 
“Asymmetrical concepts for acceptance and use of violence, limited physical focus, 
more social/mental emphasis and hidden forms of combat/influences”  
“What the defenders address as terror and subversion are key competences and  
  activities not excluding higher tactical forms of ground operations when suitable 
and  possible” 
“Fluid, highly adaptable and flexible networks of influence/combat groupings, using  
  what is supposed to bring desired results, regardless of western views of humanism   
and moral/ethical norms” 
“A military weakness leads to a continuous need for integration, for control of and 
support by the people and society” 
“A low military interest has from time to time characterized such forms of conflicts 
and warfare, compared to capabilities, skills, competence and education as 
characteristics of Regular Warfare” 
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These articulations might be further condensed into two categories, which together can 
be seen as an example of a theoretical sketch, or an empirical generalization of the term 
Irregular Warfare and can be seen as the key result of the literature study; 
 
 
 
Irregular Warfare – characteristics in general 
 
A political struggle based on society’s support with a diversity of actors and rules of 
warfare – not a military victory. Asymmetrical concepts for acceptance and use of 
violence, limited physical focus but enhanced social/mental focus and hidden forms of 
combat/influences. Fluid, highly adaptable and flexible networks of influence/combat 
groupings, using what is supposed to bring desired results, regardless of Western views 
of humanism and moral/ethical norms. A military weakness leads to a continuous need 
for integration of control of and support by the people and society. A low military 
interest has from time to time characterized such forms of conflicts and warfare, 
compared to capabilities, skills, competence and education as characteristics of Regular 
Warfare. 
Irregular Warfare – characteristics regarding tactics 
 
A broadened violence spectrum with lower end bases, and what the defenders address as 
terror and subversion are key capabilities, not excluding higher tactical forms of ground 
operations when suitable and possible. Subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, and 
Mobile Warfare are important competences in Irregular Warfare. 
Figure 2. The empirical generalization of the term Irregular Warfare  
3.6 A validation and discussion of the result 
The empirical generalization aims to objectify and frame the context in which tactical 
thought is analysed. The result can be seen as broad and lacking precision, something 
that seems to be characteristic for western ways of thinking and articulating Irregular 
Warfare. In order to strictly follow the result, I have chosen not to deviate here with 
another complementary, possibly more distinct and precise articulation. Staying with the 
original results, several areas closely linked to tactics in Irregular Warfare can be 
identified.  In order to validate the empirical generalization from the literature study and 
to develop indicators of other thought, a survey was performed during the autumn of 
2010 for officer students at the Staff Courses and military teachers in the sections for 
Ground Forces and Joint Operations of the War Studies Department. The broad question 
was; “What characterizes contemporary Swedish military thought on tactics in 
Irregular Warfare?” 
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Three sub-questions were developed as follows;  
 
Do groupings in thought exist, regarding areas of violence, which have to be 
considered in the tactics of Irregular Warfare? If so, regarding what areas of 
violence? 
 
Do groupings in thought exist, which can be linked to a military culture that regards 
Regular Warfare tactics to be sufficient even in Irregular Warfare, or is new thinking 
needed?  
 
What other groupings, regarding similar or different thoughts on tactics in Irregular 
Warfare can be derived from the result? 
 
The investigation was conducted using a qualitative and quantitative analysis of a 
collection of open-ended questions on the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare and tactics 
in general, and ten questions based on the empirical generalization from the literature 
study. Thirty-two people answered the survey with an equal amount of responses from 
students and teachers, mostly majors or lieutenant colonels. Twenty-one belonged to the 
army, six to the air force, one to the navy, three to the amphibious units and one to the 
Special Forces.  
Most of them had backgrounds in operations and had mainly been serving in field units 
or staffs. Over 60 % had been assigned on at least one international operation and of 
these; almost 20% had participated in more than three operations. Still, there was rather 
a large amount (almost 40 %) that had no international experience at all. Regarding self- 
assessment of personal knowledge and understanding of Irregular Warfare; mainly a 
limited knowledge and level of understanding was assessed by 56%. 31 % viewed 
themselves to have a limited level of theoretical knowledge and understanding of 
Irregular Warfare.  
Only about 10 % assessed themselves to have deep knowledge and extensive 
experience. Regarding the view of usefulness of the empirical generalizing, 75% of the 
officers mainly agreed to the way the empirical generalization descriptions of traits of 
Irregular Warfare and how differences compared to Regular Warfare are explained. 25 
% partially disagreed.  
70% of the respondents agreed with the often addressed opinion on difficulties to 
communicate due to limited precision in language and symbols related to Irregular 
Warfare, enhancing risks for misunderstanding and also unconscious thinking in 
“regular terms”. Concerning the violence spectrum in Irregular Warfare, the officers in 
general mainly or fully agreed (37, 5 % for each alternative) that one trait in Irregular 
Warfare is a broadened violence spectrum that has to be understood and handled. 
Subsequently, over 50% fully agreed and over 34% mainly agreed that the roles of the 
military and the police have to be developed if Irregular Warfare is to be possible to be 
fought successfully. 
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When it came to state opinions on “higher tactical forms of ground operations” as a 
more prominent trait in Irregular Warfare than “terror and subversion”, 43% either 
“fully” or “partly” disagreed. 28% did however mainly agree on the statement, showing 
signs of rather different opinions on tactical considerations. The result indicates 
different views on what constitutes main tactical capabilities for irregular actors. 25 % 
of the respondents considered the question not even to be understandable.  
Over 65 % fully agreed and 25% mainly agreed that tactics to counter irregular threats/ 
or Insurgency operations includes several moral/ethical aspects that have to be dealt 
with, due to the modus operandi of the opponents integrating amongst the people. Over 
70 % of the officers agreed or mainly agreed that there is a need to develop other 
tactical skills for Irregular Warfare than what is needed for Regular Warfare. As for 
challenges in Irregular Warfare tactics compared to Regular Warfare tactics, most 
officers perceived new ways of thinking tactics as the main area. 
Certain indications can be derived from this result, however, note well, the small sample 
and broad questions. Regarding the first question, the survey identifies thinking that 
regards terrorism and subversion as important characteristics for Irregular Warfare, 
containing violence at the lower end of the violence spectrum, such as subversion, 
terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare, having repercussions on tactics. The results from the 
second question do not indicate any particular traditional preference according to 
Regular Warfare primacy. The answers reveal challenges for tactics in Irregular Warfare 
and a need for tactical development different compared to Regular Warfare needs. 
Particular examples of challenging areas belong to the ethical and moral area and the 
roles of the military and police. Finally, regarding the third question concerning other 
aspects, an opinion of needing to handle the complicated factor of training host nation 
security forces could be detected. New ways of thinking and acting tactics seem to be 
important for many officers. The empirical generalization seems finally to be in line 
with many officers’ views of the meaning of the term Irregular Warfare. 
The overall question for the survey; ”What characterizes contemporary military 
thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare at the Swedish National Defence College?” 
could be answered as; 
Challenges exist for tactics in Irregular Warfare, many belonging to the ethical and 
moral area and the roles of the military and the police. Most concerns relate to the 
violence area of subversion and terrorism, still higher forms of tactical Land operations 
have to be handled. A need for developing tactical skills other than those belonging to 
Regular Warfare; it still is desirable and argued to exist. New ways of thinking and 
acting tactics are important aspects for many officers. The theoretical construction that 
the empirical generalization resulted in seems to be in line with many officers’ view of 
the content of Irregular Warfare. No particular thinking has been identified, that 
traditional competences for Regular Warfare are enough; on the contrary, the officers 
express an opinion that there exist differences between Regular and Irregular Warfare, 
not addressing the latter with signs, words or expressions which indicate lower status or 
lesser importance. 
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This result can be seen as trends, relevant for the actual time of the investigation. The 
character of the result was not particularly surprising, given the situation with Irregular 
Warfare in Afghanistan, the rather limited knowledge of the subject and how the 
questions were articulated. The bottom line on what is viewed challenging is, when the 
enemy is hard to find and operates amongst the people. The border area between 
military and police tasks for handling subversion, terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare, 
becomes a problem, which not only concerns each area itself but all together in a 
seamless continuum.  
Returning to the empirical generalization, a part of the description concerns a stated low 
military interest for the area of Irregular Warfare. The previous mentioned study on 
western attitudes towards Irregular Warfare; ”Following Frank Kitson´s Direction”, 
suggests that the military part, because of its ties to western culture and because of 
certain aspects of military culture itself, has paid little attention to Small Wars or 
Irregular Warfare.161 This is argued to have had an impact on doctrines, strategy, 
countermeasures and for how military training and education have been carried out in 
the Western world in the past. One reason for the time needed for transformation has to 
be attributed to the actual tasks for many Defence Forces, not including Irregular 
Warfare operations. 
The results of the study can be summarized as follows; Military culture in general has 
given a low priority to Irregular Warfare, which has generated a negative attitude 
towards it and a low capability for this type of warfare. The reasons can be traced to the 
military focus on technology, the Western liberal tradition of separating military matters 
from civilian ones, an officer corps that prioritizes Regular Warfare, an aversion to 
Irregular Warfare unless the military factor can be decisive in a conflict, and ignorance. 
The result when it comes to Irregular Warfare has been a lack of military capability and 
a consequent increase in risk for casualties and death.  
So far, there has been a rather slow interest in building countermeasures, i.e., education, 
training and supporting change within the officer corps.162A way to counteract these 
trends is suggested to be a rethinking of military education and training and to build 
new capabilities within the officer corps. To achieve this, new ways of thinking about 
the links between war and society probably need to be incorporated into military 
training.  Of particular importance here, it is argued that officers would better 
understand their own social and cultural habits and consequently, the social or cultural 
biases they have regarding themselves and their opponents’ means, resources and 
capability to wage war. Such a view has been driving and underpinning the approach for 
investigating officers’ thoughts linked to background factors in this study. However, 
such an approach for developing new knowledge, built on individual characteristics 
researched sociologically, is not within the military tradition.  
 
                                                 
161 Michael, Gustafson, ´I Frank Kitsons fotspår – En litteraturundersökning kring militär attityd till 
Irreguljär krigföring´, Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, NR 2/2010, pp. 64-
91. 
162 Ibid. pp. 64-91. 
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There are no traditions for questioning the characters of individuals and groups of 
individual spaces of experiences and horizons of expectations, to use Reinhart 
Kosselleck's tools.163 Such a view, aiming to place the results in particular historical or 
time perspectives and framework is common in military history works, and equally 
uncommon when studying contemporary military challenges. The literature study 
contains periodically structured accounts of descriptions, viewed as a static set of 
variables and argued to be of principal value and meaning history transcendentally. 
From this approach, a result has been derived, argued to catch generalist aspects that 
more or less can be said to constitute common understanding of the so-called Irregular 
Warfare phenomenon. It can be argued that two aspects stand out in particular as 
contradictory to the common ontology of war in the western sense. The first is a 
broadened violence spectrum, with particular focus on lower levels of violence.  
The second is a mental border deconstruction, de facto between the military and civilian 
sectors of the western society. The two factors are seamlessly interconnected and that is 
not a characteristic in western strategy and the tactical horizon of expectations, still 
within the space of experience, as the vast literature on the subject of Small and 
Irregular Wars evidently provide. Why have spaces of experiences then not fed horizons 
of expectations? One answer can be approached by viewing the character of the military 
ontology, as a part of common understanding of how the society is, and is wanted to be, 
constructed and regulated. When it comes to violence regulations per se, and regarding 
violence within one’s own society, a culture with low violence acceptance in general 
and a strict military and police border for violence execution has existed since the 16th 
century. Civilian violence should not be a military concern in general. In crises 
however, the Military Police function also has a role regarding civilian violence directed 
at military targets.  
When conflicts recurringly arise, impossible to be handled because of the agreed 
violence separation between the military and police spheres, nevertheless, when trying 
to be understood within the defined social and cultural set of constructions, an obvious 
irregularity develops. It seems inescapable that so-called Irregular Warfare will be 
understood with difficulty within the current society and political and military 
paradigm. Such a result means that we are left with few effective ways to address the 
problem either strategically or tactically. There is vast literature on how violence is 
constructed and regulated in western society and how victory has become synonymous 
with military force. In other words, today’s military organizational forms and practices, 
often reflected through the “lens” of different services (army, navy, air force), has 
helped to legitimatize some common understandings of what war is or should be. 
In the west, to put it in another way, there is a common perception in place of what 
violence is and the forms it should take, with a deeply held set of assumptions about 
warfare, which continue to exist, and express thought and practice in both western 
society and its military organization. This is the case, despite the fact that conflicts often 
include, to some degree, Irregular Warfare. What the term Irregular Warfare challenges 
is the extent to which violence can be contained and understood within the western 
military lexicon.  
                                                 
163 Kosselleck, Erfarenhet, tid och historia – Om historiska tiders semantik (1979). 
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Irregular Warfare can thus challenge us to reconsider how we characterize war and 
peace, and can lead us to think about both constructions in more creative and 
imaginative ways. A key issue here is to what extent do our own western biases 
contribute to the fog of words and thought that seem to surround the term Irregular 
Warfare. Besides the apparent spaces of experiences and the horizons of expectations, 
there are obviously forces that come into play, in this case, unhinging an otherwise 
logically connection. I argue that social structures interpret actions, experiences and 
expectations, gains and losses and positions in social value structures. 
 Decisions on horizons of expectations, such as strategy, not only decide outcomes in 
conflicts, they decide on what forms of violence that resources are directed towards. 
Such questions effect instant life, death, development or stagnation of different military 
systems and units, and thus lay the ground for tactical horizons of expectations. Once 
again, if we look at a summary of how Irregular Warfare can be described in broad 
terms, the horizons of expectations at the beginning of the 21st century focusing on high 
technological warfare among states, and the spaces of experiences with legacies of 
Counterinsurgency from the 50s and 60s, it seems illogical. The empirical 
generalization can be discussed as follows. As a term, Irregular Warfare implies 
conflicts whose strategy, operational art and tactics focus on the lower end of the 
violence spectrum; subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, but can also include more 
conventional forms of military operations and tactics.  
Violence is not restricted to the traditional military practices common to Western 
nations and states. Violence can take forms from and between non-state actors against a 
state. These conflicts can include Insurgency strategies, where the political and civilian 
elements are more important than military concerns and the will and support of the 
people can be of vital importance. What distinguishes Irregular Warfare can be argued 
to be the inventive intellectual use of limited physical military resources, parallel with 
hidden and subversive actions. Drivers are often the endurance and will of the people, 
extensive local knowledge and use of means hard to detect of organizing and carrying 
out operations and activities. Terrorism and subversion are key elements with the ability 
to identify and exploit what is culturally effective against the opponents. This can 
include criminal and illicit activities that fall outside of what is morally acceptable in 
Regular Warfare. Irregular Warfare relies on fluid, highly adaptable and flexible 
networks of influence groupings; ones that are often difficult for conventional military 
forces to detect, track and neutralize. This summary of an understanding of the traits of 
so-called Irregular Warfare becomes challenging when thinking of tactics. 
On the one hand, a social and military paradigm not any longer effective for 
contemporary conflicts, an unsatisfactory horizon of expectations, and on the other, a 
diffuse and shallowly researched and limitedly educated space of experiences. The stage 
for understanding and acting with tactics is new. However, ways to understand and 
explain phenomena in the world, even the military and political, have dynamics over 
time. The now widespread discussion of COIN, which did not exist before 2006, is a 
good example of this. Explanations and understanding related statements can be seen as 
constructions of words, given a certain meaning. These affect how we perceive the 
world and thus the knowledge which we consider important.  
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Conversely, they affect ambient events, sometimes unexpectedly and difficult to explain 
with applied logic, prevailing explanatory models and designs. How we look at the 
phenomena, knowledge and explanations create common grounds and values, as well as 
criticisms and struggles of these approaches among different groups.  
In situations of change, the character of power struggles might also develop. One 
question might be then; what interests and value structures can be identified connecting 
social structures with particular standpoints? Irregular Warfare can be argued to be 
understood in relation to the progress of our modern society, with strict borders between 
military and civilian institutions and functions. Subsequently, different ways of 
thinking, theorizing and practically handling violence have developed, giving grounds 
for different understandings, spaces of experience, interpretations and views of horizons 
of expectations, not to be taken for granted. 
In this context, officers still are required to think and apply tactics and the result of the 
literature analysis reveals different perspectives and aspects, into which understanding 
of Irregular Warfare can be organized. Broadly summarizing such characteristics, in 
contrast to Regular Warfare, the result as illustrated in the following table shows an 
example of generalized principal differences divided into contextual and conceptual 
perspective. 
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Perspectives and 
aspects 
   Regular Warfare   Irregular Warfare 
Contextual 
perspectives; 
Mainly actors’ 
aspects 
State actors Non/Sub-state actors 
strategy aspects 
 Military victory, enemy 
defeat/destruction 
Political victory, People’s support, 
enemy exhaustion 
Operational art 
aspects 
Joint military operations 
Different operational concepts of 
subversion, guerrilla/terrorist and 
local/regional forces up to Regular 
Warfare structures (ground forces) 
Rules of Law and 
Engagement 
Follow western society 
norms, laws and conventions 
Do not follow western society norms, 
laws, conventions or moral ethical 
standards 
Conceptual 
perspectives; 
 
Tactical aspects 
Direct approach, to control 
physical terrain. Overt, 
uniformed structures and 
operations, static concepts, 
separate from civilian 
functions. Combat focus with 
larger units operating 
collectively 
Indirect approach, to control people’s 
minds and political ambitions. Overt, 
covert and clandestine structures and 
operations, dynamic adaptable and 
fluid concepts, integrating civilian 
functions. Intelligence focus with 
smaller units operating dispersed 
Time aspects 
Striving for short duration Accepting protracted war/campaign 
Physical aspects 
 Military strengths, anti-
subversive weaknesses 
Military weaknesses, 
subversive strengths 
Moral aspects 
Exclude  the people in 
fighting structures 
Integrate people into fighting and 
supporting structures 
Figure 3. An overview of  differences between Regular and Irregular Warfare 
 
This broad description or sketch can be seen as an example of a principal comparison 
between Regular and Irregular Warfare. The next chapter will now present the interview 
study of the 43 officers. 
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4 Contemporary Swedish military thought 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the design, implementation and results of the interviews of the 43 
battalion and company commanding officers. Three analysis methods are described with 
results. The first is a qualitative analysis of a collection of open-ended questions. 
Secondly, a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) is presented, regarding the 
standpoint structure of the space of statements on tactical preferences and thereafter a 
collection of background factors. Thirdly and finally, a capital and field concept 
discussion is presented in order to characterize military sociological patterns in relation 
to the expressed thought. These three analyses end the set of descriptive investigations. 
Subsequently, a normative analysis follows, where the result of the descriptive 
standpoint analysis is compared to some contemporary doctrines on tactics in Irregular 
Warfare, related to Counterinsurgency operations. The chapter ends with a result 
summary and the answer to the research question. 
4.2 The interviews and the empirical material 
The collection method of empirical data consisted of interviews164. The questions were 
developed from the literature study, to indicate new areas and different ways of thinking 
about tactical preferences. Aspects such as the following have been included; focus on 
people or enemy centric approach in COIN, thinking mainly of military or civilian 
supporting tasks and views on primarily kinetic or non-kinetic effects. A primary focus 
is on violence such as subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare and more traditional 
infantry style operations, focus on combat or intelligence, use of larger or smaller unit 
concepts, and capability to carry out overt or low visibility actions. The interviews with 
43 officers took place during March 2011 to March 2012 with a duration of often two 
hours. The interviews were, with few exceptions, performed at the regiments 
responsible for training and deployment of the land forces and amphibious units. The 
interviews were voluntarily recorded and full transcriptions were sent out afterwards for 
verification and correction possibilities to the respondents. The empirical generalization 
was initially presented and used as a contextual framework. In particular, the results 
regarding violence areas in Irregular Warfare were used to frame the threat context in 
which the tactical issues supposedly exist. The questions included open-ended and semi-
structured multiple-choice ones, with sixteen background aspect questions,165 eighteen 
questions on tactical preferences in the form of standpoints166and ten open ended 
questions on tactics in more general terms167.  
                                                 
164 Appendix 2. The Interview Guide. 
165 Ibid. p. 1 (4). 
166 Ibid. pp. 1-4 (4). 
167 Ibid. p. 4 (4). 
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The choice of background factors and categorizations has been made in the light of what 
can be argued to be commonly used features in military categorizations. Twelve 
different kinds of background factors have been examined. The following table presents 
the result of background factor characteristics for the sample. 
Background factor Sum (total)     Background factor Sum (total)     
1. Unit affiliation  7. Military Education  
P4 10 Basic officer course 1 
P7 11 Captain course 9 
LG 4 Major course before 2007 8 
I19 5 Major course after 2007 14 
AJB 3 LtCol course before 2007 9 
K3 6 
LtCol course after 2007 
2                        
(43) 
AMF1 4 (43) 8. Civil Education  
2. Unit Type  2-year programme 6 
Mechanized 7 3-4 year Technical/Natural sciences 
programme 
14 
Mechanized Infantry 11 3-year Social science programme 11 
Mechanized Log/Staff 5 3-year Economics programme 9 
Motorized Infantry/ 
Amphibious 
8 College/University 3                        
(43) 
Intelligence/Security 4 9. International missions  
Ranger 5 0 missions 6 
Armoured 3   (43) 1 mission 12 
3. Role 2011  2 missions 13 
BnCO 10 3 missions 8 
BnCO2 5 4 missions 3 
CoyCO 27 4 missions + 1 (6 missions)    
(43) 
CoyCO2 1 (43) 10. Role in missions  
4. Unit background  No mission/role 6 
Infantry/Amphibious 9 Mec/Inf Platoon Leader 9 
Armoured/Mechanized 15 Mec/Inf Company Commander 13 
Mechanized Infantry 5 Staff duty 3 
Cavalry/Ranger 9 Others 11 (42)                  
Logistics 3 11. Experience of mission areas  
Staff 1 No missions 6 
Artillery 1 (43) Afghanistan 5 
5. Age  Bosnia 3 
30-34 5 Kosovo/Macedonia 7 
35-39 19 Liberia 1 
40-44 9 Tchad 1 
45-48 9   (42)           Two areas – Three areas 14 – 5 
6. Rank 2011   12. Combat experience   
LtCol/Maj/Capt. 
11/18/14 
(43)               
Yes/Indirect/No/Unknown 14/2/26/1           
(43) 
Figure 4. Background factor contents and distribution. 
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The sample consisted of a social group of males, forty-three officers with a mean age of 
40 (39.6) years. The majority (thirty-nine officers), were married or lived with a partner. 
Thirty-seven officers had at least one child. Only three officers were single without 
children. The group can generally be described as rather a homogenous social group of 
middle-aged family men. Regarding civilian education, thirty seven had attended 3 or 4-
year secondary school (seventeen in Technical or Natural-sciences programmes and 
eight in Social science and Economics programmes, respectively). Four had a university 
degree. Nine had some sort of civilian skills; e.g. engineer, mechanic, athletics coach. 
The group can be characterized as homogenous in general for civilian education, where 
social science and technical secondary school programmes dominate, followed by 
economics and natural sciences programme types. 
Secondary  
school  
Programme 
2-year 3-year 4-year SUM College  
2 years 
University International 
education 
Technical   4 8 12 2 2 (80 c)  
Natural sciences  5  5   1 (High School) 
Social science  12  12  1 (40 c)  
Economics  8  8    
Social 4   4  1 (60 c)  
Construction 1   1    
Aesthetics, 
music/art 
1   1    
SUM 6 29 8 43 2 4 1 
Figure 5. Summary of civilian education distribution. 
As for military education, eight officers had attended Captain Courses, twenty two 
Major Courses (of which one officer had been promoted, because of service-related 
qualifications, not having attended the Major Course) and eleven had attended 
Staff/Lieutenant Colonel Courses. One captain and one lieutenant colonel had 
participated in military training in the United States.  
Period Basic Officer 
Course 
Captain 
Course 
Major 
Course 
Lieutenant 
Colonel course 
International 
education 
SUM 
2010-12   8 1 (HSU 9-11)  9 
2008-10  2 4   6 
2006-08  1 7 3 1 (US, General 
 Staff College). 1 
(US, Captain 
course) 
11 
2004-06   2 3  5 
2002-04  2 1 1  4 
2000-02 1 1    2 
1998-00  1  1  2 
Unknown  1  2  3 
SUM 1 8 22 11 (2) 42 (2) 
Figure 6. Summary of military education distribution. 
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In conclusion, the sample showed clear differences regarding civilian and military 
training and education. A lesser part, fifteen officers, had their military training and 
education from 2008 and onwards; that is during the time when Irregular Warfare was 
beginning to be discussed more systematically in Swedish officer training. The two 
categories of command roles thus contained a broad variety of space of experiences and 
horizons of expectations.  
Of particular interest is international experience, where thirty-two officers had been on 
international assignments, at least on one mission. Of these, nine had participated in two 
missions, nine in three missions, and four in four missions. One officer had served in six 
missions. Twenty-one officers, about 50% of the group had experienced at least two 
international missions. As regards geographical and foreign culture and command role 
experiences, fifteen officers had served in Afghanistan, of which five as commanders 
for the Mechanized Infantry Company during one mission. One officer had served twice 
as the commanding officer for the Mechanized Infantry Company. Fifteen officers had 
served in Bosnia and twenty-two in Kosovo/Macedonia. Five officers had served in 
Liberia/Sierra Leone.  
True to Swedish requirements, the sample is characterized as containing relatively 
extensive international missions and geographical and cultural experience in general. 
Geographical mission experiences for the sample in all covered eight missions in 
Afghanistan, seven in Liberia, ten in Bosnia and twelve in Kosovo/Macedonia. 
Regarding command role experiences, nine had served as platoon leaders. Four of them 
claimed combat experience. Twelve had served as company commanding officers. Two 
of these had served twice as company commander and two as company commander on 
three missions. Six of them claimed combat experience. In summary, a smaller part of 
the sample had experiences of company command, even fewer claiming combat 
experience.  
The results reveal a variation of content, regarding participation in international 
missions, where geographic and cultural spaces of experience are argued to dominate, 
compared to actual performance of command (and command in combat).  This leaves a 
certain possible span of horizons of expectations of tactics in Irregular Warfare, leaning 
more towards theoretical thought and limited experiences. A question then rises; if and 
how tactical thinking is read and communicated.  Here, all officers stated an interest in 
reading books and magazines in general. However, only sixteen considered themselves 
to read extensively. Fifteen considered themselves to have limited interest. Regarding 
topics, fifteen officers prioritized military history, six claimed to read much military 
history and two primarily concerning Swedish military history. Only two officers 
mentioned reading The Swedish Armed Forces Magazines and the Royal Military 
Academy journals. Thirty-four officers stated that they did not spend any time or 
interest at all in writing.  Only three claimed spending a lot of time writing; two on book 
projects and one wrote a diary continuously, concerning service and military matters. 
Five officers indicated that they wrote articles and diaries to a limited extent.  
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The sample can be characterized as containing practising and action-oriented officers, 
seldom communicating their thinking by writing. Irregular Warfare has been a subject 
in their education only for a smaller part. This result means that a standpoint analysis 
approach regarding thought on a minor experienced area concerns mental constructions 
originating from a diversity of influences. The result shows an example of span in 
contents regarding properties, even within a rather demarcated sample such as battalion 
and company commanders. This sample might be considered uniformly composed and 
probably expected to be quite coherent in thought and preferences of tactics. After all, 
the military system is built on the principle of coherence in structure, thinking and 
acting. The next section, presenting the results from the methodological approach gives 
another picture, however. The approach entails a search for differences, first with an 
analysis of a set of open-ended questions, then to the Multiple Correspondence Analysis 
(MCA) of closed questions, generating clear differences and groupings of standpoints. 
First is however, the view of tactics in general presented from the open-ended questions.  
4.3 Framing tactical thought in general. 
Introduction 
As a base and setting for the Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) of differences, 
the results of a set of open questions have been used.168 Eleven questions were framed 
using two broader questions; how can the officer´s general reflections on tactics be 
characterized and; how can the officer´s general reflections of tactics in Irregular 
Warfare be characterized? This section describes and discusses the results and finalizes 
with conclusions for the following correspondence analysis. 
The questions providing the data. 
Results from eleven questions were used, organized in two groups corresponding to 
each of the two questions above. Questions used for the first group are marked (1), and 
for the second group (2). 
1. What does the concept of tactics means to you? (Question 6 – (1) ) 
2. How would you describe your way of thinking about tactics in general? (Question 7-
(1)) 
3. What has influenced you to think of tactics? (Question 13-(1)) 
4. What do you think affects the development of tactics and tactical thinking?  
       (Question 15-(1)) 
5. How do you assess your interest in tactics compared to strategy and operational art? 
(Question 14-(1)) 
6. Do you often discuss tactics with your colleagues and commanding officers? 
       (Question 11-(1)) 
7. How would you describe your way of thinking about tactics in Irregular Warfare? 
      (Question 8-(2)) 
8. Personal view of tactics in Irregular Warfare? (Question 4.12-(2)) 
                                                 
168Appendix 3. Results from the open-ended questions. 
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9. What aspects of the concept of war fighting capabilities do you think of mostly in 
connection with Irregular Warfare tactics? Physical, conceptual or moral aspects? 
(Question 9-(2)) 
10. Do you consider there is a need for the development of tactics for Irregular Warfare 
in the Armed Forces? (Question 12-(2)) 
11. Do you consider tactics in Irregular Warfare to be an area with high priority in the 
Armed Forces? (Question 10-(2)) 
The results regarding thought on tactics in general and in Irregular 
Warfare 
The first question; How can the officers’ general reflections on tactics be 
characterized? is answered by the following summary.169 The meaning of tactics in 
general can be described as a two-fold answer. One group, almost half of the sample, 
viewed tactics generally as the use of units or resources to reach a specific goal. The 
second group, 15 responses, described aspects more related to ways of thinking in 
general. Reflection on principal influences for  preferences can be described in three 
different ways; a Regular Warfare tradition that dominates (over half of the sample), a 
more generic and wider analytical approach, and finally, a more direct Irregular Warfare 
tactics focus. Influences on tactical thinking can be described as connected to five areas; 
combinations of influences, education and school activities, literature and gaming, 
personal experiences, personal influences, such as senior officers and colleagues, and 
exercise activities. The three last categories all connect to direct or indirect practice. 
Compared to the areas of strategy and operational art, the interest for tactics is 
prominent. However, communicating and speaking of tactics is not a well-developed 
tradition. Finally, opinions of development influences on tactics and tactical thinking 
are scattered. Most common aspects concerned experiences and influences from past 
wars, though only eight replies each. Areas such as education and exercises were only 
mentioned by four and five officers respectively.  
The second question; How can the officer´s general reflections on tactics in Irregular 
Warfare be characterized? is answered as follows. Personal views in general of tactics 
in Irregular Warfare were mostly expressed referring to conceptual aspects, including 
capability and functional aspects, for example, intelligence. Broader aspects such as 
military and civilian relations, education and training, leadership and mind-set were 
however highlighted to a lesser extent. Many of the articulations corresponded to 
general COIN standards in doctrines and field manuals. Still, some responses addressed 
more traditional mind-sets, emphasizing Regular Warfare capabilities. Dominance in 
thinking can however be related to a view of new or other demands in command & 
control and functional thinking, for example, intelligence, psychological operations and 
Electronic Warfare. As for war-fighting capabilities (physical, conceptual and moral 
factors), moral and conceptual factors were the most common mentioned. Thinking of 
physical factors was not a highlighted area.  
                                                 
169 Appendix 3. Results of open questions, results summary of the two frame questions, p. 17. 
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The whole area of tactics in Irregular Warfare is mainly thought of to have a low 
priority in the Swedish Armed Forces, however, a rather common view does exist that 
development of such tactics is needed and important.  
Conceptual and Contextual thinking perspectives – A Discussion of the 
result  
The overall result of the open questions reveal battalion and company commanding 
officers’ collective and diversified articulations of tactics in general, as well as on 
tactics in Irregular Warfare. Two main views exist on tactics per se, either as a label for 
the practical use of units for a specific goal, or as a label for methods to solve military 
problems, giving different approaches to discussing tactics. In combination with the 
dominant Regular Warfare influence, as a more generic and wider analytical approach, 
or a more direct Irregular Warfare tactics perspective, different approaches might evolve 
when discussing and communicating the subject. Opinions on primary influences on 
tactical thinking concerned several different areas, which is why the possible discourse 
is growing.  
A unifying view can nonetheless be noticed regarding the stated importance of practical 
experiences and exercises. However, if opportunities for practice of command decline, 
different views might evolve around other unifying aspects. A clear interest even so, is a 
common message regarding tactics compared to that of strategy and operational art. If 
however this is not communicated to any substantial part as indicated, tactical thinking 
development risks degradation. Views on how important development influences tactics 
and thinking, relating to experiences and influences from past wars, support an opinion 
of the importance of real life practice, also in a larger context. The few opinions on 
influences for development of tactics and tactical thinking regarding education support 
the above opinion. In summary, different opinions exist concerning understanding of the 
subject of tactics per se, doubtless with a main influence from the long tradition of 
Regular Warfare tactics. Turning to the more demarcated area of tactics in Irregular 
Warfare, it is mainly seen as a lower prioritized area of tactics. General expressions 
concern conceptual aspects including capability and functional area aspects, for 
example, intelligence. This indicates a traditional Regular Warfare mind-set, mentioned 
above. The more limited highlighting of broader aspects, such as military and civilian 
relations, education and training, leadership and mind-set, supports this view.  
However, indications are also clear about the existence of several, if not coherent, views 
that correspond to current COIN thinking. One such example is the emphasis on 
thinking related to new or other demands in command and function areas, such as 
Intelligence, Psychological Operation (PSYOPS) and Electronic Warfare (EW). As for 
thinking about conceptual solutions, contextual thinking intermingles and it is not 
possible to demarcate strictly. An apparent focus on moral aspects in Irregular Warfare 
contexts puts several demands on unit concepts with capabilities other than in Regular 
Warfare. One such example is intelligence analysis, aiming for targeting precision and 
hidden enemy identifications.  
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A rather common view is that development of tactics for Irregular Warfare is needed 
and important. If, however tactics in general is seldom discussed, as stated earlier, 
challenges arise regarding how to realize such development. The results indicate a 
limited coherent space of tactical thought, often with articulations that concern 
conceptual thinking, just about possible to distinguish from intermingling contextually 
thinking. Seeking differences and structures of differences with the use of 
characteristics such as context and concepts for tactics in Irregular Warfare, has 
therefore been viewed as possible perspectives for the Multiple Correspondence 
Analysis (MCA), to which we now turn. 
4.4 The space of standpoints – a generalized model of tactical types 
Introduction 
This section answers the question; “How can standpoints of tactical thought be 
characterized?” and describes the result of the standpoint distribution. The aim is to 
describe and characterize structures of tactical standpoints making it possible to 
construct a generic model of a space of statements. The result is discussed and the 
section closes with a summary and introduces the next section dealing with the question 
“How can social aspects such as background factors be characterized in the space of 
statements?” The presented interpretations are results from the work with Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis (MCA). Data has been used initially from the following 
eighteen questions with closed alternative answers.170  
 
3.5 Priority on military focus as offensive or defensive 
3.6 Priority on People Centric or Enemy Centric focus in COIN 
3.7 Focus on larger or smaller units 
3.8 Focus on combat or reconnaissance/intelligence 
3.9 Priority on national or international war fighting capability  
3:10 Focus on commanding their own troops in operations or training Host Nation Forces 
3.11 Priority on command/developing tactics for larger or smaller units  
3:12 Perceive themselves foremost as a field/front officer  or a staff officer 
4.1 Focus on type of violence in Irregular Warfare (IW) 
4.2 Focus on collective or distributed operations in Irregular Warfare (IW) 
4.3 Priority on capability in Regular Warfare (RW) or Irregular Warfare (IW) or equal;  Hybrid    
Warfare (HW) capabilities 
4.4 Views on  the need for specialization of units 
4.5 Thinking about tactics often or seldom 
4.6 Thinking about tactics as theory or practice or a combination 
4.8 Focus on open or low visibility operations 
4.9 Focus on the troops or  technology 
4:10 Focus on military or civilian tasks 
4:11 Focus on kinetic or non-kinetic effects 
                                                 
170Appendix 2. The Interview Guide. 
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Fifteen of these questions were chosen for further analysis, so-called active variables171. 
The following questions were not chosen due to the dominance in one answer 
alternative; 3.5 Offensive or defensive focus (34 officers stated an offensive focus), 3.10 
Commanding own units or training others focus (33 officers stated a focus on 
commanding own units rather than training the host nations’ security forces), and 
question 4.4 Conceptual focus for Irregular Warfare regarding organization structures 
(39 officers stated a focus on Task Force structures rather than traditional standard 
battalion structures).  This result supports a generalization of a rather uniformly 
offensive focus. The officers would rather command own units before training others 
and work preferably with task force structures adapted for Counterinsurgency 
operations instead of using standard Regular Warfare organized battalion concepts.  
The chosen fifteen questions were then analysed using forty-one answer alternatives, all 
responded to by more than five officers. The next step was to choose numbers of axes 
for interpretation of structural character of the space of statements. Results according to 
the charts below were obtained from the MCA for the first ten axes regarding specific 
modified values, rates and accumulated modified rates.172  
Control panel of Eigenvalues     
Trace of matrix: 1.78450     
Numbe
r 
Eigenvalu
e 
Percentag
e 
Cumulated 
Percentage 
Specific 
modified 
Values 
Specific 
modified 
Rates 
Cumulated 
Modified 
Rates 
Means of 
Eigen- 
values 
1 0,2147 12,03 12,03 0,02894 0,330782 0,330782 0,044613 
2 0,1786 10,01 22,04 0,017952 0,205192 0,535974  
3 0,1646 9,22 31,26 0,014386 0,164428 0,700402  
4 0,1386 7,77 39,03 0,00884 0,101041 0,801443  
5 0,1166 6,53 45,56 0,00518 0,059212 0,860655  
6 0,1044 5,85 51,42 0,003575 0,040861 0,901516  
7 0,0973 5,46 56,87 0,002781 0,031788 0,933304  
8 0,0907 5,08 61,95 0,00212 0,024237 0,957541  
9 0,0834 4,67 66,62 0,001504 0,017188 0,974729  
10 0,0761 4,27 70,89 0,000994 0,011367 0,986096  
Figure 7. Axis 1-10, Eigenvalue results from MCA calculations. 
 
                                                 
171Appendix 4. The 15 chosen questions with 41 modalities Table 1. The 15 chosen questions with 41  
    modalities (answer alternatives). 
172Appendix 5. Table 2 Eigenvalues and modified rates for the 41 modalities. 
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Figure 8. Graph of Specific Modified Rates for axis 1 – 16. 
The results show a dominating role for axis 1 with 33% of specific modified rates, 
followed by axis 2 with 20%, axis 3 with 16%, and axis 4 with 10%. As two 
dimensions, (represented by axes) are most easy to pedagogically work with and 
graphically present, a more clear break is preferred to be obtained. However, the data 
does not show such a clear break as axis 3 is rather close to axis 2, and axis 4 rather near 
axis 5. This result has motivated a main analysis of axis 1 and 2, but also a discussion of 
axis 3 and 4. The aim has been to finally interpret two axes or perspectives.  
In the following part, the results of the distribution of questions are presented for axis 1-
4. Contributions of active categories with, or beyond, the mean value of 2, 44 (100/41 
categories) have been used as the criterion for choosing categories to be analysed. Data 
regarding modality contribution and axes coordinates refer to results from specific 
MCA calculations.173 For each axis the mean value contribution of the chosen 
modalities has been calculated as an indication of contribution value. 
 
                                                 
173 Appendix 6. Table 3. Coordinates of active categories/modalities on axis 1-4. 
     Appendix 7. Table 4. Contribution of active categories/modalities on axis 1-4. 
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Axes results regarding standpoint distributions 
AXIS 1 results 
 
Active categories/modalities                         Relative Squared         Axis  1                Axis 1  
                                                                       Weight (%)          distance       coordinate +     contribution 
                                                                                                     to origin  
                       
4.2 Collective operations focus 2,326 1,86667 1,09 12,80 
3.7 Larger units focus  2,481 1,68750 1,04 12,60 
3.8 Combat focus  2,946 1,26316 0,76 7,86 
4.9 Troop and technical focus 1,705 2,90909 0,90 6,50 
3.11 Command and develop larger units 3,566 0,86957 0,50 4,17 
3.6 People centric focus  1,395 3,77778 0,70 3,22
      
                            
coordinate  -  
4.2 Distributed operations focus 2,791 1,38889 -0,76 7,60 
3.7 Larger and smaller units focus 2,171 2,07143 -0,75 5,76 
3.11 Command or develop smaller units 1,550 3,30000 -0,75 4,10 
3.8 Combat and reconnaissance focus 0,775 7, 60000 -1, 01 3, 71 
3.12 Front or staff officer self-image 1,240 4, 37500 -0, 72 3, 01 
3.6 Enemy centric focus  2,481 1,68750 -0,51 2,99 
3.8 Reconnaissance focus  2,636 1, 52941 -0, 47 2, 69 
3.9 National or international focus 1,395 3,77778 -0,63 2,54 
3.7 Smaller units focus  2,016 2,30769 -0,47 2,09 
     
   Active categories; 15     Mean value Contribution = 100/15= 6.67 
 
Figure 9. Axis 1. Results of coordinates and contribution of answer categories. 
The results show that standpoints regarding collective or distributed operations focus on 
unit size and combat focus, all clearly position on the first axis. These modalities are all 
beyond the mean value. Focus on commanding or developing larger or smaller units is 
below the mean value but at a clear distance from each other and thus interesting. 
The position of combat and reconnaissance focus, and solely reconnaissance focus in 
relation to the combat focus position is also interesting, and clearly contributes to an 
interpretation that the first axis describes conceptual thinking of two rather different 
kinds. Traditionally Big War or Regular Warfare thinking is on the right side, and on 
the left; a kind of tactical thinking promoting only or blended Small War thinking, 
where the intelligence function and capability are highlighted as important. 
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Figure 10. Distribution of the answer categories used for interpretation of axis 1. 
Axis 1 is therefore labelled “Conceptual thinking” with tactics for larger combat 
focused units to the right, and for larger and smaller units (also with an indication of a 
smaller unit focus) with combined combat and reconnaissance focus to the left side. On 
that side upper part, an indication exists for solely reconnaissance focused units. The 
result and labelling is considered strong and easily recognizable with traditional military 
logic.  
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AXIS 2 results 
 
Active categories                   Relative Weight    Squared   Axis 2  + coord Axis  2 contrib 
                                                       (%)                distance to  
                                                                                 origin        
                                                                                      
4.8 Low visible activities 1,240 4,37500 1,30 11,77 
4.11 Kinetic effects 1,550 3,30000 0,95 7,82 
3.6 People centric 1,395 3,77778 0,90 6,37 
3.11 Command or develop 
        smaller units 1,550 3,30000 0,76 4,97 
4.10 Military task focus 3,876 0,72000 0,43 3,95 
4.9 Troop focus 3,566 0,86957 0,37 2,79 
 
                   Axis 2 - cord  
 
4.1 Combination of 
      lower threats                    0,930 6,16667 -1,34 9,34 
4.5 Thinking equal 0,930 6,16667 -1,19 7,39 
4.9 Troop & technical focus 1,705 2,90909 -0,78 5,81 
4.10 Military and civil task 
       focus                         1,550 3,30000 -0,75 4,94 
3.12 Front and staff officer 
        Self-image 1,240 4, 37500 -0, 82 4, 63 
3.11 Command or develop 
       larger and small units 1,395 3,77778 -0,71 3,91 
4.11 Non-kinetic effects 1,240 4,37500 -0,72 3,58 
4.8 Overt and low visibility 
      activity focus  3,411 0,95455 -0,42 3,35 
3.6 Enemy centric focus 2,481 1,68750 -0,48 3,20 
 
Active categories=15    Mean value contribution = 100/15=6,67  
  
Figure 11. Axis 2.Results of coordinates and contribution of answer categories. 
The results for axis 2 show a significant contribution to the side of axis 2, consisting of 
focus on combinations of lower threats (subversion and terrorism) regarding question 
4.1. Combined with a mixed focus on military and civilian tasks (question 4.10) and 
focus on non-kinetic effects (question 4.11), it seems logical to view these aspects as 
parts of contextual thinking. The main opposite contextual thinking (at the + side of axis 
2) is then constituted of a clear focus on kinetic effects, which is a doxa in Regular 
Warfare contexts. Also the results of question 4.10, the category of military task focus, 
support such an interpretation of contextual thinking and according to Regular Warfare 
thinking. 
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Figure 12. Distribution of the answer categories used for interpretation of axis 2. 
Axis 2 is thus labelled “Contextual thinking” with tactics for military tasks with kinetic 
approaches on the + side. This side might be said to represent a Regular Warfare 
contextual thinking. The – (minus) side of axis 2 is interpreted as representing a broader 
contextual framing, with thinking in a combination of military and civilian tasks and an 
approach of non-kinetic effects. Such contextual thinking is prominent in descriptions of 
so-called Hybrid Warfare, as described in the literature study. The result is partly less 
obvious to interpret, compared to axis 1, still argued to be easily recognizable as having 
traditional military logic. 
With this interpretation result for structuring aspects in two dimensions of the space of 
statements for axis 1 and 2, the results of axis 3 and 4 are now to be discussed. 
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‘AXIS 3 results 
 
Active categories                   Relative Weight    Squared      Axis 3  + coord Axis  3 contrib 
                                                       (%)                distance to  
   origin   
      
4. 5 Thinking equal/ often/ 
       seldom on tactics             0,930 6,16667 1,35 10,29 
4.8 Overt activities focus 1,860 2,58333 0,63 4,48 
4.11 Kinetic effects 1,550 3,30000 0,60 3,42 
4.1 Combinations of lower  
     threats focus   0,930 6,16667 0,77 3,36 
3.9 National and international 
      focus               1,395 3,77778 0,63 3,34 
4.10 Military tasks focus 3,876 0,72000 0,38 3,32 
4.9 Troop & technical focus 1,705 2,90909 0,52 2,75 
3.8 Reconnaissance focus 2,636 1, 52941 0, 39 2, 38 
 
    Axis  3 coord -  
 
4.9 Technics focus 1,085 5,14286 -1,51 15,11 
4.2 Collective and distributed 
      operation focus 1,085 5,14286 -1,22 9,78 
3.8 Combat and reconnaissance 
      focus                         0,775 7,60000 -1,22 6,99 
4.11 Kinetic and non- 
       kinetic effects focus  3,721 0,79167 -0,39 3,49 
4.10 Civil tasks focus 1,085 5,14286 -0,72 3,38 
4.1 Guerrilla Warfare focus 3,256 1,04762 -0,38 2,86 
4.8 Overt and low visible 
      activity focus 3,411 0,95455 -0,36 2,64 
 
Active categories=15  Mean contribution = 100/15=6,67  
 
Figure 13. Axis 3. Results of coordinates and contribution of answer categories. 
The results for axis 3 are less easy to be given clear logic. The three categories beyond 
the mean value on the – (minus) side can however, be viewed as thinking commonly 
when it comes to Irregular or Hybrid Warfare contexts. Also the civilian task focus and 
Guerrilla Warfare focus on this side supports such an interpretation. In order to get a 
corresponding match on the + (plus) side of the axis, question 4.11 and 4.10 can be used 
(below the mean values but with clear distances). The strongest contribution to this axis 
is the technical focus on the – (minus) side, however minimally contrasted on the + 
(plus) side. In all, it is difficult to interpret and apply specific logic, which is not already 
found in axis 1 or 2; a possibility does exist to view this axis as contextual thinking. 
With such an interpretation, this axis does not contribute to any new knowledge 
compared to the interpretation of axis 2. 
Finally a view of axis 4, aiming to examine if any new aspects can be identified other 
than those which have been interpreted for the previous axes. 
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AXIS 4 results 
 
Active categories              Relative             Squared        Axis  4             Axis 4 
                                             weight              distance         coord +           contrib 
                                               (%)  to origin  
        
3.7 Large and small units 
      focus  2,171 2,07143 0,68 7,17 
4.3 Regular Warfare focus 4,341 0,53571 0,45 6,46 
3.9 National focus 4,496 0,48276 0,40 5,28 
4.11 Kinetic effects focus 1,550 3,30000 0,63 4,42 
 
    Axis  4  
                                                                                               coord –  
3.9 National and international 
      focus                         1,395 3,77778 -1,22 14,90 
3.7 Small units focus 2,016 2,30769 -0,95 13,20 
4.3 Regular and Irregular 
      Warfare focus 1,860 2,58333 -0,90 10,86 
4.1 Combinations of 
       high threats focus 1,395 3,77778 -0,77 5,91 
4.11 Kinetic and non-kinetic 
       Effects focus 3,721 0,79167 -0,40 4,28 
3.6 People centric focus  1,395 3, 77778 -0, 55 3, 00 
4.8 Low visible activities 
      focus                         1,240 4,37500 -0,56 2,79 
4.2 Distributed operations 
      focus                          2,791 1,38889 -0,77 2,58 
 
Active categories = 12 Mean value = 100/12= 8,33 
 
Figure 14. Axis 4. Results of coordinates and contribution of answer categories. 
Axis 4 provides three clear categories beyond the mean value on the – (minus) side. 3.9 
and 4.11 are easy to connect to contextual thinking on Irregular or Hybrid Warfare. 4.11 
support such a view on the contrary to 4.1 category; “combinations of high threats”.  
The main contributor on the + (plus) side; a focus equal on large and small units, 
connects to conceptual thinking. However, the remaining three categories on the + side 
are more easy to relate to contextual thinking. The categories in total can be seen as 
combining both conceptual and contextual thinking as strategic thinking with a focus on 
Regular Warfare and national strategy thinking on the axis + (plus) side. On the – 
(minus) side a strong identifiable international Hybrid Warfare context (parallel 
existence of Regular and Irregular Warfare in an operational and tactical context) can be 
interpreted.  
The result and labelling are considered geometrically strong and comprehensive, also 
recognizable with traditional military logic. Still, axis 4 contributes less to the structure 
of the space of statements compared to the contributions of axis 1, 2 and 3. The result is 
nonetheless regarded as similar to the axis 2 interpretation and does not present any new 
indications. 
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The Axes and their interpreted perspectives and content 
Axis 1 dominates with 33% of specific modified rates. Axis 2 comes second with 20% 
and axis 3 with 16%. Together, they stand for almost 70% of explanations. The 
perspectives Conceptual thinking (axis 1) and Contextual thinking (axis 2) are however, 
seen as the major analytical and pedagogical tools for interpretation and construction of 
the space of statements. Axis 3, and even more so, axis 4 results are argued to be 
possible to be interpreted similarly to the interpretation of axis 2. From this result, two 
dimensions or perspectives are considered to structure the space of statements of tactical 
thought in Irregular Warfare. The space of statements is therefore considered to be 
structured in two dimensions by axis 1 and 2. A summary of axes labels on perspectives 
and generalized aspects content is outlined in the figure below. 
 
Axis Aspects content 
- (left/lower) position 
Aspects content 
+ (right/upper) position 
Thought 
perspective label 
1. Large and Small 
units 
Combat and 
reconnaissance 
Reconnaissance 
Distributed 
operations. 
 
Large units 
 
 
Combat 
 
 
 
 
Collective operations 
 
Conceptual thinking 
2.  Military and civil   
tasks.  
Non-kinetic effects 
Military tasks 
Kinetic effects 
 
 
Contextual thinking 
Figure 15. Summary chart of axes content and thought perspective label. 
With the two dimensional structure of the space of tactical thinking in place, the next 
step was to characterize the four segments, making clear and logical descriptions 
possible.  Choices of focus for seeking certain logic can be several. Descriptions are 
pedagogically labelled in order to make sense of the whole model of tactical thought. 
Subsequently, the analysis continues on a higher abstraction level in order to give life to 
the model. 
One particular set of characteristics that struck me, regarding combinations of 
contextual thoughts, concerned military and/or civilian task focus, and focus on kinetic 
and/or non-kinetic effects. Today, the common use of defining and understanding 
warfare as either Regular, or Irregular or Hybrid Warfare, felt obvious for such labelling 
(shortened as “RW” and “IW/HW”) for the perspective of contextual thought in axis 2. 
As for clustering in axis 1, it became obvious for me to label different tactical thought 
connected to unit types such as “Infantry”, “Mechanized” and “Ranger”.  
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Such unit types have been designed for high specialization; either mobile combat in 
larger formations with combat focus (Mechanized), or for more stationary mixed tasks 
(Infantry), or for distributed or dispersed operations in smaller sections for intelligence 
or assaults (Rangers) deep in enemy or unfriendly areas.  
Such characterization and understanding is common all over the western world, also in 
Sweden.174 Later during my work, reflections were made regarding alternative labelling, 
for example, connected to operational definitions such as Peace Keeping, Peace 
Enforcement and Counterinsurgency Operations. Such labels are however, not viewed 
as equally traditional, meaningful or precise, when it comes to pedagogically 
appreciating and comparing them to the very familiar common understanding of 
“Infantry” as foot soldiers, “Rangers” as Guerrilla Warfare soldiers, and “Mechanized” 
as different kinds of tanks or armoured vehicle units. The initial choice of labels did not 
therefore change during the work.  
The following observations can be made, viewing the graph on the next page, consisting 
of four quarters. The first quarter counting clock-wise, contains thoughts on small as 
well as on small and larger unit structures, primarily with a conceptual reconnaissance 
focus. Contextually, a focus on kinetic effects and mainly military tasks dominates. This 
type of tactical thought is labelled “Regular Warfare Ranger Tactics”.  
The second quarter contains the same contextual thoughts as in quarter 1, but 
conceptually, they are thoughts on larger units operating collectively and with combat 
focus dominating. The label chosen is “Regular Warfare Mechanized Tactics”, here 
understood as including Mechanized Infantry Tactics. In the third quarter, conceptually 
the same features as in quarter 1 can be observed, however, with a more equal focus on 
combat and reconnaissance, as on a combination of smaller and larger units. 
Contextually, thoughts of a broader military and civilian task focus and non-kinetic 
effects dominate. This combination is labelled “Hybrid Warfare Infantry Tactics”. 
Finally, the fourth quarter differs mostly from quarter 2, regarding the contextual 
thinking, focusing more on Hybrid Warfare thinking. The chosen label for such a 
generic tactical type is therefore “Hybrid Warfare Mechanized Tactics”.  
                                                 
174 For a Swedish normative example, see Reglemente för Markoperationer, (RMO), remiss 3 [Field 
Manual for Land Forces Operations] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2009), pp. 81-82. and for a more 
historical view; Lars Ericson Wolke, Krigets Idéer (Stockholm: Medströms Bokförlag, 2007), pp. 180-
185: regarding Small Wars and Ranger traditions in Sweden at the beginning of 1492, and pp. 344-350. 
regarding thoughts on Infantry, Cavalry and Mechanized tactics. 
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The result in the form of a model of the distribution of standpoints  
Standpoints of tactical thought in Irregular Warfare are suggested to be characterized as 
a space of statements in the form of a model. The space of statements is argued to be 
mainly structured in two dimensions by a conceptual thinking perspective and a 
contextual thinking perspective. The model with the two perspectives and main content 
is shown in the the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 16. The model of the space of statements structured by axis 1 & 2. 
 
Military-Civilian tasks 
Non kinetic effects 
Military- tasks 
Kinetic effects 
Regular Warfare                                                   Regular Warfare 
Ranger Tactics                                                     Mechanized Tactics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hybrid Warfare                                                     Hybrid Warfare 
Infantry Tactics                                                     Mechanized Tactics 
 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
76 
 
It is possible to label the content in the model according to commonly known military 
unit names, each in relation to a context character. This results in the four tactical types; 
Ranger tactics in a Regular Warfare context, Mechanized tactics in Regular Warfare, 
Infantry tactics in Hybrid Warfare and finally Mechanized tactics in Hybrid Warfare. 
This division is to be seen in principal because overlapping exists and strict boundaries 
can be discussed. 
The result was presented to Ms Brigitte LeRoux175 during a seminar at the Swedish 
National Defence College (SNDC) on 28 January 2013. The MCA result was viewed as 
strong. The seminar was a co-arrangement between Uppsala University SEC176 and 
SNDC. 
Discussion on differences in the tactical model 
The labelling of tactical types with traditional military unit labels indicates differences. 
In order to explain some principal differences in broad terms, the so-called basic 
capabilities have been used.177 They consist of; Command and Control, Intelligence/ 
Information, Protection, Sustainability, Mobility and Effects on targets. Requirements 
of these capabilities are argued to be militarily usually viewed differently, depending on 
what contexts and concepts are being discussed. This is supported by the existence of 
doctrines and field manuals for different units and different contexts. In order to give an 
overview of a way to outline principal differences of the four tactical types, the figure 
on the next page has been made. The summarized characteristics draw from my own 
understanding and experience of studies of warfare and war fighting capabilities. The 
characteristics are to be seen as indicators of broad directions.  
                                                 
175  Brigitte LeRoux is Maitre de Conférences at the Laboratoire de Mathématiques Appliquées (MAP 5), 
CNRS (the French National Centre for Scientific Research) Université Paris Decartes and associated 
researcher at the political research centre of Science-Po Paris (CEVIPOF/CNRS). She is a world leading 
expert in GDA and has contributed to numerous theoretical research works and full-scale empirical 
studies involving GDA. She has been Doctor Honoris Causa at Uppsala University since 2013, as 
recognition of her work, including substantial support to the development of sociological research at 
Uppsala University. 
176 SEC, Sociology of Education and Culture is a research unit with numerous disciplines within the social 
sciences and humanities.  It is affiliated with several departments, primarily at Uppsala University. SEC is 
a node in Scandinavia for research in the vein of certain French traditions founded by Pierre Bourdieu, 
Jean-Paul Benzécri and others. The research areas include studies on cultural fields, history of education, 
formation of elites, students’ trajectories, and transnational transformations of the educational and cultural 
fields. There is also methodologically oriented work on geometric data analysis and prosopographical 
methods. Important research tools are concepts such as capital and field. Prosopographical methods and 
geometric data analyses are frequently used. Historical perspectives are crucial.  
http://www.skeptron.uu.se/broady/sec/ 
177 Reglemente för Markoperationer, (RMO), remiss 3 (2009), pp. 59-61. 
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Basic 
capability 
Character in 
RW Ranger 
tactics 
Character in 
RW 
Mechanized 
tactics 
Character in 
HW Infantry 
tactics 
Character in 
HW 
Mechanized 
tactics 
Command and 
Control 
Smaller 
relatively 
stationary 
structures 
independently 
operating 
deeply in 
enemy 
controlled areas 
for  extended 
periods 
Larger mobile 
structures 
operating 
frontally 
against the 
opponent with 
manoeuvre 
warfare 
Mainly smaller 
units operating 
both on enemy 
targets and 
with civilians, 
often in urban 
environments 
Larger or 
smaller mobile 
structures 
operating 
frontally 
against the 
opponent with 
manoeuvre 
warfare and 
protecting the 
people 
Intelligence/ 
Information 
Extensive 
needs, before 
and during 
operations 
Lesser needs 
other than own 
combat 
Intelligence 
Extensive 
needs, before 
and during 
operations both 
on military and 
civilian 
conditions 
Extensive 
needs, before 
and during 
operations both 
on military and 
civilian 
conditions 
Sustainability High with own 
resources 
Low with own 
resources 
Medium with 
own resources 
Low with own 
resources 
Mobility Low after 
infiltration 
High Limitations due 
to IED threats 
Limitations 
due to IED 
threats 
Protection Low 
(physically) 
High Low Higher 
Effects on 
targets 
Long range 
recce, hit and 
run attacks, 
sabotage, 
Guerrilla 
Warfare 
Symmetrical 
fires in order to 
destroy enemy 
resources 
Patrols 
amongst the 
people (COIN 
tactics) and 
attack/ defence 
against military 
threats 
Operating with 
Mechanized. 
Infantry 
supported with 
fires if needed 
Figure 17. Examples of basic capabilities and characteristics for the four tactical types. 
Despite being outlined with limited precision and with uniqueness in every situation and 
leadership, differences of this kind are argued to be of interest in relation to areas such 
as; unit training, organization, functional structures, personnel skill requirements, 
exercise character, coordination and planning need. Differences in tactical thinking, 
thought and preferences might develop in several directions, sometimes regarding 
financial needs. With this result of standpoints characterized as a four-fold model of a 
space of thought, the next section will deal with an analysis of the distribution of 
background factors. 
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4.5 Background factor structures in the model – Structuring 
indications discussed with capital and field concepts. 
Introduction 
This section answers the question;”How can sociologic aspects such as background 
factors be characterized in the space of statements?” The Multiple Correspondence 
Analysis (MCA) result is presented and discussed and the results are then interpreted in 
capital terms with possible field characteristics.  
The following twelve background factors were analysed; unit affiliation, unit type, 
command role 2011, unit background, age, rank, military education, civilian education, 
international mission experience (geographical, role, number of missions and combat 
experience). The analysis was done concerning the first two axes as the main structuring 
axes of the space of statements. The MCA work will now be presented including 
graphs. The analysis is divided into three parts containing the following background 
aspects, respectively; 1. Unit affiliation, unit type, military backgrounds and role. 2. 
Age, rank, military and civil education, and 3. International missions. roles, numbers, 
geographical experiences and combat experience.  
The section closes with an introduction of the next section which presents a comparison 
of the space of statements with a collection of normative texts on tactics in 
Counterinsurgency operations.  
Background factors; Unit Affiliation, Unit Types, Backgrounds and Roles 2011 
Unit affiliation relates to the regiments P4, P7, Livgardet, Jäger Battalion, K3 and the 
amphibious regiment. Unit type refers to; Ranger, Infantry or Amphibious (Inf/Amf), 
Mechanized (Mec), Mechanized Infantry (MecInf) or Staff/Logistics. Unit Background 
relates to units such as; Mechanized (Mec), Mechanized Infantry (MecInf), Infantry 
(motorized) or Amphibious or Ranger (including Intelligence and Security units). 
Command roles 2011 refers to serving as battalion or company commanding officers 
(BnCO and CoyCO). The distribution result is shown in the graph. 
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Figure 18. Distribution graph 1; Unit affiliation, types, background and role 2011. 
Unit affiliation (regiments, marked in italics) shows clear distribution on both axes. 
Affiliation of the regiment I 19 on the right side on axis 1, in clear contrast with 
affiliation of the regiment K3 with the Jäger Battalion on the left side of axis 1, all in the 
upper part of axis 2. The regiment Livgardet positions on the left side on axis 1, in the 
lower part of axis 2. At the centre we find the regiments P4 and P7, slightly in the lower 
part of axis 2.These centrally close positions show more diffuse positioning and less 
unified tactical thinking. The Amphibious regiment positions on the right side of axis 1, 
in the upper part of axis 2. The regiment K3 and the Jäger Battalion, with typical Ranger 
and small unit profiles position in the first quarter. The regiment Livgardet, with a 
tradition of urban warfare and close civilian cooperation, positions in the third quarter. 
Finally, the regiment I 19, with a longstanding armoured tradition, is also logically to be 
found on the right side of axis 1.  
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The distribution of the factor Unit type shows a pattern where ranger background is 
found in the first quarter, infantry/amphibious; in the fourth. Mechanized infantry are in 
the third quarter and finally, the main body of mechanized background with a slight 
trend towards the second quarter. 
Unit affiliation corresponds to the positions of Unit background, with rangers in 
quadrant 1 and mechanized background centred close to P4 and P7. Unit backgrounds 
such as infantry/amphibious are positioned close to the mechanized regiments in the 
middle and south of Sweden, but corresponding to a lesser degree in relation to the unit 
affiliation of the Amphibious Regiment and I 19. Regarding positions for battalion or 
company command during 2011, a minor but observable difference can be observed. 
The Role of Battalion commanders is found slightly in the upper part of axis 2 and on 
the left side of axis 1. The main body of the Company commanders is however 
positioned axis 1-centric but somewhat in the lower part of axis 2.  
In summary, we can see that the background aspect of Unit affiliation distributes clearly 
in the space of statements. Unit type and background also distribute significantly, 
however, partly corresponding to unit affiliation as well. Distribution of Role 2011 
shows a slight difference. Battalion commanders are positioned upward axis 2 and to the 
left of axis 1, in contrast to Company commanders who show a position more axis 
centric, giving no particular position trend according to the quarters. In total, the 
distribution of military experiences and possible traditions supports the labelling of the 
model. Obviously, practice influences more than education, the next area to be 
examined. 
Background Factors Age, Rank, Military Schools and Civil Education  
The factor of Age has four categories; 30-34, 35-39, 40-44 and 45-50 years. Rank can be 
either lieutenant colonel (LtCol), major (Maj) or captain (Capt.). Military education 
relates to basic officer education and the Captain Course (Capt. Course), the major 
course (Maj course) or the highest education level; the 2-year Lieutenant Colonel course 
(LtCol course). Finally, the category civil education has the categories; two-year 
programme secondary school, three or four-year Natural sciences or Technical 
programme, three-year Social sciences programme, three-year Economics programme, 
and university studies with degrees. 
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Figure 19. Distribution graph 2; Age, Rank, Military and Civil Education. 
The background factor of Age, distributes mostly on both sides of axis 1. Here we find 
the age category of 40-44 years on the right side. Other categories (most clearly 45-50 
years, less clearly 35-39 years) are positioned on the left side of axis 1. The age 
category 30-34 years differs from the others with a position trend of axis 1-centric but at 
the lower side of axis 2. Regarding Rank we can observe a minor, but identifiable 
distribution of Lt Col rank on the right side of axis 1, and Major rank quite axis-centric 
with a certain trend towards the lower sides of axis 2.  
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These positions follow the previous results regarding Role distribution trends. The 
distribution of Military school/education follows the rank distribution in general, 
regarding the level of LtCol, axis 2-centric but on the left side of axis 1.  
Major rank and education distribute to a lesser degree but observably on the right of 
axis 1. Captain course and Captain rank positions are observable differently on both 
sides of axis 2 and axis 1, however, the distance is small.  
Civilian education shows a distribution where 2-year programmes are found at the 
lower sides of axis 2. 3-4 year Natural/Technical programmes are rather axis-centric and 
therefore it is not possible to indicate any stronger positions in the space of statements. 
However, we can indicate a position in the second quarter for university education and 
3-year Economics programmes.  
Finally, in the 3rd quarter, on the left side of axis 1, the 3-year Social sciences 
programme position. We can thus identify a position difference regarding civilian 
education, clearer than that of military education and rank distribution. In summary; the 
background factor of Age distributes mainly over axis 1. Rank and military 
education/school shows a limited distribution result. Civilian education shows clear 
distribution signs in the space of statements, regarding social sciences versus economics 
programmes.  
Background factors International Missions; Roles, Numbers, Geographical 
Experiences and Combat Experience 
Roles in international missions are either as platoon leader for mechanized or infantry 
units or as company commander for mechanized or infantry units or as 
staff/intelligence/ other roles (Staff/Intel/other). Numbers of missions participated in 
were none, one, two or three (or more). Geographical experiences are categorised as; no 
mission, Kosovo, Kosovo and/or Macedonia, Bosnia, Bosnia and Kosovo, Africa, 
Afghanistan, Afghanistan and Macedonia. Finally, combat experience is categorised as; 
participated in some sort of combat, having indirect experience, for example, 
commanding a unit in combat from a distant place, or not having any kind of combat 
experience. 
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Figure 20. Distribution graph 3; Missions; roles, numbers, area and combat experience. 
Regarding what roles the officers have undertaken during service in international 
missions, we find no particular distribution. Mec/Inf Platoon Leaders, Mec/Inf 
Company Commanders and Staff/Intel/Others, all positions quite axis-centric. Looking 
at the factor of numbers of international missions undertaken by the officers, we can 
however, identify clear differences. No missions in quarter 4, 1 mission in quarter 2 
(axis-centric however), 2 missions strongly in quarter 1, and finally, 3 or more missions 
in quarter 3. However, international missions and geographical experience indicate 
differences. On the left side in the space, in the first quarter, we find experiences from 
Bosnia and in combination with Kosovo. However, experiences from Kosovo and in 
combination with Macedonia are positioned in the third quarter. These two positions 
show the clearest distance of over 1,0 in between. 
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In contrast, the position of Africa and Africa in combination with Bosnia and 
Afghanistan, all position in quarter 2 and relatively centric close. Finally, no mission 
area experience is positioned in quarter 4. The last background factor; combat 
experiences (or not) results in a limited distribution and all are relatively axis centric. A 
minor axis 2 position (towards the upper part) can however be indicated for “combat 
experience”. This difference is regarded insignificant to discuss. 
Background factors roles and combat/no combat experience show a limited position 
distribution. Numbers of international missions do however indicate clear differences. 
No missions are positioned in quarter 4, 1 mission in quarter 2 (still axis-centric), 2 
missions strongly in quarter 1, and finally 3 or more missions in quarter 3. Geographical 
area experiences show several different positions. In the left side of the space we find 
experiences from Bosnia and in combination with Kosovo in the 1st quarter, and 
Kosovo in combination with Macedonia in the 3rd quarter. These two positions show 
the clearest distance of over 1.0. Afghanistan and in combination with Macedonia and 
Africa and in combination with Bosnia or Afghanistan, are all positioned in quarter 2. 
Finally, no mission area experience is positioned in the 4th quarter. What roles the 
officers have undertaken in international missions and if they have experience from 
combat or not results in lesser obvious positions in the space of statements, compared to 
time in missions and where (places and culture) they have gained the experience 
internationally. Time in missions does however show a lesser position trend in the space 
of statements than geographical area experiences (e.g. geographical, cultural, social, 
mission character). 
Result of background factor structures in the space of statements 
The question “How can sociological aspects such as background factors be 
characterized in the space of statements?” is answered as; background factor unit 
affiliation (regimental culture and traditions), unit type and military background, 
distributing noticeably in the space of statement. Role 2011 shows a less observable 
distribution. Rank and military education levels show weak distribution signs, in 
contrast to civilian education, where 2-year programmes are found on the lower side of 
axis 2, opposite to 3-year Economics and university education (axis 2 upper parts).  
Age shows a nonlinear distribution on axis 1, mainly where seniors are found more 
significantly positioned, compared to younger categories. Regarding International 
mission experiences, where and how many times one has served, distributes more 
clearly than the roles and action one has participated in. Many background factors 
distribute fairly axis/quarter-centric, many with minor position distances, leaving a 
weaker basis for a capital analysis. Nevertheless, observable results can be found as has 
been described. 
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A Capital and Field Structure Discussion 
In this discussion, the structure of the space of statements and background factor 
distribution will be viewed with the capital and field concepts. The purpose is to 
identify specific military sociological structural patterns. Such a discussion might be 
considered difficult to undertake on such small empirical material as 43 officers, often 
viewed with traditional expectations of military uniformity. Still, the foregoing section 
did present indications of heterogeneous thinking as well as certain differences in 
sociological distribution. A motive in general for such a discussion is the situation for 
the Swedish Armed Forces during extensive transformation the last 10-15 years. This 
transformation can be considered in national terms of changes, purely owned by the 
Swedish field of military thinking. The transformation can also be viewed regarding 
distinct international influences on military values and doxa.  
Scientific indication for the latter is delivered, as has been mentioned earlier, by 
Andrew King in his The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces.178 Sociologically 
based variation in current tactical thinking has, as argued through this study, not yet 
been a research interest in Sweden. This lack of reflection motivates a closer look at 
indications of distribution structures with capital forms in the identified space of 
statements. 
By capital, here it is meant symbolic and tangible assets in general, in other words, 
something that has a recognised value. Different kinds of capital are described by Pierre 
Bourdieu, for example, social, cultural and economic capital. Looking at the character 
of the studied sample here, we can identify several aspects that are connected to values. 
The military hierarchical command and rank structure results in higher social status 
because of higher ranks. Different unit types are considered to be more or less valuable 
for different tasks. Educational status and experiences of international missions are 
connected to certain values. One prominent military tradition is a priority in general for 
Regular Warfare capabilities and thus for mechanized units. Infantry and ranger units 
have not been seen as equally prioritized systems. Such a view has subsequently 
conveyed various command roles different status and capital value. 
Senior (educational, rank and age) officers have traditionally been connected with a 
higher social and symbolic value in general, compared to that of junior officers. 
Regarding experience in international operations, as aforementioned, a very important 
competence; the situation can be different. As mainly younger officers (captains and 
majors) are assigned to field commands internationally, such an officer can (at least 
theoretically) gain a higher social and symbolic value than a somewhat older officer 
with no such experience. Awards on the chest with mission medals or ribbons directly 
signal and establish such a social capital integrated with a symbolic capital. In a capital 
discussion, one can also include aspects such as traditional style and performance of 
officers, who value different warfare styles/ tactics in different units. For example, some 
units/regiments value, and are traditionally established for training and fighting with 
smaller units. Others are, on the contrary, structured for, and traditionally value larger 
combat-focused units and tactics.  
                                                 
178 King, The transformation of Europe´s Armed Forces (2011). 
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The latter has traditionally been seen as the main body and the core capability in the 
Armed Forces, thus having a higher capital value. In all, it demands a study that goes 
beyond the scope of this work to systematically categorize different capital forms and 
value systems. Still, the obtained data gives an opportunity to sketch a structural view of 
value distributions in the space of statements. Not trying to separate possible social 
capital from cultural capital aspects, the label Symbolic Capital is used as a general term 
of value recognition and possession. 
How can Military Symbolic Capital as Recognition and Values be described?  
As background for the discussion, an overview of the Swedish military cultural heritage 
regarding tactical and strategic thought is sketched.179 The overview aims to give a base 
for the capital and field discussion. 
This heritage of strategic and tactical thought for the last 100 years can be characterized 
as a relatively defensive tradition. However, certain offensive thought can be found, as a 
clear tradition of Small Wars tactics. Professor Lars Ericsson Wolke describes two 
common threads of offensive thinking particularly identifiable. The primary offensive 
way of thinking and frontal attack tactics, can be seen as the ideal for the cavalry, such 
as the Supreme Commander’s “sledge hammer”, designed for frontal assault and 
actually crushing an invading aggressor in the south of Sweden, characterized with open 
terrain. Such a “direct frontal attack” dream existed until 1925, despite the experiences 
of the First World War fresh in mind, when traditional defensive strategy and tactics 
were also necessary because of extensive defence cuts.  
This generalized view of certain value recognitions, put in to the model of the space of 
statements gives a sketch of a value or capital structure. This sketch consists of higher 
values in the upper part (Regular Warfare context thinking) and to the right (larger unit 
concepts for combat). Lower values are found in the lower part (Irregular or Hybrid 
Warfare contexts) and to the left (smaller or mixed unit structures promoting combat 
capabilities to a lesser extent). This result is outlined in the next picture. 
                                                 
179 The text is a result of meetings and discussions at SNDC with Professor Lars Ericson Wolke during 
2013. Professor Ericson is currently working in the Military History Section at SNDC, regarded a leading 
expert on Swedish military history with several published books and articles on the subject. 
http://www.ericsonwolke.se/about_lars.htm, http://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lars_Ericson_Wolke 
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Figure 21. Symbolic capital structure of the space of statement. 
The suggested sketch of a principal value structure, viewed as symbolic capital structure 
in the space of statements is now used for discussing the result from the background 
factors analysis. What structures are possible to be identified in relation to the capital 
structure? The following result was gained; unit affiliation, types and military 
backgrounds in the first quarter, clearly referring to ranger tactics, but more scattered 
regarding mechanized and infantry/amphibious backgrounds. We found one trend 
indication where mechanized background is positioned in the second quarter, 
mechanized infantry in the third and infantry and amphibious background in the fourth 
quarter; all indications that support the interpretation of content in the space. Looking at 
the regimental distributions we can identify differences for the mechanized regiments 
(P4, P7 and I 19).  
Rank and military education showed limited interpretation possibilities, but civilian 
education followed some observable value distributions on axis 2. The factor of age is 
positioned clearly on axis 1. Combat experience did not show any particular 
distribution.  
Finally, International mission numbers and area experience can be identified to follow a 
counter clockwise structure where no experience is positioned in the third quarter, 
experiences from one mission in the second quarter, two missions in the first quarter 
and three or more missions in the fourth quarter.  
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The most observable result is that unit type, backgrounds and affiliation follow the 
value/capital structure according to axis 1 for ranger and infantry unit officers, however, 
not regarding officers with a mechanized background. In all, it can be said that 
distributions of different value possessions can be identified, but also that some 
indications are difficult to analyse. The result does however show that background 
factors, with different value recognitions can be found structured in various patterns, 
also in the space of statements referring to tactics in Irregular Warfare. Such analysis 
has not yet been a part of Swedish War Studies traditions.  
The space of tactical thought as statements180 obtained by the sample of field 
commanders contains several different structural indications. We can identify different 
tactical preferences in the same context (of Irregular Warfare) that are possible to link to 
different sociological aspects. We can connect to a generalized value structure, and 
identify certain distribution trends of background factors, all in the same space of 
statements. Difficulties in the ability to draw conclusions do however exist. The 
structure of the space of statements has stronger data support than the background factor 
ones. Nonetheless, differences in tactical preferences have been shown, as indications of 
background factor structuring signs in a value/capital context. Differences exist, and 
differences matter, especially when values are questioned and threatened. It is a 
commonly known fact that frictions and struggles occur when economic interests clash 
with different values of tactics and unit development needs. Potentiality for interest 
struggles is also of obvious importance for launching new ideas and creative 
development enterprises. 
The Bourdieu concept of field is possible to be used to discuss differences in 
standpoints and relations to background factors connected to properties which can 
reveal characteristics of the space. Two perspectives thus emerge. First, if the space of 
standpoints can be argued to contain some relational characteristics. In this case, the aim 
is to identify social groupings sharing the same values that oppose other groupings. In 
short, if relational structures can be indicated and their properties identified. In such a 
case, indications of a potentiality for tactical development struggles are possible to be 
described. The previous discussion identified properties relating to unit types, 
backgrounds and affiliation and international experiences of certain character, with a 
distribution of certain tactical types. However, the character of the sample consisting of 
field officers working hard with current unit training, production and structural 
transformation, is probably less likely to generate time consuming interest struggles in 
tactics.  
                                                 
180 The space of statements is described as follows. Axis 1; Two different ranges of tactical thought, 
mainly with equal focus on larger or smaller, or a more distinct focus on smaller units. Distributed tactics 
with a combination of reconnaissance and combat concepts/capabilities are prioritized. Opposite, we find 
larger units collectively operating with a clearer combat conceptual focus. These variations are argued to 
belong to the conceptual sphere of thinking (or capability needs; “how to act”). Axis 2; Two different 
ranges of tactical thought are identified. The first; regarding thought of primarily military tasks and 
kinetic effects. Secondly; a broader thought of military and civilian tasks or mainly of civilian tasks. Here, 
the focus is on non-kinetic or a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic effects. These positions are 
suggested to belong to a contextual sphere of thinking (or in terms of operational/tactical environment; 
“where to act”). 
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On the other hand, if some strong individuals emerge presenting and fighting for a new 
tactical solution, struggles might very well emerge. However, viewing a horizon of 
expectations, such as might be argued to contain differences regarding tactical thinking 
of Irregular Warfare, the existence of a diversity of differences in the space of 
standpoints is thus claimed to contain a potentiality of a field-like character. 
Secondly, if the space of statements viewed as a social space with different value 
recognitions and a field-like potentiality, in a larger perspective can be seen as a part of 
a possible field of “Swedish military thinking”. This question is regarded as highly 
interesting, containing several actors and groupings all dealing with the sum of 
resources spent on Swedish war capabilities. It thus involves several different military 
cultures and traditions, influence possibilities, interests and ambitions. In such a broad 
and comprehensive study the concepts of capital and field will become obvious tools for 
structuring and analysing data. 
Based on the presented result, regarding the space of statements on tactics in Irregular 
Warfare, a field analysis of a possible space of “Swedish Military thought of tactics and 
strategy” could lead to new further information. Such, currently unknown, areas are for 
example, how a possible sub-field of tactics in Irregular Warfare is placed in the larger 
field, and the connections to a possible sub-field of tactics in Regular Warfare, to 
operational art and, in relation to strategy. Areas such as gender, informal and formal 
entry requirements, ranks, and value hierarchies might thus be possible to be examined, 
delivering knowledge on sociological structures in relation to different kinds of tactical 
preferences. A structured examination of what properties are valued more or less and 
what doxa, or taken-for-granted truths that flourish, will also provide new perspectives 
on current ways of understanding tactics, and relating it to different parts of the defence 
and governmental structures and individuals.  
After examining structural dispositions based on specific question results, still another 
perspective is possible to discuss, now concerning the individual distribution of the 
officers in the space of statements. The graph on the next page shows the individual 
distribution of the 43 officers. This means that the property holders of certain values (as 
different background factors might be associated with officially or unofficially) can be 
seen in relation to the four tactical types in the model. 
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Figure 22. Individual distribution in relation to the tactical types in the model. 
As can be seen in the graph above, the broad distribution provides possibilities to view 
several clusters by choice. Officers position all over the space; in fact, they seem rather 
equally distributed over all tactical types at a first glance. However, as pointed out 
earlier, positions close to the centre cannot be analysed. Also a distance of more than 
0.5 between positions is sought in order to be viewed as observable. Distances over 0.5 
and preferably 1.0 are regarded as a clear indication of positional differences. That 
result shows the following numerical distribution in total, relating to the four tactical 
types; 
 
 
 
RW Ranger                                                                    RW Mechanized  
Tactics                                                                             Tactics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HW Infantry                                                                   HW Mechanized 
Tactics                                                                             Tactics 
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? Regular Warfare context, Ranger tactics thinking : 14 officers (7 BnCo, 7 
CoyCO) 
? Regular Warfare context, Mechanized tactics thinking: 7 officers ( 3 BnCO, 
 4  CoyCO  ) 
? Hybrid Warfare context, Infantry tactics thinking: 12 officers (2 BnCO,  
10 CoyCo ) 
? Hybrid Warfare context, Mechanized tactics thinking: 10 officers (1 BnCo, 
      9 CoyCO) 
 
The empirical quantitative individual distribution in relation to the officers’ role can be 
summarized according to the quarters in the model in the figure below. 
                    Concepts 
 
  Context   
Small or Mixed 
unit concepts 
Larger unit 
concepts 
Total sum 
Regular Warfare (RW)  
Context 
RW Ranger tactics RW Mechanized 
tactics 
 
Total 14 7 21 
BnCO 7 3 10 
Coy CO 7 4 11 
    
Hybrid Warfare (HW)  
Context 
HW Infantry tactics HW Mechanized 
tactics 
 
Total 12 10 22 
BnCO 2 1 3 
Coy CO 10 9      19 
Total sum: 
BnCO 
CoyCO 
26 
9 
17 
17 
4 
13 
     43 
     13 
     30 
Figure 23. Individual distribution in the model according to command roles. 
Twenty-one officers are positioned in a more traditional military contextual base for 
their tactical thought. In this category almost all battalion commanders (ten) could be 
found, but only eleven company commanders. Almost equal; twenty-two officers, 
positioned in a mixed civil-military Hybrid context, but here we find only three 
battalion commanders. A majority of company commanders (nineteen) are however, 
found here. Regarding conceptual distribution; mainly regarding smaller (platoon or 
company) or a combination of smaller and larger (battalion or brigade) concepts versus 
primarily larger concepts, a total of twenty-six officers are positioned within the smaller 
or mixed concepts. In this category, the main body of battalion commanders and 
company commanders are to be found (nine and seventeen). Seventeen officers are 
positioned in larger concepts; here only four battalion commanders and thirteen 
company commanders are positioned. The total distribution can be said to be extensive 
all over the tactical types, with varying weights. The quantitative result shows quite an 
equal distribution in total number between Regular or Hybrid Warfare context positions. 
However, a certain dominant positioning for Battalion commander ranks is found in the 
Regular context category (ten to three for Hybrid Warfare).  
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When it come to conceptual thinking, a clear dominance lies in smaller or mixed 
concepts (twenty-six to seventeen for a larger concept focus). That dominance applies to 
both company commanders and, in particular, for battalion commander ranks (9-4).  
This result presentation has to be seen as an indication based on data from a certain time 
(2011). Twelve positions (38,16,41,36,21,4,40,42,1,23,17 and 19) are however, at a 
limited distance from the centre and are as such assessed weak indicators. However, this 
leaves thirty-one positions of forty-three with a clearer indication of tactical thought 
related to some of the tactical types. In the next graph, the twelve mentioned officers 
have been concealed.  
The remaining positions can still be seen distributed almost equally over the tactical 
types (RW Ranger = 5, RW Mec=6, HW Inf= 6(8) and HW Mec=5). Command role 
and unit type are marked. As can be seen in the graph, a large amount of officers (31 of 
43) are positioned over the four tactical types in the space of statements. Of these 
officers, the ones with roles as battalion commanders are marked; also their unit types 
have been marked. 
 
Figure 24. Graph showing non-centric distribution of officers in the space of standpoints. 
 
BnC/Mek/MekI 
Bn C/Ranger 
BnC Others 
(10 of 12  
BnCO) 
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In the left part of the space, we find six battalion commanders, and only three to the 
right. Of four Ranger unit officers, three are to be found in the left part. Mechanized or 
Mechanized Infantry unit commanders are spread over all tactical types, as are the 
remaining part of the company commanders. This shows a result characterized by a 
diversified and dual view of tactics. A potentiality of a field-like character is thus 
argued to exist, particularly within the mechanized community and in general, regarding 
the whole collective of field commanders. This character is argued to have a potentiality 
not only internally in the space of tactical thought, but also within a larger possible field 
of Swedish military thought. By this, the descriptive results from the interview 
questions have been presented. The next part presents a comparison of the space of 
standpoints with a collection of current normative doctrinal texts on Counterinsurgency 
Operations. 
4.6 The space of statements compared to normative standards for 
COIN operations. 
Introduction 
This section presents American, British, French, Canadian and Swedish normative 
views of context and concepts for tactics in Counterinsurgency operations181 Compared 
to the initial literature study on Irregular Warfare in general, this analysis has the aim 
of focusing only on normative articulations, as in doctrines for tactics in 
Counterinsurgency182, because this area is argued to be the currently most commonly 
articulated within Irregular Warfare. The descriptive result from the Multiple 
Correspondence Analyses (MCA), regarding structure of the space of statements, is 
compared with the normative findings. The section closes with a discussion on 
similarities and differences leading to a generalized answer to the question; “How does 
the descriptive result of tactical thought compare with current normative standards for 
Counterinsurgency operations? The method used is a qualitative textual analysis. 
Normative views on tactics in Irregular Warfare 
Military normative articulations can be found in doctrines and field manuals, of which 
several new or re-written texts on Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency have been 
published since 2007 in the western world183.  
                                                 
181 Appendix 8. Results from a Tactical COIN doctrine study, pp. 1-16 (16). The analysis of normative 
text origins from a study by the author during 2011 at SNDC, aiming to provide knowledge to the 
Swedish Ground Forces Combat School (MSS) for their work with new field manuals. 
182 Militärstrategisk doktrin 2011 med doktrinära grunder (MSD 12) (2011), p. 16. :” the political, 
economic, civil, psychological, social, legal, and military operations by an overall strategy taken to 
combat the Insurgency. Noted here is that the military component is only one of the total spectrums of the 
exercise of power resources and the political / civil sector has the crucial role influencing the conflict.”  
183 Some influence examples are; U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Counterinsurgency, Field 
Manual FM 3-24 (2006), U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, 
Field Manual 3-24.2 (2009), U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgency Operations, 
Joint Publication JP 3-24 (2009) and UK Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine 
Centre, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (2009). 
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In Sweden, however, the first normative text also including descriptions of Irregular 
Warfare and COIN was published in 2010184. Work on tactical field manuals and 
regulations started in Sweden from 2008.185  
A Diverging and Dual Result 
The question; how does the descriptive result of tactical thought compare with current 
normative standards for Counterinsurgency operations is answered the following way. 
In broad terms, it is suggested that the examined normative texts outline tactical 
thinking based on broader military-civilian task context thinking, with capability 
requirements for smaller, as well as larger units, not only intelligence focused but 
clearly also with offensive combat capabilities.  
Regarding contextual thinking, normative standards are positioned at the lower part of 
the model, described as a Hybrid Warfare context. As for conceptual thinking, a 
position of the normative texts is found on the left side in the model, focusing on 
smaller as well as larger unit operations, combining intelligence and combat tasks. The 
result is subsequently interpreted as a Swedish tactical preference, more diverse and 
only partly corresponding to normative standards for Counterinsurgency operations. 
Background to the result – four questions on COIN tactics 
Following a dialogue with the Swedish Army Ground Combat School 
(Markstridsskolan, MSS), several specific questions of interest arose during May 2011 
and a study was initiated. Four of these questions are included in this extract, focusing 
on primarily conceptual and contextual aspects of tactics in Counterinsurgency 
operations. The questions were the following; 
1. What characterizes the description of the Insurgency movements to be analysed 
and understood (e.g. systems thinking and the concept of Centre of Gravity)? This 
question can be characterized as a contextual question with emphasis on analysis 
needs because of a broader threat perspective (Question 2 in the appendix). 
 
2. What characterizes the description of the insurgency movements to be affected 
(e.g. effects thinking, the concept of Effects Based Approach of Operations and 
Targeting)? This question can be characterized as a contextual question, with 
focus on how to deal with Insurgency in general; for example with primarily civil 
or military means, and with kinetic or non-kinetic effects, which require other 
resources compared to those in Regular Warfare (Question 3 in the appendix). 
 
                                                 
184 Militärstrategisk doktrin 2011 med doktrinära grunder (MSD 12) (2011). 
185 Reglemente för Markoperationer, (RMO) (2009) is one example. 
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3. What characterizes the description of how the military operations are to be carried 
out (e.g. the Clear-Hold-Build principle or similar, division in offensive/defensive 
operations or otherwise)? This question can be characterized as a conceptual 
question with focus on military tactics in general (Question 6 in the appendix). 
4.  
What characterizes the perception of how to use military forces against enemy 
combatants; e.g. offensive, defensive, indirect methods? This question can also be 
characterized as a conceptual question with focus on tactics against armed 
opponents (Question 7 in the appendix). 
 
The questions where qualitative text analysis with variables was chosen, were the 
following; linkage to strategy/military strategy, operational art, tactics, command levels, 
focus on irregular actors, and regarding the war fighting capability concepts; physical, 
conceptual, moral factors. Assessment of the variable values has been as follows: not 
covered, partially covered, covered clearly, and strongly addressed. The questions were 
analysed individually for each doctrine and then compared. 
The analysis included doctrines produced in recent years after publication of U.S. FM 3-
24 COIN in December 2006. Probably the most known and influential one regarding 
tactics is the U.S. FM 3-24.2 Tactics in COIN (2009), which has been chosen. 
Furthermore, the British Field manual for COIN (2009) was chosen with regard to 
Britain's long experience in Counterinsurgency. In 2008, Canada published a 
comprehensive view of COIN (on strategic, operational, as well as on tactical levels) 
and this document was perceived to be relatively unknown though interesting, due to the 
wide experience Canadian Armed Forces possess of international operations. Also 
chosen was the 2010 published French doctrine for COIN at the tactical level, also 
because of this nation’s extensive experience in the field. A current Swedish normative 
description; the Field Manual for Manoeuvre Battalion (MSR 10) from 2010 was 
chosen to be studied. This field manual is strategically linked to the new Swedish 
Military Strategy Doctrine (MSD) 2012. MSD 12 provides the following directives in 
general for the Armed Forces in terms of COIN. 
Directives for actions against irregular state structural attacks.  
 
For necessary military interoperability there are currently various international doctrines 
for e.g. Stability Operations (SO), Crisis Respond Operations (CRO), Peace Support 
Operations (PSO) and Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN). The Armed Forces do 
not need to develop their own doctrines for national needs in the above fields. However, 
for international tasks, they need to have the knowledge and ability to work with others 
to meet irregular adversaries and hybrid threats, in parallel with a capacity for Regular 
Warfare, as the latter to various extents is required, regardless of the type of opponent in 
terms of the openly executed combat. The crucial difference in strategy and tactics in 
Regular and Irregular Warfare is that the fight is about the will and trust of the people in 
relation to the legitimacy of state power. The opponent acts hidden among the people 
and at times in open combat, as well as with traditional terror characteristics.  
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This means that the military capability has to include the ability to change and adjust 
focus between protecting people locally over time and implementing direct offensive 
actions of precision. Large and partly new obligations are thus enforced on leadership, 
knowledge, experience and personal ability of the Armed Forces’ personnel. 186       
The results of the analysis of the four questions 
Question 1. What characterizes the description of the insurgency movements to be 
analysed and understood? 
A summary of the results187, tells us that descriptions of how to analyse and understand 
Insurgency movements vary in the doctrines, all of which denounce the importance of 
the intelligence function, not least at a tactical level. The US view is significantly linked 
to systems thinking with detailed methods and models. The British and Canadian 
approach is not based on systems thinking or detailed models and methods.  
The French approach mentions systems thinking briefly. The need for extensive analysis 
is shared by all. The centre of gravity thinking has a minor role in the American and 
French doctrine compared with British and Canadian descriptions. British focus is on 
how to adapt the intelligence function and organization, as opposed to the American 
concept which prescribes how to conduct analysis from the lowest level. The Swedish 
description covers discussions of analytical needs to a limited extent.  
Question  2. What characterizes the description of how the Insurgency was affected? 
A summary of the results provides the following outcome.188 The description of how the 
rebel movements will be affected varies in content and character in the doctrines. 
Canadian descriptions emphasize that influence activities are superior to physical 
effects. The implementation concept is called "comprehensive operations". The 
importance of integrating local forces is emphasized and effects thinking; Effects Based 
Approach to Operations (EBAO) and Targeting is described. The British view contains 
a dominant concept and thinking as regards influence activities, which includes all types 
of operations, where Clear-Hold-Build is seen as a tactical activity. Targeting is 
described but not EBAO. The US retains the basic concept Clear-Hold-Build with 
variations of offensive and defensive actions. Targeting is described but not Effects 
Based Approach to Operations or effects thinking. The French description includes a 
detailed tactical concept linked to "global manoeuvre" (clearly linked to operational 
level) together with an organization example for units and military-police cooperation. 
Effect thinking is described, but neither targeting nor EBAO. The Swedish view 
mentions the comprehensive approach, but mostly exemplifies military operations 
(supporting civilian efforts) including host nation security units as well.  
The Manoeuvre Warfare concept is seen as the primary one however, also including the 
psychological aspects. The Clear-Hold-Build concept is not mentioned directly but 
implied in other words.  
                                                 
186 Militärstrategisk doktrin 2011 med doktrinära grunder (MSD 12) (2011), p. 85. (author’s translation). 
187Appendix 8. Results from a Doctrine Study on tactics in COIN, pp. 4-5. 
188Ibid. pp. 7-8. 
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Question  3. What characterizes the description of how the military operations are to 
be carried out?  
The answer to this question is summarized as follows.189 Descriptions of how military 
operations are supposed to be carried out vary. Canada's approach emphasizes the 
subordinate role of the military in civil actions. Military operations are implemented 
with variations of defensive, offensive and stability operations (full-spectrum operations 
with the so-called Comprehensive Operations). Larger and smaller operations are 
described, without connection to the Clear-Hold-Build concept. The British approach is 
based on the framework "Shape-Secure-Develop" and is described as a "Joint, 
Operational Level of approach".  
Three types of approaches are described; indirect (mainly special forces and intelligence 
operations), direct approach (military forces from supporting nations and also from the 
host nation) and balanced approaches (combined military, political and economic 
measures). The division of offensive-defensive operations/tasks is not described; only 
small-scale attacks are described.  
The US description is based entirely on the Clear-Hold-Build concept with variations of 
offensive, defensive, and stability tasks/ operations/activities. The French concepts are 
not based on the Clear-Hold-Build concept. 
The French approach is on rapid interventions to secure key areas and to neutralize 
organizations, using armed violence in the form of Guerrilla Warfare and terror. The 
focus is on the people and control of the operational environment. The efforts are sought 
with a principle of preserving the security of physical areas, and to dismantle the 
counterpart organization. The principle stated in operational planning as Oil-spot 
Strategy using a "Quadrillage" system (hierarchical area organization) in secured areas 
and counter-surveillance measures, called deterrent pressure, in the important areas. 
Substantial operational activities are described with simultaneous wide discretion at 
low-levels.  
The Swedish view prescribes that the military function should support civilian efforts. 
With Manoeuvre Warfare, Comprehensive Approach and combined arms, also 
including civilian means when possible, efforts will be taken to secure areas, demobilize 
opponents, reintegrate and support the reconstruction of the civilian society.  
Question 4. What characterizes the perception of how the military forces are supposed 
to be used against enemy combatants?  
This question can be seen as a specific part of the previous one, explicitly concerning 
the enemy combatants.190 Such descriptions of how military forces are to be used 
against enemy combatant components vary in design and detail, but the main principles 
are relatively similar. Overall, the Canadian approach is interpreted as defensive, the 
British as balanced, the American as more offensive, and the French approach clearly 
offensive.  
                                                 
189Appendix 8. Results from a Doctrine Study on tactics in COIN, pp. 9-10. 
190Ibid. pp. 12-13. 
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The Canadian vision can be interpreted as prudent in offensive operations and larger 
ones, however a combination of defensive, offensive and stabilizing capabilities are said 
to be required. The ability to perform concealed actions is emphasized down to lower 
command and unit levels.  
The British approach focuses on measures that are said to primarily affect the people 
and secondly, insurgents directly with a "minimum necessary force". The doctrine 
mainly describes attack (strike/surge) actions and influence operations with clarity. The 
American approach is based on the principle that the military units are to operate 
equally well in both offensive, and defensive roles, as well as stabilizing operations. All 
in all, the enemy will be encountered and handled, as also the population will be 
protected and controlled. The offensive techniques include "movement to contact", 
"attack", "exploit" and "pursue". An offensive approach is characterized by surprise, 
simple plans, boldly executed, concentration (whether it be visible/invisible or 
kinetic/non-kinetic effects), appropriate speed and flexibility.  
Overall, the doctrines do not describe in detail how the enemy combatant elements are 
to be dealt with, but the main norm can be understood as with smaller combat 
operations. France describes a complete tactical system, where military units support the 
police in security (sometimes implementing security operations), units defensively 
protect the population through the "Quadrillage" system (cut off relations for the 
insurgents), and by offensive actions in depth, also using guerrilla tactics. Concealed, 
surprising irregular behaviour and high operational secrecy are highlighted as important. 
Only carrying out large-scale operations when one is sure of success, leads to a need for 
the highest capacity and skills for conducting patrol activities. The Swedish view can be 
summarized as a balanced approach focusing on stabilization tasks, if necessary 
however, with offensive action to eliminate or kill insurgents. The descriptions are 
mainly related to traditional warfare tactics concerning combat and offensive 
approaches.  
Summary of the answers of the four questions 
These answers to the four questions on contextual and conceptual normative views can 
be summarized as follows. Regarding the contextual perspective, all texts confess to a 
more or less comprehensive approach, where the military tasks are combined with the 
civilian tasks and efforts, from the most civilian enhancing Canadian view to the French 
most militarily articulated view. A dominant contextual perspective with expectations, 
and need for a broader Hybrid Warfare perspective for tactical thinking can be argued to 
exist. Regarding the differences in conceptual views, they can be interpreted ranging 
from the rather clear Small Wars focused Canadian view, to the very detailed French 
descriptions of an adapted Brigade Combat Team of enemy centric capabilities, with 
Guerrilla Warfare in-depth capacities. Differences are also possible to be identified 
between the British and American descriptions, both describing requirements for 
smaller as well as larger operational and tactical concepts, however not with specific 
detailed examples. The Swedish conceptual view could be interpreted by a vision of 
tactics with task force organized manoeuvre battalions, still with an emphasis on a 
Regular Warfare culture mind-set.  
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Discussion of the results 
The results suggest that various normative standards in current international and 
Swedish texts are viewed as having an acceptable robustness and level of validity. 
Despite basing on only four questions, the diversity in articulations is easy to detect. 
The perhaps unexpected scattered result of various tactical aspects of COIN can be 
criticized because of the broad and imprecise questions. The interpretation and 
generalization that the doctrines in many respects present varied and diverse viewpoints 
on tactics in COIN, are in a logical sense not surprising. Past experience and traditions 
in COIN vary to a large extent, such as how the area was chosen to be approached by 
the “rediscovery” around 2006-7. In terms of military culture, the French view is 
interpreted as more offensive, the Canadian more defensive, whereas the Anglo-Saxon 
views are more balanced. The Swedish text is viewed as balancing offensive and 
defensive approaches. In terms of the contextual focus on violence areas, France is 
perceived to outline a main focus on Guerrilla Warfare and terrorism. All doctrines 
focus primarily towards smaller-scale efforts, which allow a general interpretation 
primarily of Guerrilla Warfare. 
Neither Canada nor the British describe any unit concepts to a greater extent. The 
American view presents thinking in Brigade Battle groups with capability requirements, 
and France do the same to an even more detailed level (e.g. capability need for 
operating with own units with guerrilla tactics, deep into enemy controlled territory). 
Differences in expressions do exist and were partly expected for several reasons.  
As the time for rewriting, rethinking or articulating new and possible limited reflected 
views of tactics in COIN has been short (2007 – 2010), differences are to be expected. 
Secondly, differences in rooms of experiences and horizons of expectations regarding 
Counterinsurgency operations exist among the countries, giving a further explanation to 
the various articulations. However, the descriptions of the context have to be seen as 
rather similar regarding the contextual expectations.  
Swedish conditions are different in several respects compared to the examined western 
doctrines and field manuals. An obvious example is the limited number of Swedish 
units and limited numbers of exercises beyond company level. A background not 
involving COIN also gives a precondition, where the Swedish standpoints have to be 
viewed as introductory and preliminary, mainly influenced by American and British 
experiences and writings. Even so, several lower conflict experiences, if not labelled 
COIN, such as mainly from the Balkans, have influenced Swedish thought and writings.  
The result in all, with the apparent differences when comparing the normative texts to 
the Swedish model of tactical preferences, can be seen as unexpected. Over ten years of 
COIN operations in Afghanistan might be thought to have produced rather similar 
tactical thought and expressions. However, only parts of the sample have experiences 
from Afghanistan operations and Swedish normative texts had not been distributed or 
known; nor had the military been trained accordingly during the time of the analysis.  
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Answer to the question; “How does the descriptive result of tactical thought compare 
with current normative standards for Counterinsurgency Operations? 
The normative standards’ positions only partially correspond to the descriptive model of 
Swedish tactical thought on Irregular Warfare. Regarding contextual thinking, the 
normative standards’ position at the lower part of the model, can be described as a 
Hybrid Warfare context. As for conceptual thinking, a position of the normative texts is 
claimed to be found on the left side in the model, with focus on smaller as well as larger 
unit operations, combining intelligence and combat tasks.  
Given the tradition in Sweden with, on the one hand, a deeply rooted Regular Warfare 
mind-set and on the other, traditions of Small Wars (ranger) tactics, the character of the 
result seems credible.  
With this doctrine comparison of Swedish preferences, the analysis work in all has been 
presented and it is time to answer the research question.  
4.7 The answer to the research question 
This section answers the research question outlined as; "how can contemporary Swedish 
military thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare be characterized using descriptive 
standpoint patterns, mapped in relation to background factors and normative 
standards?" 
The answer, generated by the results of the descriptive analyses and the normative 
comparison, is described in five blocks; a characteristic of how tactics in general is 
understood; a characteristic of how tactics in Irregular Warfare in general is thought of, 
the main result: a model of the Swedish space of statements of thought on tactics in 
Irregular Warfare consisting of four tactical types, a sociological discussion of 
background factor structures and character, and finally a normative comparison of the 
model with a selection of international and Swedish doctrinal standards for tactics in  
Counterinsurgency operations.  
The officers’ general view of tactics per se191 can be characterized with an interpretation 
as either the use of units or resources to reach a specific goal, or as ways of thinking in 
general. Reflective views on principal influences can be described as either having a 
Regular Warfare tradition domination, or a more generic and wider analytical approach, 
or a more direct Irregular Warfare tactics/tactical perspective. Influences on tactical 
thinking connect mainly to education and training activities, literature and gaming, 
personal experiences, personal influences such as from senior officers, colleagues and 
exercises. Direct or indirect practice is considered important for influences. Compared 
to the areas of strategy and operational art, the officers’ interest in tactics is clearly 
dominant. However, communicating and speaking of tactics is not a well-developed 
tradition. Experiences and influences from past wars are thought to be important for the 
development of tactics and tactical thinking, still the view is largely scattered. Areas 
such as education and exercises were only mentioned by a few.  
                                                 
191 p. 62. The result regarding general views on tactics per se. 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
101 
 
A rather consistent way of thinking exists with a self-image of field or troop officer, 
thinking tactics as a combination of theory and practice, and with a basic offensive 
mind-set. Skills and knowledge in Regular Warfare for national defence needs are 
higher prioritized than skills in Irregular Warfare for multinational operations. Focus is 
on troops rather than technical aspects, with an ambition to lead and develop tactics for 
larger units (battalion structures rather than specialized company formations). 
The officers’ general reflections on tactics in Irregular Warfare192 can be characterized 
by expressions mostly regarding conceptual aspects, including capability and functional 
area aspects, for example, Intelligence. Broader aspects such as military and civilian 
relations, education and training, leadership and mind-set are addressed only on a few 
occasions. Even if many of the articulations correspond to general current COIN 
standards, views still exist with a more Regular Warfare mind-set. A major aspect in 
thinking relates to new or other demands in command and functional thinking, for 
example, Intelligence, Psychological Operations and Electronic Warfare. A minor 
number of officers emphasized Regular Warfare capabilities.  
As for war fighting capabilities, moral and conceptual factors (or combined) are in 
focus, as opposed to physical factors. A common view of tactics in Irregular Warfare 
and Counterinsurgency is a focus on Guerrilla Warfare, in contrast to lower violence 
areas such as subversion and terrorism. Regarding conceptual views, a unified focus on 
basic battalion structures with additional special functions, capable of operating in task 
group structures is evident. Tactics in Irregular Warfare is viewed to have a low priority 
in the Swedish Armed Forces. Quite a common view however, is that development of 
tactics for Irregular Warfare is needed and important.  
The Main result; the model of the Swedish space of statements of thought on tactics in 
Irregular Warfare consists of a two-by-two generic model of tactical types.193 This 
model provides an inter-subjective constructed structure of the space of statements. The 
tactical types are labelled and broadly explained as follows: 1) Regular Warfare; ranger 
tactics with focus on military tasks, smaller and larger units and reconnaissance: 2) 
Regular Warfare; mechanized tactics with focus on military tasks, larger units, and 
combat: 3) Irregular/Hybrid Warfare: infantry tactics focused on mixed military and 
civilian tasks, smaller and larger units, reconnaissance and combat: and finally, 4) 
Irregular/Hybrid Warfare: mechanized tactics focused on military and civilian tasks, 
larger units and combat. These tactical types are suggested as the content of the space of 
statements, mainly constructed with two perspectives; contextual and conceptual. The 
investigated sample distributes quite equally over the types 2, 3 and 4. A certain weight 
can be noted for type 1. 
Sociological structures of background factors positioned in the space of statements are 
possible to identify.194. Unit affiliation (regimental culture and traditions) and Unit 
background distribute most clearly. Unit affiliation and background show correlation 
regarding ranger and infantry affiliation, background and tactical thinking.  
                                                 
192 pp. 62-63. The result regarding general reflection on tactics in Irregular Warfare. 
193 p. 75. The result in the form of a  model of the distribution of standpoints. 
194 pp. 78-84. Result of background factor structures in the space of statements. 
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This is however, not possible to be identified regarding mechanized affiliation, 
background and tactical thinking. Command roles show an observable distribution. 
Rank and military education levels show signs of weak distribution, as opposed to 
civilian education, where 2-year programmes are found on the lower side of axis 2, 
opposite to 3-year Economics and university education on the upper side of axis 2. Age 
shows a nonlinear distribution on axis 1 mainly, where higher age are found more 
significantly positioned compared to the younger categories. International mission 
experiences seem to bear marks more dependent on where and how many times one has 
served compared to what role and action one has participated in.  
Many background factors distribute rather axis/quarter-centric, several with minor 
position distances, leaving a weaker basis for a capital-field discussion. However, 
observable results can be found. The space of standpoints is suggested to be viewed as a 
social space where relational structures exist195. Seen in a possible larger space of tactics 
or strategy, the results indicate a potentiality of field characteristics in Swedish military 
thought, implying potential power and influence struggles and development dynamics. 
The model with the standpoint distribution related in two dimensions (each quarter 
labelled with a generalized tactical type) is shown in the next figure, also including the 
distribution structure of Symbolic Capital. 
 
Figure 25. Symbolic Capital structure in the space of statements. 
                                                 
195 p. 87. Result of  capital distribution in the model regarding structure of Military Symbolic Capital 
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Compared with normative standards, the space of Swedish tactical thought is argued to 
be partially coherent but also partly comprising various thoughts related to normative 
tactics in Irregular Warfare regarding Counterinsurgency Operations196. Subsequently, 
there are indications of different opinions on the requirements for warfare capabilities 
and officer competences, leadership and education.  
The Swedish descriptive result of tactical types contains two primary aspects; military 
task focus and focus on combat tasks, possibly conflicting or even contradicting 
normative texts on tactics in COIN (American, British, French, Canadian and Swedish 
doctrines or field manuals). Tactical type 1: Regular Warfare ranger tactics and, in 
particular, type 2: Regular Warfare mechanized tactics, represent tactical thought not 
corresponding to normative views of a contextual mind-set addressing military as well 
as civilian task solving capabilities. 
Swedish military thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare can thus be characterized as 
dualistic structuring in a fourfold space of statements constructed by conceptual and 
contextual preferences, only partly corresponding to normative standards. A Military 
social structure is found with expected positions of ranger officers rather equally 
dispersed, but a scattered result for mechanized officers, indicating a number of officers 
with untraditional tactical thinking compared to what is usually the modus of 
mechanized Regular Warfare. 
                                                 
196 p. 100. Result of the normative comparison regarding how the descriptive results of tactical thought 
compare with the current normative standards for Counterinsurgency Operations. 
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5 Discussion, reflection and conclusions 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a discussion of the answer to the research 
question. First, validity and reliability of the results and work are discussed. Thereafter, 
consequences of the results are discussed in relation to tactics per se, operational art and 
strategy. Field characteristics and potentiality are subsequently discussed, linked to the 
influence of Bourdieu thinking. A reflection of the work is presented and the chapter 
ends with the main conclusions. 
The main argument proposed is that the finding of a duality of tactical thought has to be 
recognised per see, and obviously to be seen in relation to strategy, operational art and 
leadership. This, especially when discussing Irregular Warfare scenarios. Different and 
partly contradicting tactical preferences, problematic in resource-constrained armies to 
conceptualize in the same units bring forward several questions on coherence. One 
major question is to what extent does such tactical thought correlate with strategic 
thinking nationally and in an international normative perspective? If admitting to an 
idea where strategy and tactics are but different sides of the same coin and correlation is 
thus obviously important, one can ask if a broad tactical thought articulation is the result 
of an equally broad strategy. Or, if the first is a sign of an experienced reality different 
for officers in different units and only partially connecting to a vague and dim vision of 
strategy. 
5.2 Problem and argument of the present work 
Discussing the present study as a whole, it is important to recapitulate what the work is 
actually about. What has been studied and what results have been presented and with 
what precision? First, tactical preferences have been studied. However, what is really 
meant by the term tactics is not self-evident, not even in the military community. In the 
introduction part of the study a definition was presented, which without any further 
discussion, explained this phenomenon as “methods and techniques used in order to 
reach a military goal, often associated to combat”.197 Such a broad explanation opens 
up many ways for an investigation. Merely the fact that three different activities are 
mentioned as key components; methods, techniques and goals, means that different foci 
are possible to be used for investigating relational structures, such as standpoints of 
preferences. Relational structures in different spaces bring us back to the theoretical 
baseline for the study. An approach, founded on Bourdieu’s field theory and 
methodological tools was chosen, and such an approach sets the whole study in a 
specific frame. An important view regarding Bourdieu’s work and types of results is 
that what is presented is clearly to be seen as an ideally typical model, constructed with 
the aim of further compilations using actual situations. Therefore, the results do not aim 
at declaring an answer to the question of what tactics and tactical thought or Irregular 
Warfare “are” per se.  
                                                 
197 p. 2. Footnote no 4. Introductory discussion of the general regarding understanding of the term tactics. 
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The results aim for a contribution to subsequent research work, to analyse relational 
status in tactical thought in practice, consequently to be mirrored by the articulated 
strategy of the current time. This contribution is to be seen as a model, sketch or map of 
different positions of thought constructing a reality of relational indications. An aid to 
further knowledge work striving for better understanding of aspects and perspectives, 
contributing to development and adaption of tactics linked to strategy. Such results also 
seem obviously important to analyse in relation to operational art and leadership, 
particularly important in such complex environments as Irregular Warfare and 
Counterinsurgency.198 A principal result is the possibility to show that different 
perspectives might exist regarding tactical thought, resulting in serious over-
simplifications if trying to discuss or explain tactics without reflecting such a fact.  
Tactics is thought of by people with different backgrounds, habits, intentions and 
experiences. Sociologically as well as culturally related parameters inflict, for example, 
cost-benefit thinking; thus often making generalizations not relevant other than to 
specific samples under specific circumstances. Bourdieu’s constructionism is said to be 
impossible to distinguish from relational perspectives and it is such a view and result 
that has guided this study. The question of validity concerns how well the results of the 
analysis and the answer to the research question really correspond and provide a 
relevant answer to the research question. Have the right aspects been measured? Have 
terms been used consistently and equally understandably for all respondents and even 
afterwards during the analysis work. The degree of validity can be tested in several 
ways, for example, with the strategies of reasoning assessment of validity and empirical 
validity tests. 
Validity of terms addresses if the operationalization of interview questions and 
measurement of tactical thought in Irregular Warfare really capture what they claimed 
to do. The use of opposing variables in the interview questions, for example; small or 
large unit structures, collective or distributed operations, focusing on military or civilian 
tasks and either kinetic or non-kinetic approaches, on the one hand, they can be argued 
to be quite clear and understandable principles for most officers. On the other hand, one 
has to bear in mind that the degree of understanding, knowledge and familiarity of 
discussing similar activities, vary to a great extent among the officers. In order to 
counter such deficiencies, recurring attempts were made during the interviews to 
explain and exemplify what in fact was meant by the questions and answer alternatives.  
Nevertheless, a more stringent set of definitions on each question would have possibly 
resulted in a higher degree of validity of terms. For some respondents it was not self-
evident if the questions concerned own actions, or actions from a potential enemy, 
which for some respondents required a certain amount of time, in order to sort out the 
actual meaning of certain questions. The opinion is however, that a reasonable degree of 
common understanding was reached on the whole.  
 
                                                 
198 A study was launched during the spring of 2014 by the Leadership Department (SNDC) aiming to 
examine leadership challenges in Irregular Warfare. The study uses the result from this dissertation and in 
particular, the model of the four tactical types. 
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As for the construction, a model aiming to provide a research tool as well as a first 
reasonably understandable result, the axes interpretations and labelling of the quarters 
are argued to be valid and make sense, supporting realistic requirements for accuracy. 
However, a certain amount of military basic knowledge is confessed to be needed in 
order to understand the model. 
Discussing the degree of internal validity and risks of drawing very firm conclusions of 
the data and measurements, the result has pointed out some difficulty in making 
conclusions related to certain background factor positions. The question of external 
validity; if the result can be generalized to other populations/samples, it is strictly 
beyond the scope of the study, as an almost full sample has been investigated, but it is 
still of interest. The question of sub-field characteristics of the space, seen as a part of a 
larger possible field of tactics-strategy relational structures, deserves attention. Such 
research can bring light to power struggle potentialities and sociological structures other 
than commonly known hierarchical ones, such as theories of consecrational structures 
forming value opinions. This is when and where the field theory actually comes into 
play and thus, external validity comes into focus.  
Regarding the Swedish Armed Forces, the view is that the result can be applied to land 
forces officers in general, and also other services and arms, not only commanding 
rifle/manoeuvre units. For the last ten years or so, officers from all services, arms and 
branches have served in Afghanistan and prior to that in the Balkans. Subsequently, 
quite a large number of officers have broadly similar spaces of experiences and possibly 
similar horizons of expectations as covered by this study’s results. Thus, the experience 
of Irregular Warfare and preferences on tactics can be assumed to be quite spread over 
the armed forces, making a generalization of the result model possible. Even if 
education and training in Irregular Warfare tactics has been less prominent for the 
investigated population, impact from recent years’ major focus on Afghanistan has in 
some areas been considerable, particularly within the regiments setting up the 
participating units.  
On the other hand, an assumption that officers in general could distribute over the 
model becomes of limited interest if one does not bring in the idea of background factor 
structures analysis. It is then, with sociology, that unknown social structures of spaces 
of experiences and horizons of expectations can be unveiled. With that said, a view of 
generalizing validity becomes interesting. The distribution of the results indicates a 
reality of different standpoints regarding tactical thought, and such a reality seems also 
logical to be found in a larger sample or group. Given the construction structure of the 
model, similar results will probably be found even in other samples. However, 
following the view of Bourdieu regarding the uniqueness of a certain condition and time 
period, longitudinal generalizations of the standpoint distribution in the model deserve a 
warning, due to the variation of focus of conflict types that are emphasized from time to 
time. To what extent the results might be possible to generalize to a larger group, say 
battalion and company commanding officers in other smaller European countries, 
regarding the preference of tactics in Irregular Warfare, one has to address several other 
issues, for example different kinds of military culture.  
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However, based on my professional experience and judgment, I would argue that a great 
many officers with similar traditions, military culture background and international 
mission experiences, probably would end up in one of the four tactical types, or in some 
combination. A preference for the Big or the Small War is not a unique Swedish 
military characteristic. The result that shows a dispersed space of standpoints and 
preference, also from this small population, does however question Anthony King’s 
transformation argument with a knowledge and preference convergence regarding 
tactics in Irregular Warfare. Contrary to a convergence development, a diverging 
development is probably more likely when looking beneath the surface of staff 
structures, procedures and new brigade conceptualizations. 
The question of reliability concerns whether the measuring methods can be considered 
to be consistent and thus argued to have a high degree of inter-subjectivity. Following 
on from the results of the initial literature study; the empirical generalization can be 
argued merely to contain aspects commonly addressed in various explanations of 
Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency. To a certain degree that is a valid 
observation, but two particular interrelated aspects are argued to be emphasized more 
strongly and clearly than many critical texts of Irregular Warfare. The first is the 
military-civilian intermingling or demarcation difficulty, and the second concerns the 
broadened span of violence activities. In the Regular Warfare tradition, it has not been a 
general requirement for officers to have the skills and understanding to deal with 
subversion, terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare, in parallel with general warfare. 
Altogether, the result is argued to contain a reasonable degree of reliability for the 
purpose of framing the context and focusing on certain commonly described aspects.  
Many factors are involved to make a reliability assessment, here focusing on the work 
with the MCA. The use of the software tool SPAD means moreover, that the results are 
easy to test/re-test, as has been done several times. This supports an opinion of high 
intra-code reliability. The main method for analysing the interview data, the MCA, is 
considered to have a high degree of inter-subjectivity. Several data computations have 
been performed and even if a degree of variation of the graphical positions occurs, the 
overall picture and result stand firm. The descriptions of the work should also satisfy 
replication demands. However, an MCA replication does require a basic knowledge of 
the use of the computer-aided SPAD programme, which takes some time to acquire. 
The method of using this, or similar, software is therefore not recommended without 
previous practical knowledge, if a study work has a fairly limited time frame. 
The result of the standpoint distribution was interpreted as a two-dimensional model 
construction, with generalized interpretations of the axes. These interpretations were for 
axis 1; conceptual thinking, and for axis 2; contextual thinking, where each of the four 
quarters was labelled with tactical type names. The first part; interpretations of axes 
categories structuring the model have been tested regarding inter-assessment 
reliability.199  
                                                 
199 Appendix 9. Inter-assessment reliability test of axes interpretations 2013-07-19.  
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This test aimed to identify possible differences or similarities in interpretation of the 
character of axis 1 and 2. Pictures of the graphs showing the result distribution were 
shown to a test person, who was questioned regarding what logical clusters could be 
identified, and what generalized characteristics each axis could be interpreted as having. 
The results for axis 1 were interpretations such as; “the terrain/space”, 
“time/space/forces in traditional military thinking”, and “strategic effects of the 
operational environment on units’ organization and requirements of capabilities”. Axis 
2 was interpreted as ”thinking of the context”, however not as clear as axis 1 
interpretations. This result corresponds to the study interpretations; axis 1; conceptual 
thinking and axis 2; contextual thinking, which supports an assessment of the validity of 
the model in general. 
The result from the MCA/SPAD work, based on the interview questions, is viewed to 
have validity and reliability for position results in the graphs. Regarding the qualitative 
interpretation of a higher abstraction of generalized thinking on tactics, as well as on 
tactics in Irregular Warfare, the result is argued to present military logic from a sample 
with clear differences in spaces of experiences, but rather similar traditions of horizons 
of expectations, regarding the purpose of Swedish military power. Concerning the 
normative comparison with the descriptive result, a set of military doctrines was used. 
This part of the study can be viewed to contain a lower degree of precision, as the 
degree of variable existence was analysed qualitatively and from a habituated pre-
understanding.  
Furthermore, there are limited connections to the total doctrine structures within each 
nation, though such pre-understanding and knowledge has existed indirectly due to 
previous work. The assessment of reasoning validity in the form of face validity or 
sense, in relation to common military knowledge is however, that the results capture 
what the texts articulate. 
In sum, the work and the methods in this study are perceived as encompassing an 
acceptable ’robustness’ and level of validity and reliability. An almost full population, a 
traceable result from a method, a relatively thorough description, positioning the 
researcher out of direct result impact and a traceable comparison with normative texts, 
all claim to present reliable work with transferable considerations of the chosen methods 
and references to the sources. Reliability is also supported by the scope of the 
description of the theory and method used. The work is argued to have been presented 
with a reasonable degree of transparency, although in this case, not following 
Bourdieu´s way, according to some criticism levelled against his work200.  
 
                                                 
200 Donald Broady (ed.), ´Kultur och utbildning. Om Pierre Bourdieus sociologi´, UHÄ/FoU-skriftserie  
      1985:4: Universitets- och högskoleämbetet, FoU-enheten, p. 9.  
      Donald Broady, Sociologi och epistemologi. Pierre Bourdieus författarskap och den historiska  
       epistemologin, andra korrigerade upplagan (Stockholm: HLS Förlag, 1991), p. 541.  
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5.3 Military mind-set – the dynamics of tactical and strategic 
thought 
The results consist of a qualitative model of a space of current tactical thought on 
Irregular Warfare, comprising four rather different tactical types; Regular Warfare 
context with ranger tactics (RW rangers), Regular Warfare context with mechanized 
tactics (RW mechanized) versus Irregular/Hybrid Warfare context with either infantry 
tactics (HW infantry) or mechanized tactics (HW mechanized). 
A quantitative result was obtained regarding the graphical distribution of the officers 
individually over these four tactical types. That result disclosed a rather even 
distribution over the four tactical types, also excluding individuals who positioned close 
to centre. A large number of officers (31 of 43) positioned less centric-close over the 
four tactical types in the space of statements. Six battalion commanders could be found 
in the left parts of the space versus three in the right parts. Of four ranger unit associated 
officers, three were found in the left parts. Mechanized or mechanized infantry unit 
commanders were spread over all tactical types, as were several of the company 
commanders. The strongest structuring feature concerned conceptual thinking; 
small/large or small units, operating dispersed with reconnaissance or combined 
combat/reconnaissance, on the left side of the space. And opposite, larger units 
operating collectively with combat tasks, positioned on the right side of the model. Two 
features are identified by this. The commanders distribute all over the tactical types, 
with the most obvious standpoint differences concerning conceptual solutions; one 
group being rather Small Wars-centric, and the other more Regular Warfare focused.  
Compared with the model of tactical types referred to in the research situation 
description: the developed Archer Jones’ generic model which deals with relationships 
between tactical types, this model is argued to have quite another and more multifaceted 
applicability.201 This study’s qualitative model of the space of tactical thought in 
Irregular Warfare contains four generic tactical types and a sociologically structure of 
background factors, making this construction, arguably, more representative when 
searching for a human face of war, compared to Storr’s development of Archer’s model. 
Furthermore, the model in this study questions Anthony King’s claim of a convergence 
of knowledge and standpoints in the ongoing military transformation.202 
If such a structure indeed exists, as the model outlines, one can expect different tactical 
mind-sets, opposing each other. Downsizing the land forces might also lead to further 
struggles of interest. If so, different types of interest groupings, according to tactical 
preferences, might emerge. The results bring forward different possible consequences 
for tactical development per se. Taking the basic capabilities: Command and Control, 
Intelligence/Information, Protection, Sustainability, Mobility and Effects on targets as a 
discussion base, one can argue for several differences: when it comes to training, 
equipment, organization and production.  
                                                 
201 p. 11. regarding the Archer Jones model. 
202 p. 12. Anthony Kings argument regarding a knowledge and standpoint convergence. 
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The previously described summary chart presented some general characteristics stated 
to be different when comparing the tactical types203. The differences in basic 
capabilities can be said to cover more or less all capabilities, thus leading to different 
needs for education, training, equipment and organizations in order to conceptualize 
each tactical type. A way to conceptualize a practical meaning for the four tactical types 
can be to discuss the span and consequences in practice. Examples of such discussion 
areas are: task focus such as combat and/or intelligence, organizational structures, such 
as independently operating smaller units, patrols, platoon and companies, or larger 
formations, such as battalions and brigades as manoeuvre elements, sustainability 
demands, effects focus and capability requirements for only visible activities or mostly 
concealed/clandestine approaches.  
As the result show preferences for Small Wars with great demands on intelligence, 
larger warfare focusing on combat and also in “combination or Hybrid Warfare”, three 
meta-types of conceptual thinking or preferences can be distinguished. Two of these are 
more traditionally well-known: ranger/infantry and mechanized tactics, based on 
thought and practice with a focus on specialization for each particular use and 
environment. The third, combined thinking can be realized either with several 
specialized units under a higher command or with units containing more of both types 
of capabilities.  
The first conceptual approach demands a certain volume of units permitting such 
specialization; this is not possible in the current and planned Swedish Army. The second 
solution demands training and exercise time and resources that result in more multi-role 
capable ground force units. This solution seems, at least in the current and near time 
perspective, also hard to realize. Different preferences and tactical thinking, per se, a 
valuable asset in an officer corps, will enhance the discourse development of tactics 
with different views and arguments on “best solutions”.  
A challenge seems to exist as to what degree the arguments and opinions rest on 
practical experiences, deeper knowledge and understanding, on what is possible to 
achieve with differently trained and equipped units. Or, putting it into a Bourdieu-
Koselleck perspective; on what practical sense are the tactical choices resting, due to the 
existing spaces of tactical experiences and horizons of strategic expectations? As the 
results show a large proportion of traditional Regular Warfare thinking exists, even 
when asked to articulate thinking in Irregular Warfare, such a tradition seems to be quite 
timeless and can be expected to exist in the future. Still, the slightly more dominant 
Small War preferences exist and might linger on and influence tactical thinking, despite 
the historically intermittent interest of Irregular Warfare in the western world. Again, 
this result does not support a view of convergence regarding views of tactics in Irregular 
Warfare. Conclusions from previous discussions indicate on the contrary that tactics can 
be understood and thought of rather differently and dualistically, even when focusing on 
the same type of context.  
                                                 
203 Figure 17. Examples of some basic capabilities and characteristics argued different for the four tactical 
types, p. 77. 
 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
112 
 
Context understanding can therefore be said to be of significant importance for tactical 
thinking. Different tactical models or types will be more or less suitable in different 
contexts or scenarios. The ability to adapt to different tactical models is thus of high 
value. Education in tactics is subsequently suggested to contribute to a variety of tactical 
types/thinking, with capabilities that are traditional, but particularly non-traditional. A 
degree of caution regarding expected or taken for granted spaces of experiences and 
horizons of expectations is suggested. Given the often limited resources for field 
exercises of dignity, where units and functions are tested for extensive times, different 
tactical type experiences will probably seldom be found in one and the same officer. 
That might be the case to an even greater extent looking at Hybrid Warfare context 
based concepts. The same goes for tactical thought daring to combine more unorthodox 
or mechanized tactics with, for example, ranger tactics, not only on the operational level 
but also the tactical level.  
A conclusion is that staffs, for planning and directing operations, have to have different 
tactical experts to a greater extent than ordinary organisational structures in the future. 
Conversely, with such variations of tactical preferences in a field unit collective, it is not 
self-evident that either traditional mechanized tactical thinking or modern Hybrid 
Warfare tactical thinking for Counterinsurgency Operations automatically will be found 
among staff members in a battalion or brigade staff. If expertise in Regular Warfare as 
well as Hybrid Warfare tactics is required, more extensive training for officers, units 
and soldiers in each of the different areas probably has to be organized; at least as long 
as larger real life field exercises are rare. Different expertise competence has always 
been necessary in staff organizations, this is nothing new. The novelty might however 
be requirements for both forms of tactics in the same units and staffs, as in Hybrid 
Warfare scenarios. 
A concern can be a potential future lack of tactical competence, due to the combination 
of a widening strategy (demanding ability in Regular as well as in Irregular/Hybrid 
Warfare) and broadening tactical thought habituating effects in different tactical types, 
leading to more limited practice experience opportunities. Command assignments for 
field units frequently in use in real operations or at least extensive field exercises might 
also in the future be rare. Current general opinion of declining tactical competence from 
the tactical teacher and trainer collective will in such a case be supported by this study’s 
results.  
Looking at the actual positions of the officers in the space of statements, including the 
theoretical principle normative position from current COIN doctrines on tactics, the 
view of both scattered and different descriptive positions is supported. The normative 
COIN doctrines, including current Swedish Army texts, can be argued to contain a 
mainly Hybrid Warfare context thinking and as for concepts, a more mixed focus for 
capabilities primarily for smaller operations, however, not excluding larger units’ 
operations for certain situations.  
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If different types of tactics are argued to place different demands on the basic functions 
and thus are a part of the future officer corps capabilities and skills, new requirements 
for high tactical adaption potentiality seem to be one consequence. If so, two separate 
areas of concerns are distinguishable. First, the knowledge and skills in practical tactics: 
secondly, acquired and developed and honed capability to adapt to different 
situations/contexts, violence, tasks and tactical composition in several perspectives. 
Examples are time, space, forces, physically, mentally and ethically.  
The ability to adapt to different circumstances as different enemies, violence, culture, 
tactics, the people etc. are repeatedly emphasized, regarding Irregular Warfare and 
Counterinsurgency Operations204. Differences or relations between tactical preferences 
are arguably important aspects for new adaption requirements of the modern officer 
profession, asked to be capable of operating in Regular Warfare, as well as in Irregular 
Warfare scenarios. What seems important is then to view the requirements of adaption 
in at least three ways. First;  an adaption from Regular Warfare tactics to Irregular 
Warfare with focus on COIN Operations. Secondly, the other way round, and thirdly 
regarding a high adaption potential inside each warfare area. Such a demand means; to 
be able to think “outside the box” from different perspectives, and then not to be 
statically thinking in the new box, and finally, to be able to turn back to the traditional 
box, which might be an inner and generic challenge for officers’ thought on tactics.  
For Swedish officers, a further challenge exists, due to a period of more limited thinking 
and acting in Regular Warfare tactics, especially in higher units and also regarding 
utility, function and capability of various functions and units. This means that even if an 
officer regards Intelligence, ranger operations, low visibility capabilities, Electronic 
Warfare and Psychological Operations as important capabilities in order to organize a 
particular task group unit, he or she might not be used to doing this in practice.  
If task-group thinking, or the combined arms principle, is also adopted down at platoon 
level, this will also be a challenge because such training does not yet exist for platoon 
leaders in the Swedish army. The overall results of the open questions unveil that the 
battalion and company commanding officers, seen as a collective, have a diversified 
view on tactics in Irregular Warfare, leaning on a tradition of a Regular Warfare 
military paradigm or a more generic problem-solving approach. Only partly is the 
thought focused on challenges in a irregular scenario.  
Moral and conceptual aspects and Command & Control questions together with 
functional aspects, such as Intelligence in particular, are highlighted as concerns in this 
kind of tactical thought. Personal experiences, influences and exercises are considered 
to affect tactical preferences the most. If this is correct, there is room for more 
educational development in order to enhance influences while the amount of live 
exercises is limited. Also the views of practical life experiences from war or combat 
operations reveal grounds for discussing the role of research in order to facilitate lessons 
learned processes.  
                                                 
204 U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual FM 3-24, (2006), p. 
196. Learning and Adapting, p. 252. The Learning Imperative. 
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If a command group for ground forces gives low priority to the area of tactics and at the 
same time, there is a need for development, such a scenario might result in frictions and 
power struggles in the whole field of tactics. Still, if half of this group seldom speaks 
and discusses the area, such a risk might be limited. Such a result opens up for situations 
with contradictory views between the headquarters and the field commanders in general. 
Other questions seem currently to be of more immediate interest. Putting this in relation 
to the common view that tactics is considered to be more interesting than strategy and 
operational art, no aspect of War Studies seems to gain any higher interest from unit 
commanders. This is however no surprise since an Army under transformation struggles 
with production questions to a higher degree, compared to issues of tactics, operational 
art and strategy. However, the consequences of this might reach a level where education 
on tactics has to be re-thought in conjunction with education in strategy. 
A final conclusion regarding the dynamics of a tactics and strategic mind-set, is that 
cause-effect scenarios seem important to study further within the officer’s education in 
War Studies, as is the case for an Armed Forces’ development of capabilities. Even 
more important, I suggest, that the strategic level recognizes what tactical thought is at 
hand, based on previous strategic decisions, spaces of experiences and culturally formed 
tactical horizon of expectations. Articulations of tactics, argued to be based on 
experiences and narratives, tell a story regarding the view of status, problems, 
challenges and also possibilities of making strategy. Such stories can be posed against 
the normative and rhetoric strategic articulations in doctrines and directives, and should 
be considered when formulating a new strategy. Is the current strategy in line with 
tactical thought? If not, what relational characteristics can be identified for actors 
arguing for either a relevance of the strategy or the tactical thought at hand? 
Identification of characteristics in tactical thought might thus be an indicator or a tool to 
identify indications of disconnection between strategy and tactics.  
5.4 The dynamics of operational art and tactics 
Viewing operational art generically as the thinking and activities performed at the 
operational level, aiming to solve strategic problems with the use of adequate tactical 
resources, one can see it as an activity that uses ways of thinking tactics all over the 
operational area, over extended time periods, in order to achieve results that bring 
forward strategic effects serving political goals. This switch board of military thinking 
on the operational level has subsequently to deal with several parallel and successive 
challenges. A generally accepted view can be said to be that the challenges differ with 
the mission context and if the war fighting can be characterized as mainly Regular or 
Irregular Warfare.  
Most officers and units are commonly trained in a Regular Warfare perspective with the 
military traditions and culture, and can be said to have their roots in the perception of 
Regular Warfare. Working then in an Irregular Warfare context involves challenges 
parallel in time, space and regarding forces’ conceptual thinking of “the people” as well 
as enemies, using a broad spectrum of violent threats. Challenges will probably occur, 
depending on what effects are chosen to correspond to a large number of 
targets/influence goals.  
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In general, all this is to be done with too few resources of ground forces units, 
subsequently in need of distant fire support (e.g. air assets, drones) in an environment 
where the enemy is hard to identify and detect. Parallel thinking will be required, taking 
the protection of the people as number one priority, including the support of under-
resourced civilian society-building by a ruling government.  
Operational art easily becomes challenging work even if the tools, the tactical resources, 
can be identically handled and used by a commander’s tactical thought in the same way 
and thus provide the operational level with a unified and stable tool-kit. If the tactical 
thought however differs, also on how to act in the same scenario conceptually, a new 
dimension of challenges rises for the operational commander. In short, diversified 
tactical thought might produce new needs for knowledge and control of tactical status 
on the operational level, different compared to the more traditional thinking in Regular 
Warfare tactics and operational art. Looking closer, several areas are included in 
operational art, such as Intelligence, Logistics and Information Operations (and 
increasingly, co-operation with conventional forces and Special Operations Forces) 
which are challenged in new ways in Irregular and Hybrid Warfare scenarios. These 
challenges will subsequently be different if tactical preferences also move between a 
combat focus of large forces, collectively operating, and on the other hand, focus on 
Intelligence and distributed operations by smaller forces.  
If the operational staffs have to handle a Hybrid scenario with both regular and irregular 
opponents in parallel, diversified tactical thinking probably produces even more 
challenges. When to use what tactical resources and commanders for what tasks, aiming 
for what effects, will be a question that might reveal a new need of more personal and 
deeper knowledge between operational and tactical commanders, compared to what has 
been thought to be needed in the school of mission command in Regular Warfare in 
general. On the other hand, as long as thorough knowledge of units’ capabilities exists, 
a diversified palette of tactical thought promotes more and new options for broadened 
operational art. 
A broadened spectrum of activities in combination with few troops and units over 
extended areas for long periods of time has developed tactical thought in task groups 
down to squad levels. Operational art, in the sense of design and coordinating joint 
effects, has moved down to platoon leader level, for which training is seldom designed 
in Sweden. This means that a form of operational art competence is needed at least in 
battalion staffs, which generally are not designed for such work. The relational 
consequences of a broadened operational art spectrum in Irregular or Hybrid Warfare is 
increasingly affecting the tactical level, meeting a diversified field of tactical thought, 
which might be different than meeting a unified field of tactical preferences. Such 
diversity does question King’s argument regarding a convergence of military 
knowledge. In general, the conclusion is that such a range of tactical preferences needs 
to be observed and identified differently at the operational level compared to Regular 
Warfare scenarios. The preconditions for operational art and even opportunities to 
perform operational planning and execution of a set of combined and joint tactical 
missions, will need knowledge and understanding of tactical thought, performance 
possibilities and limitations, to meet strategic goals in a more actor-centric approach.  
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Here, this means tactical approach which is to be expected of one’s own units. Not least, 
in order to be able to identify preconditions which realistically connect to strategy. Such 
knowledge should be sought at the operational level, in order to be able to produce 
practical operational art, making strategic sense in Irregular or Hybrid Warfare 
scenarios. 
Today, a commonly viewed role of operational art is to transform strategic needs to 
tactical missions, which are realistic to accomplish. From the tactical perspective, a task 
is to understand and transform tactical realities at hand, back to the strategic thinking, 
thus making the relational aspect of strategy and tactics alive, real and matching. Such a 
consequence for operational art could create a developmental need, when it comes to 
education of officers in Joint Warfare in Irregular or Hybrid Warfare scenarios. A 
combination of traditionally limited interest for Irregular Warfare in general, a limited 
interest in tactics in the Armed Forces, and rather dispersed tactical thinking in the 
officer corps, seem to be a warning sign for a strategy chosen, which requires 
capabilities in both Regular and Irregular Warfare. Particularly, it has to be noted that 
Irregular Warfare is also distinct from Regular Warfare as a way of thinking about 
violence in society. In Irregular Warfare, violence is not clearly separated from 
everyday life.  
This threatens as well as challenges the legal, structural, organizational structures that 
constitute social order. To handle challenges of this order may require further analysis 
by the politicians, the military and law enforcement structures, regarding rules of 
engagement, in order to defend social order. Seen from a military theoretical 
perspective, the results indicate a certain breadth and scope of tactics in land operations 
against an irregular opponent that currently is seldom found in normative texts or more 
experience-based literature. Nor has officer education equally prioritized the four 
relatively different tactical types presented. This construction might be the result of 
generations of national defence thinking, a long period of extensive operations in the 
Balkans and later in Afghanistan and a certain military social and cultural inheritance. If 
so, a question arises if it is an appropriate and wanted heritage and, if there are reasons 
to discuss the results relative to the education in War Studies regarding tactics-strategy 
in particular.  
This study has indicated that the ideal of Regular Warfare tactics lives on and is still 
thought to be the most important to be skilled in, also to such a degree that about half of 
the field commanders in 2011 (with rather an extensive space of experiences in Irregular 
Warfare tactics in the Balkans and Afghanistan during the last 20 years) position 
themselves mostly in thinking in Regular Warfare terms, even when the discussed 
scenario is quite the opposite. Still, the other half of the population clearly states tactical 
preference with a wider battle-environment contextualization, involving the civil 
dimension and non-kinetic effects. This is an example which directly knits strategy with 
the needs of tactical competences and resources together. If being tasked to act with 
military force in some sort of Irregular Warfare context that will particularly alter the 
environment of the civil dimension, such competences (e.g. a military police function 
and adapted intelligence apparatus down to low-level unit structures) might be suitable 
to be included earlier in conceptual thinking, education and training.  
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This leads to my conclusion that indicators of tactical preferences might be used, also 
outside mere tactical discussions, as indicators of operational and strategic thinking. 
Certain characteristics of articulated thinking, to a greater or lesser extent rely on real-
life habituating spaces of experiences. These might indicate a larger span in horizons of 
expectations that only marginally corresponds to military strategic narratives, such as 
doctrines. Obviously, what matters in practice is how practical tactics, coordinated by 
operational art, support chosen strategy. In order to close in to such possibilities, 
education and training in operational art and strategic thought should include tactical 
thought and preferences. The indications of broadened tactical thought can be viewed as 
much in relation to operational art and strategic thinking as to risks and possibilities 
within the realm of tactical development and adaption per se. Different tactical thought 
and preferences in Irregular Warfare contexts might be the result of a clash between 
existing military ideals and political strategic ambitions or happenings. The positive side 
is that a palette of tactical thought might indicate different ways of thinking and 
articulating preferences that can contribute to a critical and more self-reflective way of 
living with and arguing for tactics per se, and in conjunction with strategy and 
operational art. 
The results of the study provide a potential challenge, because of the existence of two 
major and possibly contradictory principles: understanding and performing tactics in 
Irregular Warfare either as Regular Warfare or as Hybrid Warfare. The results of such 
diversified thought are however not unexpected, because of the combination of Swedish 
traditions and on the other hand, ten years of operations in Afghanistan, soon coming to 
an end. However, for the first time, the results are scientifically verified for the situation 
in 2011 and show several aspects to reflect upon in the development of War Studies, as 
well as aspects corresponding less well to views articulated in the new Swedish Military 
Strategy Doctrine, where the classic COIN approach is clearly underlined as contrary to 
a Regular Warfare approach, even in Irregular Warfare scenarios. For the Swedish 
Armed Forces, the situation of less discussions and no definitions of Irregular Warfare 
changed in 2011 in the new Military Strategy Doctrine, which included texts on the 
subject. These articulations must however be considered as a first step on a long way to 
broaden and deepen existing military theory rooted in the Swedish military culture and 
social space and capital structure, which prioritize Regular Warfare as a system that has 
been avoiding less technical profiles amongst the people.  
The results obtained by using an adapted field theory show that very different 
standpoints exist in certain aspects of tactical preferences for Irregular Warfare with a 
potential of practical consequences for military education, training and unit production. 
Power struggles might emerge where traditional military thought is challenged with 
possibly new and innovative military tactical thinking. Struggles might emerge at 
different levels and new requirements for prioritizing seem obvious. Choices on what 
core tactics should be the hallmark of the Swedish military practical profession seem to 
be necessary to be decided, if a more unified mind-set is preferred in reality and not 
only articulated in normative standards. Also a discussion on how education should be 
structured and organized is suggested. Classical divisions with compartments of strategy 
education and operational art and tactics, might not be the best choices if one wants to 
discuss different adaption possibilities between tactics and strategy.  
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5.5 Warfare, a comprehensive approach to viewing strategy and 
tactics as an interrelated whole. 
Symbolic value is argued to exist in articulating an endeavour for a comprehensive view 
regarding strategy and tactics as synonymous with warfare as a whole. Evidently, 
strategy and tactics need operational art in order to achieve task solving over time and 
space, but the discussion here focuses on the areas of strategy and tactics for two 
reasons.  
The first is an experienced view that these areas are often treated separately and not 
comprehensively. The second reason is that this study indicates rather diversified and 
dualistic tactical preferences. Operational art can be viewed as an area that has gained a 
high degree of interest and process training with NATO standards for several years. 
Traditional separate writings, discussions and studies of strategy and tactics seem 
therefore particularly challenging when dealing with Irregular Warfare, covering the 
whole violence and interest span, including the two segments of civilian and military 
functions intermingling.  
Warfare is used here, with the meaning of a combination of strategy and tactics, as is 
also operational art; to be designed for the actual operational area. The phenomenon of 
Irregular Warfare does invite and demand an understanding with a dynamic mind-set, 
open to a comprehensive view of warfare as a whole. The purpose is however, not to 
invent a new label or definition that comprises a combined approach for strategy and 
tactics. It is about a theoretical and practical approach that in fact creates such a more 
inclusive and holistic perspective and the very point of doing so when addressing the 
area of warfare, is in fact two-fold.  
First, it is to do so inclusively and relationally, aiming to produce knowledge on 
characteristics; on who thinks (and struggles) about different standpoints on strategy, 
tactics and operational art. Secondly, to serve as a model, where different strategic and 
tactical standpoints can be identified and discussed together. “Warfare amongst the 
people”, to paraphrase Rupert Smith’s famous book The Utility of Force,205 seems to be 
a research and educational area in need of greater comprehensive military theory and 
less segmental perspectives, in particular, such that do not expound the view of Small 
Warfare or Kleinkriege.  
In contemporary articulations of Irregular Warfare, the challenges regarding military 
and civilian intermingling are well observed and elaborated on, even if still not solved. 
However, regarding the military dimension, such as thinking and acting according to the 
large warfare tradition, or solely or blended with the more unorthodox principles of 
Small Wars, there is an unbalance. The principles of Small Wars cannot anymore be 
regarded as a niche for Special forces or ranger units in limited resource armies, as the 
western armies have become. The warfare style of Small Wars should on the contrary, it 
is argued, be needed, emphasized and included for every officer in their education, 
aimed at the requirements for knowledge of Regular Warfare principles.  
                                                 
205 Smith, The Utility of Force (2007). 
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Or, following the earlier discussion; warfare, including principles for the Big, as well as 
Small Warfare principles, is argued as a new approach. Such an approach as mentioning 
Small Warfare principles could enhance adaption capabilities and cohesion in Hybrid 
Warfare in the future, e.g. when new, problematic Counterinsurgency contexts reappear. 
Also, seldom discussed, capability in Small Warfare is still the obvious option if losing 
against a more capable aggressor. Such an outcome has to be a consideration for smaller 
Armed Forces. 
A Small Warfare approach does clearly challenge the view of warfare norms of the 19th 
and 20th century within the military establishment and fields of thought; again placing 
the concept of field in the frontline for research efforts. The research results indicate a 
duality in tactical thought, even in this rather uniform sample of field commanders on 
tactical level, and they support the conclusion that similar investigations should be done 
with operational and strategic decision-makers. Subsequently, the concern should be 
directed to what relational characteristics can be found regarding the whole construction 
of tactics, operational art and strategy, as well as regarding decision-makers at these 
levels. 
5.6 Scientific reflections on field characteristics 
The question if the proposed space of statements is linked to some sort of social field, 
and not simply a mapping of standpoints, is argued valuable for several reasons. A 
mapping of a previously unknown area, such as contemporary tactical thought is argued 
interesting in itself, unveiling possible dualistic or complementary areas between groups 
of officers. With the knowledge of background factors as properties, e.g. rank, 
command role, unit affiliation, international mission experiences and experiences of 
combat, new dimensions are obtained to be explored. Such a discussion has been 
presented and the structural results were identified with fairly clear differences of 
positions in the space regarding unit affiliation, unit type and military background, 
international mission area experiences, numbers of missions, age and civilian education.  
Different positions have been observed, giving indications of social or military cultural 
properties that create structures in the space. This space could be a sub-field of a larger 
field, if sufficient autonomy is at hand. Such a larger field could concern a bigger area 
than just “tactics in Irregular Warfare”, possibly the interconnected areas in “The 
Swedish military field of tactics and strategy”. Such a possible field consists of a far 
larger population than 43 commanders of field units, from e.g. the headquarters, staffs, 
military schools, centres and also involving other types of units from e.g. engineer, 
logistics and artillery units. For such an investigation, significantly more information 
would be required, which is possible to collect. It is also vital to discuss the question of 
autonomy, whether or not it is a field at all, or possibly some sort of sub-field. In order 
to be able to consider autonomy in a practical social space, requirements should exist. 
Values that are recognized, rewards, value hierarchies, individual entry requirements, 
communicated standpoints on attitudes, principles, behaviours and personal 
identifications are examples of such requirements. Viewing the military system, it is 
easy to find such structures at several levels.  
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The rank hierarchy is the most obvious example with very clear personal identifications. 
Of another kind, honour appreciations such as medals, ribbons and signs on the uniform, 
are examples of properties of symbolic capital. However, there are no such attributes 
related to preferences of tactics or strategy, apart from Regular or Irregular priorities. 
Still, there exist norms and traditions of a military culture valuing different war fighting 
approaches. The COIN doctrines in this study are good examples of normative value 
standards, even in a hierarchical order; strategic doctrines set the overarching standards 
for operational and tactical doctrines. Here different positions are indicated in the model 
of the space of statements by officers with different properties, in particular, common 
for officers with some sort of ranger affiliation, though on the contrary for officers with 
mechanized affiliation. Another aspect important to observe in a possible sub-field is, if 
any particular understanding, or taken for granted truth exists empirically or is 
supported by narratives. Here we have diverging and unstable perceptions related to 
tactics in general (the mechanized assault, ranger tactics and infantry primacy) and 
dualistic thought regarding Irregular Warfare: the hard-handed kinetic, enemy-centric 
approach versus the people-centric, security-supporting and defensive approach. 
It must however be considered unwise to try to argue for some “field or sub-field of 
tactics” as strategy is what (supposedly) sets the higher values and principles for 
handling violence using tactics through operational art. Several aspects speak therefore 
against viewing the space of tactical thought on Irregular Warfare as some existing or 
potential sub-field in being, per se. Tactical thought should instead be linked to strategy 
and operational art, and such a comprehensive space of military thought  might very 
well bear marks of being a field. The studied space of tactical thought in Irregular 
Warfare has however qualities of relational structures in itself, supporting an argument 
of being part, or sub-part of such a larger field.  
Still, a supposed space of military thought has to qualify for certain criteria to be argued 
as being a field. As in the earlier parts of the theoretical and methodological choices and 
presentations, we have to discuss the character of autonomy (a specific art of capital, a 
certain structure of polarities, a certain space of possibilities, certain recognitions and 
value systems, a certain doxa, certain “illusio”, certain consecrational instances and 
mechanisms for transforming imported themes and discussions to their own logic.206 As 
long as we discuss the doxa regarding warfare in its most common and narrated form, 
Regular Warfare with combating mechanized armies, it is easy to find versions of 
tactical perceptions linked to services such as infantry, mechanized units and, ranger 
principles of tactics, though the latter to a lesser degree.  
Obviously correspondingly, one finds a clear consecrational structure and tradition 
within the educational and rank system, as in the former exercise structure. However, 
such a structure and tradition does not exist related to Irregular Warfare, at least not 
concerning Counterinsurgency Operations. Turning instead to the very use of Irregular 
Warfare principles we do find the long standing ranger tradition from the 17th century 
still existing, however, currently overshadowed by the mechanized paradigm.  
                                                 
206  Broady, Kulturens fält, (ed) 1998), pp. 11-26. “Inledning: en verktygslåda för studier av fält”, pp.11-
26.  
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
121 
 
Moreover, discussing combined operations with ranger units and mechanized units has 
not yet become a natural tactical, or operational art discussion. The Regular Warfare 
tradition lingers on; partly questioned in Irregular Warfare contexts, particularly due to 
international military thought developments since around 2008. We can let Antony 
King´s argument of trans-nationalization of military thought support this view. 
What does that mean in that case, for a supposed “field of Swedish military thought”? 
Does it exist any longer at all or has it evaporated into a “western field of military 
thought”? Has the revival of Irregular Warfare meant a diffusion of an earlier national 
field of military thought or do we stand on the brink of quite a new content and value 
distribution in an old field? The field theory informs us that three dimensions or aspects 
are said to affect a field's presence, its structure, agents' choices and the existing 
opportunities. Bourdieu’s view of the future of a field is; “a field's future is at every 
moment inscribed in its structure, agent’s ability to realize the objective potentials as 
determined by the relationship between agents' abilities and the opportunities that are 
objectively inscribed in the field.”207 The question of what abilities the agents have 
based on and what opportunities they are able to recognise, involves intellectual and 
practical thinking, understandings and actions. If thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare 
partly corresponds and contradicts the Regular Warfare perception, a struggle is 
probably going to take place.  
Will the classic principles of Small Wars be involved and recognized as a developed 
understanding of warfare (as in the 16th and 17th centuries) or will it once again be 
forgotten? The answer goes beyond the area of Swedish military thought, but is still a 
part of the same. In all, we can see signs of a questioned doxa of warfare and, which is 
also a question of military sociology; if knowledge is sought regarding the character of 
thought driving structures. The agents' positions in this study and relationships to “the 
field of military thought”, could thus be seen as belonging to a possible subset in the 
total area of preferences that incorporate aspects of both Regular, Irregular, and Hybrid 
Warfare, or in short; Warfare. Such a possible field of military thought is likely to be 
found at a higher level, consisting of both strategy and tactics.  
The indications of a social space regarding tactics in Irregular Warfare, with a diverse 
preference structure, feed the question of character and structural pattern in this larger 
field. Diverse tactical thinking in a nowadays recognized context of conflicts, questions 
the strategic thinking distribution in a larger field of military thought. What social, 
cultural, and obviously economic and symbolic capital distributions are possible to 
unveil beneath articulated standpoints of military thought of strategy and tactics in 
general? These are the kinds of larger questions that this Bourdieu inspired approach to 
the concepts of field theory and capital concept will inevitably lead to.  
 
                                                 
207 Bourdieu, Praktiskt förnuft, bidrag till en handlingsteori, (2004), p. 13. 
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5.7 Concluding Reflection 
This section presents a reflection on the dissertation work as a whole, in particular 
regarding the theoretical and methodological decisions, the result per se on statements 
and background factors and finally, regarding the result in conjunction with strategy, 
operational art and subjects outside the War Studies domain. 
Inspired by Bourdieu, reflection has become an interesting subject for me.208 Adapting 
the principle of analysis, and becoming aware of one's biases is of course in line with 
field theory work. The sociological aspect, strangely almost unnoticed in military 
research in War Studies, opens up for several new perspectives for explanations or 
further hypothesis. Turning to myself, some areas of biases deserve to be observed. The 
first is a longer period in the military forces, working directly or indirectly with Small 
Wars-related activities; ranger tactics, anti-ranger tactics and different kinds of troop 
reconnaissance matters. A perception has been installed that the military system and 
career officers in general, prefer and value Regular Warfare capabilities and ideals. 
Knowledge or interests regarding war fighting capabilities for Irregular Warfare have 
been uncommon based on my own space of experience. Attitudes such as ignorance, 
romanticism, oversimplifications and sometimes unrealistic expectations from ranger 
units have on the other hand been possible to observe, also affecting parts of my horizon 
of expectations.  
A confession to a view on tactics in general as a neglected area in War Studies research 
and a declining competence among the officer corps has produced a desire to highlight 
this subject per se. Another interest, of the individual, formed by working in and with 
smaller unit structures, such as combat divers and naval anti-sabotage units, has paved 
the way for a focus on officers’ tactical thought and measuring statements and 
background factors. Such a combined interest for a subject, in a certain context, and the 
view of the importance and impact potentiality of individuals, existed before the 
meeting with Bourdieu. That meeting did however, conceptualize and visualize a 
theoretical and methodological approach which embraced my own thinking, values and 
preferences. A particular taste for the Bourdieu focus on practical sense and research 
work, the empirical digging, his criticism of the “the noble and fine culture research”, 
his academic journey from philosophy to sociology and his research start in Algeria 
during the 50s, with writings from that period on challenges of Counterinsurgency, also 
contributed to the choice of approach for the dissertation. Several arguments and 
opinions regarding the severe and profound social deconstruction following the steps of 
an insurgency can be found in Algerian Sketches (2013).209 Returning to the subject of 
reflexivity, if one wants to examine on what basis a work really stands, aiming for a 
high degree of inter-subjectivity, education is needed on what is meant and how to 
relate it to already basic methodological courses.  
                                                 
208 Pierre Bourdieu, Science of Science and Reflexivity (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
This book is recommended as an introduction of reflection and its application. 
209 Pierre Bourdieu, Algerian Sketches, texts edited and presented by Tassadit Yacine. Translated by 
David Fernbach (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013). Examples can be found on pp. 86, 95-96, 109, 110-114, 
92-103, 94-95.  
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A tradition focused on transparency in the methodological choices would benefit from 
highlighting the reflexivity principle. Who has done the research and what sociological 
and cultural patterns might there be possible to reveal? The importance of reflexivity 
and practical use of such an approach to research work is a clear message from 
Bourdieu, accompanied with strong criticism that this principle should be adopted a lot 
more by the whole of science work, in particular social science work. The researcher is, 
according to Bourdieu, required “to work towards constructing a scientific truth 
capable of integrating the observer’s vision and the truth of the practical vision of the 
agent as a point of view which is unaware of being a point of view and is experienced in 
the illusion of absoluteness”210.  
Such a need for a socio-analysis of the researcher to unveil biases, concerns what is 
expected and required in academic works. Visions exist of the neutrality of the 
researcher, even though there are arguably fewer demands for articulated views on 
one’s own biases. This applies to methodological values and preferences and also social 
and cultural effects that might have habituated views, of which one no longer is directly 
aware. The sociological and also the psychological views are sometimes 
underestimated, in my opinion. When entering research areas such as war and warfare, 
particularly outside the traditional paradigm, this might become problematic. Taking on 
a dissertation in the normative and academic culture world, where the ideal of 
objectivity is repeatedly emphasized, at the same time as everybody confesses to the 
practical impossibility of living up to that standard, Bourdieu’s clarity on this matter has 
been refreshing. His philosophical view, deeply focusing on self-reflection and living a 
reflexive life in order to reach new ways of enlightenment and self-realization, have 
appealed to me; they are close to my own way of thinking and feeling in most 
perspectives, of which I am aware.  
Regarding the methodological approach, an interest for relational focus has been 
awakened. If some sort of different opinions of ideas, which in certain ways contradict 
or challenge important values for the actors/agents can be identified (resource or 
power/influence gain or loss, is one very obvious value), a relation is at hand, or might 
be predictable. A development of personal thinking on objectivity and truth has evolved 
from an earlier attempt on “better methods” and very detailed observations and 
analyses, to a deeper interest in who the actors are behind the ideas, and what biases 
they can be presumed or suspected to have. Statements, no matter what about, can 
clearly be analysed with Correspondence Analysis.  
Capital and field concepts can be applied, as here, not pretending or presuming to 
analyse an actual or probable field per se. The tools are possible to be used in several 
social science applications, as a part or whole of War Studies, in order to indicate 
relational characteristics in spaces of statements combined with sociological features 
outlined. Such sociologically framing of spaces of statements is arguably a new 
empirically-based research paradigm in War Studies.  
                                                 
210 Bourdieu, Science of Science and Reflexivity (2001), pp. 115-116. 
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Sociological studies of spaces might generate arguments of field existences, 
potentialities of a field emerging or declining or possible field characteristics (de facto 
identified or assumed to have potentiality) and with that, I argue thus for the use of field 
theory beyond the questions of field or not. It is however, wise to take into 
consideration that quite some time is needed for both reading and understanding this 
sort of thinking purely theoretically, and then a good proportion of time to also basically 
learn and run computer aided correspondence analysis programs such as SPAD.   
Such kinds of empirical work with sociology for identification of structuring patterns of 
different phenomena, particularly within an area as difficult to measure as war and 
warfare, belong to exploratory works in Swedish War Studies. This could however be 
argued to be an appropriate approach for a young subject undergoing a process of 
academic forming while finding its way as an autonomous discipline. The paradigms of 
War Studies and military history, with their measuring focus of non-sociological and 
technical aspects, as well as Strategic Studies with their way-finding between Security 
Studies and International Relations, are all well-known. However, this is not the case 
regarding the tradition of self-reflection. The result per se, of a stated diversified and 
dualistic space of tactical thinking in Irregular Warfare might be of a more temporary 
interest as a discussion platform in tactical education, such as an example of an argued 
relational potentiality regarding tomorrow’s practical discussions and consequences for 
land forces tactics.  
That result could however, be argued to be of a wider interest in relation to strategy and 
operational art. If new interests arose for such a change in this non-comprehensive state 
of approach due to the results presented here, it would be an outcome that might 
challenge values for certain actors. In such a case, power struggles might emerge in the 
larger field of political-military thinking and practice. Using theories and methods that 
can be attributed to constructionism generally, I argue that I have worked transparently 
from my own ethos, have adapted some analytical tools relevant for analysing and 
exploring possible positions of standpoints, relationship tendencies and sociological 
characteristic structures. By this approach, I have been able to present new and 
important information on the character of a subject not before researched in this manner. 
The result of this methodology delivers a possibility to detect or uncover potential 
power characteristics in the discourse of contemporary tactics in Irregular Warfare and 
Counterinsurgency. This way of examining issues related to fighting structures might 
however be of greater value than solely for use with the group of Swedish officers’ 
articulated preference of tactics. A traditional officer education with a limited relational 
approach, risks repetitive work on subjects hiding or avoiding practical influence from 
sociological perspectives. A relational approach is a way to challenge existing 
paradigms and doxa taken for granted. Views of human practice and sense should 
therefore be included to spark off a living, critical and creative theoretical and 
methodological discussion for a subject such as War Studies. 
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5.8 Conclusions  
Views and articulations on tactics is not a uniform discourse, particularly not when 
regarding so-called Irregular Warfare. As a new phenomenon for the Swedish military 
organization and officer collective ways of thinking, tactics in Irregular Warfare exist, 
emerge and structure dynamically or statically, fragile or more constant. Older more 
stable military social networks represented by regimental and field unit affiliations with 
ranger traditions consecrate and reproduce Small War thinking. Others, also traditional 
structures, such as the mechanized traditions are under development and not any longer 
solely reproducing a traditional Regular Warfare mind-set focusing on combat with 
large unit formations.  
On the contrary, signs of new ways of tactical thinking that highlight intelligence-
focused and distributed operation concepts clearly exist. Still, without a prominent and 
strong direction from the military strategy policy-makers, such ambitions risk to be 
marginalized due to generations of a habituated culture and tradition of Regular Warfare 
ideals. When traditional thought on tactics meets other needs in practice, such as in 
multinational COIN Operations, social networks emerge, questioning old thoughts and 
shaping new thinking. Existing social structures, such as regiments and unchanged unit 
structures consecrate and reproduce, as well as shape new thinking. An 
internationalization of tactics in Irregular Warfare has emerged, normatively parallel 
with the still strong living tradition and doxa of Regular Warfare as the highest ideal 
and a derivative of threat perception. However, no sign of convergence in tactical 
thought in Irregular Warfare has been identified, contrary to contemporary research 
arguments. 
The Swedish tactical thought on Irregular Warfare, internally and externally is partly 
struggling with embracing the principles of both Regular and Irregular Warfare.. 
Tactical thinking has a dynamic, currently moving to Hybrid Warfare scenarios, where 
concepts of the Big War and Small War intermingle and sometimes contradict and 
conflict. A creative palette of tactical thought exists among Swedish field unit 
commanders, the next generation of senior military strategists. A field of military 
thought on strategy, operational art and tactics might very well exist, or is under way, 
developing challenges to current visions of strategy and operational art in a revitalizing 
way.  
Such a field might structure in ways not as uniform, according to regimental affiliation 
and cultural traditions which we are used to. Thoughts of high adaption and a creative 
mind-set might contradict normative thinking, as might more static thinking. Signs of a 
new generation of tactical thought exist, with a more open mind for combining 
principles of the Small War with the large one. It is advised to return, not only to the 
forgotten and unknown Clausewitz, but also beyond and to one of his tactical thought 
inspirers; Johan von Ewald and his Treatise of Partisan Warfare (1785). Ewald´s space 
of experiences and horizon of expectations, combined with studies of the Swedish 
counterpart; Georg Magnus Sprengtporten (1740-1819), are suggested for studies in 
order to obtain a historical mirror for reflections not yet in use in our modern tactical 
thought and preferences. A development of tactical thought for the modern officer 
seems to need knowledge equal to that of ranger, mechanized and infantry principles.  
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An approach is suggested that deals with Small Warfare on the same level as the Big 
Warfare principles, in order to promote a more open mind-set, needed for a Hybrid 
Warfare future. The doxa or perception of Regular Warfare is not argued enough 
anymore and needs to be complemented by Small War principles. An approach that 
understands and deals with warfare as a whole, paraphrasing Frank Kitson, is one that 
holistically investigates and presents the character of mind-set structures regarding 
strategy, operational art and tactics with preferences for Big and Small Warfare 
principles.  
The presented model of tactical thought can be used and adapted to the actual aspects 
investigated. The results of investigations of the characteristics of strategic, operational 
and tactical thought will answer the question of relational character of thought to 
warfare as a whole. The answers will reveal tendencies of balance, imbalance, duality or 
uniformity of mind-set, regarding Regular, Irregular and Hybrid Warfare. This kind of 
knowledge is argued to be needed if and when embarking on a development of warfare 
of hybrid character in a structured way. 
This work presents new knowledge on Swedish tactical thought on Irregular Warfare for 
Land forces using an investigation of contemporary standpoint structures and 
background aspects, thereby introducing relational sociology to tactical studies. 
Sociology is considered to be an important perspective in furthering multidisciplinary 
research efforts, in order to be able to identify relational characteristics between 
strategy, operational art and tactics, as well as for other subjects, such as for example, 
leadership, military technology and command and control science. An entrance into a 
mind-set, which would also regard ways of thinking as important knowledge, seems 
vital in the current era of otherwise more technocratic and procedural systems-thinking 
paradigms of the military community. 
Irregular Warfare, with tactics, operational art and strategy, are essentially theoretical 
thoughts that are realized in practice, by humans organized in different groupings, 
sharing the ideas and willingness to combat an opponent by denying him victory, an 
idea and value shared also by the opponent. As such, we can view war and warfare 
studies as being field studies from a scientific perspective as well, where practice and 
theory are mutually dependent and not possible to separate, such as warfare as a whole, 
per se. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. The Literature Study 
Introduction - an analysis of a collection of western thought 
The term Irregular Warfare (IW) has emerged in western writings on strategy and 
military issues since the troublesome wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from around 2005 
and onwards. In Sweden the term appeared in Swedish governmental writings starting 
from 2008.211 It is not always easy to get a common view of the meaning of the term, as 
definitions vary. The term has not previously been commonly in use in the western 
world of military discourse, moreover, military education has mostly dealt with Regular 
(or conventional and traditional military) warfare theory and practice. The research 
situation can also be characterized as limited before 2007.  
The study focuses on the following three questions; “How is the form of warfare, 
labelled “Irregular Warfare” defined and explained?”, “What is said to distinguish 
Irregular Warfare from other forms of warfare?” and “What are typical traits argued 
for Irregular Warfare?” 
The aim is to show examples of articulations, explanations and views on the 
phenomenon of Irregular Warfare from a collection of contemporary texts in doctrines 
and influence literature and from what can be called classic literature on the subject. 
The purpose is to find examples of how the subject has been, and can be described and 
thus to develop a framework and understanding base regarding what might be argued to 
be general attributes, merits and problems with the term and often related contents, and 
thus what challenges understanding of the phenomenon. As for the focus on tactics for 
the further research, and implicit aiming for knowledge enhancing within officer 
training and education, military concept development and planning work, sources of 
military thought that can be viewed as potentially influential for a military audience 
have been chosen for the analysis. This means that several other explanations and 
thought on Irregular Warfare and conflicts that could be characterized as irregular exist. 
The sources chosen here are however, assessed to have been or are particularly 
influential on military understanding of the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare. Also 
included as Literature study appendixes are summaries of views from Clausewitz and 
Frank Kitson, containing information that is assessed not to be commonly known up to 
today.  
                                                 
211 Försvar i användning, Ds 2008:49 [A Useful Defence] (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 2008), 
p.32.   ”A majority of the conflicts in recent years have been characterized by Irregular Warfare, i.e. 
Guerrilla Warfare, armed   gangs, terrorist network systems, and the employment of fighting units in 
smaller groups. Many actors are non-governmental. There are no signs that this pattern of conflict will 
change in the foreseeable future. Potential adversaries can, however, be structured and possess modern 
and qualified equipment, but act in an Irregular fashion”. 
Försvar i användning, Ds 2008/09:140 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet 2009), p. 43.”The Armed 
Forces should therefore have the capacity to …… handle both regular as well as irregular adversaries 
and  to operate nationally and internationally”.  
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The purpose is to enclose views on the subject that might be used for further reflections 
on differences and similarities of western thought on Irregular Warfare. The goal is 
strictly to answer the questions lined out on the previous page, not to establish a 
foundation for still a new definition. The purpose is to deliver answers that contribute to 
enhanced knowledge and understanding of what the term Irregular Warfare means, and 
of problems and benefits of different explanations. The main focus here is on 
contemporary explanations rather than to give a complete longitudinal view of ways of 
thinking and articulating warfare. The analysis only focuses on the term Irregular 
Warfare or on the meaning of warfare different to what is generally and universally 
understood as the main content of traditional and conventional military warfare, as it has 
developed since the Napoleon Wars. Sub-terms such as Guerrilla Warfare and alike are 
not analysed per se, but understood as being certain definitions in use today. Sources are 
limited to what can be argued to have been influential on general military thought and 
understanding (doctrines) and with a more prominent position in the military discourse 
(academic and expert literature). 
Associated terms 
Linked to the area of Irregular Warfare, the following terms often occur; 
Counterinsurgency, Insurgency, Hybrid Warfare/threat, Guerrilla Warfare and 
Unconventional Warfare. These terms are defined and understood in this analysis 
according to the following definitions. As a comparison to the term 
Conventional/traditional Warfare, such a definition is also included. 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) 
1. ”Those military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and 
civic actions taken to defeat or contain Insurgency, while addressing root 
causes”212  
 
2. “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic 
actions taken to defeat insurgency”213  
 
3. “The set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and 
psychological activities required to defeat insurgency and address any core 
grievances”214 
 
4. “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic 
actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN”215   
                                                 
212 UK Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Security and Stabilisation: The 
Military Contribution, Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, November 2009, the Lexicon. 
213 NATO, Glossary of terms and definitions (English and French), Allied Publication (AAP) 6, 2008, US 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, Joint Publications JP 1-02, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 17 October 2008), US 
Department of the Army, Headquarters, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual FM 3-24, Marine Corps 
Warfighting Publications (MCWP) 3-33.5, December. 
214 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency Operations, Allied Joint Publications (AJP) – 
3.4.4, study draft 2008, proposed modification to AAP-6 definition. 
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As can be seen, the above definitions differ in some aspects. The British version from 
2009 has included law enforcement as a specific activity, unlike the US and NATO 
definitions. The NATO definition places political actions before military, unlike the US 
and British definition. The US definition underlines that it is action taken by a 
government. The NATO and UK definitions emphasize the importance of addressing 
root causes and core grievances. In all, the political primacy and non-military aspects 
can be noticed in all definitions, however the British view of the law enforcement aspect 
is the most prominent when comparing the definitions. 
Hybrid War/Warfare/Threats 
The transition and development of military units able to operate in both Irregular and 
Regular Warfare scenarios, is today often addressed as the military contribution to 
“countering hybrid threats”216 or CHT in short. As for discussions on combinations of 
warfare, referred to as “Hybrid” War/Warfare or threats, the following definitions are 
used; Hybrid Warfare; “A form of conflict waged by a range of adversaries 
(conventional, irregular and terrorist) who will employ all forms of warfare and tactics, 
perhaps at the same place and time”217  
Hybrid Threats (HT); “HT result from a simultaneous orchestration of conventional 
and/or non-conventional methods and activities, employed by an opponent or a number 
of opponents that may include the use of military force”218  
The two NATO working definitions of Hybrid Warfare/threats both cover all forms of 
actors and warfare/violent actions, maybe performed at the same time and place. The 
explanation becomes so broad that it encompasses everything and risks losing meaning 
as a definition of a specific form of threat and/or warfare.  
Guerrilla Warfare (GW); “Military and paramilitary operations conducted in 
enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also 
called GW”219 This classic and more or less universally understood meaning of 
“guerrilla activities or violence” is used throughout the study. 
                                                                                                                                               
215 US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, Joint Publications JP 1-02, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 17 October 2008) 
216 The NATO CD&E Conference 2009 in Rome (16-19 November) in particular focused on the 
challenge for the alliance and the military contribution for counter hybrid threats (CHT) and concept work 
on this. NATO MC Chairman, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola underlined the role of today’s C, D &E as 
the driver of NATO transition. Mind-set, capabilities and better understanding of hybrid threats was one 
area emphasized during his introduction. Hybrid threat has the working definition; ”hybrid threats result 
from a simultaneous orchestration of conventional and/or non-conventional methods and activities, 
employed by an opponent or a number of opponents that may include the use of military force”. This 
means parallel use of Regular and Irregular Warfare. The need for a concept here was stressed by Dr 
Russell Glenn, working for SACT; ”for being able to understand the character of warfare in education 
and training”. One difficulty today is the problem of coherent communication in NATO on the matter, 
which is also a problem in the Swedish Armed Forces. 
217 UK DCDC Working definition presented at the NATO CD&E Conference 2009, 17 November, Rome 
218 Working definition presented at the NATO CD&E Conference 2009, 17 November, Rome 
219 U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Special Operation Task Force Operations, Joint 
Publication JP 3-05.1, 26 April, 2007. 
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Insurgency 
USA.; “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government 
through the use of subversion and armed conflict”220  
UK: “The actions of a minority group within a state that is intent on forcing political 
change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure aiming 
to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change”221 
NATO; “An organized ideologically motivated group or movement that seeks political 
change in a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population of a region 
through violence, subversion and propaganda”222  
Unconventional Warfare (UW); “A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary 
operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with or by 
indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and 
directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, 
Guerrilla Warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional 
assisted recovery. Also called UW”223 
Conventional/traditional/Regular Warfare (RW); “A form of warfare between states 
that employs direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, 
destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to 
force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. The focus of conventional 
military operations is normally an adversary’s armed forces with the objective or 
influencing the adversary’s government. It generally assumes that the indigenous 
population within the operational area is non-belligerents and will accept whatever 
political outcome the belligerent government impose, arbitrate, or negotiate. A 
fundamental military objective in conventional military operations is to minimize 
civilian interference in those operations”224  
Method and empirical material 
The method for this study is textual analysis of a conceptual history approach. Aspects 
of conceptual content and classifications are used. The focus is the text and what can be 
said about limits and characteristics about a phenomenon of Irregular Warfare. Chosen 
sources have been examined for qualitative aspects, addressing certain variables which 
have been extracted from On War, book six, chapter 26. 225  
 
                                                 
220 U.S. JP I-02 (2001), U.S FM 3-24 (2006) 
221UK Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Security and Stabilisation: The 
Military Contribution, Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, November 2009. 
222 NATO AJP 3.4.4 (2008). 
223 U.S. JP 3-05 (2008). 
224 U.S. Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare (IW), Joint Operations Concept JOC, version 1.0, 11    
September 2007. 
225 Clausewitz, Om Kriget, (1991), pp. 478 – 483. 
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Although only in a limited number of pages, Clausewitz in fact characterizes Irregular 
Warfare from several aspects, which can be used as variables regardless of the time 
perspective on a particular definition or explanation that is subjected to be analysed. The 
motive for using Clausewitz for defining variables in the actual subject is two-fold.  
First, On War is universally well-known in the western military discourse and has 
influenced thinking and understanding of war and warfare since the 19th century and 
still does. Secondly, several factors and areas of activities described by Clausewitz in 
the actual chapter can be argued to be commonly used when theorizing military 
activities and are thus, easily understood and commonly accepted as useful description 
categories. For the examination, seven variables, seen below, have been used. 
Regarding strategy, Clausewitz mainly addresses the area of Irregular Warfare, 
primarily as one form of strategic defence226. Clausewitz argues that this kind of warfare 
as a phenomenon of the 19th century could have had a revolutionary origin but does not 
elaborate that aspect further.227 He discusses the form of warfare as a complement to 
Regular Warfare. Clausewitz underlines the importance of not letting “the big strategic 
form of defence” develop to defend in a tactical form, here claiming that “people-in-
arms” can never be a form of decisive defensive warfare.228 As for the strategic form of 
defence, he states however, that there are two forms of “people-in-arms” warfare to be 
considered, either as a “last resort” or as “natural” support connected to a decisive 
battle. 229 
He describes a concept where tactics, generally understood as Guerrilla Warfare, 
supports Regular Warfare combat to be used when the right opportunities occur. As for 
tactics Clausewitz claims, the larger the areas the enemy has to use, the more dangerous 
the tactics from an opponent will be.230 Regarding physical factors, Clausewitz writes 
that the disadvantages of weak physical power could lead to the use of this sort of 
tactics primarily over large areas.231 
As for operational conceptual factors, he speaks of combining “loose formations”, 
“lantstorm” and “lantstorm supported with regular elements”. Combining these 
elements together in parallel for more offensive use, is what Clausewitz describes, 
which could be argued for being a way of expressing what in modern terms is labelled 
as Operational Art (2) even if that term was not in use at that time. The power of actions 
in the rear and harassing the enemy is stressed. Also, “the power of the example”, that is 
courageous and brave initiatives will be examples to be followed by other “armed 
people units”. A third concept discussed, is to have a part of the regular army that 
supports and is attached to the “lantstorm”. However, it is important not to merge too 
much, as that could lead to merely a concept of regular-“lantstorm” composition.  
                                                 
226 Clausewitz, Om Kriget, (1991), p. 481. 
227 Ibid. p. 478. 
228 Ibid. p. 482. 
229 Ibid. p. 482. 
230 Ibid. p. 479. 
231 Ibid. p.479. 
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Clausewitz states the opinion that one of the major aspects of fighting power, the moral 
factors, to be fully utilized have to be born from the people.232 Thus, he acknowledges a 
high potentiality of this force, the moral force, to the tactics of people-in-arms. 
Clausewitz argues emphatically for the preparation and use of people-in-arms as a moral 
necessity for the soul of the people and for the legitimacy of a state government.233 It is 
from the tactical view that Clausewitz outlines certain characteristics; such as flank 
attacks over large areas, harassing but not directed at the enemy strengths. A small scale 
attrition war in the enemy flanks and rear areas is generally the key characteristic as 
well as the arguably forceful force driver in war. Another is the moral power which can 
be found and utilized from the people usually to a greater extent than from regular 
military formations, according to Clausewitz.  
The appropriate character of people-in-arms should be like fog, in contrast to the 
physical bodies of Regular Warfare concepts. This might be seen as one explanation of 
the differences between Regular and Irregular Warfare. The fog in the flanks can 
suddenly be changed to lightning with a concentration of both people-in-arms and minor 
attachments of more regular organized units, preferably also jointly with some 
organized units that together form superiority over the enemy.234 He points out different 
attitudes to the phenomenon, both from a political view, as being dangerous with 
anarchistic influence potentiality, and from a military perspective, as being doubtful of 
the results compared to the efforts.235 
The variables and the empirical material 
From Clausewitz’s writings, the following seven aspects have been used as qualitative 
variables; 
? Strategy factors (purpose of violence, resistance, Insurgency, 
Counterinsurgency etc.)  
? Tactics and operational art factors (means, methods, coordination of the 
violence). The term operational art was not in use at the time of Clausewitz 
but instead the actual meaning was the coordination of tactics to a strategic 
goal. Such descriptions are categorized as operational art factors here). 
? Physical factors (descriptions of equipment, strength of fire and protection) 
? Conceptual factors (descriptions of structural and organizational solutions) 
? Moral factors (descriptions of troop morale, ethics, leadership) 
? Character of warfare (level of violence, for example) 
? Attitudes of warfare style/form. 
 
Quantitative assessment of the variables is made by using the following variable value 
categorizations; 0= Variable is not addressed, neither directly nor indirectly, 1= 
Variable is addressed implicitly, 2= Variable is addressed directly, 3= Variable is 
addressed as predominantly important/highlighted.  
                                                 
232 Clausewitz, Om Kriget. (1991), pp. 478 and 480. 
233 Ibid. pp. 482-83. 
234 Ibid. pp. 480-81. 
235 Ibid. p. 478. 
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Each description or definition is characterized from a “description character” angle in 
order to get a view of the approach and perspective of the description. To capture 
differences or similarities in explanations, two forms of descriptions are distinguished, 
either with predominantly explanatory content or of a predominantly umbrella 
character, less directly explanatory. Further, each explanation is focused on the actors 
considered to be an important aspect (the explanation focuses on either one or both of 
the belligerents participating or using an irregular form of warfare). Finally, it seems 
important to try to distinguish if the descriptions mainly focus on military or 
political/civilian aspects, so as to form linkage to views of violence dimensions or 
power executions from certain prosecutors. Each definition will be discussed on its own 
first. Secondly, a discussion will be held on contemporary definitions and their 
similarities and differences, followed by a comparison with some earlier definitions; 
finally, a discussion on possible benefits and difficulties of the definitions. 
Empiricism on western thinking and thought on military issues has been sought among 
two main categories; firstly, assessed influential contemporary military doctrines 
addressing the subject. Here, the famous US Marine Corps Small Wars Manual from 
1940 is included as well as a Swedish governmental text and an early Cold War 
American doctrinal text. Secondly, classical military theory or practice thinking on the 
subject, influential writings from the post Second World War period, primarily 1950 – 
1970, and some influential writings from the beginning of 2000 to 2010.  
 
The following contemporary doctrines or governmental writings have been used;  
NATO AJP 3.4 (A) Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, second study draft 
2008. 
NATO AJP 3.4.4 Counterinsurgency, study draft 2008. 
U.S. Army/ Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual – FM 3-24, MCWP 3-
33,5, University of Chicago Press; Chicago 2007. 
U.S. Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-24.2 (FM 90-9, FM 7-98) Tactics in 
Counterinsurgency, March 2009. 
U.S. Field Manual 3-05.130, Army Special operations Forces Unconventional 
Warfare, September 2008. 
U.S. Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations, 05 October, 2009 
U.S. Department of Defence, Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operations Concept 
(JOC) Version 1.0, 11 September 2007. 
UK Army Field Manual, Vol. 10, Combined Arms Operations, Part 10, Countering 
Insurgency, 2009, Draft. 
UK Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, Security and Stabilisation: The Military 
Contribution, Ratification Draft, 2009. 
UK Joint Doctrine Publication, JDP 0-01, British Defence Doctrine 3rd edition, 
August 2008. 
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For comparison, examples of earlier military definitions, two American sources have 
been used; U.S. Army FM 31-15 Operations against Irregular Forces236 and the U.S. 
Marine Corps Small Wars Manual from 1940237. For a comparison with a contemporary 
Swedish governmental view, the source Försvar i användning 238 has been used.  
Regarding literature, three time periods have been chosen, each with influential 
thinkers. Period One: “From Clausewitz to the Second World War” Carl von 
Clausewitz, Charles Callwell and Thomas Edward Lawrence. Period Two: “Second 
World War to the 70s” David Galula, Werner Halhweg, Frank Kitson, John J. McCuen, 
Robert Thompson and Roger Trinquir. Period Three: “From 9/11 to 2010”, James 
Corum, Colin S. Gray, Thomas X. Hammes, David KilCullen, James Kiras, John 
Mackinlay and Gil Merom. 
Analysis of doctrinal definitions and explanations 
 
American definitions 
Irregular Warfare 
Irregular Warfare is explained in the U.S. FMI 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency 
from 2009 as; “A broad form of conflicts in which Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and 
Unconventional Warfare are the principal activities”.239  
Result and conclusions 
The description of the term Irregular Warfare can be categorized as an umbrella 
description which demands pre-understanding of the subparts. The definition is a 
category definition and not an explanatory definition and equates warfare with a certain 
form of conflict. All three subparts, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Unconventional 
Warfare can exist with or without formal declarations of war and they can also exist 
within a conflict characterized as mainly regular dominated warfare, for example the 
Second World War. If all or just some of the subparts exist, the conflict is still defined 
as Irregular Warfare. This leads to an understanding of this definition, that it can exist 
both as a part of Regular Warfare or as a stand-alone type of warfare. This definition is 
however not exact; it opens up to more content and aspects with the word “broad form 
of conflict” and “the principal activities” and can thus be used more as directional 
guidance than demarcating definite borders.  
                                                 
236 U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Army Operations against Irregular Forces, Field Manual 
No. 31-15, May 1961. 
237 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington D.C.: US Governmental printing Office, 1940; a 
new edition of the original US Marine Corps manual by Sunflower University Press, 1996, pavilion Press, 
2004 and Cosimo Reports, 2010). 
238 Försvar i användning, Ds 2008:49 [A Useful Defence] (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 2008), 
chapter 3. 
239 U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, Field Manual Interim 
(FMI) 3-24.2 (FM 90-9, FM 7-98), March 2009, Glossary-12, Also in U.S JP 3-24 COIN (2009), 
Glossary GL-7. 
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The definition requires understanding and knowledge of the subpart definitions to give 
some meaning and to be useful, as in itself the definition is not sufficient to understand 
the meaning of Irregular Warfare as a phenomenon. The potential of explaining content 
covers only aspects of character of activity (variable no 6) addressing no particular 
actors directly. The description has a partly military focus although the subpart 
Insurgency implies a clear political and civilian dimension. The description has the 
character of a circle-description, not addressing root content but merely embracing 
further more or less hard-to-define terms. The description is comprehensive and clear if 
the subparts are defined, otherwise the description has less explanatory potential. 
Another American definition of the term Irregular Warfare comes from the U.S. 
Department of Defense (2008)240; Irregular Warfare: ”A violent struggle among state 
and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). 
Irregular Warfare favours indirect and asymmetrical approaches, though it may employ 
the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, 
influence, and will. Also called IW”. 
Result and conclusions 
This definition is an explanatory definition framing the phenomenon in a level of 
violence (violent struggle) and the participating actors (between (a) state(s) and non-
state actors). The actors involved are addressed as being state and non-state actors. The 
purpose of the struggle is to define the extent of both influence and legitimacy over 
relevant populations. The definition also covers what strategy is in focus (indirect and 
asymmetrical approaches to erode power, influence and will) covering not just military 
capabilities.  
The definition opens up for any forms of capabilities from civilian/political to military, 
especially if the struggle is “violent”, thus implying a military focus. It might be a 
question of whether this definition constitutes all opponents (state and non-state) using 
mainly indirect means or if it should be understood that such strategy is the main 
approach from the non-state entities. A problem lies in how to define violent struggle 
and also if it is useful to narrow the definition, changing “struggle” to just between non-
state actors or between state entities. It does not explain what is thought to be the end-
state of “irregular”, the state or non-state status, the ways to influence, the goal, or if all 
three aspects have to be present. It does however emphasize that these aspects are 
specific characteristics of Irregular Warfare, and not excluding that such struggles can 
be a part of regular dominating warfare and conflicts.  
                                                 
240 U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, Joint Publications JP 1-02, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 17 October 2008),  
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict. 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
10 
 
The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy and operational art 
and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered as conceptual and moral factors. The 
description covers characteristics such as the diffuse expression; “a violent struggle”. 
Participating actors are described with a focus on both state and non-state actors. The 
description leans primarily on a military emphasis of the phenomenon, but also includes 
political and civilian activities with the expression; other capabilities. The definition is 
assessed to be a comprehensive explanation, relatively understandable but non-specific 
as regards the means (asymmetrical). This reduces the explanatory potential. 
Irregular Forces 
The U.S. FMI 3-24.2 and U.S. JP 3-40 defines the term irregular forces as “Armed 
individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other 
internal security forces”241  
Result and conclusions 
The description focus is on content of participating actors and of a combined umbrella 
and explanatory character, opening up for every individual or group that is armed and 
not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces to be 
addressed as irregular forces.  
This definition does not distinguish between criminality, insurgents, and terrorist or 
resistance activities and thus, covers both legal and illegal activities. In itself, this 
definition is so open that it has to be defined further in order to be meaningful and 
useful. A key characteristic is that participants have to be armed. All actors addressed 
are non-state actors. The definition is assessed to be comprehensive and with good 
explanatory potential.  
An example of a Cold War era definition of irregular forces can be gained from the 
U.S. Army Field Manual FM 31-15 Operations against Irregular Forces; “The term 
irregular, used in combination such as Irregular forces, Irregular activities, and 
counter Irregular operations, is used in the broad sense to refer to all types of 
nonconventional forces and operations. It includes guerrilla, partisan, insurgent, 
subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolutionary, and similar personnel, organizations 
and methods”242. The following text section says further; “Irregular activities include 
acts of a military, political, psychological, and economic nature, conducted 
predominantly by inhabitants of a nation for the purpose of eliminating or weakening 
the authority of the local government or an occupying power, and uses primarily 
Irregular and informal groupings and measures”243 
                                                 
241 U.S. Army FMI 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency (2009), Glossary-12, Irregular forces, Also in 
US JP 3-40 COIN (2009), Glossary GL-7. 
242 U.S. Army FM 31-15 Operations against Irregular Forces, (1961), chapter 1. Introduction, section 2 
Terms, p. 3. 
243 Ibid. section 2. 
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Result and conclusions 
This explanation, rather than definition of the term Irregular activities is both of an 
umbrella and explanatory character, containing category, activity and goal descriptions 
(different groupings, all with the same goal, to take political control from an existing 
government either originally in the country or an occupying power). It does not include 
non-political activities such as criminality per se and thus narrows the field of interest to 
the politico-military domain and needs further definitions of all subparts included, if 
those are not already known. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as 
strategy, conceptual and character factors. Attitude aspects such as included/not 
included are mentioned. Participating actors are described with a focus on the opposing 
actors as the inhabitants of a country. The description leans primarily on a 
political/civilian focus of the phenomenon. The description is assessed to be 
comprehensive and with good explanatory potential. 
Small Wars 
In the U.S. Marine Corps “Small Wars Manual” from 1940 a description starts with the 
following statement; “The term “Small Wars” is often a vague name for any of a great 
variety of military operations”. A definition is then outlined; “Small wars are 
operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military forces are combined 
with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose 
government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of 
such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation”244  
A further explanation states; “Small wars vary in degree from simple demonstrative 
operations to military interventions in the fullest sense, short of war. They are not 
limited in size, in the extent of operations nor their costs in property, money or lives. 
The essence of a Small War is its purpose and the circumstances surrounding its 
inception and conduct, the character of either one or all of the opposing forces, and the 
nature of the operations themselves”. “The ordinary expedition of the Marine Corps 
which does not involve a major effort in Regular Warfare against a first-rate power may 
be termed a small war “.245  
Three classes of Small Wars are outlined where the first is within the policy of the USA;  
“ to suppress lawlessness or insurrection”, “punitive expeditions may be resorted to in 
some instances” and finally (not within the U.S. policy, is stated) “ campaigns of 
contest”. An opinion of the difficulty to define the problem is stated as; “The legal and 
military features of each small war present distinctive characteristics which make the 
segregation of all of them into fixed classifications an extremely difficult problem”.246  
                                                 
244 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (1940), p. 1. 
245 Ibid. p. 1. 
246 Ibid. p. 2. 
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A foremost character of Small Wars is stated as; “that the (U.S.) forces “dribble in” to 
the countries in which they intervene. It (the U.S. government) is not at war with the 
neighbouring state; it proposes no aggression or seizure of territory; its purpose is 
friendly and it wishes to accomplish its objective with as little military display as 
possible with a view to gaining the lasting friendship of the inhabitants of the 
country”.247 
The dynamics between low-level military actions and following police actions until a 
withdrawal are explained. A view of a future problem with this kind of warfare and war 
is expressed as follows on the next page. 
“There is a sad lack of authoritative texts on the methods employed in small wars”, 
however it is stated that the U.S. MC is probably the most experienced organization in 
the world on such operations”…. “This experience has been gained almost entirely in 
small wars against poorly organized and equipped native irregulars…”248. 
”That experience must not lead to an underestimation of the modern irregular, supplied 
with modern arms and equipment”….”the future opponent may be as well armed as 
they ( the Marines) are; he will be able to concentrate a numerical superiority against 
isolated detachments at the time and places he chooses; as in the past he will have 
thorough knowledge of the trails, the country and the inhabitants; and he will have the 
inherent ability to withstand all the natural obstacles, such as climate and disease, to a 
greater extent than white man”249 
“All these natural advantages, combining primitive cunning and modern armament, 
will weigh heavily in the balance against the advantages of the marine force in 
organisation, equipment, intelligence and discipline, if a careless audacity is permitted 
to wrap good judgement”.250 
“Small wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, 
resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small wars are conducted in uncertainty, are conducted 
often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders 
lacking specific instruction”.251  
The definition; “Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, 
wherein military forces are combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or 
external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or 
unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the 
foreign policy of our nation”252 in combination with the explanations, gives the 
following analysis result. 
                                                 
247 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (1940), pp. 5-6. 
248 Ibid. pp. 5-9. 
249 Ibid. p. 8. 
250 Ibid. p. 8. 
251 Ibid. p. 9. 
252 Ibid. p. 1. 
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Result and conclusions 
The description is of a combined umbrella and explanatory character. Not all is 
inclusive in one specific definition; several explanations are given in the first chapter of 
the manual. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as primarily 
strategy, but also operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered as 
physical and moral factors. The description covers characteristics. Attitude aspects are 
not included directly but indirectly, the text points out that; “There is a sad lack of 
authoritative texts on the methods employed in small wars”, which might be 
discussed as a general attitude of unwillingness of addressing the subject. Participating 
actors are described with a focus on the Marine Corps engaging inhabitants of a foreign 
country. The description has a clear focus on strategy as regards the purpose and 
consequences. The description is comprehensive and has a good explanatory potential. 
An overview of American definitions 2009-1940. 
  
Source U.S. FMI 3-
24.2 (2009), JP 
3-40 ,(2009) 
U.S. JP-02 
(2008) 
U.S. FM 3-15 
(1961) 
U.S. MC Small 
Wars (1940) 
Term Irregular 
Warfare 
Irregular 
Warfare 
Irregular 
Forces 
Small Wars 
Aspects on 
IW/T/A/F 
    
Description of 
level of violence 
A broad form 
of conflict 
Violent struggle - From show of 
force to military 
interventions 
short of war. 
Operations not 
involving Regular 
Warfare against 
first-rate powers. 
Description of 
actors 
- State and non-
state actors have 
to be involved 
Inhabitants of 
a nation, all 
forms of non-
conventional 
forces, 
guerrilla, 
partisan, 
revolutionary, 
terrorists, 
insurgents. 
The U.S. Marines 
against irregulars 
of different kinds 
and force. 
Description of 
goals 
- Legitimacy and 
influence over 
relevant 
population(s). 
Erode an 
adversary’s 
power, influence 
and will. 
 
To take 
political 
control from 
the 
government or 
against an 
occupant force. 
To suppress 
lawlessness or 
insurrection. 
Punitive 
expedition 
(seldom) 
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Description of 
means 
  Guerrilla 
tactics, 
subversion, 
terrorism 
Military force 
combined with 
diplomatic 
pressure. 
Description of 
methods/activities 
Principal 
activities; 
Insurgency, 
counter-
Insurgency, 
Unconventional 
Warfare. 
Focus on 
indirect and 
asymmetrical 
approaches. 
military, 
political, 
psychological, 
economic 
nature. 
Diplomatic, 
military and 
police nature. 
Focus of the 
actors’ concept 
Describes both 
parties.  
Focus on the 
opponents. 
Focus on the 
opponents.  
Focus on one’s 
own party. 
Figure 26. Appendix 1. An overview of American definitions 2009-1940. 
The 1940 comprehensive definition of Small Wars has a lot in common with the 2008 
definition of Irregular Warfare. The latter however, implies more substantial violence, 
which the “Small Wars Manual” in fact pointed out as a future risk. However, 1961 
articulations do not seem to include such a risk. The 2009 explanation does not address 
levels of violence at all but focuses more on the Insurgency phenomenon. The Small 
Wars label addresses one’s own actions primarily; the 1961 and 2008 descriptions focus 
on the opponent and finally, the 2009 text includes both parties’ activities. 
NATO definitions 
Irregular Threats 
NATO addresses the area of Irregular Warfare within the broader term Irregular threats 
which is defined in the study draft AJP 3.4 Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations 
as; “Irregular threats are those posed by an opponent employing unconventional, 
asymmetric, and quite often illegal, methods and means to counter traditional military 
advantages. A weaker opponent often uses Irregular Warfare to exhaust collective will 
through protracted conflict. Irregular Warfare includes such means as terrorism, 
insurgency, criminality and guerrilla warfare.  Economic, political, civil and cultural 
initiatives usually accompany and may even be the chief means of irregular attacks on 
the influence of Western countries”.253  
                                                 
253 NATO AJP 3.4 Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (2009), pp. 1-3. paragraph (2). 
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Result and conclusions 
This definition is both an umbrella and an explanatory definition. The umbrella 
perspective is very wide, from criminality to Guerrilla Warfare and terrorism. The 
explanations focus on opponents’ use of threats or means against traditional military 
advantages. The term Irregular Warfare is used here as a category definition, including 
explanations such as terrorism, Insurgency, criminality and Guerrilla Warfare. That 
contains everything short of military tactical operations and beyond. The comprehensive 
political, civil and cultural dimension is explained as the main aspects for attacks on the 
influence of western countries. The definition does not exclude that irregular threats or 
warfare may coexist with Regular Warfare. The definition focuses on effects on 
(western) military capabilities as a specific, very broad, aggressor activity.  
A key characteristic is said to be “to exhaust the will by protracted conflict”, thus not 
focusing on destroying military power, if at all focusing on military force. The 
explanation opens up for all constellations of legal-illegal opponents, focusing both on 
political/civilian and military perspectives. The definition does not address irregular 
capabilities on the higher military level, such as company/battalion formation assaults 
and offensive operations against military forces, and can thus be said to deal with 
mostly indirect violence up to some level of Guerrilla Warfare, nevertheless mainly 
within guerrilla tactics capabilities. 
NATO also explain this area as; “The term Irregular threat is used in a broad, inclusive 
sense to refer to all types of non-conventional methods of violence employed to counter 
the traditional capabilities of an opponent. Irregular threats include acts of a military, 
political, psychological, and economic nature, conducted by both indigenous actors and 
non-state actors for the purpose of eliminating or weakening the authority of a 
government or influencing an outside power, and using primarily asymmetric methods.  
Included in this broad category are the activities of insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists, 
and similar irregular groups and organizations. Countering an irregular threat 
requires that NATO forces have an understanding of the particular character of the 
conflict, its context, and its participants.  Typically this is more difficult in a conflict 
involving Irregular threats as opposed to conventional forces”. 254 
NATO divides Counter Irregular Threat Operations into; Antiterrorism operations, 
Counter Terrorism Operations and Counter Insurgency Operations.255 COIN is further 
developed in the study draft AJP 3.4.4 Counterinsurgency where Counter Irregular 
threats, described; “As stated before an increase exists towards the use of Irregular 
activities by various opponents in an operating environment.” NATO considers the 
following Irregular activities256: Insurgency, Terrorism and Other Irregular activities 
such as: Criminality, Disorder and Piracy.”257 
                                                 
254 NATO AJP 3.4 Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (2009). p. 3-3. paragraph 0303, Counter Irregular 
Threat Operations. 
255 Ibid, pp. 3-3. – to 3-9.  
256 Ibid. Chapter 3. Irregular activities are described in chapter 3.  
257 NATO AJP 3.4.4 Counterinsurgency (2008), pp. 7-127. 
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Result and conclusions 
This text provides both explanations and an umbrella definition. It attempts to explain a 
broad content of activities and actors all within the label “Irregular threats”. The content 
addressed is so broad that it comprises all activities that actors can use up to the level of 
“Regular Warfare”, not saying it explicitly. The explanation points out the goal as 
being, eliminating or weakening the authority of a government or influencing an outside 
power. Here, both Insurgency and terrorism (not included in an Insurgency) are 
included. The definition requires several under-definitions in order to be useful. In fact 
it just opens up for all forms of influences on governments short of traditional military 
violence, which has to be defined further regarding responsibility between the military 
and police tasks.  
Result and conclusions –total NATO 
The description of the term Irregular Warfare, as a form of sub-term under the umbrella 
term Irregular threats is both of an explanatory and umbrella character. The potential of 
explaining content covers aspects such as strategy and operational art and tactics, 
though the latter more indirectly. Fighting power factors are covered as foremostly 
conceptual and moral factors. The description covers characteristics. Attitude aspects 
are not included. Participating actors are described with a focus on aggressors in the 
western countries.  
The description leans primarily on a comprehensive (both political/civilian and military) 
focus of the phenomenon. The description demand understanding of sub-terms such as; 
“Insurgency”, “Guerrilla Warfare” and “Terrorism”. 
British definitions 
Irregular activity 
In Britain the term Irregular activity is explained as; “Irregular activity is the use, or 
threat, of force by Irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or 
criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and 
authority.”258  
                                                 
258 UK JDP 3-40, Security and Stabilization: the Military Contribution (2009),  p. 14;  Irregular activity is 
the use, or  threat, of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or 
criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. (JDP 01 
(2nd Edition)). 
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Result and conclusions 
The description is both an explanatory and a broad umbrella definition, with a focus on 
actors at a sub-military level, who oppose authorities with both legal and illegal means, 
mainly from a non-military perspective. Compared to the British definition; 
“countering-irregular activities”; The coordinated measures, incorporating military 
activity with the other instruments of power within a Comprehensive Approach, that 
deal with the threats to security from irregular activity, while building governance and 
authority and addressing the underlying causes, the level of force including military 
levels is not particularly underlined.259  
The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy and operational art 
and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered as are primarily conceptual factors. The 
description covers characteristics and attitude aspects are not included. Participating 
actors are described with an emphasis on actors who oppose governments. The 
explanation includes all levels of violence from non-violence (disorder) to non-specified 
levels of terrorist and/or Insurgency violence, goals, actors, means and ways. It opens 
up for legal or illegal activities, thus not distinguishing between military or non-military 
violence. Not addressing the term warfare, it gives the impression of “sub-military” 
level of threat or use of force, even though the term insurgency indicates the opposite. 
The description leans primarily on a political/civilian focus of the phenomenon. The 
description requires the understanding of sub-terms such as; insurgency and terrorism. 
Swedish view 
The term Irregular Warfare is used in the 2008 Swedish governmental publication 
Försvar i Användning (A Useful Defence) in the following way; ”A majority of the 
conflicts in recent years have been characterized by Irregular Warfare, i.e. Guerrilla 
Warfare, armed gangs, terrorist network systems, and the employment of fighting units 
in smaller groups. Many actors are non-governmental. There are no signs that this 
pattern of conflict will change in the foreseeable future”260  
Result and conclusions 
This explanation is both of an umbrella character, containing all actors and means of 
violence from criminality to small groups Guerrilla Warfare and of some explanatory 
character. Goals for the actors are however not addressed, focusing on levels and actors, 
implicitly threatening a government and its military system. The potential of explaining 
content covers aspects operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered as 
conceptual factors. The description includes characteristics spanning from Guerrilla 
Warfare to criminal activities and attitude aspects such as included/not included.  
                                                 
259 UK JDP 3-40, Security and Stabilization: the Military Contribution (2009),  p. 234, Lexicon,  The 
coordinated measures, incorporating military activity with the other instruments of power within a 
Comprehensive Approach, that deal with the threats to security from irregular activity, while building 
governance and authority and  addressing the underlying causes. (JDP 01 (2nd Edition)).  
260 Försvar i användning, Ds 2008:49 [A Useful Defence] (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 2008), p. 
32. 
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Participating actors are described with a focus on the opposing actors (non-state actors). 
The description leans predominantly on a political/civilian focus of the phenomenon.  
The description is relatively comprehensive and has a good explanatory potential. 
The 2002 Swedish Military Strategy Doctrine defines Irregular Forces as follows; “The 
description of “Irregular forces” contains all forms of actors from loose formations to 
guerrilla units and is thus both a broad umbrella description and an explanatory 
description”261 
Result and conclusions 
The description of the term Irregular forces can be categorized as an explanatory 
description with an umbrella perspective. The potential of explaining content covers 
aspects such as strategy and operational art and tactics, though the latter mostly 
indirectly.  Fighting power factors are covered primarily as conceptual factors. The 
description covers characteristics though attitude aspects are not included. Participating 
actors are described from an aggressor perspective. The description leans predominantly 
on a political/civilian focus of the phenomenon, up to the military level of handling 
Guerrilla Warfare. The description requires understanding sub-terms such as; 
“guerrilla”, “partisan” and “terrorist”. The term “insurgent” or “insurgency” is not 
mentioned. 
                                                 
261 Militärstrategisk doktrin [Swedish Military Strategy Doctrine] (2002), p. 27. 
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An overview of modern definitions  
 
         
Definitions 
Variables 
SW 
2008 
U.S. 
2008 
U.S.  
2009 
NATO 
2008 
UK 
2009 
1. Strategy No Legitimacy 
and 
influence on 
population 
(s). 
No A weaker 
opponent’s 
Strategy. Economic, 
political, civil and 
cultural initiatives 
may be chief 
means. 
Ideology or 
criminality. 
Strategy to affect 
or prevent 
change/challenge 
authority. 
2. Tactics and 
Operational Art 
Guerrilla 
Warfare 
Indirect and 
asymmetrical 
approaches. 
No Unconventional, 
asymmetric, illegal 
methods and means. 
Terrorism, 
Insurgency, 
criminality, 
Guerrilla Warfare. 
Insurgency, 
Terrorism, 
criminality, 
disorder. 
3. Physical 
factors 
No No No No No 
4. Conceptual  
factors 
Network 
systems, 
fighting units 
in smaller 
groups. 
Full range of 
military and 
other 
capabilities. 
No No Irregular forces, 
groups or 
individuals. 
5. Moral factors No Erode an 
adversary’s 
power, 
influence 
and will. 
No To exhaust 
collective will. 
No 
6. Character of 
activity 
Many actors 
are non-
governmental. 
A pattern of 
conflict. 
Guerrilla 
Warfare, 
armed gangs, 
terrorists. 
A violent 
struggle. 
A broad form 
of conflict. 
Principal 
activities;  
Insurgency 
COIN 
un-
conventional 
warfare. 
Protracted conflict. Use or threat of 
force. 
7. Attitude 
aspects 
No No No No No 
8. Explanatory 
description 
Yes Yes Limited Yes Yes 
9. Umbrella 
description 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
10. Addressing  
actors 
The 
opponents. 
Yes, State 
and non- 
state actors. 
No particular 
actors. 
The opponent. The opponent. 
11. Military 
focus 
Limited Partly Predominantly  Limited Limited 
12.  Political/ 
civilian focus 
Mostly Partly Partly implicit Mostly Mostly 
 
Figure 27. Appendix 1. An overview of modern definitions. 
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Result and Comments  
 
The collection of contemporary doctrines and governmental writings from USA, UK, 
and NATO provides the following result. 
The UK, NATO and U.S. 2008 writings address strategy aspects in different ways. The 
Swedish writing and U.S. 2008 doctrine do not directly address strategy aspects. As for 
aspects concerning tactics and operational art, which are linked to strategy and to each 
other and not always strictly separable, the Swedish, the U.S. 2008, the NATO and the 
UK documents do highlight such aspects (in different words) though the clearest 
examples are in the NATO and UK writing (Insurgency, terrorism, criminality, disorder, 
Guerrilla Warfare). The 2009 U.S. doctrine does not mention the same/similar or other 
examples. 
Regarding physical factors no writings address this directly. As for conceptual factors, 
there are quite different examples given in the Swedish document (smaller groups in 
network systems) compared to the 2008 U.S. writings (full range of military and other 
capabilities). The 2009 U.S. document does not deal with conceptual descriptions at all. 
Nor does the NATO document, if one can understand labels such as terrorism being 
tactical/operational or strategy factors. The UK paper can be seen, like the Swedish one, 
to provide an image of both forces, groups, and more loosely formatted or 
independently operating individuals within the conceptual framework. As for addressing 
moral factors, only the U.S. 2008 and NATO paper give guidance. They differ however 
regarding content, where NATO only identifies the collective will as a target for an 
aggressor. The U.S. paper also includes the power and the influence as targets for an 
aggressor.  
When describing “character of activity” the papers do this in different ways, from the 
loose UK expression of; “use of threat of force”, the NATO; “protected conflict”, the 
U.S. 2008; “a violent struggle”, to the Swedish and U.S. 2009 different but clearer 
examples such as “Guerrilla Warfare”, “Insurgency”. One can notice that the Swedish 
writings and NATO 2008 use the term “Guerrilla Warfare”, which the U.S. and UK do 
not. As for attitude aspects, no writings deal with it. 
All writings except the U.S. 2009 can be seen as explanatory descriptions, identifying a 
field of violent activities, threatening the state and striving for influence over the 
population. These descriptions can also be seen as umbrella explanations of different 
aggressions against a legitimate state from non-governmental actors. The U.S. 2009 
description can, on the contrary, be seen as an umbrella description also covering the 
defending activities for such aggressions (for example, “counterinsurgency”). This view 
differs from the UK, NATO and Swedish explanations, which only focus on the 
aggressors. As for the focus on military activities, the U.S. has a clearer focus. The other 
papers have more limited military focus addressing “terrorism”, “criminality”, “armed 
gangs”, which are usually in the area of concern for police forces. Conversely, as 
regards political focus on the subject of Irregular Warfare, the Swedish, NATO and UK 
writings express this more than the U.S. perspective. 
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From this a pattern can be seen, where the view of the aggressor in Irregular Warfare is 
fairly similar for NATO, Sweden and UK, concerning aggressions from armed 
criminals, terrorists and “guerrillas” or Insurgency. The UK view also embraces the 
lowest form of aggression such as disorder, which NATO and Sweden do not. The U.S. 
view might be said to indirectly include this, because the use of the term Insurgency by 
definition incorporates such “lower-level” aggression, but it is not highlighted in the 
same way as by the others. On the other hand, the U.S. clearly include the higher 
violence spectrum (“full range of military and other capacities”) that the others do not. 
Violence-influence spectrum focus 
 
Different views of the violence spectrum or focus on this can be seen between the U.S. 
and more European view. Also, only the U.S. view expresses the opinion that the 
“defender” conducts Irregular Warfare, contrary to the other view that it is the 
“attacker” who conducts Irregular Warfare. A rather similar view exists on the character 
of the attacker and that the struggle concerns the legitimacy of the state and the 
influence of the people, regardless if the cause is just criminality or Insurgency or other 
form of attack on the state. As a consequence of this, the aggressor is not conceptualized 
to defeat the opponent’s military forces in open direct combat, which is basically a key 
concept and modus operandi for classic Guerrilla Warfare in its early stages. 
Answers to the three questions 
 
The first question; “How is the form of warfare, labelled Irregular Warfare (IW) 
defined and explained?” can be summarized as a conflict between state and non-state 
entities, where the latter threatens and attacks the ruling governmental function with 
violence that exceeds the capability of the police function to handle. The U.S. view in 
contrast to NATO, UK and Sweden is that IW covers activities from both the attacker 
and the defender. NATO, UK and Sweden view IW as activities from the attacker. 
Indirect means and a more political than military focus are generally addressed as 
characteristics. The explanations often address criminality and terrorism as components 
for the aggressor. The definitions and explanations differ in use of words and also in the 
emphasis on what part of the violence spectrum is of main concern. The explanations 
often include terms such as “Guerrilla Warfare”, “Insurgency” etc. where it is not 
always self-evident as to what they exactly mean, thus giving a broad potential for 
different understanding and mental pictures of the phenomenon trying to be explained. 
The words “unconventional” and “asymmetrical” are used, as are “Guerrilla Warfare” 
and “Insurgency”, which might cause interpretation to stray away from the traditional 
mental picture of armed combat between military forces at land, sea or in the air. Most 
explanations narrow the violence spectrum to the lower end and highlight the civilian 
and political focus. U.S. explanations on the other hand, open up the violence spectrum 
to more comprehensive combat, still with an indirect main approach.  
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All in all, the explanations try to both restrict and open up for what can be included, 
making it difficult to produce a distinct demarcation and more commonly understood 
picture of what it is and is not. Depending on education, experiences and working or 
studying within this field, a broad range of mental pictures might emerge for different 
people, even for those in the military forces. 
The second question; “What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms 
of warfare?” can be summarized with following aspects mentioned in the texts; IW can 
include criminality and terrorism, contrary to what is stated as rules for conventional 
and traditional western Regular Warfare. A protracted campaign where military 
capability is not the main key target also differs from Regular Warfare. Non-
governmental aggressors, focusing on influencing the people (local, regional and 
transnational) are also main differences in Regular Warfare. Even if IW can also include 
tactical combat, the main emphasis is on different types of network groupings, nestling 
within the population, hard to detect, which differ from the traditional formations of 
Regular Warfare units. Looking strictly at what is addressed as characteristics of 
Irregular Warfare, one can list the following five aspects as different from the 
traditional, main view of conventional warfare. First, the actors do not follow rules of 
law and might involve criminality in their activities. Secondly, they might use terrorism 
as a means. Thirdly, the main goal for combat is not to defeat the opposing military 
forces. Fourthly, time is on the aggressor’s side in Irregular Warfare. A key goal is to 
influence the population and the military focus is secondary. 
The third question; “What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?” addressed 
to the collection of texts can be answered with the following summary; a 
violence/influence spectrum starting at the low end from “disorder”, “criminality” via 
terrorism, Insurgency to Guerrilla Warfare and further on including on hand, available 
tactical concepts for ground operations. This broad span of activities/tactics should not 
only be seen as sequential but also as possibly used back and forth and in parallel. As 
non-state actors are able to hide from the governmental forces, a sort of integration 
within the social structure can be argued to emerge, where the control and influence of 
the people become a vital and typical trait in IW, which differs from Regular Warfare. 
With this sort of struggle, often for a long time, where the will of the people stands high, 
the political aspect becomes another typical trait where actions other than military and 
police-related ones are the most important. 
Discussion of the result 
 
The texts with their definitions and explanations have in common that they are 
articulations in doctrines and governmental writings with very varying degrees of pre-
understanding, background research, tradition of the subject and different levels of 
political sensitivity regarding words, labels and willingness to address possible 
consequences for security policy. The Swedish text does not mention “Insurgency” and 
the NATO texts are merely at the very beginning of addressing this sort of conflict. On 
the other hand, the U.S. and UK have backgrounds with both research and educational 
efforts on IW, although in varying degrees.  
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Despite different words in explanations and diverging views of emphasis on the 
violence scale, there seems to be rather a common view in general of the phenomenon – 
although there are several limitations for making distinct demarcations.  
The very fact that something “irregular” obviously is supposed to indicate a difference 
to what is understood as “regular” leads to perspectives that in turn might be infinitely 
different. As some of these differences might very well also occur in “regular contexts”, 
this challenges the whole effort of understanding. 
This broad overview of definitions and explanations must be seen from the perspective 
that some words have been easier to observe and deal with for me, compared to a total 
stranger to the subject and this could have affected the result in some way. The 
definitions and explanations in the actual texts have a somewhat different result in how 
to define the phenomenon of IW, both regarding the use of words and actual meaning of 
the term. What seems remarkable is that no attempt can be found highlighting the 
importance of intelligence conceptually, the requirements of the police function and the 
conceptual needs for addressing military and police functions simultaneously, by the 
U.S., NATO, UK and Swedish articulations on the subject. 
Analysis of the literature definitions and explanations 
 
Period One; “From Clausewitz to the Second World War” 
 
Carl von Clausewitz 
 
Clausewitz uses the expression “People at Arms” in his limited analysis of what might 
be called the irregular character of war as another form of armed struggle, compared to 
the main interest in his Magnus Opus On War. Clausewitz underlines that his 
discussions on the subject have to be seen as more of “an intuitive seeking for the truth 
than an objective analysis” because so little was known in general, and those who had 
studied the subject for longer times had written too little about it so far. He argues that 
this kind of warfare as a phenomenon of the 19th century could have had a revolutionary 
origin. Clausewitz does not elaborate on the physical aspects of “People at Arms” other 
than the opinion that the disadvantages of weak, physical power could lead to the use of 
this sort of tactics, primarily in large areas. Thus, Clausewitz claims; the larger the 
areas the enemy has to use, the more dangerous the tactics from an opponent will be.262  
He does not go into the political-revolutionary aspect but instead, focuses on tactics, 
which he sees as a development resulting from the former artificial borders of warfare 
and an enlargement of the operational environment. Wisely used, which can be 
interpreted as having a sound strategy, tactics in most cases will give relative superiority 
against opponents, according to Clausewitz. “It destroys like smouldering embers, it 
consumes the basic foundations of the enemy forces”, is how he expresses the effect of 
tactics.263  
                                                 
262 Clausewitz, Om Kriget (1991), p. 479. 
263 Ibid. p. 479. 
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He stresses the importance of proportions between the operational area and the army in 
order to withstand distributed hostile tactics. Clausewitz claims that this form of tactics 
is mostly a part of major campaigns, where regular and irregular (people-in-arms) forces 
complement each other in an overarching (operational) plan. If used as a single form or 
warfare, he gives examples where it can give effect; that is, if the war is fought in the 
inner parts of a country and if the country is large enough, and if the people’s support is 
ensured and finally, if the terrain is suitable, it would be disadvantageous for the enemy 
to fight.  
Three concepts of Irregular Warfare are discussed, one is an organized form of units, 
“lantstorm”, and another is a more loosely composed structure of “armed people”. The 
power of actions in the rear and harassing the enemy is stressed. Also, “the power of the 
example”, i.e. courageous and brave initiatives will be examples to be followed by other 
“armed people units”. A third concept, a part of the regular army that supports and is 
attached to the “lantstorm” is discussed. However, it is important not to blend too much 
as that might lead to a mere concept of regular “lantstorm” composition. The power of 
the “will of the people” declines in “lantstorm-units” if too many regular troops coexist 
in the same area, according to Clausewitz.264 The advantages of operations in small 
formations and attacking weak points and bases are important to be recognized, 
according to Clausewitz, neither should this form of tactics be over or underestimated. 
The right character of “people-in-arms” should be “fogs” in contrast to the “physical 
bodies” of Regular Warfare concepts. This might be seen as one explanation of the 
differences between Regular and Irregular Warfare.265  
The “fog” in the flanks can suddenly be changed to “lightning”, with a concentration of 
both “people-in-arms” and minor attachments of more “regular” organized units, 
preferably also combined with some organized units, which together create superiority 
over the enemy. Clausewitz underlines the importance of not letting “the big strategic 
form of defence” develop into Regular Warfare tactical defence, claiming that “people-
in-arms” can never be a form of decisive defensive warfare. As for the strategic form of 
defence, he states however, that there are two forms of “people-in-arms” warfare to be 
considered, either as a “last resort” or as “natural” support connected to a decisive 
battle. Clausewitz states the opinion that one of the major aspects of fighting power, the 
moral factor, to be fully utilized has to be borne from the people. Thus, he 
acknowledges high potentiality in this “force”, the moral force, to the tactics of “people 
in arms”.266 A main question he argues is to analyse what influence actual “people-in-
arms” tactics might result in. The mental aspect, “the willingness to resist is everywhere 
and nowhere”267 is emphasized by Clausewitz, with respect to the people, no matter rich 
or poor. Clausewitz argues emphatically for the preparation and use of “people-in-arms” 
as a moral necessity for “the soul of the people” and for the legitimacy of a state 
government.268  
                                                 
264 Clausewitz, Om Kriget (1991), p. 481. 
265 Ibid. p. 480. 
266 Ibid. p. 478. 
267 Ibid. p. 480. 
 268Ibid. p. 483. 
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Also, he points out different attitudes to the phenomenon, both from a political 
perspective as being dangerous with anarchistic influence potential, and from a military 
perspective as being doubtful of the results compared to the efforts. As a whole, 
Clausewitz mainly addresses the area of Irregular Warfare, primarily as one form of 
strategic defence. It is from the tactical view he outlines certain characteristics, such as 
flank attacks over large areas, harassing but not directed at the enemy strengths. As for 
the operational concept, he speaks of combining “loose formations”, “lantstorm” and 
“lantstorm supported with regular elements”. Combining these elements together in 
parallel for more offensive use is what Clausewitz writes, which links to operational art. 
Clausewitz describes a concept where tactics of what generally is understood as 
Guerrilla Warfare, support Regular Warfare combat, to be used when the right 
opportunities occur. Otherwise, a small scale attrition war in the enemy flanks and rear 
areas is the key characteristic. The arguably forceful force driver for war in general is 
the moral power, which can be found from the people rather than from regular military 
formations, according to Clausewitz. 
Result and conclusions 
The descriptions are both of an umbrella and explanatory character. The potential of 
explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, operational art and tactics. Fighting 
power factors are covered; physical, conceptual, and moral factors. The description 
covers characteristics and attitude aspects are included. Participating actors are 
described mostly with a focus on the aggressor perspective (people-at-arms). The 
description leans primarily on a military focus of the phenomena. The description is 
clear and substantial in its content and has potential understanding without 
complementary sub-explanations or definitions. Although from the Napoleonic times, a 
surprisingly comprehensive content is outlined, which expressed in more modern words 
could well be a contemporary definition of “Irregular Warfare”. 
Charles Callwell 
 
Callwell’s descriptions in his famous Small Wars are said merely to aim to give a sketch 
of the principles and practice of Small Wars regarding strategy and 
tactics………..against adversaries of whom modern works on military art seldom take 
account.269 The first chapter gives the following description of the term Small Wars as; 
“somewhat difficult to define”….. “…practically can be said to include all campaigns 
other than those where the opposing side consists of regular troops”270 Further on 
Callwell states; “It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilised races 
by disciplined soldiers, it comprises campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and 
Guerrilla Warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling 
against opponents who will not meet them in the open field, and it thus obviously covers 
operations varying in their scope and in their conditions”271  
                                                 
269 Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (1996), p. 22. 
270 Ibid. p. 21. 
271 Ibid. p. 21. 
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Another broader articulation regarding the term Small War is that “is simply used to 
denote, in default of a better, operations of regular armies against irregular, or 
comparatively speaking irregular, forces”272.  
Callwell outlines three different forms of Small Wars: 1 Partisan warfare, which usually 
arises when trained soldiers are employed in quelling sedition and of insurrections in 
civilised countries, 2 Campaigning for conquest, (of a Great power), 3 Punitive 
expeditions against tribes bordering upon distant colonies.273;  
In the third chapter, Callwell describes the following different classes of Small Wars; 
campaigns of conquest or annexation (external war), campaigns for suppression of 
insurrections or lawlessness or for the settlement of conquered or annexed territory 
(internal war) and campaigns undertaken to wipe out an insult or to overthrow a 
dangerous enemy.274 
Callwell recognizes warfare differently depending on the adversary forces’ character or 
if the adversary is weaker and thus fights in other ways. 
“Whenever a regular army finds itself engaged upon hostilities against Irregular forces, 
or forces which in their armament, their organisation, and their discipline are palpably 
inferior to it, the conditions of the campaign become distinct from the conditions of 
modern Regular Warfare, and it is with hostilities of this nature that this volume 
purposes to deal”275  
Callwell also discusses Irregular enemies organized regularly276. The work is discussed 
merely from the regular troop point of view.277 
As for explaining a view on what is different from Regular Warfare, Callwell writes the 
following; “The teachings of great masters of the art of war, and the experience gained 
from campaigns of modern date in America and on the continent of Europe, have 
established certain principles and precedents which form the groundwork of the system 
of regular warfare of to-day “……….”But the conditions of small wars are so 
diversified, the enemy’s mode of fighting is often so peculiar, and the theatres of 
operations present such singular features, that irregular warfare must generally be 
carried out on a method totally different form the stereotyped system. The art of war, as 
generally understood, must be modified to suit the circumstances of each particular 
case. The conduct of small wars is in fact in certain respects an art by itself, diverging 
widely from what is adapted that there are not in all its branches points which permit 
comparisons to be established” 278 
                                                 
272 Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (1996), p. 21. 
273 Ibid. p. 22. 
274 Ibid. p. 26. 
275 Ibid. p. 22. 
276 Ibid. p. 29. 
277 Ibid. p. 23. 
278 Ibid. p. 23. 
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Callwell underlines a “great diversity in tactics and strategy in different Small wars and 
different Guerrilla wars”279 and regarding Intelligence; “The vital importance of 
understanding the enemy and the war to embark”280, however, Callwell recognizes, 
echoing several contemporary statements; “Despite Intelligence work …in Small wars 
the regular forces are often working very much in the dark”281 A view of complexity is 
also to be noticed; “So different conditions….actions”282 “It is this extraordinary 
diversity of conditions which makes the consideration of small wars so complex and so 
difficult to discuss as one general subject”283 
Result and conclusions 
The descriptions are of both an umbrella and explanatory character. The potential of 
explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, but the focus is on tactics. Fighting 
power factors are covered for physical, conceptual factors and moral factors. The 
description covers several characteristics and attitude aspects as not directly included. 
Participating actors are described both for the regulars and the irregulars. The 
description leans primarily on a military focus of the phenomena. The descriptions are 
clear and substantial in content and have potential understanding without 
complementary sub-explanations or definitions. Although from the 19th century, a 
comprehensive content is outlined, which, in more modern words, could well be a 
contemporary discussion on “Irregular Warfare” from the military part of operations. 
Thomas Edward Lawrence 
 
Thomas Edward Lawrence’s personal accounts and despatches from the Arab revolt 
cover the period of 1918-1919 and were written in 1921. The epos Seven Pillars of 
Wisdom284 has become an unmatched and unique classic concerning Irregular wars seen 
from a westerner’s eye, from the actual time period. The book covers 661 pages, 
appendixes excluded, and is a personal narrative, not pretending to be impartial.285 
Lawrence uses the terms regulars286 and irregulars.287 He also equates rebellion with the 
form of an Irregular war, a term he uses; “the Sheriff’s rebellion had been unsatisfactory 
for the last moths: (standing still, which, with an Irregular War, was the prelude to 
disaster)”288 Lawrence also uses the term “Guerrilla Warfare” and “mobile columns”, 
the latter of regular character.289 A character of the “irregulars”, not suited for combat in 
larger formations, instead the smaller the better, is described.290  
                                                 
279 Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (1996), p. 23. 
280 Ibid. p. 33. 
281 Ibid. p. 43. 
282 Ibid. p. 43. 
283 Ibid. p. 42. 
284 Thomas Edward Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom. A Triumph (Norwalk, CT: The Easton 
Press, 1926/1935; New York: Anchor, Imprint of Random House, 1991). 
285 Ibid. p. 6. 
286 Ibid. p. 65; “Arab regulars” 
287 Ibid. p. 137. 
288 Ibid. p. 67. 
289 Ibid. p. 104. 
290 Ibid. p. 136. 
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An example of Unconventional Warfare is given in the following passage; “We 
received a great reinforcement to our cause in Jaafar Pasha, a Baghdadi officer from 
the Turkish Army. After distinguished service in the German and Turkish armies, he had 
been chosen by Enver to organize the levies if the Sheikh el Senussi. He went there by 
submarine, made a decent force of wild men, and showed tactical ability against the 
British in two battles”.291 Lawrence gives a glimpse of another character of Irregular 
Warfare, that of a “difference to the principles of Regular Warfare; “I began to recall 
suitable maxims on the conduct of modern, scientific war. But they would not fit, and it 
worried me”.292  
Lawrence discusses the moral cause to fight and the British attitude; “Efforts to make 
our men hate the enemy usually made them hate the fighting”.293 Lawrence continues 
with a discussion of the aim of Feisal and the Arabs fighting the Turks geographically 
and opposing their freedom of action. Only if absolutely necessary, killing was the 
answer; if possible, victory without combat.294 Another way to characterize differences 
in warfare and traditions and mind-set is this passage; “Armies are like plants, 
immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through the long stems to the head. We might be a 
vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man’s mind; and as we 
wanted nothing material to live with, so we might offer nothing material to the killing. It 
seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target, owning only what he sat in, 
and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at”.295 Special conditions 
for distribution of raiding parties are described (unorthodox), as tribes could not be 
mixed or combined due to distrust.296  
Further explanation on the special character of the warfare; “In character our 
operations of development for the final stroke should be like naval war, in mobility, 
ubiquity, independent of bases and communications, ignoring of ground features, of 
strategic areas, of fixed directions, of fixed points. `He who commands the sea is at 
great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will. And we 
commanded the desert. Camel raiding parties, self-contained like ships, might cruise 
confidently along the enemy’s cultivation-frontier, sure of an unhindered retreat into 
their desert-element which the Turks could not explore”.297 
We should use the smallest force in the quickest time, at the farthest place.298 In all, 
Lawrence describes his personal experiences and thinking during the time of the Arab 
rebellion. He does little in giving that form of particular warfare a name or a label. The 
depths in descriptions of character, content and tactics are however comprehensive in 
many aspects, from material to mental perspectives, not least concerning the importance 
of cultural understanding. Lawrence uses the term Irregular War at least in one passage. 
                                                 
291 Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom. A Triumph (1926), p. 166. 
292 Ibid. p. 188. 
293 Ibid, p. 190. 
294 Ibid. p. 191. 
295 Ibid. p. 192. 
296 Ibid. pp. 338-339. 
297 Ibid. p. 337. 
298 Ibid. p. 337. 
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Result and conclusions 
Lawrence’s descriptions of Irregular War and Warfare, without dealing with definitions 
are of a comprehensive character. The potential of explaining content covers aspects 
such as strategy, but focuses on tactics. Fighting power factors are covered such as; 
physical, but mainly conceptual factors. The description covers several characteristics 
and attitude aspects are limitedly included. Participating actors are described mostly 
with a focus on the aggressor perspective. The description leans primarily on a military 
focus of the phenomena. The descriptions are clear, colourful and often also 
metaphorical and substantial in content, and have potential understanding without 
complementary sub-explanations or definitions. Lawrence describes his view of the 
advantages of this form of warfare during this conflict, and also the difficulties related 
to what today is defined as Unconventional Warfare in order to support Regular 
Warfare campaigns. 
Summary of views on Irregular Warfare, Period One; 1900 century – Post 
First World War 
 
         
Definitions 
Variables 
Clausewitz 
 
People-at-Arms 
Callwell 
 
Small Wars 
Lawrence 
 
Irregular 
War/Warfare 
1. Strategy - Revolution, Uprising. 
- Strategic defence against a 
foreign military force (last 
resort) 
- (Natural) complement/ 
support to Regular Warfare. 
Callwell outlines three different forms 
of “Small Wars”;  
1. “Partisan Warfare”, which usually 
arises when trained soldiers are 
employed in quelling or subduing and 
of insurrections in civilised countries.  
2. Campaigning for conquest (of a 
Great power).  
3.  Punitive expeditions against tribes 
bordering upon distant colonies. 
 
Irregular war as 
complement to Regular 
Warfare. 
“We received a great 
reinforcement to our cause 
in Jaafar Pasha, a 
Baghdadi officer from the 
Turkish Army. After 
distinguished service in 
the German and Turkish 
armies, he had been 
chosen by Enver to 
organize the levies if the 
Sheikh el Senussi. He went 
there by submarine, made 
a decent force of wild 
men, and showed tactical 
ability against the British 
in two battles” 
2. Tactics and 
Operational 
Art 
Guerrilla tactics over large 
areas, flank attacks, harassing 
in the rear areas. 
 
Combining three concepts 
within a higher plan or only 
“IW-concepts” (inside a large 
country, people support, 
suitable terrain). 
“great diversity in tactics and 
strategy in different Small wars and 
different Guerrilla wars”. The work 
focus on tactics. 
“Camel raiding parties, 
self-contained like ships, 
might cruise confidently 
along the enemy’s 
cultivation-frontier, sure 
of an unhindered retreat 
into their desert-element 
which the Turks could not 
explore”. 
 
Guerrilla Warfare 
principles. 
Mobile column principles. 
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3. Physical 
factors 
Weak force compared to 
regular forces. 
Whenever a regular army finds itself 
engaged upon hostilities against 
Irregular forces, or forces which in 
their armament, their organisation, 
and their discipline are palpably 
inferior to it, the conditions of the 
campaign become distinct from the 
conditions of modern Regular 
Warfare, and it is with hostilities of 
this nature that this volume purposes 
to deal. 
 
We should use the smallest 
force in the quickest time, 
at the farthest place. 
4. Conceptual 
factors 
“Loose formations” 
“Lantstorm-units” 
“Lantstorm supported with 
regular detachments” 
 
Natural support and 
complement to regular 
combat. 
But the conditions of Small Wars are 
so diversified, the enemy’s mode of 
fighting is often so peculiar, and the 
theatres of operations present such 
singular features, that Irregular 
Warfare must generally be carried out 
in a method totally different from the 
stereotyped system. 
“We might be a vapour, 
blowing where we listed. 
Our kingdoms lay in each 
man’s mind; and as we 
wanted nothing material 
to live with, so we might 
offer nothing material to 
the killing. It seemed a 
regular soldier might be 
helpless without a target, 
owning only what he sat 
in, and subjugating only 
what, by order, he could 
poke his rifle at”. 
 
 
 
 
5. Moral 
factors 
 
The great importance of the 
will of the people is 
addressed. 
Whenever a regular army finds itself 
engaged upon hostilities against 
Irregular forces, or forces which in 
their armament, their organisation, 
and their discipline are palpably 
inferior to it, the conditions of the 
campaign become distinct from the 
conditions of modern Regular 
Warfare, and it is with hostilities of 
this nature that this volume purposes 
to deal. 
Special conditions for 
distribution of raiding 
parties are described 
(unorthodox) as tribes 
could not be mixed or 
combined due to distrust. 
 
Lawrence discusses the 
moral cause to fight and 
the British attitude; 
“Efforts to make our men 
hate the enemy usually 
made them hate the 
fighting…” 
6. Character 
of activity 
“a fog against the physical 
enemy”, “a fog that suddenly 
could be concentrated to 
lightning”. 
Important function /activity 
and claiming high effect, 
when wisely used, on enemy 
and particular on one’s 
morale and fighting power 
potential.  
It is this extraordinarily diversity of 
conditions which makes the 
consideration of small wars so 
complex and so difficult to discuss as 
one general subject”. 
 
Callwell recognizes warfare 
differently depending on the 
adversary forces’ character or if the 
adversary is weaker and thus fights in 
other ways. 
A character of the 
“irregulars” as not suited 
for combat in larger 
formations, instead the 
smaller the better. 
 
“I began to recall suitable 
maxims on the conduct of 
modern, scientific war. 
But they would not fit, and 
it worried me”. 
 
8. Attitude 
aspects 
Negative political and 
military attitude is 
mentioned. 
Negative attitude is not directly 
mentioned but Callwell points out that 
the understanding of “modern Regular 
Warfare” is not enough to understand 
and deal with Small Wars. 
 
 
Not a focus in the 
descriptions 
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9. Explanatory 
description 
 
 
The work has mainly 
explanatory character. 
 
 
The work has mainly explanatory 
character. 
 
 
The work has explanatory 
character often with use of 
philosophical metaphors. 
10. Umbrella 
description 
 The work has an overarching 
umbrella character in the beginning. 
 
The descriptions cannot be 
characterized as umbrella 
descriptions. 
11. Addressing  
actors 
 Participating actors are described 
mostly with focus on the aggressor 
perspective (people-at-arms). 
Focusing on the aggressor 
perspective (the 
insurgents). 
12. Military 
focus 
The focus is military. The focus is military. The focus is mainly 
military. 
13.  Political/ 
civilian focus 
C chooses not to elaborate 
further on the political side of 
his “On War”. 
The political focus is limited. Political focus is included. 
Figure 28. Appendix 1. Summary of views on Irregular Warfare, Period One. 
Result and Comments 
The three chosen influential experts are of very different character; Clausewitz – the 
primus classic military philosopher of the 18th and 19th century, Callwell – the primus 
British practitioner from the Imperial War period and Lawrence – the debated, unique 
British Irregular Warfare leader, self-reflector and mentor from the First World War 
period. They stand for views on the subject from the end of 1700 to the beginning of 
1900, during which the development of armed violence took huge steps, from 
Napoleonic warfare to mechanized combat on the ground, at sea and now also in the air.  
Moreover, they express their views from different lengths of experiences, two of them 
focusing on how to defend or defeat Irregular opponents and one from the position of 
how to use Irregular Warfare in order to defeat a regular opponent. Lawrence and 
Clausewitz respectively, note that they have incomplete views or limited knowledge on 
the subject.  
One grand war philosopher in general, deriving theories within and beyond the 
scientific paradigms, one COIN commander pragmatically writing on methods and 
finally, one tactical Insurgency commander reflecting on the subject of personnel, 
sociological/psychological aspects that clearly go beyond positivistic aspirations. With 
such differences in time, context, social realities, personal backgrounds and purposes for 
their descriptions, explanations and thinking, there exist innumerable possibilities to 
extract some nucleus from their views. The thirteen aspects here used to structure and 
examine traces of expressions give nonetheless, the following result. Apart from 
addressing strategy aspects, all three experts refer to revolutionary up-risings as a 
natural complement to Regular Warfare.  
Tactics and operational art characterized as different forms of Guerrilla Warfare with 
classic aspects of high mobility, self-contained forces, flank attacks, harassing the 
enemy and great diversity in execution, are rather similarly addressed. As for physical 
factors, the Irregular side’s military weaker position is recognised. As regards 
explaining different concepts of warfare, Clausewitz gives three conceptual examples, 
Callwell denotes “the great differences” and Lawrence focuses on the non-material 
centre of gravity (“the mind”).  
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Callwell also notes concepts of irregulars using Regular Warfare principles. These three 
different explanations can be said to complement very different perspectives though all 
point in the same direction. The strong moral factor, through the will of the people is 
underlined by Clausewitz. Callwell deals with the need of a high offensive spirit in the 
regular troops and Lawrence discusses the problems of adopting a new cultural moral 
perspective for westerners practising Irregular Warfare in foreign countries and different 
parts of the world. 
As for the character of the activity, Clausewitz uses the fog and lightning metaphor that 
goes well with Lawrence’s expressions. Callwell underlines the uniqueness in every 
case, making generalization very difficult. One characteristic has a weaker military 
potential, another focuses on the fight. As a result of this form of warfare and the 
character of irregulars, they are not suitable for Regular Warfare according to Lawrence. 
Regarding the attitude towards this kind of warfare, both Clausewitz and Callwell write 
about negative or limited interest in the western world. All writings are explanatory, 
from a theoretical and more positivistic approach, seeking specific and demarcable 
structures in the romantic and emotionally loaded formulations. Clausewitz and also 
Callwell give structural approaches and classifications of an umbrella character, even if 
admitting the difficulties for doing this. Clausewitz and Lawrence focus on the user of 
Irregular Warfare, Callwell focuses on the defender for such aggressions. The political 
focus is mentioned by Clausewitz, little addressed by Callwell and integrated into 
Lawrence’s texts. The military focus is in dominance for all. 
Answers to the three questions 
The first question; “How is the form of warfare, labelled “Irregular Warfare” defined 
and explained?” can be summarized as a sort of warfare, either as a complement to 
Regular Warfare, a substitute for Regular Warfare (for example after occupation or 
against Irregular attacks) or attacks on the ruling power within an uprising, where means 
and methods are physically very different to the actual forms or military Regular 
Warfare. A main characteristic is that military force and seeking “the decisive battle” is 
not a goal or possibility here. Both actions from irregulars and against such enemies are 
included.  
The descriptions give expressions for other techniques and tactics than just for Regular 
Warfare and with a view that these concepts can (and should) be used in combination 
with Regular Warfare as well. Irregular Warfare can exist both standing alone and 
linked to Regular Warfare. 
The second question; “What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms 
of warfare?” can be summarized with following aspects mentioned in the texts. The 
different terms such as “People-at-Arms”, “Small Wars” and Lawrence’s “Irregular 
War”, despite different explanations and description techniques, point towards a 
conceptual view of a form of activity that opens up for diversity and adaption, motion 
and flexibility, on the contrary to structural pre-determined formations and manoeuvres 
in certain orders. The power and consequences of involving the “people” in this sort of 
warfare differ from the Regular Warfare conducted by soldiers only.  
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Requirements for certain abilities to lead different formations, or irregulars using 
Guerrilla Warfare strategy, tactics, and operational art, possibly in combinations with 
regular operations, can be seen as differing for the usual needs of Regular Warfare. As 
this sort of warfare is based on needs for high mobility in the actual cultural and 
climatological conditions (under extended periods), a need for survival capability, 
hiding and at times a very high offensive spirit, greater than compared to what is 
demanded of units in Regular Warfare units (special forces excluded). A protracted 
campaign where military capability is not mainly the key target, also differs from 
Regular Warfare. A certain combat form where the enemy is worn down – not “fought 
down” differs much from Regular Warfare. 
The third question; “What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?” addressed 
to the collection of texts can be answered with the following summary. First, one trait is 
that the activity is hard to explain in distinct categories and definite demarcations. Traits 
such as “the weaker tactics or strategy”, high mobility, total culture/climatological 
adaption, non-material motivators, loose formations and “blowing winds”, not being 
able to engage physically and Callwell’s view of the necessity to hunt down the 
irregulars using all means, can be said to be typical traits from expressions during this 
time. 
Discussion of the result 
The texts with their definitions and explanations have in common that they are 
articulations of the same phenomena and that problems are thought to exist in defining 
and explaining it properly. Clausewitz argues that little is written on the subject, even if 
he himself was lecturing in the subject during 1810-11 and wrote 250 pages for this 
purpose. The authors view the phenomena from different time perspectives, different 
lengths of time (Lawrence only a couple of years), and different roles with different 
aims for their studies and writings. Also they were differently educated and very 
differently linked to the subject. These differences and many more not expressed here, 
in spite of or possibly due to their existence, still point out several similar core aspects 
of Irregular Warfare. As for symbolic influence, Lawrence’s images have probably had 
the most important impact reaching an audience far beyond the military structures, 
highlighting the role and character of the lonely leader (western) of Irregular forces. 
Similarities considering the phenomena do exist as can be shown; still, this overview 
has to be looked upon as very brief and rather as examples of articulation than a solid 
textual analysis of each author’s view in total. 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
34 
 
Period Two; “Second World War to 1970s” 
 
David Galula 
 
David Galula starts his well-known book Counterinsurgency Warfare from 1964 with 
an analysis of the nature and characteristics of the term Revolutionary War, with the 
following paraphrasing of Clausewitz; “Insurgency is the pursuit of the policy of a 
party, inside a country, by every means”299 On the contrary to Regular War, Insurgency 
can start long before the insurgents resort to the uses of force, Galula claims.  
Not using the term Irregular Warfare, Galula differs between revolution, plot and 
insurgency, the latter described as a “protected struggle conducted methodically, step by 
step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow 
of the existing order”.300   
He describes the differences of conventional war as the asymmetry between the 
opposite camps in strengths, assets and their liability.301 The political goal and the 
people as the objective is underlined, as the gradual transition from peace to war.302 
More differences between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent are addressed as 
fluidity for the first and rigidity of the latter.303 One fundamental difference between 
conventional war and insurgency, according to Galula is that the latter has its own 
principles. 
Secondly, that these “laws of war or insurgencies” do not apply in the same way for the 
counterinsurgent.304 Another difference is that only the insurgent can start to struggle, 
Counterinsurgency is only an effect of Insurgency.305 Galula admits there is a problem 
in generalization and extrapolation from a limited amount of studied insurgencies 
(learning about conflicts after the Second World War), thus only claiming for a “hope 
merely to clear away some of the confusions that we have found so often and so long 
witnessed in the (wrong camp)”.306 Galula sees Revolutionary War primarily as an 
internal conflict “although external influences seldom fail to bear upon it”.307 An 
Insurgency is seen as a protracted struggle conducted methodically and Galula 
differentiates between two types of Revolutionary Warfare as the base for an 
Insurgency; the Communist pattern and the Bourgeois-nationalist pattern with different 
uses of organization phases and terror.  
 
                                                 
299 David Galula,  Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice, (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Security International, second printing, 1965. Reprinted 2006 with new page numbers), p. 1. 
300 Ibid. p. 2. 
301 Ibid. p. 3. 
302 Ibid. p. 5. 
303 Ibid. p. 7. 
304 Ibid. p. xii. 
305 Ibid. p. 1. 
306 Ibid. p. xiv. 
307 Ibid. p. 1. 
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The pattern of the communist Insurgency is outlined by Galula as;  
1. Creation of a party 
2. Unified front 
3. Guerrilla Warfare (mostly to organize the population – not military aim) 
4. Movement Warfare (not fixed defence operations)  
5. Annihilation Campaign 
 
The situation of overwhelming superiority in forces for the governmental side is 
noted.308 The political primacy of this kind of war is underlined and “politics becomes 
an active instrument of operations”.309 The gradual transition from peace to war is 
noted310 as the “fluidity of the insurgent, rigidity of the counterinsurgent” 311 as 
characteristics. Another characteristic is that the insurgents operate clandestinely 
although their actions other than subversion are overt.312 Galula deals thoroughly with 
the area of propaganda, both for the insurgent and for the counterinsurgent. Galula 
states; “The military efforts need to be supplemented by an intensive psychological 
offensive against the guerrillas; the trump card here is an amnesty offer”.313 Galula also 
maintains that Revolutionary War never reverts to a conventional form; creation of a 
regular army does not end subversion and guerrilla activity, instead these methods are 
combined for synergy.314 The vital role of the police organization and forces is clearly 
stated. 315 Galula’s view of having an adapted military force, also with the aspect of 
moral issues (if the Counterinsurgents’ forces develop feelings for the insurgents’ stated 
cause) is discussed. 316  
Galula underlines the role of the counterinsurgents’ leader’s knowledge of 
Counterinsurgency Warfare and his resoluteness and addresses his role as paramount.317 
As for the subject of Guerrilla Warfare, Galula spends time on discussion principles. He 
states the attrition of the enemy military forces is merely a by-product here, and not the 
essential goal, which Galula states is the impact on the people.318 A strategy when 
turning to “Movement Warfare” is described where in occupied areas, clandestine 
structures will still be existing in order to resume the struggle, if the enemy re-takes the 
area.319 Galula discusses two forms of Counterinsurgency; in Cold Revolutionary War 
(legal and not violent Insurgency actions) and in Hot Revolutionary War (openly illegal 
and violent insurgent actions).320  
                                                 
308Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice (1965), p. 3. 
309 Ibid. pp. 4-5. 
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313 Ibid. p. 94. 
314 Ibid. p. 9.  
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316 Ibid. p. 21. 
317 Ibid. p. 17. 
318 Ibid. p. 35. 
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Galula advocates not adopting the insurgent style of warfare (Guerrilla Warfare, for 
example) as the main form of Counterinsurgency Warfare.321 Command and control of 
the people is vital and the “irreversibility” occurs when leaders emerge from the 
people.322 Territorial control and an adaption of mind-set of the Counterinsurgents’ 
forces are crucial (politics are central to the struggle).323 Important aspects “from 
strategy to tactics” are single direction, political primacy, coordination, territorial 
command, and adaption of the forces to Counterinsurgency Warfare and adaption of 
minds.324 
Galula describes tactics for operations as “simple in essence” and consisting of mobile 
units and earmarked units to stay in the area, in order to reinforce whatever static units 
were originally there, or are suddenly concentrated around the area. They start 
operations from the outside in, aiming at containing the guerrilla in a ring. At the same 
time, units garrisoning the adjoining areas are ordered to intensify their activity on the 
periphery of the selected area. The sweep is next conducted from the inside out, aiming 
at least at expelling the guerrillas. The over-all operation is finally broken down to 
several small-scale ones. All the static units, the original ones as well as the new ones, 
are assigned to their permanent sectors. A part of the mobile units operate as a body. 
Centrally controlled; the rest are allocated to the sector. All the forces work on what is 
left of the guerrillas after the two earlier sweeps.325 Galula is clear in his view regarding 
the need for a Counterinsurgency doctrine in order to unite both civilian/political and 
military actions.326 
Result and conclusions 
The descriptions are of an explanatory character. The potential of explaining content 
covers aspects of strategy but focuses on operational art and tactics. The political aspect 
is however underlined throughout the book. Fighting power factors are covered as are 
physical factors with a focus on conceptual factors. Moral factors are dealt with.  The 
descriptions cover characteristics of subversion, mainly overt insurgencies and even the 
necessity of considering personal characteristics when dealing with Counterinsurgency 
Warfare. Attitude aspects are included. Participating actors are described both from the 
attacker and defender position. The description focuses primarily on military activities 
in the phenomena, although police work is stated as vital. The description does not 
demand an understanding of sub-terms as Galula clearly explains them as they occur. 
The description is clear and has good potentiality of being understood easily.  
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Werner Hahlweg 
Werner Hahlweg wrote his well-known “Guerilla, Krieg Ohne Fronten327 during 1964-
1966, linked to his research on Clausewitz lectures on people-in-arms (or Guerrilla 
War) 1810-1811 at the “Allmänna Krigsskolan” in Berlin.328 The work was linked to 
military history and War Studies seminars at Munster Westfalen University faculty of 
history. Clausewitz’s view on the relationship between the “Small War” and the “Big 
War” was that the former was mainly a support to the Big War (until the First World 
War).  There was low German interest according to Hahlweg, in contrast to the British 
and French greater interest, according to Callwall, but for all the “Big War” was the key 
concern.  In Austria there was some interest and military historians are claimed to have 
had low interest329   
Some military people wrote about it (German, Russian, Lawrence of Arabia) and the 
idea was that the Guerrilla War was so linked to the people and that the people’s war 
should be regarded as “war”, with its particular character of psychology of the people, 
that it should also be acknowledged outside the military aspects (Schraudenbach, 
1926).330 A main aspect is said to have been the integration of military and political 
issues (the military becoming more civilian and politics more military).331  
The work of Hahlweg is organized in seven time perspectives;  
1. From the “beginning” to the 19th century (the foundations for Guerrilla Warfare 
as a trade craft and art of war) 
2. The North American War of Independence, the French Revolution, The    
Napoleonic War, Guerrilla War and People- in-arms 
3. Guerrilla War during the 20th century as a part of the regular army operations and 
a means of national insurgencies. 
4. Marx, Engels, Lenin, Partisan Warfare/War as a revolutionary way of combat 
and a mean of revolutionary state building 
5. Guerrilla War in the First World War 
6. Guerrilla War, total war and resistance, the “fourth arm”, the Second World War 
7. Guerrilla War as a way of war in the coloured and under-developed people’s 
freedom fight and a mean in the revolutionary world politics. 
 
                                                 
327 Werner Hahlweg, Gerilla, Krig utan Fronter [Guerrilla, Krieg ohne Fronten], translated by Karl 
Gustav Kavander and Crister Ellsén, (Stockholm: Militärtlitterturföreningen nr 252, 2003, original 
published in German, 1968). 
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Hahlweg asks what the general traits in Guerrilla Warfare are and what specific traits 
there are in different conflicts. He also addresses the legal aspect and the possibility of 
studying Guerrilla Warfare from anthropological and typological aspects. He refers to 
Carl Schmitt’s  study “Theorie des Partisanen” with four different aspects ; the “room”-
aspect, the “crushing of social structure”, the incorporation of the strategic perspectives 
and the technology-industrial aspect, all of which stand in interdependency of each 
other. 332 
Hahlweg also points out another aspect, the relations between the guerrilla and the 
supporting power/countries/governments. Other aspects are the relations between 
military and civilian differences and if even a new form of combatant emerges. Too 
many aspects to be handled in one study, Hahlweg claims his work only to be “a first 
inventory on the total phenomenon of Guerrilla Warfare”333 Hahlweg uses diverse 
sources such as expert literature, published literature, training manuals, archive 
materials, however, not explaining what method he used or from what perspective he 
directed his work. The goal is however explained as being one to create an introductory 
base for the subject of Guerrilla Warfare; ”with comprehensive explanations of many 
aspects often discussed¨. The aim is to give impulses for further work; the focus is the 
modern guerrilla phenomenon.  
Hahlweg outlines six typical traits stated to be differing from Regular Warfare334where 
he concludes that all are connected to one form of warfare, which overall is 
characterized by a vast versatility and different forms of applications not found in 
“Regular Warfare”.335 He chooses to further use interchangeably, the terms of Guerrilla 
War or Partisan War. The following traits are typical for the character of Guerrilla 
Warfare, according to Hahlweg; small detachments fighting with lower ambitions than 
ordinary Regular Warfare, fighting dispersed and not in regular pre-determined 
formations, Revolutionary Warfare (social revolutionary impulses) bringing forward an 
urge from the opponent to strike back with the same means as Counterinsurgency 
against insurgencies.  
As the human being is carrying the main burden in Guerrilla Warfare, the label 
“partisan” catches something special, a human being with certain characteristics; a 
warrior with initiative, wholeheartedly fighting for his cause, alone with his cause still 
attached to a larger unit to which he is committed, no matter if for social or nationality 
reasons. A special combat technique, the subversive war, with its hard-to-define tactical 
rules compared to overt war between states. An anonymous fight by ambushes, sabotage 
and resistance everywhere and nowhere at the back of the enemy and on his 
installations.  
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Finally, in the terrain, the guerrilla know no frontiers which Regular Warfare is 
connected to. Different labels exist according to Hahlweg, all meaning the same form of 
warfare, where in the west the term “Guerrilla Warfare” is used and in the east, 
“Partisan Warfare”. Hahlweg noticed that the term “Klienkrieg” is frequent in 
Switzerland and in Austria.  
Result and conclusions 
The descriptions are both of an umbrella and explanatory character. The potential of 
explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, operational art and tactics. Fighting 
power factors are covered; physical, conceptual, and moral factors. The description 
covers characteristics and attitude aspects are not included. Participating actors are 
described mostly with focus on the aggressor perspective (people-at-arms). The 
description leans primarily on a political-social base with military focus on a fighting 
perspective of the phenomena. The description is clear and substantial in its content and 
has potential understanding without complementary sub-explanations or definition. A 
deep social and human dimension is included in the descriptions, as well as a thorough 
explanation of the characteristics of the type of warfare, based on a subversive and 
anonymous ground. 
Frank Kitson 
As one of the most well-known experts on Irregular War and Counterinsurgency during 
the Cold War, Frank Kitson´s famous Low Intensity Operations336 discusses and 
explains terms such as subversion and Insurgency. The term Irregular Warfare is 
however, not mentioned by Kitson. Regarding many problematic areas with these kinds 
of military operations, Kitson acknowledged a problem of yesterday that still stands 
today (1971 when the book was published the first time), which concerns the matter of 
terminology. Kitson lines up variations in use in The British Army; civil disturbance, 
insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare, subversion, terrorism, civil disobedience, communist 
Revolutionary Warfare and insurrection on the one hand. 
And counterinsurgency, internal security and counter revolutionary operations on the 
other. Other terms in use are Partisan, Irregular or Unconventional War. 337 Kitson 
discusses merits and disadvantages of the term “Revolutionary Warfare”, which he on 
the one hand finds covering the field, but due to “ the expression is too heavily weighted 
towards the activities of communist or left-winged groups”, does not mentally cover 
non-communist activities of the same kind.338  Kitson does not find it useful to try to 
outline a completely comprehensive new definition and stays with the pair of terms; 
“subversion” and “Insurgency”. Kitson chooses to define subversion as; “all means of 
measures short of the uses of armed force taken by one section of the people of a 
country to overthrow those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do 
things which they do not want to do”.  
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He defines “Insurgency” as; “to cover the use of armed force by a selection of the 
people against the government for the purposes mentioned above”, here referring to the 
explanation of subversion.339 
The area of Peacekeeping, understood as “how to prevent by non-warlike methods, one 
group of people from fighting another group of people” is also covered by Kitson, thus 
already in 1971, covering the whole spectrum of emergencies that might have to be 
handled by, or supported by military forces.340 This perspective is uncommon to be 
found in most analyses of Irregular Warfare during the Cold War. Still today, with the 
expanding writing on the subject, Peacekeeping is seldom included. Kitson argues for 
some main differences between Irregular and Regular Warfare. The first he claims are 
the areas of subversion and Insurgency; both are forms of civil conflicts. The second is 
the claim that the use of “persuasion is the main method of gaining support” (of the 
people), sometimes backed up by uses of force and this in contrast to regular war where 
the opposite is the rule, that is mainly force, sometimes backed up by persuasion. 341 
With the terms subversion and insurgency, Kitson covers all influence and violence 
activities directed by people (often needing support from the outside) up to the conduct 
of Regular War with these two terms. He also includes civil war as a result of an 
insurgency in some ways.342 He refers to Roger Trinquier’s term “Modern Warfare” as 
a lumping together of subversion and insurgency, as being an interlocking system of 
actions, political, economic, psychological and military that aim at the overthrowing of 
established authority in a country.343 Regarding attitudes for this kind of operation by 
the army and military organizations in the western countries, Kitson discusses this in his 
last chapter of the book.344 Attitude problems will in turn be the subject for fighting 
morale and thus a question regarding fighting power for military units countering 
subversion and insurgencies. 
Result and conclusions 
The descriptions are of both an explanatory and umbrella character. The potential of 
explaining content covers aspects of strategy but focus on operational art and tactics. 
Fighting power factors are covered such as physical factors but the focus is on 
conceptual factors. Moral factors are implicitly dealt with. The descriptions cover 
characteristics of subversion and insurgencies and also regarding the need for personal 
characteristics, dealing with “Low Intensity Operations”. Attitude aspects are included 
and participating actors are described both from the attacker and defender position. The 
description leans primarily on a military focus of the phenomena, such as handling such 
operations. The description does not demand an understanding of sub-terms as Kitson 
explains them as they occur. The descriptions are clear and have good potentiality of 
being easily understood.  
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John J. McCuen 
 
American author John McCuen’s book The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War from 
1966, departs from the Mao school of Revolutionary War.345 Taking into account the 
number of books regarding various aspects of Revolutionary Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare 
and Psychological Warfare, his book tries to give a broad, unified counter-revolutionary 
Strategy.346 The attempt is to deal comprehensively with political, psychological and 
military fundamentals. The view is primarily from the indigenous governing authorities. 
Stating that the form of War(fare) is new in this comprehensive form that Mao 
designed, he claims too many people do not understand the problem involved.347  
The key message is that a governing power can defeat any revolutionary movement if it 
adapts the revolutionary strategy and principles and apply them in reverse to defeat the 
revolutionaries with their own weapons on their own battlefield.348 McCuen defines the 
revolutionary strategy stages as; organization, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare (which 
governments often underestimate, according to McCuen) and mobile warfare (the final 
stage).349 The large scale resources for civic actions in the organization phase are 
emphasized.350 McCuen outlines the following principle, the same one stated, both for 
the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary side; Preserving Oneself and 
Annihilating the Enemy, Establishing Base Areas, Mobilizing the Masses (where the 
organization of the people fits in), Seeking outside Support and Unifying the Effort. All 
these five strategic principles require a unity of principles so as to coordinate them all. 
351  
Counter-revolutionary strategies are outlined for; Counter-Organization, Counter-
Terrorism, Counter Guerrilla Warfare and Counter-Mobile Warfare.352 The Counter-
Organization is claimed to be the goal of all Counter-Revolutionary strategy.353 The 
Counter-Terrorism part contains all the examples from Algeria and  asserts that the 
police should lead the intelligence work.354 Regarding territorial consolidation, 
examples from Malaya are used. Detailed examples of deep patrol operations, also with 
the use of trackers, are given.355 Neither the city-bred British nor the village-bred 
Malayan soldiers possessed the skills needed in the jungle.356  
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The use of air power and especially the role of helicopters in Counterinsurgency 
operations is discussed.357 The French were training tribes for fighting Viet-minh as 
early as in 1946 as described in the book and can be seen as an example of 
Unconventional Warfare.358 
As for Counter-Guerrilla Warfare, including fighting up to divisional strength, the 
problem with too few troops is discussed, either to finish clearing and pacifying, or to 
attack and destroy the guerrilla bases. For the French during the seven and a half years 
of war in the area of operations in Indochina, it was never possible to have sufficient 
forces for all needs.359 McCuen describes different tactics; the most successful for 
countering guerrillas is stated to have been small units nomadizing an area under long 
periods with high mobility.360 Different combinations of partisans, local forces, river 
patrols and regular combat teams are described.361  
As an example of larger mobile operations, Operation Hirondell (Swallow) in 1953 is 
described: the raid of two parachute battalions, covered by up to about sixty fighters and 
bombers.362 The merits and risks of counter-guerrillas are mentioned, over all, giving 
that form of tactics a positive character, at the same time recognizing the dangers.363 As 
for the strategy of moving back and forth between terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare and 
Mobile Warfare, the counterinsurgent forces have to be able to understand and deal with 
this capability and way of warfare.364 McCuen argues that a solid politico-military base 
is of prime necessity before countering the adversaries. The strategic bases consist of 
the people’s loyalty to the government. The Oil-spot strategy is suggested to be very 
calculatedly based on where the government’s resources can be placed. McCuen 
recognizes the general lack of troops as for the need over the region.  
He stresses the local perspective, “the grass root level”, when establishing work to 
“mobilize the masses” (the support of the people). The importance of counter-
organizing the people as the very first step for a secured area is stressed, and here the 
role of a functional civil administration and economic programme is underlined. Outside 
support is often necessary but McCuen recommends that foreign military should not be 
used in police work. The training of new police forces is however important.  
The final chapter365 in his book is focused on the challenges of understanding the 
problem and how to out-administrate the insurgents, which in turn demands unity of 
effort between military and civilian activities. This he admits is a problematic area to 
activate due to differences in opinions between the military and civilian parts. He 
emphasizes that the police have lead-roles in counter-terrorism activities, which need an 
adapted intelligence apparatus with clandestine resources.  
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The ultimate goal is to out-administrate the enemy, according to McCuen.366 A strategy 
and military operational art, with tactical capabilities to work both statically and mobile, 
from patrol operations to large scale anti-guerrilla-operations, up to the capability of 
joint operations against enemy mobile warfare are outlined, all with a focus on 
territorial defence and activities. McCuen concludes with the following statement; 
“Winning a revolutionary war will take massive organization, dedication, sacrifice, and 
time. The government must decide early if it is willing to pay the price. Half-measures 
lead only to protracted, costly defeats”.367 
Result and conclusions 
The descriptions of the term Counter-revolutionary Warfare, not using the term 
Irregular Warfare can be categorized as being of both an explanatory and umbrella 
character. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, focusing 
the descriptions mostly on military operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors 
mainly include physical and conceptual factors. The description covers characteristics 
though attitude aspects are included to a limited extent. Participating actors are 
described from the view of the defending side. The description leans primarily on a 
military focus even if the comprehensive character is emphasized several times.  
Robert Thompson 
 
Sir Robert Thompson was one the most famous British and also western world Cold 
War experts in Counterinsurgency during the Cold War. With a background368 from 
Guerrilla Warfare in Burma during World War Two, a civil servant in Malaya, a Ferret 
Force trainer during the Malayan emergency and advisor to the USA during the 
Vietnam War, he had unique experiences from “both sides of such a struggle”. In his 
well-known book Defeating Communist Insurgency369 he aims to describe a basic 
theory for Counterinsurgency.370  Thompson saw a new form of insurgency; “with 
armed intervention by neighbouring countries in support of next-door subversive and 
insurgent movements on a scale which in the past has been termed aggression and has 
led to war”.371 Thompson underlines that the book should not be taken out of context; 
alluding to the discussions concerning the insurgencies of Malaya and Vietnam.  
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His vocabulary does not include the term Irregular Warfare but deals with the terms 
subversion and insurgencies, and only applied with a communist base. Thompson is 
referred to by Frank Kitson.372 Thompson describes a communist struggle, initiated by 
subversion combined with selective terror and murders of officials with extreme 
brutality. The volume of civilian victims of terror is given in numbers.373 In general, the 
method is described as subversion supported by selective terrorism, followed by a 
second prong of attack; the armed struggle. The need for a safe sanctuary is discussed 
being part of the methods and aims of the guerrilla-phase of an insurgency.374 The 
combined aims of political and military efforts are described and referred to with a 
phrase of Mao Tse-Tung, in which he states that the villages must be used to encircle 
the towns.375 The primacy of organizational efforts both for the insurgents and the 
counterinsurgents is one key note in Thompson’s argumentation.376  
Thompson uses an organizational view of insurgent movement, which outlines two 
different sub-organisations, the political and military, where subversion, intelligence, 
terror and sabotage belong to the political wing. The military wing organizes village 
guerrilla squads, local units and regular units who perform ambushes and attacks 
respectively.377 The problem of governmental overreliance on higher violence with 
“aggressive search-and-clear operations” is noted by Thompson.378 A third stage is 
described with alternatively moving the Guerrilla War up to a war of movement with 
higher formations (up to division), combining Guerrilla Warfare with higher pressure to 
demoralize the government to achieve negotiation or additionally, forcing an increasing 
number of the rural communities to seek refuge in the towns, thus creating a large-scale 
refugee situation.  
Thompson argues that a communist armed Insurgency is not a “people’s Revolutionary 
War”, but only a revolutionary form of warfare designed to enable a very small ruthless 
minority to gain control over the people.379 Insurgency is equalled to war.380 Thompson 
discusses the argued problems of a conventional army structure and mind-set in detail, 
when confronting an Insurgency, but also the hampering effect of giving low priority to 
civilian administrational efforts.381 Concerning military affect, Thompson argues for the 
same theory of Guerrilla Warfare as for the counterinsurgent, emphasizing “clear-hold 
operations” instead of “search and clear operations”.382 Here, he emphasizes using 
ambushes on the guerrilla to disrupt the lines to the populations, on the same premises 
as the guerrillas, but with even more determination than theirs.383 
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Result and conclusions 
The descriptions are of both an explanatory and umbrella character, where the terms 
subversion and Insurgency cover all power aspects from nonviolence to divisional 
warfare with ground forces. Thompson uses the term “Guerrilla War” and “war of 
movement” to separate ambushes from attacks with formations. The potential of 
explaining content covers aspects of strategy and, to a degree, operational art and 
tactics. Fighting power factors are covered as physical factors but the focus is on 
conceptual factors. Moral factors are dealt with. The descriptions cover characteristics 
of subversion and insurgencies and also regarding the need to re-design regular military 
units for Counterinsurgency operations.  
Greater demands on junior officers and capabilities to operate “like guerrillas” are 
advocated by Thompson. Attitude aspects are included. Participating actors are 
described both from the attacker and defender positions. The description leans primarily 
on an administrative/political and civil focus. The military focus of the phenomena is, 
however, clearly elaborated on when speaking of such operations. The descriptions do 
not demand understanding of sub-terms as Thompson explains them as they occur. The 
descriptions are clear and have good potential of being understood easily.  
Roger Trinquir 
 
Roger Trinquir, together with David Galula, represents one of the most prominent Cold 
War writers of Irregular Warfare, or “Modern warfare” (La Guerra Moderne), the title 
of his well-known book, which has seen growing interest since western countries’ 
renewed concern about Counterinsurgency.384 Trinquir uses the terms, Subversive 
Warfare or Revolutionary Warfare, claiming them to be a new kind of warfare.385 
Characteristics are argued to be “an interlocking system of actions – political, economic, 
psychological, military – that aim at the overthrow of the established authority in a 
country and its replacement of another regime”386.   
Trinquir says; “on so vast a field of action, traditional armed forces no longer enjoy 
their accustomed decisive role…..combat actions carried out against opposing armed 
forces, are of limited importance and are never the total conflict”.387  
Trinquir labels this arguably new kind of war; “Modern War” and states that studies 
about subversive warfare have been frequent, but that these studies rarely go beyond the 
stage of Guerrilla Warfare, which comes closest to the traditional form.388 According to 
Trinquier, mostly the offensive form of Guerrilla Warfare has been studied.  
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The subtlest aspects of this kind of war are stated to be, the manipulation of the 
population and the sine que non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional 
support of the population.389 Terrorism is said to be the most effective tool for an enemy 
to gain such support. Characteristics are a few armed elements acting clandestinely 
within a population manipulated by a special organization.390 Victory for the defender 
belongs to the one who completely destroys the armed clandestine organisation. 
Trinquir gives comprehensive examples of the structure of clandestine organizations.391  
Terror as a “weapon of warfare” is stated to have the goal of controlling the population 
and Trinquir equals terrorists with soldiers and thus motivates such methods used by the 
terrorists to be used on them (controlled torture in order to get information). 392 
Problems of identifying the adversary are discussed. The vital role of the inhabitants to 
protect themselves against Terrorism is underlined. Defence organizations with police 
and army operations in the cities combined with countrywide intelligence are needed, 
according to Trinquier. The importance of intelligence is discussed.  
Police operations, propaganda efforts and social programmes are considered in detail in 
what Trinquier also calls “internal warfare”.393 Police actions are said to be “actual 
operational warfare”. Trinquier admits the risk and possible need for harsh action 
amidst the population in order to get to the enemy, but leans on army discipline and 
methods to correct transgressions.394 A problem lies in that the military forces usually 
are unprepared for such kinds of operations.395With Terrorism in the cities as the main 
weapon, Guerrilla Warfare is the method in the countryside. Both methods are seen as 
only one stage in “modern warfare”.396 This stage is designed to create a favourable 
situation to build up a regular army. Even with regular units, Guerrilla Warfare will 
continue, aiming not so much to support regular combat but nonetheless, to instil a 
climate of insecurity for the defender and the population. As for military operations, 
Trinquir does not recommend trying to adapt to Guerrilla Warfare with command units, 
outposts or more conventional sweeps and large scale operations. The best way of 
getting knowledge of the enemy is (if possible) to turn the inhabitants against him, 
fighting and getting intelligence in the same fashion.397 
                                                 
389 Trinquir, Modern Warfare: A French View on Counterinsurgency (1964), p. 6. 
390 Ibid. p. 7. 
391 Ibid. pp. 9-13. 
392 Ibid. pp. 18-19. 
393 Ibid. p. 38. 
394 Ibid. p. 40. 
395 Ibid. p. 42. 
396 Ibid. p. 45. 
397 Ibid. pp. 46-50. 
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Counter guerrilla operations should be conducted using three principles, according to 
Trinquir; to cut the guerrilla off from the population, to render guerrilla zones 
untenable and to coordinate these actions over a wide area and for long enough. Here, 
Trinquir talks about divisional operations.398 The counter guerrilla strategy is outlined 
as; “the most desirable objective is the destruction of the politico-military organization 
in the intermediate area”.399 Trinquier describes various tactics in detail (grid units in 
the town for police operations, well-trained interval units with a basic four-company 
battalion of light infantry structure for deep sector operations to destroy the politico-
military organizations, to organize inhabitants and to regroup dispersed populations, and 
intervention units of elite troops (nomads)).  
In all, Trinquier mentions volumes of at least four divisions for a theatre for this kind of 
operation.400 Here he states the opinion that this kind of war is not a war for junior 
commanders, but for the highest coordination and command officer. The problem is not 
a lack of troops but of how to use the available resources, according to Trinquir.401 In 
order to bring the war to the enemy, he advocates the establishment of “Maquis Zones” 
with indigenous partisans, an example of the use of Unconventional Warfare in order to 
perform counter guerrilla operations  deep in the enemy areas.402  
This could also include “a few well-calculated acts of sabotage and terrorism will then 
compel any reluctant citizen to give the required cooperation”.403 Trinquir’s key 
message is that the army has to use all available means to fight an enemy using 
“Modern Warfare”. At the same time, he poses an implicit question, if this is possible. 
Throughout the book, there are examples of statements regarding military unwillingness 
to fight these wars and the problems of adapting when de facto engaged in such 
conflicts. 
Result and conclusions 
The description of the term “Modern Warfare” is of an umbrella character, 
complemented with thorough explanations.  The potential of explaining content covers 
aspects of strategy but the focus is mainly on operational art and tactics, as well as on 
police and military operations.  The political aspect is underlined, mainly as regards the 
Insurgency perspective through the book. Fighting power factors are covered as are 
physical factors but with a focus on conceptual factors. Moral factors are dealt with. The 
descriptions cover characteristics of subversion, terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare and 
countering activities against them. Attitude aspects are included. Participating actors are 
described both from the attacker and defender positions. The descriptions focus 
primarily on the military activity of the phenomena, including police work. The 
description does not demand an understanding of sub-terms as Trinquir clearly explains 
them as they occur. The description is in all, clear and has good potential of being 
understood easily.  
                                                 
398 Trinquir, Modern Warfare: A French View on Counterinsurgency (1964), pp. 54-55. 
399 Ibid. p. 60. 
400 Ibid. pp. 60-74. 
401 Ibid. p. 74. 
402 Ibid. pp. 84-88. 
403 Ibid. pp. 84-88. 
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Summary of views on Irregular Warfare, Period Two; “Second World War 
to 1970s” 
 
         
Definitions 
Variables 
Galula Halhweg Kitson 
1. Strategy Insurgency is seen as a 
Strategy. 
The strategic perspectives are 
discussed but are not the focus of 
the work (complement to the big 
war, resistance, revolutionary 
aims etc.)  
Insurgency can be seen as a 
Strategy. 
2. Tactics and 
Operational 
Art 
All different forms of 
influence activities are 
mentioned from both sides 
of the perspective. 
 
Ambushes, sabotage, rear 
attacks, subversive war. 
All different forms of influence 
activities are mentioned, short of 
Regular Warfare. 
3. Physical 
factors 
The weaker military force 
of the insurgent is addressed 
 
Smaller formations. A weaker military force. 
4. Conceptual 
factors 
The span covering 
subversive structures up to 
more overt structures is 
discussed. 
 
The connection to the people and 
the political aspect. 
The span covering subversive 
structures up to more overt 
structures is discussed. 
5. Moral 
factors 
Problems for the countering 
side are discussed. 
The human will to fight. Kitson discusses attitude 
problems, which can affect 
fighting power. 
 
6. Character 
of activity 
Is discussed directly. Crushing of social structures, the 
room-aspect, the anonymous 
fight, the human perspective, 
high versatility and different 
forms of tactics. 
Is discussed directly. 
8. Attitude 
aspects 
Mentioned is the need for 
adaption of the mind of 
those who are going to work 
with counter measures. 
 
Low interest for military and 
historian side is apparent. 
Are mentioned in the full 
description in the book. 
9. 
Explanatory 
description 
Predominant. Predominant. Predominantly explanatory 
descriptions. 
 
10. Umbrella 
description 
 Partly described as resistance or 
Insurgency struggle or 
complement to Regular Warfare. 
 
Kitson uses “subversion” and 
“Insurgency” as covering terms. 
11. 
Addressing  
actors 
Deals with both parties. Mostly the user of Guerrilla 
Warfare. 
 
Deals with both parties. 
12. Military 
focus 
Mostly as discussions on 
the army counter-activities 
but heavily underlining the 
political importance. 
 
Military tactics. Mostly as discussions on the 
army activities for 
counteractions. 
13.  Political/ 
civilian focus 
Predominantly from both 
parties’ perspective. 
Predominantly political and 
social aspects. 
Predominantly from the 
perspective of the aggressor. 
 
    
Figure 29. Appendix 1. Summary of views on Irregular Warfare, Period Two. 
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Definitions 
Variables 
McCuen Thompson Trinquier 
1. Strategy 
 
 
Directly addressed as a 
main theme. 
The political aspect is clearly 
described. 
The strategy behind subversion 
and Insurgency is outlined. 
2. Tactics and 
Operational Art 
 
 
Directly addressed with 
several examples. 
Military aspects and subversion, 
sabotage, terrorism and guerrilla 
warfare are described. 
Different operational and tactical 
aspects are described, both for 
counter subversion and counter 
Guerrilla Warfare. 
3. Physical 
factors 
Directly addressed as the 
need for outside support. 
Different forms or warfare 
strategies based on the actual 
strength of the insurgent are 
discussed. 
Physical factors on both sides 
are discussed. 
4. Conceptual 
factors 
 
 
Directly addressed with 
several examples. 
The span covering subversive 
structures up to over Regular 
Warfare  is discussed. 
Concepts for both sides are 
described. 
5. Moral factors Not addressed. Moral aspects both on 
insurgent’s terror activities and 
possible consequences for the 
government are discussed. Also 
wrong behaviour of the army 
towards the people. 
Problems for the counter-
insurgent side are discussed. 
6. Character of 
activity 
Directly addressed, not 
least with the final 
statement of the book. 
Is discussed directly. Is discussed directly. 
8. Attitude 
aspects 
Limitedly addressed. Are mentioned regarding big 
armies’ interest in “big wars”. 
Are mentioned as a need for 
adaption of the mind of those 
who are going to work with 
COIN. 
9. Explanatory 
description 
The description of 
“Counter revolutionary 
Warfare” is explanatory. 
Mainly explanatory descriptions. Several explanations are given. 
10. Umbrella 
description 
Covers the areas of 
counter-organization, 
terrorism, guerrilla and 
mobile warfare. 
Thompson uses subversion and 
Insurgency as covering terms. 
The term “Modern Warfare” can 
be said to be a version of 
Irregular Warfare. 
11. Addressing  
actors 
 
Primarily from the 
defenders’ side. 
Deals with both parties. Deals with both parties. 
12. Military 
focus 
Primarily. Mostly as discussions on the 
army activities for counter 
activities. 
Predominantly as discussions on 
the army activities for counter 
activities. 
13.  Political/ 
civilian focus 
 
 
 
Is stated to be the vital 
part, but the descriptions 
are mainly military. 
Predominantly and with the key 
aspects: organization and 
administration. 
Mostly  from the aggressors’  
perspective. 
Figure 30. Appendix 1.Summary of views on Irregular Warfare, Period Two. 
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Result and Comments  
The six chosen experts are represented in all writings from the 1960s-70s, during and 
shortly after the East Asian and African revolutionary Insurgency experiences. All but 
Hahlweg were officers with extensive experiences of Small Wars, some as far back as 
guerrilla operations during the Second World War. Hahlweg represents the well-known 
historian, scholar and professor; a Clausewitz expert. Galula; the military-theory thinker 
and Thompson; the adviser with extensive own experiences. McCuen; the military 
practitioner, leaning also on Thompson’s views. Trinquier represents the commander of 
irregulars and Kitson the intelligence officer and pragmatic participant in counter-
subversion operations.  
The writers deal with the subject with obvious biases and from different levels of 
academic degree and perspectives. Turning to the variable strategy, all experts point out 
its vital influence on Irregular Warfare, obvious for Thompson as an adviser. Also 
McCuen and Kitson are clear here, as is Galula. Halhweg does the same although his 
focus, as McCuen’s and Trinquir’s is more conceptual. Concerning tactics and 
operational art, all experts give examples of means and methods both for the irregulars 
and their opponents. Activities such as ambushes, sabotage, rear attacks, subversive 
war/subversion, and terror and Guerrilla Warfare are described by Hahlweg and 
Thompson. In general, McCuen gives the most comprehensive examples here, also 
including the higher level of tactics as mobile warfare  
Kitson gives the broadest examples of intelligence work against subversion and 
insurgency. One particular difference in opinion stands out for Galula, who clearly 
dismisses any attempt to “copy” irregular strategy and tactics. McCuen on the other 
hand, seems to suggest a sort of reverse copying of the irregular approach. Physical 
factors are dealt with by all, suggesting a military weakness for the irregulars, smaller 
formations and, according to Thompson, a need for outside support. Regarding 
conceptual factors, all experts, albeit in a slightly different way, address the subversive 
dimension and develop further to open combat. Kitson mostly deals with the lower span 
of violence. McCuen on the other hand, deals more with the higher level, guerrilla and 
mobile warfare. Hahlweg refers to the connection to the people.  
As for the moral factors, the irregulars’ frequent use of terrorism is highlighted as a 
problem of ethical/moral perspective by Trinquir and Galula and Thompson, but not by 
Hahlweg and Kitson. McCuen gives several examples of moral problems for the 
counter-irregular forces. All experts give their view of conceptual factors but Hahlweg 
might be argued to give the most generalized articulations with explanations such as a 
crushing of social structures, the room-aspect, the anonymous fight, the human 
perspective, high versatility and different forms of tactics. As for attitude aspects, both 
Galula and Trinquir argue for the need of adaption of the minds of those who have to 
work with counter-irregular activities. Hahlweg, Kitson, McCuen and Thompson all 
describe an argued, traditionally low interest within military and historian circles for 
Irregular Warfare. All texts can be seen as explanatory attempts and regarding umbrella 
descriptions. 
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Halhlweg uses the term Guerrilla Warfare as a cover for resistance, insurgency and a 
complement to Regular Warfare. Kitson and Thompson use the terms subversion and 
Insurgency as overarching terms for non-armed respectively armed violence/attacks on 
the government. McCuen´s “Counter-revolutionary Warfare” covers; Counter 
Organization, Counter Terrorism, Counter Guerrilla Warfare and Counter Mobile 
Warfare. Trinquir uses the term “Modern Warfare” as an umbrella term for Irregular 
Warfare. Galula, Kitson, Thompson and Trinquir address both sides of the struggle. 
Hahlweg mostly focuses on the irregular side and McCuen vice versa, on the defenders’ 
side. All experts write with a clear focus on the military activities, with Thompson 
primarily viewing the strategic horizon and Hahlweg the tactical perspective. Trinquir 
addresses the military perspective predominantly in contrast to Thompson, who 
predominantly focuses on political/civilian perspectives, such  as organization and 
administration. This is followed by McCuen, who conversely has a military focus. 
Galula views these perspectives equally for both parties where Trinquir and Kitson 
mostly write from the aggressors’ perspective.  
Answers to the three questions 
The first question; “How is the form of warfare, labelled Irregular Warfare defined and 
explained?” can be summarized in general, despite different names, to be understood as 
including different forms of uprisings (revolutionary or against an occupier) or a 
complement to Regular Warfare. A specific character of this form of violence is stated 
to include the lower span – from subversion and sabotage via terrorism and Guerrilla 
Warfare with classic ingredients such as flank attacks and harassment to mobile 
warfare. The political aspect of the struggle with vital needs for support from the people 
is often highlighted. Means and methods are physically very different from the actual 
forms or military Regular Warfare. A main character is that military force and seeking 
the decisive battle is not a goal or possibility here. Both actions from irregulars and 
against such enemies are included. All descriptions focus on Irregular Warfare as a 
specific form of warfare, excluding Hahlweg, who includes such explanations as a 
complement to Regular Warfare. 
The second question; “What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms of 
warfare?” can be summarized with following aspects mentioned in the texts; limited 
physical strength, crushing of social structures, room-aspect, the human perspective, the 
anonymous fight, high versatility and different forms of tactics are factors argued as 
being different from Regular Warfare. The power and brutal consequences of terror and 
involving the “people” in this sort of warfare differs from Regular Warfare performed 
by soldiers, only because of higher levels of moral and ethical behaviour and standards. 
Another difference is stated to be a generally low interest from the military side in this 
form of warfare. The almost complete focus on ground combat differs from the Regular 
Warfare focus, which is on joint operations.  
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The third question; “What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?” addressed 
to the collection of texts can be answered with the following summary. First, one trait is 
that the activity is labelled and explained in slightly different ways. The political and 
civilian perspective, the violence spectrum from subversion to mobile warfare, the role 
of the police and the argued necessity of organization and administration can be seen as 
other typical traits.  
Discussion of the result 
The texts with their descriptions and explanations all have in common that they are 
written during the same time period of 1960-71, a period dominated by the 
revolutionary wars in Indo-china, Algeria, Malaya, Kenya and the growing fear of 
terrorism in the European mainland. The writers, except the historian professor 
Hahlweg, who can be seen as the link to Clausewitz and 19th century views of 
“kleinkriege”, are all military professionals. Some of them, such as Trinquier and 
Thompson had extensive experience of working both as “irregulars” and “counter-
irregulars” in the field. Galula stands out as an example of an early warrior scholar and 
so might McCuen also be seen, despite not being as influenced as his French 
counterpart. Strictly historical academic perspectives stand side by side with 
practitioners’ emotional or more theoretical attempts, to not only explain but also solve 
the “Irregular riddle”. Of these, only Kitson is still alive, possibly to be asked if his 
articulations have been correctly understood. The result shows a fairly similar direction 
in expressions and explanations. Differences in details might be addressed at the 
different aims of the authors’ analyses and discussions rather than at their different 
views of what the phenomenon of Irregular Warfare is all about. These differences and 
many more not here expressed are in spite of or possibly due to, still drawing attention 
to several similar core aspects of Irregular Warfare.  
Period Three; “From 9/11 to 2010” 
James Corum  
James Corum defines Insurgency in his book Bad Strategies (2008) as; ”an attempt to 
overthrow an established government by violent means”.404 The term Irregular Warfare 
is not used, but Insurgency is addressed as a form of warfare; “Insurgency is also a 
highly political form of warfare”.405 Corum includes very different forms of 
insurgencies, from terrorist campaigns to Conventional Warfare.406 All insurgents are 
said to have the same goal, to attain power. The range of influence activities is 
mentioned, from propaganda and organizing the people to military means. A 
characteristic is described as; “a war of choice for non-state groupings mounting 
challenges against governments”. 407  
                                                 
404 James S. Corum, Bad Strategies (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2008), p. 18. 
405 Ibid. p. 18. 
406 Ibid. p. 18. 
407 Ibid. p. 19. 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
53 
 
Dealing with a non-state enemy is legally complex as regards developing a strategy.408 
Different centres of gravity are claimed to exist for insurgencies and 
counterinsurgencies (COIN) compared to conventional state-on-state warfare.409 One of 
the biggest problems in COIN is that there is rarely one enemy and they often wear 
civilian clothes and blend in amongst the people.410 The intelligence problem, when 
there are large underground civilian support networks is stated. In combination with a 
common feature of Insurgency, that of changing sides; the challenges increase.411  
The time factor and usually protracted lengths of insurgencies are also a difficulty.412 
The paramount aspect for democracies in COIN conflicts to win and maintain public 
support for the war is stated.413 Corum also uses the term “Unconventional Wars”, not 
explained but implied implicitly to be equal to insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.414 
The need for democracies to conduct a war, and in particular Counterinsurgency within 
a basic and recognizable standard of ethical behaviour, is stressed.415  
The use of guerrilla tactics as a means for insurgents and irregular troops is 
mentioned.416 A more apparent need for fewer military resources and more efforts 
towards civilian aid is stated.417 Special requirements for understanding and the ability 
to perform and function in Counterinsurgency operations are argued and linked to a 
discussion of western military culture.418 Corum also addresses a view of the problem of 
a traditional military mind-set for Regular Warfare and negative attitude towards 
Irregular Warfare and COIN in several places in the book. In all, not specifically using 
the term Irregular Warfare, it is possible to analyse what Corum implies, as a way of 
explaining content in such kinds of conflicts.  
Result and conclusions 
The descriptions running throughout the book are of an explanatory character. In some 
places an umbrella character is given to the term Insurgency, even equalling it to 
warfare as a whole. The potential of explaining content covers aspects such as mainly 
strategy but also operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered e.g. 
physical, conceptual and moral factors. The descriptions define characteristics and 
attitude aspects are included. Participating actors are described for both parties. The 
descriptions lean primarily on a political/civilian focus of the phenomena. The 
descriptions have a comprehensive explanatory potential. 
                                                 
408 Corum, Bad Strategies (2008), p. 24. 
409 Ibid. p. 24. 
410 Ibid. p. 24. 
411 Ibid. p. 26. 
412 Ibid. p. 25. 
413 Ibid. p. 27. 
414 Ibid. p. 28. 
415 Ibid. p. 28. 
416 Ibid. p. 205. 
417 Ibid. p. 241. 
418 Ibid. pp. 254-256. 
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Colin S. Gray 
 
In Chapter 6 in Colin Gray’s book, Another Bloody Century, Future Warfare, Irregular 
Warfare and Terrorism are discussed419. Gray argues that terrorism is a mode of 
Irregular Warfare, which in turn is warfare, thus defining terrorists as soldiers.420 Gray 
disagrees with Kiras’ definition of terrorism, and leans on Bruce Hoffman’s (“the 
deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in 
the pursuit of political change”). According to Gray, Kiras distinguishes between 
terrorism and Irregular Warfare. Gray defines Irregular Warfare as “warfare between 
regulars and irregulars” and that is warfare between a state and a non-state adversary. 
The legal status of the rival belligerents is the key, not the character of fighting, 
according to Gray.  
The weak use Guerrilla Warfare and terrorism but later on develop regular war-fighting 
capabilities (as Mao). Warfare of all kinds, other than that between states, can be seen as 
Irregular Warfare. The ability to turn the opponent’s strengths to his weakness and one’s 
own weaknesses (material) to strengths…..a paradox…..a character of  Irregular 
Warfare.421 The Irregular warrior needs to behave covertly with stealth, be highly 
motivated, possess excellent intelligence and have territorial sanctuary and support, 
according to Gray.  
 “Post-modern Terrorism” (Al Quaida) is, according to Gray, not new, it is terrorism; 
Irregular Warfare and warfare.422 Regular and Irregular Warfare have always co-
existed.423 Gray gives historical examples. A typical trait is said to be that Irregular 
Warfare almost invariably makes the regular belligerent use terror against the civilian 
populace, who provide, or might provide recruits or support for the guerrillas. The 
problem of elusive guerrillas is described.424 Gray argues for the result potentiality of 
harsh means, although it is ethically wrong according to western standards….. ”given 
doubt to more half-measured hearts-minds actions”, ”a brutal war”425 Gray claims the 
only new thing is, that the latest technology will permit both irregulars and regulars to 
perform their bloody deeds either in new ways or more efficiently in old ways. 426 
Referring to Callwell, who “explained for all times”, the key problem of conducting 
Irregular Warfare is “the difficulty of persuading or coercing an irregular enemy to 
home out and fight so that he could be duly slathered in satisfactorily large 
numbers”.427  
 
                                                 
419 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century, Future Warfare, (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), pp. 
212-254. 
420 Ibid. p. 213. 
421 Ibid. p. 215. 
422 Ibid. p. 219. 
423 Ibid. p. 222. 
424 Ibid. p. 223. 
425 Ibid. pp. 223-224. 
426 Ibid. p. 224. 
427 Ibid. p. 224. 
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Irregular Warfare is in its very nature structurally asymmetrical and more political 
according to Gray.428 The importance of linking Counter Terrorism (CT) with 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) is underlined.429 Irregular Warfare is said to demand an 
attrition strategy.430 Gray favours the simple way, defining warfare (future) as either 
Regular or Irregular Warfare. Gray uses a minimalistic definition of Irregular Warfare; 
“warfare between regulars and irregulars” and that it is warfare between a state and a 
non-state adversary. 
Result and conclusions 
The description of the term Irregular Warfare can be categorized as a clear umbrella 
term. Explanations are included in the text linked to the definition. Potential of 
explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, operational art and tactics. Fighting 
power factors are covered e.g. physical, conceptual, and moral factors. The description 
explains several characteristics though attitude aspects are not included. Participating 
actors are described with a focus on the non-state actors. The description leans primarily 
on a military focus of the phenomena. The description is clear and gives a precise 
understanding potential with a low risk of misinterpretations.  
Thomas X. Hammes 
 
Thomas Hammes describes two particular and outstanding aspects of insurgents; “their 
utter determination to continue the struggle despite the odds” and “the remarkable 
ingenuity they displayed for overcoming problems”431 Claiming there are no revolutions 
in war, Hammes puts forward a theory of a “fourth generation warfare” (4GW) as a 
fundamental different kind of warfare432 as an evolved form of Insurgency433.  
The characteristics are said to be that they “use all available networks – political, 
economic, social, and military - to convince the enemy’s political decision-maker that 
their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit”434. It 
directly attacks the minds of the enemy decision-makers to destroy the political will 
and, unlike previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the 
enemy’s military forces.435 Hammes claims Mao´s work as being the fundamental work 
upon which the fourth generation of war would be built.436 A specific characteristic is 
that 4GW makes use of society’s networks to carry on its fight.437 Another is the 
adversary’s act of constantly changing sides.438 He claims that even a 4GW effort will 
only be resolved by Conventional Warfare.  
                                                 
428 Gray, Another Bloody Century, Future Warfare (2005), p. 229. 
429 Ibid. p. 245. 
430 Ibid. p. 246. 
431 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2004), pp. viii-ix. 
432 Ibid. p. xi. 
433 Ibid. p. 2. 
434 Ibid. p. 2. 
435 Ibid. p. 2. 
436 Ibid. p. 55. 
437 Ibid. p. 208. 
438 Ibid. p. 210. 
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Hammes denotes there is an ability to create political paralysis in both the international 
system and in the target nation ranging from non-military means to Guerrilla Warfare 
and to include the dangers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).439 From a military 
view, Hammes includes terrorist, guerrilla though rarely, conventional actions.440 The 
timelines, organizations, and objectives are said to be different from those of earlier 
generations.441 Hammes distinguishes between two types of 4GW, an insurgent 
movement to seize control of a territory and a nation using 4GW techniques and 
alliances to neutralize the power of the United States.442 A main task to prepare for 
4GW is to select and groom the right people.443 Only people create change in an 
organization, which is needed to understand and act against 4GW, according to 
Hammes.444 
Result and conclusions 
The description of 4GW is both an umbrella and an explanatory description. The 
potential of explaining content covers aspects such as both strategy and operational art 
and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered e.g. conceptual and moral factors. The 
description explains a broad range of characteristics. Attitude aspects are not included. 
Both parties of the antagonists are described. The description leans primarily on a 
comprehensive and not mainly a military focus of the phenomena. The description has a 
comprehensive explanatory potential. 
Frank Hoffman 
 
In 2007, the American warrior-scholar Frank Hoffman launches a discussion on the 
term Hybrid War.445 Arguing new threats create unique dilemmas for states planning for 
either conventional capabilities or, for more likely scenarios of non-state actors 
employing asymmetric or irregular tactics.446 The key message is that future threats will 
consist of more simultaneously conducted “hybrid” threats of different conventional and 
“irregular” character, blurring the possibilities of distinguishing between war, warfare, 
capabilities and separate discussions on Regular Warfare, Irregular Warfare, terrorism 
etc. It is stated future threats will include all forms of warfare and even criminal 
activities.447  Not suggesting a decline of interstate warfare and conventional or Regular 
Warfare, the message is a fusion of different kinds of warfare and power executions, 
                                                 
439 Hammes, The Sling and the Stone (2004), p. 217. 
440 Ibid. p. 220. 
441 Ibid. p. 221. 
442 Ibid. pp. 254-55. 
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even delivered by non-state actors with decentralized planning, using both simple and 
sophisticated technologies in innovated ways.448   
A specific character of Hybrid Wars is argued to be that different modes of warfare will 
occur on all levels of war and in the same operational battle space. Also, it will be 
difficult to label actors or wars as either regular/conventional or irregular.449 The main 
characteristic of convergence and combinations in several modes is said to target the 
strategic weakness of America´s conventional military thinking.450 
Hoffman defines Hybrid Wars as; “Hybrid Wars incorporate a range of different modes 
of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist 
acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”451 A term 
such as Hybrid War is used interchangeably with Hybrid Warfare and linked to 
Irregular Tactics, “Irregular adversaries” and “primitive forms of warfare” in Hoffman’s 
writings. Hoffman started to use the term Hybrid Warfare in 2005.452 Hoffman discusses 
4GW (Lind at al, 2001) its critics, its merits and a probable linkage to Clausewitz.453 
Different from the term of 1996, Compound Wars (Huber, 1996), Hybrid Warfare is not 
supposed to occur with regular and irregular operations separated in the operation area, 
but simultaneously in the same area.454 Hybrid Wars blend the lethality of state conflict 
with the fanatical and protracted fervour of Irregular Warfare, addressing both the 
hybrid character of organizations and means.455  
Hoffman distinguishes Hybrid Wars from “Maoist or compound wars” as not 
facilitating the progression of the opposing force through phases, nor helping set up a 
conventional force for decisive battle.456 Hoffman gives several research examples of 
thinking as regards a problematic mix of future warfare and conflicts and how to define 
these. An example is the following statement from Dr Mike Evans in an overview of 
future conflicts; “Armed conflicts also began to reflect a bewildering mixture of modes 
– conventional and unconventional activity merged – while many combatants 
simultaneously employed modern Kalashnikov assault rifles, pre-modern machetes and 
post-modern cellular phones in their operations”.457 The key example of Hybrid Warfare 
by Hoffman is the Hezbollah operations against Israel in southern Lebanon during the 
summer of 2006.458 
                                                 
448 Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (2007), p. 7, Here, Hoffman cites 
General Conway, Admiral Roughead and Admiral Allen, A Cooperative Strategy For Maritime Security, 
Washington, D.C, 2007 
449 Ibid. p. 8. 
450 Ibid. p. 9. 
451 Ibid. p. 14. 
452 Ibid. p. 14. 
453 Ibid. p. 20. 
454 Ibid. p. 20. 
455 Ibid. p. 28. 
456 Ibid. p. 29. 
457 Ibid. p. 33, Hoffman cites Michael Evans, ´From the Long Peace to the Long War: Armed Conflict and 
Military Education and Training in the 21st Century´, Australian Defence College, Occasional Paper No. 
1, 2007 p. 6. 
458 Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (2007), p. 36. 
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Result and conclusions 
The descriptions of Hybrid War and Hybrid Warfare are of both an umbrella and 
explanatory character. Sub-terms such as Irregular Warfare or Irregular threats are not 
explained however. The potential of explaining content covers aspects partly on strategy 
but mainly on operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered partly on 
physical, but mainly on conceptual, and finally on some aspects of moral factors. The 
descriptions explain characteristics. Attitude aspects are limitedly included. 
Participating actors are described for both parties. The descriptions lean primarily on a 
military focus of the phenomena. The descriptions have a good explanatory potential, 
but due to the span of the terms, there is a risk that hybrid becomes “Everything at the 
same time and place”. 
David KilCullen 
 
David KilCullen is currently the most well-known warrior scholar, who offers several 
explanations and theories about different kinds of warfare in his book, The Accidental 
Guerrilla from 2009.459 He provides a theory which claims that “The War on Terror” 
might be best understood as a form of globalized Insurgency.460 He distinguishes 
traditional Counter-Terrorism being enemy-centric, from classic Counterinsurgency 
being people-centric, and finds both of them inadequate models for today’s conflicts 
e.g. in Iraq and Afghanistan.461 He uses expressions such as “Small Wars”, “Hybrid 
Warfare” and mentions the term “Irregular Warfare” in the beginning. Later he 
mentions “Asymmetric Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare and unconventional enemies”.462  
KilCullen claims that one characteristic of “Asymmetric Warfare” is that it is logical for 
any rational opponent, if fighting the United States, to use non-conventional means. 
Such means may include propaganda, subversion, terrorist attacks, Guerrilla Warfare, 
weapons of mass destruction, or attempts at dragging conventional forces into 
protracted engagements for little strategic gain, so as to enthuse the American people’s 
political support for the conflict.463 Economic Warfare and Unrestricted Warfare, 
referring to a Chinese study about “Unrestricted Warfare”, is mentioned.464  
Two forms of terrorism are discussed; “expeditionary terrorism” (exemplified by the 
9/11 Attack) and “guerrilla terrorism” (exemplified by Al Qaida operations in Pakistan), 
where the latter is described as consisting of four elements (infection, contagion, 
intervention, rejection).465 KilCullen names this theory “The Accidental Guerrilla 
Syndrome”. A characteristic is that the enemy presents a form of confederated 
movement which blends Insurgency with terrorism and information operations.466  
                                                 
459 David KilCullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
460 Ibid. p. xiv. 
461 Ibid. p. xv. 
462 Ibid. pp. 22-23. 
463 Ibid. p. 23. 
464 Ibid. p. 25. 
465 Ibid. pp. 34-35. 
466 Ibid. pp. 52-53. 
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Different kinds of status of forces are described, the first generation of Irregular 
conventional forces operating in a linier fashion using light cavalry tactics, a second 
generation with embryonic guerrilla forces with raiding operations, a third generation 
with an extremely proficient, well-organized, and well-equipped insurgent force 
combining cynical, experienced, hard-bitten leaders with extremely well-motivated, 
disciplined fighters and a new capacity for terrorist attacks”.467Structures of local 
clandestine networks, a main force of full-time guerrillas and part-time networks of 
villagers are described.468 Tactics is described in detail.469 KilCullen advocates the 
conduct of Counterinsurgency; “persistent presence”, as being opposite to “repetitive 
raiding” and “extreme kinetic approaches”.470  
He further describes “in Counterinsurgency terms, “clearing” an enemy safe haven does 
not mean destroying the enemy in it but rescuing the population in it from enemy 
intimidation or, more clinically, separating the enemy from the population”.471  
Regarding the term Hybrid Warfare, Kilcullen offers a model, a framework, claimed to 
be “a systematic oversimplification, designed to clarify an extremely complex, rapidly 
changing reality”. The fundaments are four strategic problems, an underlying capacity-
building problem of building/supporting a weak and fragile state-construction, 
terrorism, Insurgency and communal conflicts. The suggested actions against these are a 
combination of counter-terrorism, Counterinsurgency, peace enforcement and, at the 
bottom, capacity-building (inclusive governance, law and order functions).472 He 
exemplifies the Iraqi operations as “a hybrid war involving Counterinsurgency plus”.473  
As for discussions on Hybrid Warfare concepts, KilCullen refers to Frank Hoffman as a 
leading thinker of Hybrid Warfare. KilCullen discusses subversion and counter 
subversion, going through some earlier definitions of subversion, giving his own: “the 
conscious, clandestine manipulation of grievances, short of armed conflict, in order to 
weaken states, communities and organizations”. 474 He claims there is importance in 
looking further into this when addressing new forms of warfare and conflicts. Finally, 
he underlines that understanding (new) threats might be the most important challenge 
the western world faces.  
Not explicitly using the term Irregular Warfare, KilCullen explains and describes certain 
activities related to power struggles that can be embraced by that term. The phenomena 
KilCullen altogether deals with are analysed as “a description of Irregular Warfare”, 
possibly called Irregular Warfare “plus”. Throughout the book, KilCullen returns to the 
negative attitude of western warfare to irregular adversaries and Counterinsurgency 
operations. 
                                                 
467 KilCullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (2009), p. 53. 
468 Ibid. p. 55. 
469 Ibid. pp. 55-58. 
470 Ibid. pp. 124-125. 
471 Ibid. p. 145. 
472 Ibid pp. 149-151. 
473 Ibid. p. 152. 
474 Ibid. pp. 252-253. 
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Result and conclusions 
The description is a pedominantly explanatory description. The potential of explaining 
content covers aspects such as strategy, operational art and tactics. Fighting power 
factors are covered e.g. physical and conceptual. The description explains 
characteristics from manipulation to threats of weapons of mass destructions (WMD), 
but focuses on the lower end of violence (subversion). Attitude aspects are included. 
Participating actors are described with a focus on the adversary. The description leans 
primarily on the political/civilian focus of the phenomena. The descriptions are 
comprehensive and have an explanatory articulation, but need pre-understanding or 
complementary sub-definitions of several terms. KilCullan’s descriptions might be seen 
as an argument for a new form of threats and enemies, focusing on the lower end of the 
“Hybrid Warfare School”. 
James Kiras 
 
James Kiras defines Irregular Warfare in 2008 as; “the use of violence by sub-state 
actors or groups within states for political purposes of achieving power, control and 
legitimacy, using unorthodox or unconventional approaches to warfare owing to a 
fundamental weakness in resources or capabilities”.475 The definition addresses 
“violence” not specifying any level, thus, in theory, leaving open a field from civil 
disturbances to nuclear attacks. Only the sub-state actors or groups know or can use 
Irregular Warfare, according to the above definition; it is “their violence”. The character 
of violence is left to the reader, with no further explanation than, the approaches are 
“unorthodox” or “unconventional”. This form of explanation simply moves the 
definition problem from certain words to others;  diffuse words such as “irregular” are 
changed to words e.g. “unorthodox” or “unconventional”. Kiras later defines five 
categories of Irregular Warfare as coup d’état, terrorism, revolution, insurgency and 
Civil War.476 An earlier definition of Irregular Warfare by James Kiras from 2002 and 
2007, is outlined by the following working definition; “Irregular Warfare is the 
umbrella term used to describe violence used by sub state actors and including different 
forms, including terrorism and insurgency”.477 Kiras defines terrorism as “the sustained 
use of violence against symbolic or civilian targets by small groups for political 
purposes, by inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political grievance, and/or 
provoking a draconian or unsustainable response”.  
Thus terrorism does not by itself result in a political change, which is the sign and 
strategy of an Insurgency activity, according to Kiras.478 Principal differences between 
Irregular and Conventional War are that the latter involves more or less symmetrical 
adversaries, in equipment, training and doctrine. In an Insurgency, the adversaries are 
asymmetric and weaker, almost always a sub-state group attempting to bring about 
political change by administrating and fighting more effectively than its state-based foe, 
                                                 
475 Jordan, David, Kiras, James D., Lonesdale, David J., Speller, Ian, Tuck, Christopher and Walton, Dale 
C., Understanding Modern Warfare, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 232. 
476 Ibid. p. 232. 
477 Baylis, John, Cohen, Eliot, Gray, Colin S., Wirtz, James, Strategy in the Contemporary World (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 164-167. 
478 Bylis at al, Strategy in the Contemporary World (2007),  p. 165. 
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through the use of guerrilla tactics. Such tactics are characterized by hit-and-run raids 
and ambushes on the security forces. Insurgency is also characterized by the active 
and/or passive support and mobilization of a significant proportion of the population. 
Kiras mentions a wide difference in the characteristics of Insurgency, such as cultural, 
social and economic aspects. Moreover, Kiras describes different types of insurgencies 
where he includes Revolutionary, Guerrilla, Partisan, Liberation, or Civil War. The 
ultimate goal is to wield political power. Kiras does not include Coups as he claims they 
do not involve required popular support. Finally, Kiras notes the importance of external 
support (physical and moral) for insurgencies.479 He remarks that his explanations are 
just functional attempts at definitions and not the final word.  
The problem of definitions is discussed, as there are considerable difficulties for 
western democracies to conceptualize responses and understand the phenomenon of 
violent global terrorism480. The political dimension of Irregular Warfare is thus 
underlined. Kiras also points out that many military officers view terrorism and 
Insurgency as “dirty war”481. Also, the perception; “Irregular diversions distract from 
what state-based military organizations are most comfortable with, namely preparing to 
fight against one another” is noted. Kiras argues that the baseline in Clausewitz’s spirit 
is the same as in Irregular Warfare; the primacy of politics. Even if today’s religious, 
social, cultural and economic factors are recognized to play a substantial role, politics 
still override. Principal differences between Irregular and Conventional War are that the 
latter involves adversaries who are more or less symmetrical in equipment, training, and 
doctrine. In an insurgency, the adversaries are asymmetrical and weaker, almost always 
a sub-state group, attempting to bring about political change by administration and 
fighting more effectively than its state-based foe through the use of guerrilla tactics.482 
Great differences in terms of character (social, cultural, economic aspects) and type 
(Revolutionary, Partisan, Guerrilla, Liberation and Civil War) are said to characterize 
the concept of insurgency.483 Coups are not included. The role of the people is 
emphasized. Kiras discusses subversion, as a phenomenon of Insurgency, and notes that 
a weakness is one of taking a very long time, which alone cannot guarantee success. 
Four areas are discussed as important for Irregular Warfare (here insurgency) time, 
space, legitimacy and support and how to gain advantages over the regular opponents.  
The moral superiority of the guerrillas is said to be a vital cornerstone in all irregular 
and terrorist theory, according to Kiras. Different opinions on the use of terror against 
the population have existed (Che Guevara - against, Mao and Marighella - for).484 Kiras 
uses Samuel Griffiths’ (his translation of Mao’s book Yu Chi Chan), summary of three 
words as the most important in anti-guerrilla warfare; location, isolation and 
eradication, as a departure in his part on Counterinsurgency.485  
                                                 
479 Bylis at al, Strategy in the Contemporary World (2007), p. 165-166. 
480 Ibid. p.163. 
481 Ibid. p.165. 
482 Ibid. p.166. 
483 Ibid. p. 167. 
484 Ibid. p.174.  
485 Ibid. p. 176. 
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Kiras discusses the challenges of anti-subversion and military – civilian roles. 486 
Tactics and passive-active techniques are discussed.487 Finally, Kiras concludes with a 
warning when analysing Irregular Warfare/insurgency and terrorism out of their actual 
contexts, ignoring the overriding political reason.488 Irregular Warfare is about political 
goals even if very different warrior cultures can be seen as conceptually unlike Regular 
Warfare. A comment can be that the “toolbox” for strategies and tactical applications 
might vary a lot between different states and sub-state structures as regards “power 
projection”, fighting ethics and traditions and rules.  
Result and conclusions 
Kiras’ definition of the term Irregular Warfare from 2002/07; “the umbrella term used 
to describe violence used by sub state actors and including different forms, including 
terrorism and insurgency” differs a lot from the developed definition of 2008; “the use 
of violence by sub-state actors or groups within states for political purposes of 
achieving power, control and legitimacy, using unorthodox or unconventional 
approaches to warfare owing to a fundamental weakness in resources or capabilities”. 
The latter has several explanatory attributes (goals, character of weakness and 
“approaches to warfare” notations) however; the “approaches” descriptions are 
imprecise and open up for further questions. How should “unorthodox” and 
“unconventional” be understood?  
The definitions are of an umbrella character with unevenly developed explanations. The 
potential of explaining content covers aspects such as primarily strategy and limitedly 
on operational art and tactics. Fighting power factors are covered as mostly conceptual 
factors. The description covers characteristics including Insurgency and terrorism. 
Attitude aspects are not included. Participating actors are described with a focus on the 
aggressor. The descriptions lean primarily on a political focus of the phenomena. The 
descriptions do not demand pre-understanding of sub-terms (e.g. insurgency and 
terrorism), as they are explained and discussed in Kiras’ texts.  
John Mackinlay 
 
The key subject in John Mackinlay’s “The Insurgent Archipelago”, is an argumentation 
on the disputably limited understanding of the development of Insurgency, from the 
jungles of Malaya to the British Home Office Counter-Terrorism operation, CONTEST. 
A development, it is argued, that has neither been properly understood nor has it been 
shown any interest as having a link to the area of Counterinsurgency489. Mackinlay 
suggests several disadvantages of understanding and countering operationally, due to 
the focus on terrorism and Counter-Terrorism not analysing the phenomena linked to 
Counterinsurgency.  
                                                 
486 Bylis at al, Strategy in the Contemporary World (2007),  p. 179. 
487 Ibid. p. 182. 
488 Ibid. p. 186. 
489 John Mackinlay, The Insurgency Archipelago, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2009), p. 7. 
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Absence of a clear strategy is addressed as a major disadvantage. The development of 
Insurgency as a function of the development of society is discussed. 490 The problem 
with the word “Insurgency” as a political word, compared with the unpolitical word 
“terrorism”, is that the latter is easier to manage politically. Mackinlay develops a 
theory of the “Post Maoist Insurgency” concept, with different characteristics compared 
to the traditional understanding (if studied) of the “classic Maoist Insurgency” 
approach. Globalisation of communications has given individuals opportunities to 
influence not only organizations. This is a new development argued to create 
multifaceted self-sustaining phenomena with organic similarities, making it difficult to 
identify centres of gravity. Regarding the different influence possibilities of Insurgency, 
the area of subversion is the key area in Mackinlay’s discussions and here, “the 
propaganda of the deed” is emphasized as a major weapon.  
The absence of a doctrinal evaluation after the post-colonial Cold War phase of 
Insurgency is said to have led to difficulties in the strategy to comprehend the situation 
after 9/11, and also to a lack of appropriate tactics and resources at the practical 
level.491 As regards the whole spectrum of power forces, (politics, terrorism, 
subversion, persuasion and Guerrilla Warfare including military, or armed, organized 
violence at the lower end of warfare), Mackinlay focuses on politics and subversion as 
key elements. The problem of the military attitude to Counterinsurgency and not the 
“real war” is mentioned.492 Also, the fact that no NATO or international concept 
existed or was universally understood, is pointed out as being troublesome.493  
One important cause of the argued declining British understanding of 
Counterinsurgency during the period after the Cold War, is said to have been due to the 
disappearance of the previous corps of highly experienced civil-servants all over the 
world, linked to the previous long colonial era, who possessed both the political-
strategic perspective as well as a deep cultural understanding, both being key aspects 
able to link a military support intervention to “a comprehensive approach”.  
Today, the force commanders seldom, if ever have such expertise to connect with, at the 
same time as having a comprehensive approach to strategy. Absence of knowledge, due 
to neglect of the area of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency is suggested as being 
important factors for this argued lack of understanding of insurgency development. 
Narrow definitions with more politically suitable articulations of terrorism have also 
contributed to limited understanding possibilities and subsequently, limitations for 
strategy. Military disinterest in limited tactical development is argued to have played a 
part in an “unlearning” period, which characterizes the difficulties of contemporary 
understanding of terrorism and insurgencies. Mackinlay does not use the term Irregular 
Warfare as a label however, he discusses the development of activities concerning 
insurgency, terrorism, Counterinsurgency, Guerrilla Warfare and mainly the aspect of 
subversion.  
                                                 
490 Mackinlay, The Insurgency Archipelago (2009). p. 10; ”Insurgency changes at the same speed as the  
society from which it arises” 
491 Ibid. p. 12. 
492 Ibid. p. 44. 
493 Ibid. p. 45. 
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Thus, he indirectly deals with Irregular Warfare as a function of a power struggle. He 
does not however, elaborate on the military-police labouring tasks or the difficulties of 
both overt and covert warfare. He has a clear political focus and not a “this is 
war/warfare” attitude. Finally, he does however discuss a “non-centre of gravity” 
theory, as a mark of the “Postmodern Maoist” Insurgency concept, argued so far as not 
to be understood in governmental as well as military circles. 
Result and conclusions 
The description is a predominantly explanatory description. The potential of explaining 
content covers aspects such as strategy, operational art and tactics. Fighting power 
factors are covered as are mainly physical and conceptual factors. The description 
explains characteristics with a lower-end violence focus. Attitude aspects are included. 
Participating actors are described with a focus on both sides of the parties. The 
description leans primarily on the political/civilian focus of the phenomena. The 
description is civilian comprehensive, but limited for the military part though it has 
clear explanatory articulations, with good understanding potentiality not needing any 
complementary sub-definitions. 
Gil Merom  
 
Gil Merom does not use the term Irregular Warfare but relies on the label Small Wars. 
He writes in the introduction of his well-known “How Democracies lose Small Wars” 
from 2003, as follows; “a small war has the following distinct characteristics: It 
involves sharp military asymmetry, an insurgent that fights guerrilla war, and an 
incumbent that uses ground forces for Counterinsurgency warfare. The incumbent can 
be an indigenous government that fights on its own or with external participation, or a 
foreign power that imposes itself on the population”.494 The definition does not include 
moral aspects though the whole book extensively deals with this aspect. Merom also 
mentions explanations from Eliot A. Cohen, Charles Callwell, Loren B. Thompson, 
Andrew F. Keprinevich and Walter Laqueur. 
Result and conclusions 
The description is mostly an explanatory description with an umbrella character. The 
potential of explaining content covers aspects such as strategy, and operational art and 
tactics and the terms “Guerrilla War” and “Counterinsurgency War” indicate all aspects. 
Fighting power factors are covered only in physical factors, referring to “ground forces 
for COIN”. The description explains characteristics only for “military asymmetry”. 
Attitude aspects are not included. Participating actors are described with a focus on the 
incumbent. The description leans primarily on a military focus of the phenomena. 
Merom´s definitions and explanations focus mainly on the guerrilla aspect, for the part 
which is militarily weaker than an incumbent, (which can be either the existing 
government or a foreign power), which in turn uses ground forces for 
Counterinsurgency Warfare.  
                                                 
494 Gil Merom, How Democracies lose Small Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 4. 
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The descriptions are not comprehensive and have a military focus with a narrow scope. 
The explanatory potential is assessed as being precise. 
Summary of views on “Irregular Warfare”, Period Three  
Variables Corum Gray Hammes 
1. Strategy Political form 
of warfare, 
attempt to 
overthrow a 
government. 
Warfare between regulars 
and irregulars. 
To seize control of a territory or to 
neutralize the power of the USA. 
Directs the mind of an enemy. 
2. Tactics and 
Operational Art 
 Covert activities with great 
stealth from the non-state 
actor. 
From non-military means  to 
Guerrilla Warfare and WMD, terror 
and ( rarely) conventional warfare. 
3. Physical 
factors 
Lack of 
military 
resources. 
The weak opponent.  
4. Conceptual 
factors 
Intelligence 
driven 
operations. 
Sub-state actors or groups 
against states.  
Network organizations. 
5. Moral factors  Highly motivated 
personnel. 
The will of the enemy. 
6. Character of 
activity 
Time factor, 
changing sides, 
legally 
complex, from 
terrorism to 
conventional 
warfare. 
Need territorial sanctuary. 
A political war, often 
drives the defenders to 
behave as  terrorists 
towards the people, a 
brutal war. 
Uses the society’s networks, different 
timelines, objectives and 
organizations compared with previous 
warfare. Utter determination and 
ingenuity by the aggressors. 
Changing sides. 
7. Attitude 
aspects 
Negative 
attitude to 
Irregular 
Warfare is 
mentioned 
several times. 
 
 
  
8. Explanatory 
description 
Predominantly.  Partly, describes 
characteristics. 
Predominantly. 
9. Umbrella 
description 
Limited. Predominantly a form of 
warfare between states and 
non-state actors. 
Predominantly. 
10. Addressing  
actors 
Both parties. Addressing both sides. Addressing both sides. 
11. Military 
focus 
Limited. Mostly. Partly. 
12.  
Political/civilian 
focus 
Predominantly 
addresses the 
political 
perspective. 
Mostly. Mostly. 
Figure 31. Appendix 1. Summary of views on Irregular Warfare, Period Three. 
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Variables Hoffman KilCullen Kiras 08 
1. Strategy The combination of 
different strategies, 
fewer or Regular 
Warfare capabilities. 
Globalized Insurgency, 
clandestine manipulations of 
grievances. Underlying capacity 
building problem. 
Political purposes, achieving 
power, control, legitimacy. 
2. Tactics and 
Operational 
Art 
Predominantly a focus 
on different “armed” 
activities 
simultaneously. 
Different forms of tactics; 
terrorism, Insurgency, counter-
Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare, 
WMD, attempts at 
Conventional Warfare. 
Unorthodox or unconventional 
approaches. 
3. Physical 
factors 
 States that no 
intentions exist of 
building larger 
formations for decisive 
battles. 
Different statuses on insurgent 
forces. 
Fundamental weakness in 
resources or capabilities. 
4. Conceptual 
factors 
Decentralized 
execution of different 
forms of regular, 
irregular and terror 
tactics. 
 Expeditionary terrorism. 
 guerrilla terrorism. 
Sub-state actors or groups. 
5. Moral 
factors 
The role of fanaticism 
is mentioned. 
Extremely well motivated 
insurgents. 
 
6. Character 
of activity 
Simultaneous 
operations in the same 
area with very 
different characters of 
combat and warfare. 
Subversion, mix of terrorism, 
Insurgency and information 
operations. Blended form of 
adversaries, pointing to cultural 
aspects and the so-called 
“accidental guerrilla” 
syndrome. 
Unorthodox or unconventional 
approaches. 
7. Attitude 
aspects 
The American 
weakness towards 
favouring conventional 
warfare.  
Mentioned throughout the book.  
8. 
Explanatory 
description 
Descriptions to a 
certain level exist. 
 Predominantly. Defines actors, goals, use of 
violence as a means.  
9. Umbrella 
description 
The term covers 
everything except 
nuclear warfare. 
 Covers all actors (sub-state or 
groups) with a violent political 
ambition. Does however not 
explain  unorthodox  and 
unconventional. 
10. 
Addressing  
actors 
Both parties are 
described. 
 Addressing the adversary 
predominantly. 
 
11. Military 
focus 
Mostly military focus. Partly, regarding the risk of 
military over-focus and 
violence. 
Partly. 
12.  Political/ 
civilian focus 
Partly terror. 
Criminality is mostly 
within the police 
domain.  
Predominantly.  Predominantly. 
Figure 32. Appendix 1. Summary of views on Irregular Warfare, Period Three. 
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Variables Kiras 09 MacKinlay Merom 
1. Strategy Insurgency. Political power struggle. Guerrilla War and Counter-
insurgency war. 
2. Tactics and 
Operational 
Art 
Terrorism.  Subversion. Guerrilla War and  Counter-
insurgency capabilities. 
3. Physical 
factors 
 Different kinds of 
insurgents (adversaries). 
 Ground forces for COIN. 
4. Conceptual 
factors 
Sub-state actors or 
groups. 
Sub-state actors or groups 
against states. 
 
5. Moral 
factors 
   
6. Character of 
activity 
 Violent activities, 
Insurgency, terrorism. 
Mainly at the lower end of 
the violence spectre, 
non-COG character. 
Military asymmetry. 
7. Attitude 
aspects 
  Problems of military 
attitude. 
 
8. Explanatory 
description 
  Predominantly. Mostly. 
9. Umbrella 
description 
 Predominantly.  Limited.  Partly. 
10. Addressing  
actors 
The opponent of a 
government. 
Addressing both the state 
and the sub state actors. 
Predominant focus on the 
incumbent. 
11. Military 
focus 
 Partly. Limited. Addresses “war”, military forces. 
12.  
Political/civilia
n focus 
Insurgency and 
terrorism mainly have a 
political goal. 
Predominantly. Talks about guerrilla and COIN 
which are broader aspects than 
just military. 
Figure 33. Appendix 1. Summary of views on Irregular Warfare, Period Three. 
Result and Comments  
The nine chosen experts represent a collection of thought on the subject during the 
period 2004 to 2009, the period when the western interest for Small Wars and 
particularly the problematic area of Counterinsurgency, once again appeared and 
formed new discourse. Professor Gray, with over 30 years’ experience as a practising 
strategist and scholar in the USA and his native Britain, could be seen as the sharp 
pragmatist, postulating that “war is war”. His influence is well-known. His American 
colleague James Kiras, also well-known from strategy literature, exemplifies a scholar 
with more emphasis on history aspects and lengthier descriptions and explanations than 
Gray. James Corum, also from the USA, exemplifies an early so-called “warrior-
scholar”, or “scholar-warrior” , with history research as a main area and his own 
extensive experiences of Counterinsurgency operations. The Australian Dr KilCullen, 
also a warrior scholar but with an anthropological background, exemplifies a current, 
most influential strategic adviser on the subject. The British former General, 
MacKinlay, is currently one of the most notable UK military writers on the subject, but 
is not a scholar. Neither is the American Colonel (ret) Thomas Hammes a scholar, but 
represents one of the most influential thinkers on how to understand new forms of 
Irregular Warfare in the early years of 2000.  
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
68 
 
The American warrior-scholar Frank Hoffman has been one of the most influential 
thinkers concerning new forms of Irregular Warfare, with his articulations and ideas of 
“Hybrid Warfare”, also in the early years of 2000. Finally, the Israeli Dr Gil Merom has 
been noted in 2008, for his social science-oriented study of western problems with 
Irregular Warfare and linked to a confessed unwillingness to use force against irregular 
opponents and thereby lose those kinds of conflicts. Turning to the variable strategy; 
Corum, KilCullen, Kiras and MacKinlay address the political perspective and power 
struggle in various ways, mainly by overthrowing a government. KilCullen widens the 
horizon with his discussions on globalized Insurgency. Hammes on the other hand, 
highlights the strategy for seizing control of a territory or for neutralizing the power of 
the USA. Merom addresses Guerrilla War contrasted with Counterinsurgency wars, 
both in strategic terms. Gray reduces explanations to warfare between regulars and 
irregulars, which like Hoffman he argues, can be strategies of combinations. 
The variable “Tactics and Operational Art” can include; subversion, according to 
Mackinlay, terrorism according to Kiras, Hammes and KilCullen, covert activities with 
great stealth according to Gray and Guerrilla Warfare according to Hammes, KilCullen 
and Merom. Kiras’ latest more sketchy explanations from 2010 state unorthodox or 
unconventional approaches. Regarding physical factors, most experts address low or 
lack of military resources for the insurgents. Hoffman on the other hand, discusses that 
such actors have no intentions of building large formations for decisive battles. 
Conceptual factors are mentioned such as intelligence driven operations, according to 
Corum, net-work organizations, according to Hammes and decentralized execution, 
according to Hoffman. KilCullen uses expressions like “Expeditionary Terrorism” and 
“Guerrilla Terrorism”. Kiras, MacKinlay and Merom point out the sub-state 
actors’/groups’ actions against states, which can be seen indirectly as conceptual needs 
for existing and execution in secrecy with covert capacity. Regarding moral factors 
Gray, Hammes, Hoffman and Kilcullen present a view of very highly motivated 
insurgents.  
The character of this sort of struggle is argued to involve the time factor, changing 
sides, complexity from terrorism to Regular Warfare (Corum), need of territorial 
sanctuary, brutality on the people (Gray), using the society’s networks, utter 
determination and ingenuity by the aggressor (Hammes), simultaneous operations in the 
same area with very different characteristics of combat (Hoffman), subversion and a 
mix of terrorism, Insurgency and information operations, different cultural aspects in 
different groupings of adversaries (KilCullen), violent activities of unorthodox 
approaches (Kiras), mainly activities at the lower end of the violence spectrum and with 
non-centre of gravity character (MacKinlay). Finally, Merom addresses an expressed 
character of military asymmetry. Attitude aspects are addressed by Corum, Hoffman, 
KilCullen and MacKinlay as well as the general negative attitude (especially in 
America) towards Irregular Warfare. 
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Corum, Hammes, KilCullen, MacKinlay and Merom can be said to predominantly 
discuss using an explanatory, descriptive technique. Gray, Hammes, Hoffman and Kiras 
(2010) can be said to use umbrella descriptions, with different contents of explanations. 
As for addressing actors, Corum, Gray, Hammes, Hoffman and Mackinlay deal with 
both sides. KilCullan focuses mostly on the irregular side as also does Kiras and 
Merom.  
Regarding a focus on military or political/civilian perspectives, Gray deals with both 
military and political/civilian aspects. Hoffman, Hammes and Merom focus slightly 
more on the military perspective, while Corum, KillCullen, Kiras and MacKinlay have a 
predominantly non-military perspective. 
Answers to the three questions 
The first question; “How is the form of warfare, labelled “Irregular Warfare defined 
and explained?” despite having been discussed in various ways, can be summarized 
here as; Hoffman; Hybrid Warfare, Hammes; Forth Generation Warfare and Merom; 
Small Wars; primarily a form of political warfare between regulars and irregulars 
including attempts to overthrow a government and seize control of people and territory. 
Globalized aspects are often included using different strategies such as subversion, 
terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare and on the defenders’ side, Counterinsurgency 
operations. All descriptions focus on Irregular Warfare as a specific form of warfare, 
not addressing such concepts as a complement to Regular Warfare as well. 
The second question; “What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms 
of warfare?” can be summarized with following aspects mentioned in the texts; limited 
physical strength, importance of covert and clandestine structures and activities, the 
human perspective, the use of terror as a weapon, effects of globalization regarding the 
use of psychological operations, the use of society’s networks and the simultaneous use 
of different tactics within and outside what is permitted in Regular Warfare. The power 
and brutal consequences of terror and involving the “people” in this sort of warfare 
differs from the style of Regular Warfare. Another difference is stated to be a general 
low interest from the military side in this form of warfare.  
The third question; “What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?”, according 
to the experts from this period, can be answered by the  following aspects; military 
asymmetry and weak physical resources, opponents that change sides, use of subversion 
and terrorism and a combination of strategies usually not included in Regular Warfare, a 
political form of struggle with limited military decisive goals, complex to defend 
against, need of sanctuaries, covert activities with great stealth, fanaticism and utter 
determination in the Irregular forces and groups. 
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Discussion of the result 
The descriptions and explanations from the nine experts show several commonalities 
regarding separate factors and some key characteristics. On the one hand, it can be 
noticed there are rather different arguments when discussing what possibly might be 
new or fundamental weakness for democracies to handle this sort of warfare. On the 
other hand, the writers do however; look at the subject from different angles, with 
different background knowledge and different degrees of scientific perspectives and 
theoretical approaches (history, sociology, anthropology) thus using different 
formulations.  
Several difficult experiences and problematic actions have also occurred between the 
writings of e.g. Hammes 2004 and KilCullen 2009. The writers have had differing 
amounts of information to work with. Nevertheless, the result gives an overall, fairly 
unified picture of the subject.  
Hoffman differs mostly by not specifically addressing Irregular Warfare but instead an 
argued new form of warfare that includes IW, as well as parts of Regular Warfare. Also 
Hammes argues for a new form of warfare different from Gray, Corum, Kiras, 
MacKinlay and Merom, who all rather see the phenomenon as timeless, even if it 
naturally adapts to actual conditions. Some of the authors strive to give new 
explanations to the phenomena and some strive to build a strong historical base. Corum 
and Hammes are exemplary writers with a message, mostly for the way it is argued that 
the USA have neglected to observe and adapt defence against Irregular attacks. As for 
biases to an important employer, KilCullan might be observed as the most current 
prominent adviser for the U.S. government. 
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The result in total of the doctrine and literature analysis - Summary 
Sources Doctrines Literature 
period 1; 
Clausewitz to 
the First 
World War 
Literature period 
2; The 50-70s 
Literature 
period 3; 9/11 
to 2010 
Question 1     
Label Irregular 
Warfare 
People-at-Arms 
Kleinkriege 
Small Wars 
Irregular War 
Insurgency 
Counterinsurgency 
Low-intensity 
operations 
Revolutionary Warfare 
Modern Warfare 
Irregular Warfare 
Hybrid Warfare 
4G Warfare 
Small Wars 
1. “How is 
the form of 
warfare, 
labelled 
Irregular 
Warfare, 
defined and 
explained?” 
A conflict  
between state 
and non-state 
entities. 
Violence 
spectrum 
exceeding 
police 
capacities. 
Primarily, but 
not limited to  
lower violence 
spectrum. 
Includes 
insurgency, 
Guerrilla 
Warfare, 
terrorism. 
Indirect, as well 
as  political and 
civilian focus. 
The label might 
include both 
sides of warfare 
or only the 
irregular part of 
warfare. 
Primarily a 
complement or 
substitute for 
Regular Warfare. 
Might however 
have revolutionary/ 
political origin. 
Different means 
and methods that 
do not seek 
military decisive 
battles. 
The label describes 
the warfare style of 
the irregulars. 
Uprisings against a 
government or a 
complement to Regular 
Warfare. 
Lower span of violence, 
subversion, terrorism, 
Guerrilla Warfare up to 
mobile warfare. 
Political aspect and 
need of support from 
the people. 
Not seeking military 
decisive battles. 
The label includes both 
parties’ actions. 
Political warfare 
between regulars and 
irregulars (state and 
non-state entities). 
Overthrowing a 
government also with 
globalized ambitions. 
Control of people. 
Different strategies 
and tactics, 
subversion, 
terrorism, Guerrilla 
Warfare. 
A specific form of 
warfare. 
Figure 34. Appendix 1. The result of the doctrine and literature analysis –  Question 1. 
All in all, the first question; “How is the form of warfare, labelled Irregular Warfare, 
defined and explained?” can be answered as follows; conflicts and/or warfare principles 
characterized by strategy, operational art and tactics with an emphasis on, and from the 
lower violence spectrum (subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare) between state and 
non-state entities. These sorts of conflicts include insurgency strategies, where political 
and civilian perspectives dominate and the people’s will and support are of vital 
importance. IW is sometimes meant to address either the irregulars’ struggle or 
sometimes includes the counter irregular party as well.  
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Over time, that sort of warfare has been understood as being different from Regular 
Warfare in conceptual terms, a specific form of warfare, and as such, also a natural 
complement. 
Sources Doctrines Literature 
period 1; 
Clausewitz 
to the First 
World War 
Literature 
period 2; The 
50-70s 
Literature period 3; 
9/11 to 2010 
Question 2     
Label Irregular 
Warfare 
People-at-Arms 
Kleinkriege 
Small Wars 
Irregular War 
Insurgency 
Counterinsurgency 
Low intensity 
operations 
Revolutionary 
Warfare 
Modern Warfare 
Irregular Warfare 
Hybrid Warfare 
4G Warfare 
Small Wars 
2. “What is 
said to 
distinguish 
Irregular 
Warfare 
from other 
forms of 
warfare?” 
IW can include 
criminality and 
Terrorism. 
 
IW benefit from 
protracted 
campaigns. 
 
IW does not 
focus on 
military battles 
but on the 
control and will 
of the people. 
 
IW seeks 
integration and 
hard-to-detect 
networking 
within the 
society. 
 
IW opens up for 
diversity and 
adaption and 
flexibility in 
contrast to the 
Regular Warfare 
more rigid 
concepts. 
 
The power and 
influence of the 
people in the 
struggle. 
 
 
The less physical 
power and more 
mental power. 
Limited physical 
power. 
 
Crushing of social 
structures. 
 
 
The room aspect. 
 
The anonymous 
fight. 
 
 
The human 
perspective. 
 
The use of terror 
and consequences 
thereof. 
 
Little interest from 
the military. 
Limited physical strength 
 
Importance of covert and 
clandestine capabilities. 
 
 
The human perspective. 
 
Terror as a weapon. 
 
 
Influential use of 
globalization. 
 
Use of society’s networks. 
 
 
Low military interest. 
Figure 35. Appendix 1. The result  of the doctrine and literature analysis – Question 2. 
The question; “What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms of 
warfare?” can be summarized with several common opinions that originate from 
Clausewitz via Callwell to contemporary views. A conceptual difference not built on 
distinct physical formations, moral goals that aim at the mind and will of the people, 
limited physical military power and extensive knowledge and use of hard-to detect 
(covert, clandestine and low visibility) concepts for existing, organizing and activating 
the influence operations and activities. Terror and subversion as key activities are used 
when it is culturally effective. There is common use of criminality, moral and ethical 
standards other than those, which are standards in Regular Warfare.  Moreover, military 
interest in Irregular Warfare is traditionally lower compared to the interest in Regular 
Warfare skills and competences. 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
73 
 
Sources  
 
Doctrines Literature 
period 1; 
Clausewitz to 
the First 
World War 
Literature 
period 2; The 
50-70s 
Literature 
period 3; 9/11 
2010 
Question 3     
Label Irregular Warfare People-at-Arms, 
Kleinkrieg, 
Small Wars, 
Irregular War. 
Insurgency, 
Counterinsurgency, 
Low-intensity 
operations, 
Revolutionary 
Warfare. 
Modern Warfare 
Irregular Warfare, 
Hybrid Warfare, 
4G Warfare, 
Small Wars. 
3. “What 
are typical 
traits 
argued for 
Irregular 
Warfare?” 
The violence 
spectrum starting 
with “disorder”, 
“criminality” via 
terrorism, 
Insurgency, to 
Guerrilla Warfare 
and further on. 
 
Parallel and “back 
and forth” 
movement. 
Use of all overt 
and covert tactics 
and strategies. 
 
Integration into 
society and hard 
to detect enemies.  
 
The will of the 
people and 
political aspects 
from local to 
global levels. 
A weaker strategy 
or tactics. 
 
High mobility. 
 
Total culture/         
climatological  
adaption. 
 
Non-material 
motivators. 
 
Loose formations. 
 
Not able to fight 
down physically. 
 
Political and civilian 
prime perspective. 
 
The violence 
spectrum from 
subversion to mobile 
warfare. 
 
The role and 
importance of the 
police. 
 
The need for 
organization and 
administration. 
Military asymmetry. 
 
Weak military 
resources. 
 
Opponents changing 
sides. 
 
Use of subversion 
and terrorism. 
 
Limited military 
goals. 
 
Legally complex to 
defend against. 
 
Need for sanctuary. 
 
Covert activities with 
great stealth. 
Fanatics and utter 
determination in the 
irregulars. 
 
Combination of 
strategies less of 
Regular Warfare. 
Figure 36. Appendix 1. The result of the doctrine and literature analysis – Question 3. 
The question; “What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?” can be 
summarized with the following aspects of traits (seen from the aggressors’ side); A 
military weakness leads to a continuous need for integration with the people and 
society. The main goal to control the people and their support, leads to a political and 
civilian focus for the fight. Fluid and highly adaptable and flexible network of 
influence/combat groupings, using what is supposed to bring desired results, regardless 
of western views of humanism and moral/ethical norms. Military strategies, operational 
art and tactical skills, from subversion to mobile or manoeuvre warfare with light 
ground forces. 
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Summary of the result 
Three questions have been addressed dealing with the subject from a military theoretical 
or practical perspective. The questions answered are summarized as follows.  
The first question; “How is the form of warfare, labelled Irregular Warfare, defined 
and explained?”; conflicts and/or warfare principles characterized by strategy, 
operational art and tactics, with an emphasis on and from the lower-violence spectrum 
(subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare) between state and non-state entities. These 
sorts of conflicts include Insurgency strategies, where the political and civilian 
perspectives dominate and the will and support of the people is of vital importance. 
Irregular Warfare is sometimes meant to address either the irregulars´ struggle or 
sometimes also includes the counter irregular party as well. From time to time, that sort 
of warfare has been understood as being different in conceptual terms from Regular 
Warfare – a specific form of warfare - not seeking decisive battles but during an 
extended time, eroding the will to fight the enemy and thus, as such, a natural 
complement. 
The second question; “What is said to distinguish Irregular Warfare from other forms 
of warfare?”; there is a conceptual difference, not built on distinct physical formations 
but on moral goals, which is part of the mind and will of the people; limited physical 
military power, extensive knowledge and use of concepts difficult to detect - covert, 
clandestine and low visibility – necessary for the existence, organisation and activation 
of the armed operations. Terror and subversion as key competences and activities are 
often used, as are criminality and behaviour, often different in moral/legal/ethical 
aspects compared to western and traditional views when conducting Regular Warfare. 
Also, there is generally a low military interest compared to interest in Regular Warfare 
skills and competences. 
The third question; “What are typical traits argued for Irregular Warfare?” is answered 
with the following aspects of traits (seen from the aggressors’ perspective); a military 
weakness leads to a continuous need for integration with people and society. The main 
goal is to control the people and gain their support, resulting in a political and civilian 
focus in the fight. Fluid and highly adaptable and flexible networks of influence/combat 
groups, using what is supposed to bring the desired result, regardless of western views 
of humanism and moral/ethical norms. Military strategy, operational art and tactical 
skills from subversion to mobile or manoeuvre warfare with light ground forces are also 
typical characteristics. 
A first step to an empirical generalization summary from this result, not pretending to 
say what is the truth, just reporting expressions often occurring in attempts to explain 
and understand the phenomena in “Irregular Warfare”, indicates that the term might be 
described as in the following figure, which contrasts commonly described 
characteristics of Regular Warfare. 
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Overview of commonly described characteristics of Regular and 
Irregular Warfare 
             
Warfare form 
 
Aspects 
Regular Warfare Irregular Warfare 
Dominant Actors 
 
State actors. Non/Sub-state actors. 
Strategy 
 
Military victory, enemy 
defeat/destruction. 
Political victory, people’s support, 
enemy exhaustion. 
Operational 
design 
Joint military operations. Different operational concepts of 
subversion, guerrilla/terrorist and 
local/regional forces up to Regular 
Warfare structures (ground forces). 
Tactics Direct approach, to control 
physical terrain. 
Indirect approach, to control 
people’s minds and political 
ambitions. 
Time  
 
Strive for short duration. Accept protracted war/campaign. 
Conceptual 
factors 
 
 
 
 
Overt, uniformed structures 
and operations, static 
concepts, separate from 
civilian functions. 
Overt, covert and clandestine 
structures and operations, dynamic, 
adaptable and fluid concepts, 
integrating civilian functions. 
Physical factors 
 
 
Military strengths. 
Anti-subversive weaknesses. 
Military weaknesses. 
Subversive strengths. 
Moral factors 
 
 
Exclude people’s will in the 
fighting structures. 
Integrates people’s will in the 
fighting and supporting structures. 
Rules of Law and 
Engagement 
Following western society 
norms, laws and 
conventions. 
Does not follow western society 
norms, laws, conventions or moral, 
ethical standards. 
Figure 37. Appendix 1. Overview of  characteristics of Regular and Irregular Warfare. 
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Generic aspects of Irregular Warfare 
According to the findings, it is possible to generalize aspects in a non-specific 
perspective. Generic aspects that are attributed to, and commonly understood connected 
to the field of Irregular Warfare and related areas, are the following;  
Contextual and Conceptual aspects 
? Influencing one’s  own people for support is vital 
? Influencing the people of the opponents is crucial today 
? Propaganda of the deed is very important 
? Ability to perform various tactics as well as operational art are essential to be able to 
adapt to the opponents’ strategy  
? Strategy and tactics are often very closely linked from the highest to the lowest level 
? Capability within the same organisation to use the whole range of non-violence to 
violence, overt or covert/clandestine and armed influence on the opponent. 
? Integrate civilian / military aspects and activities  
? Integrate all forms of influences (passive-active) violent (armed, sabotage, terrorism) 
and non-violent 
? Limited capability to influence regular military in direct confrontation (indirect 
strategy, military strategy, operational art and tactics) 
? Parallel use of subversion, Guerrilla Warfare, terrorism and different levels of ground 
operations  
? Conceptually high adaption to the society and opponent  
? Strategy of attrition and transforming/changing centres of gravity 
? The will or “the idea” is the driving force (moral force and not physical force) 
Tactical aspects 
? Small groups operating dispersed 
? Operating over large areas 
? Hit-and-run attacks/ambushes 
? Only attacking weak points 
? Avoiding combat unless on own terms 
? Sabotage actions and terrorism 
? Civilian support (for control / indoctrination) 
? Close relations between warfare and politics must be understood down to soldier level 
? Covert, clandestine, low visibility capabilities 
? Mobility 
? Light armament 
? Difficult terrain 
? Surprise and high tactical adaption capability 
? Great demands on low ranking officers 
? Smaller formations with coordination to larger operations 
? Support of the people 
? Sustainability for long periods 
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Appendix 1.1 Clausewitz’s writings on Small Wars – a collection of 
thoughts.  
Introduction and content 
The following part contains extracts from a report written by LtCol Claes Bergström, 
(working at the Swedish National Defence College during 2010), as a result of research 
in Germany, during the spring of 2010. The purpose of the work was to get information 
on more views of Clausewitz’s thoughts on Small Wars/Irregular War than what can be 
derived from On War. All texts examined are in German and have been translated by 
LtCol Bergström. The content consists of a background part on the development of 
military theory written by Werner Hahlweg and the main part, Clausewitz’s thoughts of 
Small Wars, with references to Werner Hahlweg, The Clausewitz-Gesellschaft and 
Deutsche Geschichtsquellen des 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. 
Background – Development of military theory on Small Wars from the 
18th and 19th century. 
Werner Hahlweg, in his book Preussische Reformzeit und revolutionärer Krieg, writes 
about the Guerrilla or Small War in the context of Prussia during the early 19th 
century.495 During the occupation of Prussia (1808-1813) by Napoleonic troops, the 
Guerrilla or Small War was seen as an option for a Prussian repossession of 
independence.496 The Spanish Guerrilla War during this period was seen as an example 
to follow. In 1811, the talented Major von Clausewitz was tasked to develop a 
memorandum on the possibility of a Small War in Mark Brandenburg.497  
Hahlweg writes that the concept of Small War was well known and documented in the 
early 19th century.498 A number of generals and field marshals (among them 
Scharnhorst) had documented that the Small War and the concept, tactics and 
techniques could (unless a revolution in warfare happened) be considered perfected.499 
However, a new paradigm did occur in the form of the American Revolution, the French 
Revolution and not least through Napoleon. The Small War had until then been almost 
an exclusive military affair, but the revolutionary times made the Small War a matter 
for revolutionaries and became an instrument for revolution. Its importance was moved 
from the periphery of a conflict closer to (or becoming) the centre of the conflict.500  
At the same time however, the Small War kept its importance for the normal armies. 
Hahlweg further state that the Prussian reformers Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, Gneisenau 
and von Stein were all involved in questions regarding the Small War.  
                                                 
495 Werner Hallweg, ´Preussische Reformzeit und revolutionärer Krieg´: Beiheft 18 der 
Wehrwissenschaftlichen Rundschau,  Zeitschrift für Europäischen Sicherheit, (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag 
E.S.Mittler & Sohn, September 1962), p. 7. 
496 Ibid. p. 7. 
497 Ibid. p. 7. 
498 Ibid. pp. 10-11. 
499 Ibid. pp. 10-11. 
500 Ibid. pp. 11-12. 
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Also people outside the group of reformers were involved, among them de la Roche-
Aymon and General York.501 Schanhorst wrote at least two papers (studies) on the 
subject.502 In 1808 de la Roche-Aymon wrote what could be described as a field manual 
for Small Wars. This manual, written originally in French, was reprinted three times. In 
1810 light Brigades were formed in Prussia and de la Roche-Aymon was commander of 
one of these.  
Due to pressure from Napoleon, de la Roche-Aymon being a Frenchman, had to leave 
Prussian service in 1811.503 One of the more important concerns for de la Roche-Aymon 
was the ability of light troops to accurately and quickly be able to hit a target with a 
gun. Shooting was therefore one of the most important skills for a light soldier.504 In 
1810 and 1811, General York issued instructions for light brigades.505 York required an 
officer to be “independently thinking”.506 The fighting of the light troops consisted 
mostly of independent direct fire, i.e. a loose line without simultaneous firing but with 
precise single shots.507 According to Hahlweg, York always looked at the Small War as 
something for regular troops and not as Revolutionary War or Volkskrieg.  
Werner Hahlweg makes the connection between Small Wars and different forms of 
Irregular War in his book Lehrmeister des kleinen Krieges: von Clausewitz bis Mao 
Tse-Tung und Che Guevara.508 In this book, Hahlweg claims the Small War as the root 
of the different forms of Irregular Warfare, Revolutionary War and Partisan War. All 
these types of Irregular War are, according to Hahlweg, related and represent different 
forms of Small Wars.509 The Small War is, according to Hahlweg, the original form of 
warfare and was brought to its fulfilment during the 16th and 17th centuries. During the 
wars of the American Revolution, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, 
Small Wars evolved and developed into something not only engaging military forces.510 
Among the foremost theorists and practitioners of Small Wars, Schanhorst, Valentini, 
Duhesme and Schels are particularly noted by Hahlweg. Also Gneisenau and 
Clausewitz are specifically mentioned by Hahlweg.511 Hahlweg claims that at the 
beginning of the 19th century, the Small War was already fought as today, defined by 
fighting with “intensity and dedication, continuous offensive action, for a long time and 
with utmost brutality”.512  
                                                 
501 Hallweg, Preussische Reformzeit und revolutionärer Krieg: Beiheft 18 der Wehrwissenschaftlichen 
Rundschau, (1962), p. 16. 
502 Ibid. pp. 16-17. Von der Nothwendigkeit, leichte Truppen zu haben und deren Nutzen and 
Unterstützung der leichten Infanterie und Jäger: 
503 Ibid. pp. 18-20. 
504 Ibid. pp. 20-21. 
505 Ibid. pp. 22-25. 
506 Ibid. p. 24. 
507 Ibid. p. 24. 
508 Werner Hahlweg, Lehrmeister des kleinen Krieges: von Clausewitz bis Mao Tse-Tung und Che 
Guevara, (Darmstadt: WEHR UND WISSEN Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 1968). 
509 Ibid. pp. 7-11. 
510 Ibid. pp. 10-11. 
511 Ibid. p. 11. 
512 Ibid. p. 11. 
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One of the deciding particulars of the Small War was that parties fighting understood 
that a prerequisite for success was that the population embraced the idea or the purpose 
which formed the motivation for the Small War. The support of the population was 
necessary in order to receive information about the enemy, receive logistical support, in 
emergencies be able to get refuge, and to create a basis for further recruitment:513 The 
development of Small Wars as Revolutionary War continued through the 19th and 20th 
century, among others, through the uprisings in Africa and Asia and the Russian 
revolution 1905. According to Hahlweg, the great wars of the 20th century showed that 
Small Wars fighters were not marauders but had completely different qualities and 
strategic impact. Halhweg also mentions the Partisan Wars on the eastern front and in 
Yugoslavia as well as Mao’s resistance against the Japanese.514 During the 20th century, 
the Small Wars (or Partisan War) has been an important part of world politics.515  
 Clausewitz lectures on Small Wars 
 
In 1810, Clausewitz was ordered to be a teacher at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, with 
the subjects of “Small Wars, general staff duties, field fortifications and artillery”.516 
The manuscripts for the lectures held on the theme of Small Wars in 1810 and 1811 are 
preserved. Hahlweg notes that Clausewitz at this time was responsible within the 
Prussian Staff for questions regarding the general armament of the Prussian people 
(Volksbewaffnung).517 Halhweg takes the stand that Clausewitz emerged as the leading 
military theorist of Small Wars during the 19th century.518  
Clausewitz defines Small Wars to be limited by the number of soldiers participating in 
fighting, with an upper limit of 300-400 soldiers. This is true unless the fighting takes 
place as part of a larger whole. In principle, according to Clausewitz, everything a small 
unit does independently is a part of the Small War. The difference between Small Wars 
and larger wars is not defined but has to be decided every time.  One of the specifics of 
the Small War compared to the larger war is the ability to hide, which a unit within the 
Small War has. Units involved in a larger war cannot hide as easily and are dependent 
on supply and support, including combat support to a larger degree.519 Clausewitz also 
defines the connection between strategy and tactics in a Small War.  
In the larger war, strategy decides purpose, time, location and strength of troops 
participating in the battle, meaning that strategy determines tactics. In the Small War, 
strategy is part of the tactics.520  
                                                 
513 Hahlweg, Lehrmeister des kleinen Krieges: von Clausewitz bis Mao Tse-Tung und Che Guevara 
(1968), p. 11. 
514 Ibid. pp. 11-12. 
515 Ibid. p. 12. 
516 Hallweg, Preussische Reformzeit und revolutionärer Krieg (1962), p. 26. 
517 Ibid. p. 26. 
518 Ibid. p. 54. 
519 Ibid. p. 28. 
520 Ibid. pp. 28-29. 
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In order to remember the 200th anniversary of the birth of Carl von Clausewitz, the 
German Clausewitz-gesellschaft published an anthology in 1979, where different 
aspects of Clausewitz’s thinking were reflected upon521.  
In this book, Werner Hahlweg contributes with an article about Clausewitz and 
Guerrilla Warfare. In this short (seven pages) article, Hahlweg highlights the chapter in 
book 6 about Volkskrieg, stating that this is the same as Guerrilla War.522 Among the 
particulars of Clausewitz’s writings highlighted by Hahlweg, notice should be taken of 
the following:523  
? an important war is to be fought internally 
? a decisive battle must be avoided 
? war should be fought over a large geographical surface 
? the people must support the war (cause) 
? guerrilla forces should use the terrain and avoid the areas where strong regular 
enemy units are 
 
Hahlweg concludes this article by stating that Clausewitz did consider Small War within 
his theory, in particular by the statement that the Small War (Volkskrieg) can never be 
looked upon as an isolated phenomenon, but needs to be considered within the whole of 
politics, strategy etc.524 The lectures, held in 1810 and 1811 are preserved in the form of 
complete manuscripts. These manuscripts were published in 1966 by the Historischen 
Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.525 In the introduction, 
written by Werner Hahlweg, the history of the Clausewitz papers is told, starting with 
the publications in 10 volumes (the first three containing Vom Kriege), in 1832 to 
1837.526 Part of the first volume is the lectures held by Clausewitz on the theme of 
Small Wars. In the here published form, they cover 244 handwritten pages.527 The 
lectures are, according to Hahlweg, complete and previously not published. The lectures 
have four main topics:528 Small War and field fortifications, examples, collectaneen529 
to the lectures, and techniques of artillery firing.  
 
 
                                                 
521 Clausewitz-Gesellschaft e.V., Freihet ohne Krieg?: Beiträge zur Strategi-Diskussion der Gegenwart 
im Spiegel der Theorie von Carl von Clausewitz, (Bonn; Ferd. Dümmlers Verlag, 1980). The antology 
contains an article by Werner Hahlweg about Clausewitz and Guerrilla Warfare 
522 Clausewitz-Gesellschaft e.V., Freihet ohne Krieg?: Beiträge zur Strategi-Diskussion der Gegenwart 
im Spiegel der Theorie von Carl von Clausewitz, (1980), pp. 353-356. 
523 Ibid. pp. 354-355, These writings can also be found in the sixth book of On War. 
524 Ibid. pp. 356-357. 
525,Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Deutsche 
Geschichtsquellen des 19. und  20. Jahrhundert: Band 45: Carl von Clausewitz: Schriften – Aufsätze – 
Studien – Briefe: Erster Band , Herausgeber Werner Hahlweg (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 
1966). 
526 Ibid. p. 11. 
527 Ibid. p. 217, In Band 45 these notes with comments from Hahlweg cover the pages 208-599. 
528 Ibid. p. 217. 
529 Collectaneen = notes and comments to the lectures, not part of the lectures (Bergström’s comment) 
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The Small Wars lectures have the following structure in the chapters; 530 
     -General (Introduction to Small Wars and tactics of the Small War) 
     -Vorpostensystem 
     -Detaschements- oder Parteigängerkrieg 
 
Hahlweg states that this manuscript is almost totally written by Clausewitz personally 
and without the intent of being published.531 The third chapter; Detaschements- oder 
Parteigängerkrieg, is according to Hahlweg, not completed by 
Clausewitz.532Clausewitz was engaged in the subject of Small Wars at later dates, which 
a letter in 1823 from the Prins August of Prussia brings to light. The letter is 
accompanied by eleven booklets containing Clausewitz’s lectures, in a more advanced 
state than those from 1810-1811.533 In the introduction to his lectures, Clausewitz 
defines Small War and what it is that makes it different from the low intensity. 
Clausewitz’s definition concerns the size of the troops involved, saying it is 
unphilosophical but true. All war-like actions taken by these smaller units are part of the 
Small War.534 The main particulars which make the difference between small and larger 
wars are according to Clausewitz the following:535  
? Small units will almost always find supplies in the field 
? Small units can keep their whereabouts hidden easier 
? Small units can, particular in combat, move faster 
? Armies and larger corps need to be divided into subunits; in smaller units a 
subdivision is mostly not possible 
? Small units lose their  character when fighting from fixed positions  
?  Combat of the small units will almost always be supported 
? Small units can retreat easier and faster, without need of prepared roads 
? The tasking of small units does not require major preparations 
? Small units have the task of observing the enemy more often than to attack or 
defend 
 
Clausewitz also discusses the terms strategy and tactics, saying that all actions in the 
larger war are motivated by one or the other and states that the same is valid for the 
Small War.536  
 
In the chapter; Über den Charaktär des kleinen Krieges, Clausewitz states that the 
Small War means a higher personal danger for the soldier, requiring the greatest 
                                                 
530 Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Deutsche 
Geschichtsquellen des 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Band 45: Carl von Clausewitz: Schriften – Aufsätze – 
Studien – Briefe: Erster Band , (1966), p. 217. 
531 Ibid. pp. 217-218. 
532 Ibid. pp. 218-219. 
533 Ibid. p. 220. 
534 Ibid. pp. 231-233. 
535 Ibid. pp. 234-235. 
536 Ibid. p. 235. 
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courage and bravery, compared to the larger war.537 In the third chapter, Clausewitz 
discusses tactics in the Small War, stating that in the Small War there are no differences 
in how weapons are used compared to the larger war. Further, the particulars of tactics 
for the infantry, cavalry and artillery in the Small War is discussed.538 He states that the 
infantry most often will fight in open formations, from protected positions.  
Clausewitz lists four principles of the Small War valid for the infantry:539  
1. Often and almost always, the opponent will be numerically greater than the 
enemy. 
2. Should you not be weak compared to the enemy, you will always be inferior 
compared to the area you are to occupy. 
When defending, a total defence is almost never necessary, and the need to 
defend is limited in time. Additionally; total defence is the task when a point 
must not be taken by the enemy; for example a fortification. A relative defence 
should be limited in time, in order to make the advance of the enemy difficult. . 
3. In Small Wars, respect for enemy fire is greater, because the risk of serious 
losses will only be taken when bigger goals can be achieved. However, these 
situations seldom occur in Small Wars as you will more often be engaged by the 
other side. 
 
After discussing the infantry, Clausewitz continues with cavalry, cavalry and infantry 
together, artillery together with infantry and cavalry, ending with a discussion on how to 
use the terrain.540 In the lectures Clausewitz uses the terms Grosser Krieg (larger war) 
and Kleiner Krieg (Small War).541 The following lectures on Small Wars include one on 
defence in Small Wars. In the introduction to the lecture, Clausewitz argues that in 
Small Wars defence is never totally passive or reactive, but that to defend means 
waiting for the right moment to attack. Clausewitz further argues for  two most 
important things regarding defence in Small Wars,542 these are; that you win time by 
waiting for the enemy and his action, that you fight him in terrain that you know and 
that you know of his intentions when you take on the fight. Therefore (argues 
Clausewitz), I’m being defensive when I wait for the enemy to approach my position or 
that the enemy approaches the terrain that has advantages for me. To be defensive in 
Small Wars means to fight the enemy in one’s own theatre of war or from one’s own 
defensive position. 543 Further on in the lectures, it is stated that in the Small War, 
almost all attacks will be surprise ones. Clausewitz also argues for the moral effects that 
a sudden attack has on the defenders.544  
                                                 
537 Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1966), pp. 237-238. 
538 Ibid. pp. 239-266. 
539 Ibid. pp. 239-240. 
540 Ibid. pp. 246-266. 
541 Ibid. p. 250. Example is given. 
542 Ibid. pp. 300-302. 
543 Ibid. pp. 300-302. 
544 Ibid. pp. 397-398. (Angriffe kleine Posten und Überfälle) 
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The final comments to the lectures include the wish for the students not to memorize the 
principles but to reflect for themselves in order to learn.545 Clausewitz further states that 
there is much more written on the small war then on the larger war, but most of the 
writings of the Small War are similar, and Clausewitz recommends that it is enough to 
read the work of either General Scharnhorst or General (Danish LtCol) Ewald.546 The 
lectures cover a large number of topics, including retreat, detachments, patrols and 
reconnaissance.547   
                                                 
545 Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1966), pp. 443-
449.(Schlussbemerkungen über den kleinen Krieg) 
546 Ibid. pp. 445-446. 
547 Ibid. pp. 226-227. 
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Appendix 1.2 General Sir Frank Kitson´s views on Irregular Warfare 
2010 – a collection of thoughts. 
The following part contains part of my correspondence with Sir General Frank Kitson 
during the spring of 2010.  
Letter One, 23 March, 2010 
 
During 1953 to 1973 Sir General Frank Kitson was very much concerned with low 
intensity operations of one sort or another, including peace keeping. During this period 
he was very much concerned with getting people to understand the differences between 
low intensity operations and operations of a more conventional type, he writes; “For 
some time I had trouble getting anyone to take an interest in these operations, but later 
when Commandant of the Staff College, 1978-1980, I was well placed to get my views 
taken seriously”. His famous book Low Intensity Operations was written in 1969 before 
he was moved to take command of the troops in Belfast 1970-1972. Therefore, his 
experiences gained there are not included in the book. In 1975, he wrote Bunch of Five 
(Faber and Faber, 1977, republished in June 2010) designed to explain how he gained 
the experiences that led to Low Intensity Operations. Kitson writes; “I would have liked 
to have described my time in Belfast, but that was too sensitive for publication at that 
time”. “I did however summarize my experiences in the last three chapters which 
therefore contain my most up to date views of Counterinsurgency”. The U.S. Army 
extracted three chapters and for some time used them for instructional purposes. His 
experiences were gained in Kenya (The Mau-Mau rebellion), Malaya, Muscat and 
Oman (1958), Cyprus (1963-1964 and 1967-1968) and Northern Ireland (1970-1972). 
Letter Two, 20 April, 2010 
I had asked what to do about the disinterest in the subject of Irregular Warfare from 
officers in general and Kitson writes; “You can´t do anything about the fact the more 
senior officers are likely to be the most difficult to convince [of the importance of 
understanding Irregular Warfare]). The good thing is that they will die or relive and the 
younger ones who you can teach, will eventually fill their place”. 
To my suggestion of  COIN operations for levels of intensity, giving each a separate 
name (Counter-Subversion, Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Guerrilla operations), Kitson 
says; “So far as I am concerned this is fine. Anyone can choose to use any name they 
like so long as they define it carefully”.  
Asking for an opinion on my idea of focusing on the company and battalion level for 
training levels (of basics in Irregular Warfare), Kitson agrees; “that it would be wise” 
and “By doing so you will be teaching the people most likely to be involved in the 
immediate future and who will be going on to become the senior officers later on”.  
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Regarding different personal interests and ability to gain understanding of Irregular 
Warfare, Kitson puts it; “If there are some who cannot understand it, they just have to 
be moved to other posts”. He also recommends reading his book; Directing operations 
where he also deals with selection and training and career management.548  
Letter Three, 28 May, 2010 
Referring to my writing on the subject of “Hearts and Minds Operations” as not being a 
special strategy and an alternative, but rather a complement to other operations of more 
offensive character, such as killing/capturing/turning, Kitson writes; “ In my opinion 
you are absolutely correct”. The interest in Irregular Warfare and particularly in 
Counterinsurgency was limited mostly during the time when Kitson experienced such 
operations. Later on, this changed. Kitson writes; “The subject became increasingly 
taught in a general sense like Sandhurst School of Infantry, Staff College etc. as time 
went by starting in the 1960/1970´s. Specific training for units about to take part 
became much more efficient from the early 1970´s and dealt with preparing units for 
the particular places to which they were going”.  
Kitson also says; “You are correct in thinking that the British took insufficient interest 
in teaching COIN until the 1970´s, although there had been some interest earlier”. “It 
is certainly right that a few senior officers thought knowing how to deal with Regular 
Warfare was all that mattered right up to the 1980´s, but not many”.  
Letter Four, 12 July, 2010 
Regarding needs for the military to understand and know police work (related to 
countering or supporting Counter-subversion and Insurgency) Kitson writes; “I agree 
with you that the military needs to know how police work when dealing with subversion, 
so they can be ready to assist them if necessary”. “Also the Army should be kept fully 
informed of events because subversion can so easily develop into Insurgency and must 
be ready to get involved as soon as it does”. 
As for relevance of teaching different sorts of warfare, Kitson writes; “I agree that 
discussing different sorts of warfare can be helpful for training purposes. But when 
trouble breaks out it is necessary to realize that no two situations are alike and people 
must learn to deal with every situation on its merits”. 
Also in this letter Kitson comments, regarding “Hearts and Minds Operations”; “Hearts 
and Minds is definitely not an alternative to other sorts of actions. It needs to be worked 
in with other aspects of the campaign”. 
                                                 
548 Frank Kitson, Directing Operations (London; Faber and Faber, 1989, reprinted in August 2010). 
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Appendix 2. The Interview Guide 
This appendix presents an extract from the Interview Guide, including the questions 
used for analysis. 
General information at the start of the interview; these questions are based on Irregular 
Warfare aspects, which simplified can be seen as; use of, or defence against one or more 
of the following violence types; subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare and tactics/ 
operational warfare (traditional infantry activities up to company/ battalion size). 
Below, an extract from the Interview Guide with the questions that have been analysed 
is presented. 
1. BACKGROUND FACTORS - SOCIAL and EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS (16) 
1.2 Year of birth 
1.4 Rank and command role  
1.5 Command of unit type  
1.6 Regiment affiliation 
1.7 Arms affiliation – unit background 
1.10 International missions (where, when, for how long, position) 
1.19 Participation in combat/war 
2.1 Post-graduate education 
2.2 Professional training/education 
2.3 University education 
2.4 Other civilian education/training 
2.5 Military education/training 
 
3. TACTICAL THOUGHT (8)  
What is your position/standpoint in 
relation to the following polarities 
with regard to your personal 
tactical thinking? For example;  
what you prioritize and highly 
value or want to highlight as 
important for tactics in IW.  
 
3.5 a) Offensive  b) Defensive 
focus, where is your basic focus? 
a           b               equal               neither a) or b) 
3.6 a) Enemy-centric  
b) People-centric approach in COIN 
operations? 
a           b               equal               neither a) or b) 
3.7 a) Mechanized, collective 
combat with larger units or  
b) Ranger combat, distributed 
operations with patrols? 
 
 
 
a           b               equal               neither a) or b)  
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3.8 a) “Combat” or 
b) “Recce”? 
 
a           b               equal               neither a) or b) 
3.9 a) National defence focus or 
b) International mission focus, 
regarding tactics (i.e. to be familiar 
with FM 3.24-2)? 
 
a           b               equal               neither a) or b) 
3.10 If you can choose, what do you 
prefer to lead and command?  
a) own operations  
b) training others (meaning Host 
Nation units) implementing 
operations 
a           b               equal               neither a) or b) 
3.11 What do you rather prefer to 
command or develop tactics for?  
a) larger units    
b) smaller structure (i.e. 
Mechanized battalion combat or 
distributed ranger combat)  
a           b               equal               neither a) or b) 
3.12 Do you consider yourself 
primarily to be? 
a) “troop” or “front” commander  
b) planner/staff officer  
a           b               equal               neither a) or b) 
4. TACTICAL THOUGHTS (10)  
4.1 Types of violence in IW can be 
describes as; a) subversion, b) 
terrorism, c) Guerrilla Warfare,  
d) tactical combat. Which of these 
do you think of in particular when 
tactics in IW is the concern?  
a       b     c     d     equal               neither a) or b) 
4.2 Where is your tactical emphasis 
in general?  
a) collective unit combat 
b) distributed unit combat  
a           b               equal               neither a) or b) 
4.3 What do you consider to be 
most important to have capabilities 
for in general? 
a) Regular Warfare  
b) Irregular Warfare 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a           b               equal               neither a) or b) 
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4.4 Conceptually, one can think of 
a battalion structure, capable of IW 
in different ways.  
See the examples in the picture 
below. What do you think of in the 
first place?  
a) traditional infantry, no 
specialized units  
b) different levels of specialization 
c) a totally new concept 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a           b        c       equal             neither a) or b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Do you think of tactics?  
a) often  
b) seldom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a           b               equal               neither a) or b)
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4.6 Do you think of tactics primarily 
as  
a) theory?  
b) practice? 
c) a combination?  
a           b               equal               neither a) or b) 
4.8 Do you think of tactics in IW 
primarily as  
a) open/visible activities  
b) covert, low visible activities? 
 
a           b               equal               neither a) or b) 
4.9 When speaking of tactics, is 
your focus on  
a) troops?  
b) technology?  
a           b               equal               neither a) or b) 
4.10 Where is your focus in tactical 
thought in COIN operations? 
a) military tasks  
b) civilian tasks 
a           b               equal               neither a) or b) 
4.11 a) Hard (kinetic) effects?  
b) Soft (non-kinetic) effects?  
a           b               equal               neither a) or b) 
 
 
Ten Open-ended Questions 
1) What does "tactics" mean to you? 
2) How would you describe your way of thinking about tactics in general? 
3) Linked to the concept of "war fighting capabilities”, what aspects do you 
mostly connect to tactics in IW; physical, conceptual, moral? 
4) Do you think tactics in IW is a priority in the armed forces? 
5) Do you often discuss tactics with your colleagues and commanding officers? 
6) Do you think tactics for IW needs to be developed in the armed forces? 
7) How have you been influenced to think of tactics? Self-perceived 
experiences or indirectly read experiences, by colleagues, through exercises 
or real life operations?  
8) How do you assess your interest in tactics compared with strategy and 
operational art? 
9) What do you think affects the development of tactics and tactical thinking? 
10) What would you like to add anything regarding tactics in IW, not mentioned    
in these questions? 
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Appendix 3. Results from the open-ended questions  
This appendix presents the summaries and results of the twelve open-ended questions 
from the interview guide. The questions, listed below, are marked with the question 
number referring to the Interview Guide, as well as with the analyses of group (1);  
views of  tactics in general, or (2); views of tactics in Irregular Warfare explicitly. The 
answers regarding these two overarching questions  are summarized at the end of the 
appendix. 
 
? What does the concept of tactics means to you? Question 6 (1) 
? How would you describe your way of thinking about tactics in general? Question 7 (1) 
? What has influenced your tactical thinking? Question 13 (1) 
? What do you think affects the development of tactics and tactical thinking?  
             Question 15 (1) 
? How do you assess your interest in tactics compared to strategy and operational art? 
Question 14 (1) 
? Do you often discuss tactics with your colleagues and commanding officers? 
             Question 11 (1) 
? How would you describe your way of thinking about tactics in Irregular Warfare? 
? Question 8 (2) 
? Personal view of tactics in Irregular Warfare? Question 4.12 (2) 
? What aspects of the concept of war fighting capabilities do you mostly think of in 
Irregular Warfare tactics? Physical, conceptual or moral aspects? Question 9 (2) 
? Do you consider there is a need for the development of tactics for Irregular Warfare in 
the armed forces? Question 12 (2) 
? Do you consider tactics in Irregular Warfare to be an area with high priority in the armed 
forces? Question 10 (2) 
? What would you otherwise like to add anything regarding tactics in Irregular Warfare, 
not mentioned in this interview? Question 26 used in the discussion part of validity. 
Results 
Question 6. What does the concept of tactics mean to you? 
The result (35 of 42 possible answers) can be divided into two major groups. The first 
and dominant group; 20 answers, describes a view where tactics is understood as;”the 
use or manoeuvre with, or coordination of, or adaption of units or resources, in order 
to reach a specific goal”. 
The concept of winning or achieving success was only used by five officers. Four 
officers stated a view that tactics could also include civilian resources. Four officers 
meant that it had to do with available resources or from a certain base of resources. One 
officer claimed that resources could also be employed. The concept of art was related to 
by one officer. Concepts such as enemy and terrain were used in one answer   
One officer viewed tactics as related to command level. Tactics is a unique opportunity, 
during a limited time frame, a way of thinking and aiming for a common goal, were 
other descriptions.  
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The other group (15 answers) covered several aspects not directly related to the 
overarching description;”use of units for a certain goal”. Six answers described tactics 
as thought processes, problem-solving activities or as an intellectual process. One 
officer viewed tactics as a combination of theory and practice. Two officers stated the 
ability to transfer will-power and ideas to combat techniques related to command levels. 
Two officers viewed tactics as unit level related up to battalion size units. The use of 
hard and soft methods and a connection to combat were stated by three officers. 
Another officer implied that combat techniques in Irregular Warfare would soon reach 
the area of tactics.  
A clear relation to the enemy or aggressor was described by two officers. A typical 
traditional Regular Warfare description was sketched by one officer as; “find holes, 
advance routes, move squares, draw arrows”. Another, more generic and holistic view 
was stated by one officer as; ”to calculate and think of all parameters and do the best 
one can in a given situation (from soldier and upwards)”. A third officer described 
aspects such as troops and technology, theory and practice, leadership and social and 
political science all woven together in tactics, as the most important subject for an 
officer. One officer expressed views such as; “cunning, wisdom and reflection….a 
thought process…..to out-manoeuvre the enemy physically and mentally, leadership, to 
think freely and openly, an accepting working environment and to encourage your 
personnel to take responsibility and initiative and to award such ambitions, to 
encourage to assume responsibility, think freely and creatively and be able to take 
command when needed”.  
Result summary; the question resulted in two major areas of thinking. The first, and 
dominant group (20 answers) described a view of tactics meaning; ”the use (or 
manoeuvre with, or coordination of, or adaption) of units or resources in order to reach 
a specific goal”. In this category several different articulations could be found. The 
other group (15 answers) comprised several aspects not directly related to the 
overarching description such as;”use of units for a certain goal”. About half of the total 
sample (20 officers) viewed tactics as an overarching expression, meaning more 
directly; “the use of units for a certain goal”, however, there were several different 
interpretations.  
The second group (15 officers) viewed tactics to mean primarily aspects not directly 
related to the use of units for a certain goal, also here, interpreted in many different 
ways. The result shows a slight tendency towards the direct view, i.e. tactics in general 
is thought of as the use of units. Another group, somewhat smaller, highlighted a view 
that tactics is mainly a way of thinking. These views can be summarized with; “to use 
practically” and “to think about how to use units”, or generalized as one practical and 
one theoretical view. Therefore, two perspective angles are argued to be found here; the 
general understanding perspective characterized by focusing on theoretical problem-
solving, and the principles of warfare-related perspective, the latter indicating a more 
direct and hands-on view. 
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Question 7. How would you describe your way of thinking about tactics in general?  
The result (38 of 43 possible) can be categorized in four areas;  
1). General aspects not directly related to war fighting capabilities or performance (14 
answers). The following views were stated in this group; own and the enemy 
intelligence needs, strengths and weaknesses analysis, general method thinking, a 
problem-solving principle, striving for simplicity and need for limitations, a task-
oriented process and method and need for rapid reaction. Problem analysis in order to 
tie down or avoid confronting the enemy. Need for several solutions to the goal and 
being able to revise (the tactics). Theory and practice, an intellectual process, minimal 
solutions with limited means, should be able to answer the question why, context-
oriented thinking, forward-focused thinking, what is to be accomplished? Goal 
articulated (to the lowest cost) tactics, great demands on understanding. Aggressor-
oriented thinking better then terrain-time-oriented thinking, as the “mechanized 
fundamentalists” according to one officer.  
2). Traditional Regular Warfare tactical aspects (10 answers); the following views were 
stated in this group ; armour habituated manoeuvre thinking, rapid and unexpected 
actions, time-space-force calculation with a clear and distinct attack focus and little 
knowledge of aspects important in Irregular Warfare. Psychological operations and air 
coordination were described as a way of thinking by one armoured company 
commanding officer. Strictly following the field manuals, surprisingly, is viewed the 
most important aspect. Deception, such as decisive combat offensive thinking, little 
patience, controlled aggressive and rapid decisive operations were other examples, as 
also combined arms and manoeuvre warfare, avoiding frontal attacks by the enemy.  
One officer argued there was a problem to be available with a so-called field exercise 
mentality, with consequences such as difficulties or impossibility to manoeuvre with 
more than platoons out- flanking each other, followed by frontal assaults. Two officers 
described their way of thinking about tactics in general, clearly related to Swedish 
ranger traditions; small unit operations, surprise and deception and unconventional 
thinking. 
3). New thinking with a wider approach to tactics in general (8 answers); to balance 
habituated thinking, needs for new ways of thinking, understanding new cultures, a 
reflective way of thinking tactically and to be capable of different tactical approaches. 
One description implied that the armed forces had requirements that were too low for 
developing such abilities, for example, no particular reading requirements and not 
providing the best teachers at the schools. A greater knowledge other than in planning 
methods is thought to be required. One officer missed deeper tactical discussions in 
general.  Other views were; “a need for new thinking, alternative solutions beyond old 
patterns, finding unconventional solutions outside the field manuals (also in Regular 
Warfare tactics). Task analysis thinking, new ways of organizing the units, less 
traditional. Striving for the unconventional”.  
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4). Tactics in general with links to Irregular Warfare (7 answers); the manoeuvre 
principle and Regular Warfare capabilities as a foundation but recognizing differences 
in Irregular Warfare. The need for extensive knowledge of the aggressor, time 
calculations, thinking innovatively or differently, training based on tactics and 
reflections on the manoeuvres in COIN. Be able to see devolvement of events and flow, 
experience-based tactics, with particular demands on the leadership area in Irregular 
Warfare with Swedish units, which comprise more experienced soldiers than 
commanders. A strive for simplicity, even though this is difficult in Irregular Warfare 
because of the great unwillingness to take risks or preparedness to take risks. Military 
theoretical concepts such as mobilization, surprise and local superiority have different 
meanings in Irregular Warfare. One officer says that his thinking could be described as 
traditional Regular Warfare thinking, with a certain amount of Irregular Warfare 
knowledge. Another officer described a geographically heavy focus, including human 
terrain aspects, the units, the terrain and the enemy as components in his tactical 
thinking in general. 
Result summary; the result can be categorized in four areas; general aspects not 
directly related to war fighting capabilities or performance (14 answers), traditional 
Regular Warfare tactical aspects (10 answers), thinking innovatively with a wider 
approach to tactics in general (8 answers), and tactics in general linked to Irregular 
Warfare (7 answers).  
Twenty-four officers, that is about half the total sample state rather a traditional way of 
thinking, mainly influenced by Regular Warfare thinking (the first two groups) A smaller 
group of fifteen officers revealed thinking with either a more generic and wider 
analytical approach, or with a more direct Irregular Warfare tactics perspective. 
Generalized, it can be concluded that a more direct Regular Warfare perspective is 
common, whether as a wider generic approach or a more direct Irregular Warfare 
approach, which is less common.  
 
Question 13. What has influenced you to think about tactics (from what)? Self-
perceived experience or indirect experiences? Via colleagues? Through exercises or 
operations? 
The answers (38 of 43 possible) were distributed relatively evenly into five groups of 
aspects that were considered to have influenced the officers’ tactical thinking. 
1. Education / school activities (9) 
2. Personal experiences (11) 
3. Literature / games (9/2) 
4. Personal influences (senior officers, colleagues) (7) 
5. Exercise activity (10) 
6. Combination of the influences (11).  
 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
5 
 
Two smaller groups consisted of Colleagues’ influences (1 reply, regarding 
international colleagues) and operations (4 replies). Aspects of the officers’ Personal 
experiences and Exercise activities go together, when primarily within the tactical 
exercises from which experiences can be drawn.  
These two aspects were emphasized by twenty-one officers, about twice as many than 
for each of the aspects, Education / school activities and Literature / games and 
Combination of influences.  
Result summary; the question resulted in answers distributed relatively similarly into 
the following five groups:  
1. Education / school activities (9) 
2. Personal experiences (11) 
3. Literature / games (9/2) 
4. Personal influences (senior officers, colleagues) (7) 
5. Exercise activity (10) 
6. Combination of the influences (11).  
 
Aspects of the officers’ Personal experiences, Influences and Exercise activities connect 
when primarily within these areas from where more practical experiences can be drawn. 
These three aspects together were emphasized by twenty-eight officers, and dominate 
clearly above each of  the aspects Education / school activities and Literature / games 
and Combination of influences. Clearly addressed educational influences are only stated 
by nine officers as dominant. This result reveals that the structure and content of 
exercises might be particularly important to analyse and implement, according to the 
current form of tactical thinking that is normatively addressed.  
Question 15. What do you think affects the development of tactics and tactical 
thinking? 
The responses (34 of 43 possible) were divided into a large number of positions. Two 
areas; Experiences and influences from past wars / interventions received the most 
replies (8 each). Three areas; Schooling / training and External developments and Lack 
of influences due to the low priority in the armed forces received five (5) responses 
each. Exercises/training and Individual influences (strong commanders, people with 
strong will and drive in general), Technological development, and the Swedish Armed 
Forces organizational and material development then received four (4) replies each. 
Personal experience, History (WW2) and Money received two (2) responses each. 
Finally, one (1) reply each concerned the following aspects; Research / studies, Lack of 
opponents to practice against, Time inhibitory processes and staff work, Current 
workload on commanders, Social climate and Resource allocation, Past conflicts, War 
experience, Doctrines, USA, Types of threat (existential threats or threat types in 
international missions), Climate for discussion, Open-mind to new solutions, Swedish 
ranger tactics/mind-set. 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
6 
 
Result summary; the question resulted in responses divided into a very large number of 
different positions. Two areas; Experiences and influences from past wars received 
most replies (8 each). Schooling / training received five (5) responses. 
Exercises/training received four (4) replies.  
This question and the results are argued to connect to relational cognitive value 
perspectives with indications of a high value in personal experiences and in general 
“lastest war” influences indicating a less influential view than theoretical influences 
from schools. 
Question 14; How do you assess your interest in tactics compared to strategy and 
operational art? 
The answers (31 of 43 possible) were distributed as follows; a major interest in tactics 
(19), equal interest in tactics and operational art (4), most interest in operational art 
(OpArt) (4), equal interest in all three aspects (2), and finally, most interest in strategy 
(2).Result summary; the question resulted in answers distributed as a major interest in 
tactics (19), equal interest in tactics and operational art (4), most interest in operational 
art (OpArt) (4), equal interest in all three aspects (2), and finally, most interest in 
strategy (2).  
Question 11; Do you often discuss tactics with your colleagues and commanding 
officers? 
The replies (38 of 43 possible) distributed mainly over two larger groups of 15 
statements each. The "Yes group” contained two officers; one mechanized battalion CO 
and one amphibious rifle company CO, who said they often discussed tactics with 
subordinates but not with their senior commanders. This group also included two 
officers; one armoured company CO and one amphibious battalion CO, with the 
contradictory view that they discussed tactics mainly with the senior commanders. The 
"No group” contained 15 statements of which two argued that they discussed tactics 
during international missions. Six officers claimed they occasionally talked a lot about 
tactics. One officer said he discussed tactics amounting to about 3 weeks during a year. 
 One officer said that there is an increasing amount of tactics discussions. Four of the 
battalion commanders stated that they often discuss tactics. Six battalion commanders 
said they did not discuss tactics often. Replies from two battalion commanders are 
missing. 
Result summary; the question resulted in replies that distributed mainly into two larger 
groups of 15 statements each. Four of the battalion commanders stated that they often 
discuss tactics. Six battalion commanders said they did not discuss tactics often. Replies 
from two battalion commanders are missing. The result indicates that discussing tactics 
is not a habitual tradition generally in the ground forces.  
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Question 8. How would you describe your way of thinking tactics in Irregular Warfare?  
The results (31 of 43 possible) were distributed over two larger, and four smaller 
groups.  
1) Other demands, Planning and coordination/command and functions (13 answers). 
Need for accurate planning, possibly more dynamic decision making, less direct combat 
command, hard to do the analysis - not schooled in Irregular Warfare, increased 
demands on consequence analysis, other goals than in Regular Warfare.  
The analytical method, "The Interest Model" was appropriate according to an officer 
who highlighted answers as follows; "what makes a village leader behave in a certain 
way officially and another unofficially, what causes certain behaviours and needs for 
action, what can I do to strengthen actors' positions that benefits me?".      
Other issues raised were; the importance of having a variety of perspectives, more 
parameters are contained in Irregular Warfare. One answer said that "it becomes much 
less sequential……..it is about finding, weighing parameters ........... as when you were 
new in tactics ... to manoeuvre.... ". Another officer viewed that, "there are new 
influences, other influences, and it is possible that our business sometimes should really 
just be to act against one influence”.  Other views were; “It may be far from 
manoeuvring, it's a completely different thing”. "Need for increased endurance, need 
for tactical adaption, we are weak at tempo shifts". “Bigger need for concentrated 
effort in what you do, not a lot of small scale operations”, “ it requires movement 
capability…helicopters”, ”it is difficult to do simply”, “a vast area to deal with”.  
As for coordination needs at lower levels, three officers specifically address the 
following: “operations are pressed down (to platoon combined arms), you have to be 
able to use different types of units”, "one must be able to use different types of systems 
...... have more understanding of lower level than I think you need in national invasion 
defence warfare,", “bigger requirement to work with the lower level units”. 
2). A need for knowledge of more and new functions; e.g. Intelligence, Psychological 
Operations and Electronic Warfare) (11 answers). Other functions than in Regular 
Warfare such as gender, logistics and CIMIC (civil-military cooperation), which also 
have new requirements, e.g. combat logistics.  Six answers regarded intelligence as 
having a ”very big difference within intelligence and information functions compared to 
Regular Warfare”, ”extensive uncertainty of the opponent”, ”other types of opponents 
and goals”.  
A need to organize the Intelligence function from below, very Intel-heavy with 
requirements for adaption. A need to affect the opponent in several dimensions, 
coordinated in time and space.  
3) Regular Warfare capability as a fundament (6 answers). Take advantage of the 
regular types of units and add units with special skills. Task groups with regular units 
that clear areas, then build communities with specialists, including civilians. An officer 
expressed his thinking; "It's all of how I will be able to use the Regular Warfare model 
and apply it to another opponent, another type of opponent”.  
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Adaption is needed. "Maybe I need to be even cleverer right there and then, than I need 
to be to cope with the real Regular Warfare. To be able to act with confidence as a 
whole unit, and have good self-esteem, based on the feeling I can conduct Regular 
Warfare very well”.  
The basic skills of Regular Warfare are adapted by certain centralized competence 
centres because it is impossible to have all the necessary expertise and skills at all the 
regiments. Primarily, offensive actions but also combined with defensive methods.  
One officer implied that there is no difference compared to situation-adapted Regular 
Warfare thinking; the centre of gravity and the decisive points of the opponent are 
identified and targeted mainly kinetically, in order to break resistance and capability.  
4) Commanders’ skills and leadership (5 answers); "Then it will become much more 
difficult, for commanders who may not be trained in it (Irregular Warfare), but the 
importance of making it easy becomes even more important, so to speak”. “Needs for 
greater functional knowledge even among the commanding officers”, “completely 
different challenges today if you look at requirements for a Battalion Commander”.  
One officer exemplified using a Regular Warfare situation, a different leadership 
challenge; "I can translate it actually with FS xx and the three different platoons we 
had. One platoon had one, if not a huge, battle in which the squads were involved for a 
while. Another platoon went out on a contact and battle where they did actually use 
their weapons, even if they did not shoot at an actual opponent. They fire some antitank 
grenades and flares, seized the terrain and felt that they had pushed away the 
insurgents. Whilst the third platoon was not involved in anything at all, they were very 
concerned, to the last day, to get into the little more troublesome areas to get a 
confirmation for .... they were also good.  
They were certainly as good, there certainly was no difference, but they wanted the 
confirmation, something the rest got”. One officer took up the area of morale  " ... and 
you must have an extremely high morale and spirit". One officer took up the opinion of 
increasing demands on commanding officers and leaders at lower levels.  
5) Execution of COIN tactics (5 answers). Military operations in collaboration with 
civilian actors who ensure an increased standard of living for everyone involved in the 
conflict, and thus counter the will to fight and recruit insurgents. The combination of 
troops and technology, working among the people to fix problems. The social aspects 
are more significant compared to Regular Warfare, more solutions can be found. 
Enemies that are not visible can be frustrating for military self-confidence, not being 
able to "do things". A Hearts and Minds approach in order to minimize the opportunities 
for the opponent to recruit more people.  
Surprise or force mobilization works differently in Irregular Warfare compared to 
Regular Warfare. Indirect methods working with civilians and the population. Cunning 
and surprise, deception and unorthodox methods are possible to learn. A lot of troop 
experience is important, as is also to read a lot (e.g. on ranger tactics and history). 
Execution of tactics in COIN is opposite to traditional Regular Warfare frontal attacks. 
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6) A need for a different understanding and mind-set (4 answers). Need to not act too 
quickly, to reflect, sometimes doing nothing, to understand "why" in the longer term. It 
takes time and patience, patience with tempo changes. 
Result summary; the question resulted in answers that were distributed over two larger, 
and four smaller groups as follows;  
1) Other demands on planning and coordination/command and functions (13 
answers).  
2) A need for knowledge of more and new functions; e.g. Intelligence, 
Psychological Operations, Electronic Warfare (11 answers).  
3) Regular Warfare capability as a fundament (6 answers).  
4) Commanders’ skills and leadership (5 answers) 
5) Execution of COIN tactics (5 answers).  
6) A need for a different understanding and mind-set (4 answers).  
 
The result shows dominance in thinking about new or other demands in Command and 
functional thinking. A minor number of officers articulated a way of thinking that 
emphasizes Regular Warfare capabilities as a fundament. Also, a limited number of 
officers specifically highlighted the commanders’ skills and leadership abilities, COIN 
tactics execution and a need for a new mind-set. This result indicates a clear emphasis 
on thinking connected to the principles of warfare related perspectives, in particular, 
regarding conceptual factors in conjunction with a view of a more difficult context to 
operate in. 
Question 4.12. Personal view of tactics in Irregular Warfare?  
39 (of 43 possible) answers was distributed in three major groups of aspects; Capability, 
Conceptual and Intelligence aspects as major focus areas. Also, the following aspects 
were highlighted, but to a more limited extent; Military and civilian relations, Education 
and training, mind-set (7) and a group of Other aspects (5). Each sub-group consisted of 
views as follows;  
- Capability aspects (18 standpoints); combat, harassment, hard and soft effects, 
primarily Regular Warfare capability needs,  probably more need for enhanced 
capability in Regular Warfare (tactics), capability requirement for civilian tasks as a part 
of tactics, capabilities for Irregular Warfare only necessary for a smaller part of the 
armed forces, special forces capabilities, requirement for tactical adaptability, ability to 
take risks, need for psychological operations, need for manoeuvre and surprise, 
collective and distributed operations, sustainability, task force capability for both 
collective as well as distributed operations. Comment; the results are summarized as 
mostly traditional military Regular Warfare dominant views. 
- Conceptual aspects (13 standpoints); tactical concepts for permanent operations 
among the people, concepts for distributed operations, concepts that prevent camp 
behaviour, concepts for indirect effects, concepts that permit ranger operations, 
concepts for military-civilian cooperation.  
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Concepts of offensive, defensive and stabilization approaches, area responsibility for 
smaller units, concepts for combined arms and special functions, particular care during 
planning, conceptual basis in battalion structure, concepts with platoon task 
forces/groups that work with host nation security forces. Comment; the results are 
summarized as mostly modern/contemporary Irregular Warfare dominant views. 
- Intelligence aspects (14 standpoints); a focus in general on the importance of 
intelligence in Irregular Warfare. One standpoint addressed the capability of clandestine 
intelligence. Comment; the results are summarized as mostly modern/contemporary 
Irregular Warfare dominant views. 
- Military-civilian relationship (10 standpoints); a central aspect in tactics in Irregular 
Warfare, a balance regarding focus of ”the people” and ”the enemy”. The most 
important aspect, a need for winning the confidence from the people, ” a part of the 
tactics is to build a relation to the people, economical recourses, enhanced living 
standards should be the winning concept, but this should be effected by civilian actors, 
protected by the military function if so necessary.” If the people have a good living 
standard, the motivation for combat and war fighting shrinks drastically” according to 
one officer’s view. Another view was expressed as a need for civilian social advisers 
(social reconstruction) together with the military units. 
- Education and Training related aspects (10 standpoints); need for enhanced 
understanding of the operational concept, need for training that provides greater self 
confidence in combat capability, training needs across the whole armed forces regarding 
Irregular Warfare in general, need for education in military history experiences, need for 
training of platoon leaders in combined arms and task force created units, more needs 
for command training in general (particularly on company command level), better 
exercises.  
- Mind-set (7 standpoints); in general a need for another mind-set compared to Regular 
Warfare, more “grey areas”, everything is not either black or white, need for an 
offensive mind-set with tempo adaption, need for a generic mind-set that handles the 
time-terrain-troops, an enhanced need for general interest in the area of tactics. Need for 
patience, leadership and discipline.  
- Other aspects (5 standpoints); The vital importance of Information Operations, the 
importance of the linkage between tactics and strategy, the most common type of 
conflicts the coming ten years, last major operation for the Swedish Armed Forces – 
Kosovo – was bad as it drew the focus away from combat capability. Finally, aspects 
such as “a complex and difficult task” were stated.  
Result summary, the question resulted in three major groups of aspects; Capability 
aspects (18), Conceptual aspects (13) and Intelligence (14) as major focus areas. 
Moreover, the following aspects were highlighted, but only from a few officers and to a 
minor extent; Military and civilian relations (10), Education and training (10), Mind-set 
(7) and a group of Other aspects (5). The three major groups (Capability and Conceptual 
and Intelligence aspects) mostly covered aspects commonly related to contemporary 
COIN operations; still some answers addressed a more Regular Warfare mind-set.  
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Few officers refer to commonly COIN addressed vital areas such as military-civilian 
relations, education/training, mind-set and meta-aspects on a higher level. The result 
points to a general way of articulating tactics usually from a principle of a warfare 
related perspective. The actual content is fragmented regarding actual aspects without 
prioritization, still, in all with a certain connection to contemporary IW/COIN thinking. 
Question 9; What aspects of the concept of war fighting capabilities do you think of 
mostly in tactics in Irregular Warfare; physical, conceptual or moral aspects?  
32 of 43 possible responses were obtained, and mainly clustered in two larger and one 
minor group. Eleven answers focused on the moral aspects of tactics in Irregular 
Warfare. Eight answers emphasized the conceptual aspects as most important. Five 
answers viewed the moral and conceptual aspects as equal, or more important than 
physical aspects. Three answers viewed the three aspects equally important, two 
answers viewed combinations of physical-conceptual or physical-moral as most 
important. One officer stated, somewhat surprisingly, that he had no opinion in this 
question.  
Result summary: the question resulted in answers mainly clustered in two larger and 
one minor group; Moral aspects (11), Conceptual aspects (8), and Moral and 
Conceptual aspects (5). A few officers mentioned other combinations. All together, a 
distribution of views emphasizing the moral factors, closely followed by the conceptual 
aspects to be in focus. Clearly, something expressed that was not articulated with 
emphasis were the physical factors.  
Question 12. Do you consider there is a need for development of tactics for Irregular 
Warfare in the Armed Forces?  
32 of 43 possible responses were obtained. These consisted of a major group of twenty-
seven answers. This group, responding “yes”, consisted of comments such as;  "yes, but 
mainly concerning mental flexibility," "yes, but changing all the time," "yes, evidence of 
own knowledge gaps," "yes, but the need is our own, not only to take the U.S. / NATO –
concept”, "yes, but not a specific Swedish style," "yes, for example, development of the 
ranger concept," "yes, methodology, scenarios," "yes, not handled at all today in my 
company," "yes, but more importantly that we develop a strategy for the defence of our 
country". Two officers gave answers "yes and no" with the following comments: "too 
conventional an approach in Afghanistan but at the same time important not to go too 
far with Afghanistan experiences", "more a mind-set that needs to be developed, not 
developing systems," focus on Regular Warfare tactics but also be able to handle 
Irregular Warfare ". Three officers entered "no" with the following comments: 
"conventional capability first," "we have the tactics, it's the composition and ways of 
thinking that need to be developed," "no, develop an understanding of what to do in 
order to win the war." 
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Result summary; the question resulted in responses consisting of a major group of 
twenty-seven answers responding “yes”. Two officers answered "yes and no" with the 
following comments; "too conventional an approach in Afghanistan but at the same 
time important not to go too far with Afghanistan experiences", "more a mind-set that 
needs to be developed, not developing systems," focus on Regular Warfare tactics but 
also be able to handle Irregular Warfare ".  
Three officers stated "no" with the following comments; "conventional capability first," 
"we have the tactics, it's the composition and ways of thinking that needs to be 
developed," "no, develop an understanding of what to do in order to win the war." The 
result indicates quite a common view that development of tactics for Irregular Warfare 
is thought of to be needed and important.  
Question 10. Do you consider tactics in Irregular Warfare to be an area with high 
priority in the Armed Forces? 
The answers (30 of 43 possible) were distributed over one major group with nineteen 
answers not viewing tactics in Irregular Warfare to be a prioritized subject. One officer 
implied that it had a certain priority but is now declining. A smaller group of six officers 
felt that the area could partly be said to be in priority, e.g. the Afghanistan training. Four 
officers perceive that the area is of priority. One officer responded that Regular Warfare 
is the most important.  
Result summary, the question resulted in a view of low priority for tactics in Irregular 
Warfare. Overall, this result does not give an indication that the area would be 
considered to have a high priority within the Swedish Armed Forces.  
Question 26. What would you otherwise like to add concerning tactics in Irregular 
Warfare?  
41 of 43 possible responses were collected. 
Result Summary; the answers resulted in 14 responses where two groups dominate. 
These two are related to the areas of "Tactics in general" (11 standpoints) and 
"Education / Training" (9 standpoints). The other areas were; 
• Capabilities (1) 
• Politics / strategy (3) 
• Violence areas (1) 
• Organization / division (3) 
• Personal skills (3) 
• Unit activities (2) 
• Management / leadership (4) 
• Civil interaction (1) 
• Experiences (1) 
• Other comments (3) 
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In the area of ”Tactics in general" the following was addressed; 
- Important to have a Swedish approach and not solely rely on foreign doctrines, and 
from a Swedish thought take the tactical discussions. 
- Important to remember tactics at different levels and understand the need for 
different types of units that can be combined into composite forces. Tactics cannot 
be one-dimensional time-space-force thinking. 
- Important with knowledge on unit capabilities to create composite task groups (also 
at low-levels) and to lead them. New capability needs are for example UAVs, IEDD 
and dogs. 
- Tactics discussions will increase in line with the transformation stabilizing. 
However, a rough road lies ahead especially for a brand new unit concept such as at 
P7. 
- Some units are often excluded in discussions on IW, such as tank units. Removes 
creative thinking. For example tanks with barricade-fences, which definitely make 
people move away. 
- Extensive need for breadth of possible resources, from conversation skills with 
villagers to battalion attacks with indirect fire and air support 
- Tactics are controlled by the financial framework 
- Every conflict and every mandate has its frames. We have mostly been on the 
defensive side, but in these operations an offensive approach is needed. 
- Tactics are given little space (not even prior to the operations) 
- Danger of excessively equating IW/COIN with Afghanistan 
- Initiatives are important, requires on-going analysis, planning and action. 
- How to measure success. 
 
In the area of "Education / training", the following was addressed; 
 
- We need to educate younger colleagues at the schools better; insight that sometimes 
it is not black or white but there are grey areas. Everything has its time. 
- The second lieutenants are very dynamic, specialist officers are more stereotypical. 
Difficulties when all platoon leaders have exactly the same tactical thinking. 
- Increased requirement for training platoon leaders in complex tasks. Not existing 
today. 
- Must know the basics first. Warning for quick tactics and fighting style adaption. 
The regulations apply. Skills to shoot at long ranges come first. 
- Once the Major Course and the Basic Officer Course read the same military theory, 
it will result in completely different tactical thinking as personal experiences and 
perspectives are completely different. 
- More command training for complex situations and composite units. Today, it is a 
short time at the regiment Livgardet and tomorrow, the need remains if smaller units 
are to be deployed abroad. 
- Field manuals, doctrines, books are one thing - what matters is how they are 
practised. It is practised well at Livgardet training section for international missions 
up to company level. 
- Important to have good trainers, it is not enough with a good theory. National 
training teams for certain things might be needed. 
- More emphasis on training of the units, not just officer training. 
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- The link between culture and religion is needed to be more emphasized in officer 
education. It is important in Irregular Warfare. 
 
Result summary; the answers resulted in 14 response groups where two dominate. 
These two are related to the areas of "Tactics in general" (11 standpoints) and 
"Education / training" (9 standpoints). Several other areas were addressed, all however, 
to a limited extent. These areas were Capabilities (1), Politics / strategy (3), Violence 
areas (1), Organization / division (3), Personnel skills (3), Unit activities (2), 
Management / leadership (4), Civil interaction (1), Experiences (1) Other comments (3). 
In general, regarding the area of tactics, a deeper and more analysed and reflected view 
and discussion, from the unique Swedish perspective was addressed as being needed. In 
the area of "Education / training", development efforts were addressed for all levels, 
particularly highlighting the importance of extensive practice based on deep analysis of 
lessons learned and experienced trainers.  
Summary of the answers to the open-ended question  
Question 6; “What does the concept of tactics mean to you?” resulted in two major 
areas of thinking. The first and dominant group (20 answers) describes a view of tactics 
that can be generalized as; ”the use (or manoeuvre with, or coordination of, or 
adaption) of units or resources to reach a specific goal”. In this category several 
different articulations can be found. The other group (15 answers) contains aspects not 
directly related to the overarching description such as; ” use of units for a certain goal”, 
but as a way of thinking in general. These two views can be summarized with; “to use 
practically” and; “to think about how to use” (units) or generalized as one practical and 
one theoretical view.  
Regarding question 7; views of one’s own thinking on the subject of tactics, three 
categories can be generalized. Twenty-four officers, who are about half the total sample, 
state a rather traditional way of thinking, mainly influenced by Regular Warfare 
thinking. The two other categories can be described as containing a more generic and 
wider analytical approach, as a more direct Irregular Warfare tactics perspective. 
Generalized it can be said that a more direct Regular Warfare perspective is common, 
whether as a wider generic approach or a more direct Irregular Warfare approach.  
Question 13; “Do you often discuss tactics with your colleagues and commanding 
officers?” resulted in 38 replies (of 43 possible) distributed mainly over two larger 
groups of 15 statements each. The "Yes group” contained one mechanized battalion 
commanding officer and one amphibious rifle company commanding officer, saying 
they often discussed tactics with subordinates, but not with their senior commanders.  
This group also included one armoured company commanding officer and one 
amphibious battalion commanding officer; contradictably saying that they discussed 
tactics mainly with the senior commanders. The "No group” contained 15 statements of 
which two said that they discussed tactics during international missions.  
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Six officers argued that they intermittently talked a lot about tactics. One officer said he 
discussed tactics to the amount of 3 weeks during a year, and one officer said that there 
is an increased amount of tactics discussions. Four of the battalion commanders stated 
that they often discuss tactics. Six battalion commanders claimed they did not discuss 
tactics often. Replies from two battalion commanders are missing. The result indicates 
that discussing tactics in not a strong tradition generally for these land forces 
commanding officers. 
Question 15; "What has influenced you to think about tactics?” resulted in 38 of 43 
possible replies divided in five response categories; Education / school activities (9), 
Personal experiences (11), Literature / Games (9/2), Personal Influences (senior 
officers, colleagues) (7), Exercise Activity (10), Combinations of the influences (11).  
Aspects of the officers’ personal experiences, influences and exercise activities connect 
to primarily more practical experiences. These three aspects together emphasized by 
twenty-eight officers, dominate the above aspects; Education / school activities, 
Literature / Games and Combinations of influences. Clearly addressed educational 
influences are only stated by nine officers as dominant.  
Question 14; Regarding views on interest in tactics compared to strategy and 
operational art resulted in answers from 31 officers. The area of tactics dominated with 
19 responses, whereas the interest for tactics and operational art was equal, receiving 
four responses. Few responses were interested in all the three aspects and in strategy 
alone.   
Question 11; Regarding thinking about aspects affecting the development of tactics and 
tactical thinking. The question resulted in responses divided into a large number of 
different positions. Two areas; experiences and influences from past wars received most 
replies (8 each). Schooling / training received five responses; Exercises / training 
received four replies.  
Question 8; Regarding ways of thinking about tactics in Irregular Warfare resulted in 
responses of two larger and four smaller groups as follows;  
1) Other demands on planning and coordination/command and functions (13 
answers).  
2) A need for knowledge of more and new functions; e.g. Intelligence, 
Psychological Operations, Electronic Warfare (11 answers).  
3) Regular Warfare capability as a fundament (6 answers).  
4) Commanders’ skills and leadership (5 answers) 
5) Execution of COIN tactics (5 answers).  
6) A need for a different understanding and mind-set (4 answers).  
 
The result shows dominance in thinking as the first two areas together deal with new or 
other demands in command and functional thinking. A minor number of officers 
articulated a way of thinking that emphasizes Regular Warfare capabilities as a 
fundament. Also, a limited number of officers specifically highlighted commanders’ 
skills and leadership abilities, COIN tactics execution and a need for a new mind-set.  
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Question 4.12; Personal view of IW?; resulted in three major groups of response 
aspects; Capability aspects (18), Conceptual aspects (13) and Intelligence (14) as major 
focus areas. Moreover, the following aspects were highlighted, but from few officers 
and to a minor extent; Military and civilian relations (10), Education and training (10), 
Mind-set (7) and a group of Other aspects (5). The three major groups; Capability and 
Conceptual and Intelligence aspects, can be viewed as all concerning conceptual 
thinking about needs. Mostly, the articulations correspond to general COIN norms 
currently found in doctrines and field manuals. Still, some responses addressed a more 
Regular Warfare mind-set. A rather limited number of the sample referred to commonly 
COIN addressed vital areas, such as military-civilian relations, education/training, and 
mind-set compared to needs in Regular Warfare. The actual content is fragmented 
regarding real aspects, however, all in all, with a certain connection to contemporary 
IW/COIN thinking. 
Question 9; Regarding aspects of war fighting capabilities (physical, conceptual and 
moral factors), resulted in responses mainly clustered in two larger and one minor 
group. Moral aspects (11), Conceptual aspects (8), Moral and Conceptual (5). Some 
officers stated other combinations. All together, a distribution of views emphasizing the 
moral factors, closely followed by the conceptual aspects to be in focus.  
Question 12; Do you consider there is a need for development of tactics for Irregular 
Warfare in the Armed Forces, resulted in responses consisting of a major group of 
twenty-seven answers responding “yes”. Two officers gave answers "yes and no" with 
the following comments; "too conventional an approach in Afghanistan but at the same 
time important not to go too far with Afghanistan experiences", "more a mind-set that 
needs to be developed, not developing systems," focus on Regular Warfare tactics but 
also be able to handle Irregular Warfare ". Three officers entered "no" with the 
following comments; "conventional capability first," "we have the tactics, it's the 
composition and ways of thinking that need to be developed," "no, develop an 
understanding of what to do in order to win the war." The result indicates quite a 
common view that development of tactics for Irregular Warfare is thought of to be 
needed and important.  
Question 10; Do you consider tactics in Irregular Warfare to be an area with high 
priority in the Swedish Armed Forces, resulted in a view of low priority for tactics in 
Irregular Warfare.  
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Result summary of the two frame questions 
The summarized results regarding thought on a) tactics in general and b) tactics in 
Irregular Warfare are presented below. 
The first question; How can the officer´s general reflections on tactics be 
characterized? is answered with the following summary. The meaning in general of 
tactics can be described as a two-fold one. One group (almost half of the sample) views 
tactics generally as; ”the use of units or resources to reach a specific goal”. The second 
group (15 responses) described aspects more related to ways of thinking in general. 
Reflective views on principal influences for thinking can be described in three different 
ways; a Regular Warfare tradition that dominates (for over half of the sample), a more 
generic and wider analytical approach, and finally, a more direct Irregular Warfare 
tactics focus.  
Influences on tactical thinking can be said to connect to five areas; combinations of 
influences, education and school activities, literature and gaming, personal experiences 
and personal influences, such as from senior officers and colleagues, and exercise 
activities. The three last categories, all connect to direct or indirect practice. Compared 
to the areas of strategy and operational art, the interest for tactics is prominent. Still, 
communicating and speaking of tactics is not a well-developed tradition. Finally, views 
are scattered concerning influences on tactics and the development of tactical thinking. 
The most common aspects concerned experiences and influences from past wars, still 
only eight replies each. Areas such as education and exercises were only mentioned by 
four and five officers respectively.  
The second question; how can the officer´s general reflections of tactics in Irregular 
Warfare be characterized? is answered as follows; personal views in general of tactics 
in Irregular Warfare were expressed mostly regarding conceptual aspects, including 
capability and functional aspects, for example, Intelligence. Broader aspects such as 
military and civilian relations, education and training, leadership and mind-set were 
however, more limitedly highlighted. Many of the articulations corresponded to general 
COIN standards in doctrines and field manuals. Still, some responses addressed a more 
traditional mind-set emphasizing Regular Warfare capabilities. Dominance in thinking 
can however be related to a view of new or other demands in command & control and 
functional thinking, for example, Intelligence, Psychological Operations and Electronic 
Warfare. As for war-fighting capabilities (physical, conceptual and moral factors), 
moral and conceptual factors were the most common mentioned. Thinking of physical 
factors was not a highlighted area. The whole area of tactics in Irregular Warfare is 
mainly thought of as having a low priority in the Swedish Armed Forces, still, a rather 
common view does exist that development of such tactics is needed and important.  
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Appendix 4. Table 1. The 15 chosen questions with 41 modalities 
This appendix presents the 15 chosen questions and corresponding 41 answer 
alternatives (m = modalities). Only modalities of a minimum of 5 responses are 
included. 
 
3.6 People – Enemy-centric focus 
m1   - EC                   |   16       
m2   - P/EC                |   18       
m3   - PC                   |    9   
      
 
3.7 Larger - Smaller units focus 
m1   - L/S Units           |   14       
m2   - L Units              |   16       
m3   - S Units              |   13 
       
 
3.8 Combat - Intelligence/Recce focus 
m1   - Combat               |   19       
m2   - Combat/Recce    |    5        
m4   - Recce                  |   17  
      
 
3.9 National Defence - International Mission focus 
m2   - Nat/Int focus        |    9        
m3   - Nat focus            |   29 
       
 
3.11 Command/Developing  larger - smaller unit 
structures 
m1   - Dev l/s units        |    9        
m2   - Dev larger units     |   23       
m3   - Dev smaller units    |   10  
      
 
3.12 Front officer or Staff officer/Planner focus 
m1   - Front/Staff officer  |    8       
m2   - Front officer        |   31  
 
      
4.1 Focus on violence areas in IW 
m1   - Comb high threats    |    9        
m2   - Comb low threats     |    6        
m4   - Guerrilla Warfare     |   21       
 
 
 
4.2 Collective ops - Distributed ops in IW focus 
m1   - C/D ops              |    7        
m2   - Coll ops             |   15       
m3   - Distrib ops          |   18       
 
4.3 Priority RW or IW capabilities 
m3   - R/IW                 |   12       
m4   - RW                   |   28       
 
4.5 Thinking tactics often or seldom 
m1   - Think equal          |    6        
m2   - Think often          |   19       
m3   - Think seldom         |   18       
 
4.6 Thinking tactics as theory, practice or a 
combination 
m2   - Practice             |   12       
m4   - Theory/Practice      |   28       
 
4.8 Overt or Low visible ops priority in IW  
m1   - Low vis act          |    8        
m3   - Overt/Low vis        |   22       
m4   - Overt act            |   12       
 
4.9 Troops or Technology focus in IW 
m2   - Technology             |    7        
m3   - Troop/Tech           |   11       
m4   - Troops               |   23       
 
4.10 Military tasks or Civilian task priority in 
COIN 
m1   - Civ task             |    7          
m2   - Mil/Civ task         |   10       
m3   - Mil task             |   25       
 
4.11 Kinetic or Non- kinetic effects priority in 
IW 
m1   - Kin/Non-kin eff      |   24       
m2   - Kin effects          |   10       
m4   - Non-kin eff          |    8        
 
Figure 38. Appendix 4. Table 1. The 15 chosen questions with 41 modalities. 
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Appendix 5. Table 2. Eigenvalues and modified rates for the 41 
modalities 
This appendix presents the Eigenvalues and modified rates for the 41 modalities (or 
active categories). 
Control panel of Eigenvalues
Trace of matrix:         1.78450
Number Eigenval
ue
Percenta
ge
Cumulat
ed 
Percenta
ge
Spec 
modified 
values
Specific 
modified 
Rates
Cumulat
ed 
Modified 
Rates
1 0,2147 12,03 12,03 0,02894 0,330782 0,330782
2 0,1786 10,01 22,04 0,017952 0,205192 0,535974
3 0,1646 9,22 31,26 0,014386 0,164428 0,700402
4 0,1386 7,77 39,03 0,00884 0,101041 0,801443
5 0,1166 6,53 45,56 0,00518 0,059212 0,860655
6 0,1044 5,85 51,42 0,003575 0,040861 0,901516
7 0,0973 5,46 56,87 0,002781 0,031788 0,933304
8 0,0907 5,08 61,95 0,00212 0,024237 0,957541
9 0,0834 4,67 66,62 0,001504 0,017188 0,974729
10 0,0761 4,27 70,89 0,000994 0,011367 0,986096
11 0,0729 4,08 74,97 0,000798 0,009116 0,995211
12 0,0622 3,49 78,46 0,000311 0,003552 0,998764
13 0,0523 2,93 81,39 5,93E-05 0,000677 0,999441
14 0,0506 2,84 84,23 3,61E-05 0,000412 0,999853
15 0,0469 2,63 86,86 5,16E-06 5,9E-05 0,999912
16 0,0418 2,34 89,20 7,71E-06 8,81E-05 1
17 0,0301 1,69 90,89
18 0,0284 1,59 92,48 0,08749
19 0,0265 1,49 93,97
20 0,0236 1,32 95,29
21 0,0168 0,94 96,23
22 0,0160 0,89 97,13
23 0,0114 0,64 97,77
24 0,0085 0,48 98,24
25 0,0076 0,43 98,67
26 0,0065 0,36 99,03
27 0,0050 0,28 99,31
28 0,0046 0,26 99,57
29 0,0027 0,15 99,72
30 0,0018 0,10 99,82
31 0,0011 0,06 99,88
32 0,0009 0,05 99,93
33 0,0006 0,03 99,96
34 0,0003 0,02 99,98
35 0,0002 0,01 99,99
36 0,0001 0,01 100,00
37 0,0000 0,00 100,00
38 0,0000 0,00 100,00
39 0,0000 0,00 100,00
40 0,0000 0,00 100,00
41 0,0000 0,00 100,00  
Figure 39. Appendix 5. Table 2. The 15 chosen questions with 41 modalities.
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Appendix 6. Table 3. Coordinates of active categories/modalities on 
axis 1-2 
      
Label   Relative 
Weight (%)  
Squared 
distance to 
origin        
Axis  1 Axis  2 Axis  3 Axis  4 
 
3.6 People - Enemy centric  
    
EC 2,481 1,68750 -0,51 -0,48 -0,38 -0,08 
P/EC 2,791 1,38889 0,10 -0,03 0,18 0,34 
PC 1,395 3,77778 0,70 0,90 0,32 -0,55 
       
3.7 Larger - Smaller units focus; Off focus on larger units     
L/S Units 2,171 2,07143 -0,75 0,19 0,17 0,68 
L Units 2,481 1,68750 1,04 -0,38 -0,17 0,18 
S Units 2,016 2,30769 -0,47 0,26 0,03 -0,95 
       
3.8 Combat - Intel/Recce focus    
Combat 2,946 1,26316 0,76 -0,26 0,02 0,05 
Combat/Recce 0,775 7,60000 -1,01 -0,25 -1,22 -0,07 
Recce 2,636 1,52941 -0,47 0,30 0,39 -0,02 
       
3.9 National Defence - International Mission focus     
Nat/Int focus 1,395 3,77778 -0,63 0,00 0,63 -1,22 
National focus 4,496 0,48276 0,21 0,03 -0,09 0,40 
       
3.11 Command/Dev larger - smaller unit structures    
Dev l/s units 1,395 3,77778 -0,38 -0,71 0,41 -0,43 
Dev larger units 3,566 0,86957 0,50 -0,06 -0,14 0,16 
Dev smaller units 1,550 3,30000 -0,75 0,76 -0,04 0,09 
       
3.12 Front officer or Staff officer/Planner focus     
Front/Staff officer 1,240 4,37500 -0,72 -0,82 0,24 0,13 
Front officer 4,806 0,38710 0,24 0,21 -0,11 0,04 
       
4.1 Focus on violence areas in IW    
Comb high threats 1,395 3,77778 0,41 0,09 0,43 -0,77 
Comb low threats 0,930 6,16667 -0,56 -1,34 0,77 -0,06 
Guerrilla Warfare 3,256 1,04762 -0,15 0,20 -0,38 0,14 
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4.2 Collective ops - Distributed ops in IW focus     
C/D ops 1,085 5,14286 -0,23 0,58 -1,22 -0,26 
Coll ops 2,326 1,86667 1,09 -0,04 0,25 -0,25 
Distributed ops 2,791 1,38889 -0,76 -0,16 0,21 -0,77 
       
4.3 Priority RW or IW capabilities     
R/IW 1,860 2,58333 0,17 -0,39 -0,38 -0,90 
RW 4,341 0,53571 -0,03 0,14 0,14 0,45 
       
4.5 Thinking tactics often or seldom    
Think equal 0,930 6,16667 -0,50 -1,19 1,35 -0,17 
Think often 2,946 1,26316 0,06 0,27 -0,15 0,30 
Think seldom 2,791 1,38889 0,10 0,11 -0,29 -0,26 
       
4.6 Thinking tactics as theory, practice or a combination     
Practice 1,860 2,58333 -0,13 -0,08 -0,51 0,28 
Theory/Practice 4,341 0,53571 0,07 0,09 0,17 -0,10 
       
4.8 Overt or Low visible ops priority in IW      
Low vis act 1,240 4,37500 -0,22 1,30 0,04 -0,56 
Overt/Low vis 3,411 0,95455 0,19 -0,42 -0,36 0,25 
Overt act 1,860 2,58333 -0,34 -0,04 0,63 -0,07 
       
4.9 Troops or Technology focus in IW    
Technology 1,085 5,14286 -0,34 -0,04 -1,51 -0,03 
Troop/Tech 1,705 2,90909 0,90 -0,78 0,52 0,10 
Troops 3,566 0,86957 -0,27 0,37 0,22 -0,06 
       
4.Military task or Military and Civilian task priority in COIN     
Civ task 1,085 5,14286 -0,63 -0,47 -0,72 0,32 
Mil/Civ task 1,550 3,30000 0,30 -0,75 -0,43 -0,35 
Mil task 3,876 0,72000 0,08 0,43 0,38 0,08 
       
4.11Kinetic or Non- kinetic effects priority in IW     
Kin/Non-kin eff 3,721 0,79167 0,03 -0,16 -0,39 -0,40 
Kin effects 1,550 3,30000 0,47 0,95 0,60 0,63 
Non-kin eff 1,240 4,37500 -0,60 -0,72 0,43 0,49 
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Appendix 7. Table 4. Contribution of active categories/modalities on 
axis 1-4 
This appendix presents the contribution of the answer alternatives/modalities/active 
categories for axis 1-4. Contribution mean value is 100/41 (the total number of answer 
alternatives included for the analysis) = 2,439 (2,44). Modalities with contribution of 
minimum, 2.44 are marked grey in the table. 
Contributions of active categories 
 Mean value; 2,439024 (100/ 41 categories)      
Label   Relative Weight (%)  Squared distance to origin        Axis  1 Axis  2 Axis  3 Axis  4 
3.6 People - Enemy centric focus     
EC 2,481 1,68750 2,99 3,20 2,17 0,10 
P/EC 2,791 1,38889 0,13 0,01 0,54 2,33 
PC 1,395 3,77778 3,22 6,37 0,86 3,00 
TOTAL 6,667   6,34 9,58 3,57 5,43 
       
3.7 Larger - Smaller units focus     
L/S Units 2,171 2,07143 5,76 0,45 0,37 7,17 
L Units 2,481 1,68750 12,60 2,03 0,46 0,59 
S Units 2,016 2,30769 2,09 0,78 0,01 13,20 
TOTAL 6,667   20,45 3,27 0,85 20,97 
       
3.8 Combat - Intelligence/Recce focus;     
Combat 2,946 1,26316 7,86 1,10 0,01 0,05 
Combat/Recce 0,775 7,60000 3,71 0,26 6,99 0,02 
Recce 2,636 1,52941 2,69 1,34 2,38 0,01 
TOTAL 6,357   14,26 2,71 9,38 0,09 
       
3.9 National Defence or International Mission focus     
Nat/Int focus 1,395 3,77778 2,54 0,00 3,34 14,90 
Nat focus 4,496 0,48276 0,96 0,03 0,22 5,28 
TOTAL 5,891   3,50 0,03 3,56 20,17 
       
3.11 Command/Development of larger or smaller unit structures    
Dev l/s units 1,395 3,77778 0,95 3,91 1,41 1,89 
Dev larger units 3,566 0,86957 4,17 0,07 0,42 0,65 
Dev smaller units 1,550 3,30000 4,10 4,97 0,02 0,09 
TOTAL 6,512   9,22 8,95 1,84 2,63 
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3.12 Front officer or Staff officer/Planner focus 
Front/Staff officer 1,240 4,37500 3,01 4,63 0,45 0,15 
Front officer 4,806 0,38710 1,34 1,19 0,37 0,05 
TOTAL 6,047   4,35 5,83 0,82 0,20 
       
4.1 Focus on violence areas in IW    
Comb high threats 1,395 3,77778 1,11 0,07 1,60 5,91 
Comb low threats 0,930 6,16667 1,38 9,34 3,36 0,02 
Guerrilla Warfare 3,256 1,04762 0,36 0,72 2,86 0,46 
TOTAL 5,581   2,85 10,12 7,82 6,39 
       
4.2 Collective operations - Distributed operations in IW focus     
C/D ops 1,085 5,14286 0,28 2,04 9,78 0,53 
Coll ops 2,326 1,86667 12,80 0,02 0,89 1,01 
Distrib ops 2,791 1,38889 7,60 0,40 0,78 2,58 
TOTAL 6,202   20,68 2,46 11,45 4,12 
       
4.3 Priority RW or IW capabilities     
R/IW 1,860 2,58333 0,26 1,60 1,65 10,86 
RW 4,341 0,53571 0,02 0,48 0,49 6,46 
TOTAL 6,202   0,28 2,08 2,13 17,31 
       
4.5 Thinking tactics often or seldom    
Think equal 0,930 6,16667 1,08 7,39 10,29 0,19 
Think often 2,946 1,26316 0,06 1,22 0,39 1,90 
Think seldom 2,791 1,38889 0,13 0,19 1,46 1,36 
TOTAL 6,667   1,26 8,80 12,14 3,45 
       
4.6 Thinking tactics as theory, practice or a combination     
Practice 1,860 2,58333 0,15 0,07 2,89 1,04 
Theory/Practice 4,341 0,53571 0,11 0,18 0,77 0,29 
TOTAL 6,202   0,26 0,25 3,66 1,33 
       
4.8 Overt or Low visible ops priority in IW      
Low vis act 1,240 4,37500 0,28 11,77 0,01 2,79 
Overt/Low vis 3,411 0,95455 0,60 3,35 2,64 1,54 
Overt act 1,860 2,58333 1,00 0,02 4,48 0,07 
TOTAL 6,512   1,88 15,14 7,12 4,40 
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4.9 Troops or Technology focus in IW     
Technology 1,085 5,14286 0,58 0,01 15,11 0,01 
Troop/Technology 1,705 2,90909 6,50 5,81 2,75 0,13 
Troops 3,566 0,86957 1,21 2,79 1,01 0,08 
TOTAL 6,357   8,29 8,61 18,87 0,22 
       
4.10 Military task or Military and Civilian task priority in COIN      
Civ task 1,085 5,14286 1,98 1,35 3,38 0,82 
Mil/Civ task 1,550 3,30000 0,64 4,94 1,74 1,41 
Mil task 3,876 0,72000 0,11 3,95 3,32 0,17 
TOTAL 6,512   2,73 10,25 8,44 2,39 
       
4.11Kinetic or Non- kinetic effects priority in IW     
Kin/Non-kin eff 3,721 0,79167 0,01 0,56 3,49 4,28 
Kin effects 1,550 3,30000 1,57 7,82 3,42 4,42 
Non-kin eff 1,240 4,37500 2,06 3,58 1,42 2,19 
TOTAL 6,512   3,65 11,95 8,34 10,88 
Numbers of active 
categories 
(modalities/ answer 
alternative) for axis 
1-4   
 
 
15 
15 16 12 
 
 
Comment. Modality Smaller Units 3.6, is below mean value but assessed interesting to 
include in the analysis as such thinking clearly can be connected to IW/HW tactical 
thinking in general, as with traditional ranger tactics thinking in Regular Warfare. 
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Appendix 8. Results from a tactical COIN doctrine study 
The following appendix presents results from a study delivered to the Swedish Ground 
Forces Combat School in 2011. A study of several questions was decided in June 2011. 
The study was done with the same textual analysis approach as for the literature study. 
The study was labelled “Tactics in COIN – On the Western front, Different news”. 
Results from four, of the total ten questions are presented in the following. 
Question 2; What characterizes the descriptions of how to analyse and understand the 
Insurgency movements?  
Summary answer Canada549; descriptions of how to analyse and understand Insurgency 
movements occur frequently through the doctrine down to company levels with 
characteristics described.550 It is argued to be important to understand the causes and 
characteristics of the specific and general in a given situation and culture.551 The vital 
importance of the intelligence function and requirements for development and adaption 
is underlined.552 Six different forms of insurgency are defined to support analysis and 
understanding.553 The people (in the area, as in the home country) are viewed as the 
strategic centre of gravity.554 The concept of centre of gravity is used (according to the 
NATO view) and described in several places.555 These centres of gravity are said to be 
complex at lower levels.556 The descriptions do not include references to systems 
thinking. 
Summary answer Britain557; the section "Fundamentals" highlights the importance of 
intelligence558. Intelligence is said to depend as much on the tactical level pattern of life 
in each area of operation as it does on the top-down feed of intelligence from 
operational and strategic levels.559  Also, it is emphasized that the intelligence, including 
analysis, must be integrated at every level of management, as well as across and 
between "agencies engaged in Counterinsurgency".560 A variety of characters of 
insurgencies are described that challenges the search for root causes.561 The start for the 
Insurgency is viewed vital in order to correctly identify the nature of the problem that 
exists.562  
                                                 
549 National Defence Headquarters, Counterinsurgency Operations, B-GL-322-004/FP-003, Ottawa, 
Ontario, December 2008. 
550 Ibid. Chapter 2. 
551 Ibid. p. 45. 
552 Ibid. section 306, p. 73. 
553 Ibid. p. 50. 
554 Ibid. p. 48. 
555 Ibid. p. 107. section 5-11, pp. 107-108. and 115. 
556 Ibid. pp. 89. and 125. 
557 UK Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, Volume 10, Part 10, Combined Arms 
Operations, Countering Insurgency, October 2009. 
558 Ibid. Chapter 1. Fundamentals. 
559 Ibid. Chapter 1. section 1-2. 
560 Ibid. Chapter 1. section 1-2. 
561 Ibid. Chapter 1. section 1-10. 
562 Ibid. Chapter 2. section 2-1. 
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This leads to a need to adapt the intelligence function. Different models for focused 
analysis are mentioned to facilitate the categorization of Insurgency, such as Dr. John 
MacKinlay's model with five different types of insurgencies.563 Understanding of "the 
Human Terrain" is emphasized as a basis for understanding the uprisings564. A detailed 
description on integrating intelligence with the work in general emphasizes the 
importance of the tactical level, time, training and continuity.565 The importance of 
intelligence and  having such a capability at the tactical level as the instrument for the 
analysis is clear. References to systems thinking are not included.  
The concept of centre of gravity (COG) is described as more complex (compared to in 
Regular Warfare), but important to use.566 As an example of an "Operational COG", 
"Population optimism about their future”567 is mentioned. The description of how 
insurgents must be understood is characterized by emphasis on adaption of the 
intelligence function and work needed to be integrated throughout the whole staff work 
structure, and this will be built up over time. Accurate descriptions of how and why this 
is required are included. The Intelligence and Security functions and work are 
emphasized as an integral part of the entire planning and implementation process, as 
well as important for education of officers in general. HUMINT specifically is 
mentioned, as well as analysis and research. 568 The intelligence function is placed at the 
top of the summary of experience569 to develop. Intelligence, the intelligence staff, 
ISTAR and problem areas have 14 pages devoted to them.570. Understanding of "the 
Human Terrain" is emphasized as crucial; only understanding the enemy is not viewed 
sufficiently.571  
Summary answer U.S.572; descriptions of insurgencies to be analysed and understood 
are frequent, down to the company level.573 Effective analysis is viewed to require 
knowledge of the Insurgency strategically, its operational and tactical objectives, which 
can be both physical and non-physical.574. Descriptions are characterized by pervasive 
system thinking. Descriptions of centre of gravity (COG) do not occur (the dictionary 
indicates COG as a joint description). The COIN environment is said to consist of a 
"system of systems" (inter-connected systems).575 A clear structure and concept for the 
analysis is described. Eight operational variables are used (the so-called PMESII-PT; 
the political, military, environment, social, information, infrastructure, physical 
environment and time aspects).  
                                                 
563 UK Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, Volume 10, Part 10, Combined Arms 
Operations, Countering Insurgency (2009), Annex A to Chapter 2.  
564 Ibid. Chapter 3. section 3-12 – 16. 
565 Ibid. Chapter 3. section 3-33 – 37. 
566 Ibid. Chapter 7. section 7-8 Planning Concept. 
567 Ibid. Chapter 7. figure 7-2. 
568 Ibid. Chapter 3. section 3-37 and 3-44. 
569 Ibid. Chapter 4. section 4-51. 
570 Ibid. Chapter 5. section 5-1 – 42. 
571 Ibid. Chapter 5. section 5-1. 
572 U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24.2, 
April 2009. 
573 Ibid. Chapter 2. 
574 Ibid. p. 45. 
575 Ibid. p. 251. 
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There are mission variables described where particularly "Civil considerations" are 
stressed.576 An analysis method; “ASCOPE" is introduced and described.577 Several 
analysis methods for different levels are described, often in table and matrix forms. 
Detailed examples of patterns and linkage analysis at a low-level are provided, as are 
examples of completed matrixes and tables. A conceptual idea is presented of how the 
Insurgency should be analysed on the basis of five groups of categories of persons in the 
uprising, eight dynamic categories that characterize the actual Insurgency, and six 
Insurgency strategies. 578 The idea for the systematization of the analysis is described.579 
The conditions to carry out such an analysis are described at the company level, using 
the so-called "Company operational team or Company Intelligence Team". 580 
Summary answer France581: A brief and general description of less than one page 
describes the now common and assumed important aspects of human-, signal- and open 
sources intelligence, as well as troop reconnaissance.582 It is stated that in order to 
understand Insurgency, a systemic analysis of multiple factors of the opposing party’s 
intentions is required. The requirements for analysis of capabilities is described, 
however, no problem discussion is included. The insurgent’s centre of gravity is 
exemplified by popular support, logistical network for arms and ammunition, as well as 
a need for sanctuaries. The description is superficial, but may be presumed to be seen as 
complementary to the corresponding description (more detailed) in the doctrine FT -
02.583  
Summary answer Sweden584: The Field manual covers tactics in general at battalion 
level and is not solely aimed at Irregular Warfare and COIN. However, the introductory 
part addresses the dominant civil dimension, the supporting role for the military 
function, and the different Irregular actors.585 Insurgency movements in the section are 
described as “the aggressor”, whereas irregular actors are outlined generically regarding 
organizational structures and aims.586 Specific requirements regarding analysis needs 
are described in different places but to a limited and shallow extent.587  
                                                 
576 U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24.2, 
April 2009, section 1-30. 
577 Ibid. p. 20. 
578 Ibid. p. 39, section 2-1. 
579 Ibid. subsection A-7. 
580 Ibid. p. 83. 
581 Ministère de la Défense, Armée de Terre, Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level, Army 
Manual, Centre De Doctrine dÉmploi Des Forces, Paris, April 2010. 
582 Ibid. p. 16. 
583 Ministère de la Défense, Armée de Terre, General Tactics, FT 02, Centre De Doctrine dÉmploi Des 
Forces, Paris, June 2010. 
584 Markstridsreglemente, Manöverbataljon (MSR 6)[Field Manual for Land Forces Manoeuvre 
Battalion, pre-edition] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, förhandsutgåva, 2010). 
585 Ibid. pp. 18, 27-33. 
586 Ibid. pp. 30-32. 
587 Ibid. p. 42. and  p. 148. describing the need for longer periods of extensive intelligence work, however 
not emphasizing the need for more analysis efforts, also at lower level units such as battalion and 
company. 
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No discussion of the centre of gravity and systems thinking exists; however, the 
dominant role of the civilian dimension is stated.588  
Summary answers question 2. 
Descriptions of how to analyse and understand Insurgency movements vary in the 
doctrines, all of which denounce the importance of the Intelligence function, not least at 
a tactical level. The U.S. view is significantly linked to systems thinking with detailed 
methods and models. The British and Canadian approach is not based on systems 
thinking or detailed models and methods; the French approach mentions systems 
thinking briefly, though the need for extensive analysis is shared by all. Centre of 
gravity (COG) thinking has a minor role in the American and French doctrines 
compared with British and Canadian descriptions. The British emphasis is on how to 
adapt the Intelligence function and organization, as opposed to the American concept 
which prescribes how to conduct analysis from the lowest level. The Swedish 
description covers discussions of analytical needs to a limited extent.  
Question 3: What characterizes the description of the insurgency to be affected?  
Summary answer Canada: Descriptions of the Insurgency movements to be affected, are 
characterized by the view that this is mainly done by the influence of the people and 
also directly against insurgents. Further, it is considered that "Influence activities" (IA) 
override "Physical effects".589 Coordination is done by so-called "Comprehensive 
operations".590 Comprehensive targeting is described.591 Insurgents must be affected 
separately from their physical and moral forces.592 A classic description outlines firstly, 
the establishment of bases and then the activities to physically and 
psychologically/morally neutralize insurgents.593 The importance of integrating local 
forces and civilian resources to the greatest extent possible is stressed. Comprehensive 
Approach and Comprehensive Operations through all command levels are described.594 
Effects Thinking, EBAO and comprehensive targeting are described. 
Summary answer Britain: Descriptions are characterized by the view that it is primarily 
the population that should be affected; secondly, the Insurgency movement is to be 
influenced. This will be achieved through the framework "Shape-Secure-Develop", 
where intelligence is the cornerstone to understanding and being able to work with 
"Influence Activities" (IA). 595  
                                                 
588 Markstridsreglemente, Manöverbataljon (MSR 6)(2010), pp. 30-31. 
589 National Defence Headquarters, Counter-Insurgency Operations, B-GL-322-004/FP-003, Ottawa, 
Ontario, December 2008, p. 66 describes the IA and Fire/Physical (including Electronic warfare) effects. 
590 Ibid. p. 208, section 108. 
591 Ibid. p. 212 Chapter Information Operations – Influence Activities, section 808. 
592 Ibid. p.75, section 307. 
593 Ibid. section 308 and 517. 
594 Ibid. p. 99. 
595 UK Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, Volume 10, Part 10, Combined Arms 
Operations, Countering Insurgency, October 2009, Section 4-5 – 10. 
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IA are described in a separate chapter, where clear conceptual descriptions are available 
on organising at different levels (division, brigade, battle group).596 To influence people 
to neutralize the irregular players is argued as important using a combination of physical 
and psychological means and methods.597  
Strong troop presence is claimed to be particularly important in areas where Insurgency 
activities are directed at influencing the population. Influences are stressed to have to be 
according to the law.598 Self-criticism is directed at exemplified occasions when the 
British army acted, or is said to have acted outside the legal framework. Influences must 
be planned for implementation during a long time. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
are said to be about a "war of ideas". The Clear-Hold-Build concept is seen as a basic 
tactical activity, which can be applied to an area under insurgent control.599 Specific 
staff elements (officers) need to monitor the balance between kinetic and non-kinetic 
operations, as well as coordination with civilian activities.600 A new concept for 
Influence Activities is described, including deception, Psychological Operations, Key 
Leader Engagement, Electronic Warfare, Presence, Profile and Posture, Computer 
Network Operations and Physical Destruction.601 Influence considerations for tactical 
level are exemplified.602 Targeting covering all types of influences is described in the 
manual but the concept of Effects Based Operations (EBAO) is not mentioned. 
Summary answer U.S.; Description of how the Insurgency is to be affected can be 
characterized with the view that "analysis" is a primary activity. Analysis must occur at 
all command levels, from tactical level down to company level, and needs to have 
resources to do this, which are different compared to the need during Regular Warfare. 
The principle of Clear-Hold-Build, with various combinations of offensive, defensive 
and stability operations, is described as the framework.603 Other major tactical 
operations in COIN such as "Strike Operations" and "Populace and Resource Control 
Operations" are also described.604 Targeting is described specifically in planning 
descriptions and is said to have a wider role than targeting in Regular Warfare.605  
Targeting is included in all seven operational lines. A distinction is outlined regarding 
Person and Regional Targeting, and within these a division of lethal and nonlethal and, 
in terms of area, combined targeting.606 Effects thinking and EBAO are not specifically 
mentioned. There are traditional and very detailed alignment descriptions of the 
performance of different types of offensive and defensive operations, as well as 
described stabilizing operations down to patrol activities. No examples of large-scale 
operations/activities are presented.  
                                                 
596 UK Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, Volume 10, Part 10, Combined Arms 
Operations, Countering Insurgency, October 2009, chapter 6, annex AD. 
597 Ibid. section 3-9. 
598 Ibid.section 3-15. 
599 Ibid. section 6-2. 
600 Ibid. section 6-3. 
601 Ibid. section 6-5-7. 
602 Ibid. section 6-D-1-3. 
603 U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3.24-2 Tactics in COIN (2009), Chapter 3, section 4. 
604 Ibid. Section 5. 
605 Ibid. Chapter 4, section 4. 
606 Ibid. Section 4-138. 
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Information operations are given no detailed description throughout the document.607 
The emphasis can be said to be on traditional physical offensive or defensive 
implementations. 
Summary answer France; the struggle takes place in the context of a "global 
manoeuvre", where the population is in the centre against "anti-organizational forces", 
which indiscriminately use guerrilla tactics and terrorism.608 The aim is to neutralize 
organizations using armed violence in the form of Guerrilla Warfare and terror. The 
focus is to control the operational environment.609 COIN is said to represent a 
"compelling" (coercive) operation.610  
Efforts are focused on preserving the security of physical areas, and to dismantle the 
opponent’s organization.611 Military and police work in collaborative efforts is 
described.612 COIN must comprise operational planning to neutralize the insurgents by 
taking up the fight against the armed elements. The Oil-spot Strategy is described as the 
"Quadrillage-system” (hierarchical area organization) in secured areas and counter 
surveillance measures,  "deterrent pressure" in the other important areas though some 
areas are not covered. 613 Substantial operational activities are advised amongst others to 
be conducted with so-called operational latitude i.e. simultaneous wide discretion at 
low-levels.614 Effects thinking is articulated in the doctrine for general tactics and linked 
to the COIN doctrine, however, the concept of Effects Based Operations (EBAO) is not 
mentioned, neither is Targeting specifically described. There is more emphasis on how 
to organize forces in; permanent sector forces, intervention forces, and supporting 
forces with directions on how to utilize these forces tactically and operationally.615  
The descriptions which are explanatory and of an alignment character, display detailed 
principles for the organization of the forces and principles for implementation, and 
should be read together with the doctrine General Tactics.616    
 
 
 
                                                 
607 U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3.24-2 Tactics in COIN (2009), Chapter 5. The chapter includes mainly 
summarized descriptions. 
608 Doctrine For Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level (2010), p. 9. 
609 Ibid. p. 10. 
610 Ibid. p.11. 
611 Ibid. p. 24. 
612 Ibid. p. 22. 
613 Ibid. pp 28- 29. 
614 Ibid. p. 28. 
615 Ibid. pp 50-62. Appendix A. 
616 General Tactics, FT 02, Centre De Doctrine dÉmploi Des Forces, Paris, June, 2010. This general 
doctrine for tactics includes; overall tasks; coercion, controlling, influencing (p. 22.), Effects thinking as a 
basis for the manoeuvre (p. 55.). Here a force structure of four control elements capable of combined 
arms to the lowest level is advocated (p. 59.). Regarding tactics, the importance of sequential activities of 
disruption, manoeuvres and destruction are emphasized (p. 74.). A clear compilation of activities and 
tasks is related to organizations (p. 76.) 
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Sweden Summary answer: This type of tactics is necessary for all units in order to be 
able to function in various conflicts.617 Capabilities are needed for offensive, defensive 
and stabilization approaches within the principle of Manoeuvre Warfare.618 Combat or 
stabilization methods are described, where the latter can also include offensive and 
defensive activities, mainly supporting the police and civil activities.619 Manoeuvre 
Warfare with physical and psychological dimensions is supposed to be carried out by 
task force units with the battalion or part of it in combination with fire and movement, 
surprise and also non-military contributions.    
Initiative, high tempo, mission command, indirect methods and joint actions are general 
articulated views. The descriptions include limited articulations regarding COIN tactics 
explicitly, instead, there is an attempt to outline generic approaches for assault and 
defence tactics and techniques, mainly with a Regular Warfare mind-set. The 
Stabilization methods part mostly includes low intensity activities such as surveillance, 
control and escorting tasks. There are limited discussions on intelligence function 
adaptions, Effects Based Operations and systems thinking, when regarding the 
opponent. The concept Clear-Hold-Build is not mentioned, nor is Targeting or 
Comprehensive Approach.620 
Summary responses to question 3.  
The descriptions of how Insurgency movements should be affected vary in content and 
character in the doctrines. Canadian descriptions emphasize Influence Activities as 
being superior to physical effects. The implementation concept is called 
"Comprehensive Operations". The importance of integrating local forces is emphasized. 
Effects thinking, EBAO (Effects Based Approach to Operations) and Targeting are 
described.  
The British view contains a dominant concept and thought on "Influence Activities", 
which includes all types of operations where Clear-Hold-Build is seen as a tactical 
activity. Targeting is described but not EBAO. U.S. retains the basic concept of Clear-
Hold-Build with variations of offensive and defensive actions. Targeting is described 
but not EBAO and effects thinking. The French description includes a detailed tactical 
concept connected to "global manoeuvre", which is clearly linked to the operational 
level with organization examples for units and the military-police cooperation. Effects 
thinking is described, but not targeting and EBAO.  
                                                 
617 MSR 6, Manöverbataljon, Markstridsreglemente för Manöverbataljon (2010), pp. 27-33 describes 
different types of actors (regular or irregular, civilian populations and aid organizations) regarding aims, 
organizational principles. 
618 Ibid. pp. 39-52. 
619 Ibid. pp. 135-150. section Stabilizing methods 
620 This pre-release of a Swedish tactical view of Irregular Warfare including COIN leans on a parallel 
production of a regulation for Ground Operations in general (Reglemente för Markoperations, RMO, 
remiss 3, 2009) with clearer articulation on COIN principles (pp. 101-106.). There is also an example of 
offensive action during a Stabilizing approach outlined; pp. 118-119. A certain toning down of COIN can 
be noticed in 2010 MSR 6 compared to the 2009 RMO. This can be seen as an example of how the view 
of COIN in Sweden by no means can be viewed to have a stable and fixed direction. 
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The Swedish view mostly exemplifies military operations supporting civilian efforts 
within a traditional Regular Warfare manoeuvre concept, however, developed mainly 
with a defensive stabilizing approach. 
Question 6: What characterizes the description of how the military 
operations are to be carried out?  
Summary answer Canada; descriptions are based on capabilities for variations of 
defensive, offensive and stability operations/tasks, starting with the first. The ability to 
balance so-called Full Spectrum Operations is viewed necessary.621 The Clear-Hold-
Build concept is not mentioned. Military operations are clearly described as 
"comprehensive" and part of a "Comprehensive Approach". Clear descriptions of 
meaning for tactical ability are described.622 Host country strategy will be supported, 
legal conditions are emphasized and operations are built from below with a focus on 
people and different forms of attacking insurgents, thereafter physical separation, 
intellectual and moral separation, neutralization.  
Manoeuvre and indirect intervention are clearly advocated. Military capabilities are not 
solely believed to be able to destroy the Insurgency.623 Requirements for minor and 
larger operations are clearly described.624   
Summary answer Britain; descriptions are based on how military operations will be 
carried out founded on the ten principles of Counterinsurgency with a description of a 
number of paradoxes from the U.S. FM 3-24 from 2007625. The framework "Shape-
Secure-Develop" is described by a "Joint, Operational Level of approach", where the 
"transition" (transfer of responsibility for security to the host country's resources) is 
clearly described as being a vital objective and activity to be achieved. Clear-Hold-
Build operations are described as part of the overall security efforts for specifically high 
priority areas exposed to insurgent operations626. The Clear-Hold-Build concept is 
problematized through the description of a number of conditions that need to be 
considered.627 Each part of the Clear-Hold-Build concept is described clearly and with 
practical examples.  
The meaning of ”Info Ops Messages” in every action is described lucidly.628 Three 
types of approaches are described; Indirect (mainly Special Forces and Intelligence), 
Direct (military forces, also host nation forces) and, Balanced (combined military, 
political and economic measures)629. Methods, means and basic implementation are 
fully described generically (e.g. in text, image, and checklists in detail for Urban Strike 
Operations). Strike operations are considered to often need specially trained personnel. 
                                                 
621 Counter-Insurgency Operations (2008), Section 528. 
622 Ibid. p. 30. figure 1-3. Tactical Activities and Tasks 
623 Counter-Insurgency Operations (2008), p. 80. section 310. 
624 Ibid. section 6-12 – 16. 
625 British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency (2009), Chapter 3. 
626 Ibid. Section 4-14. 
627 Ibid. Section 4-35. 
628 British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency (2009). Section 4-20. 
629 Ibid. Section 1-1.5 
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"Detention Operations" are described in detail. The division of offensive, respectively 
defensive operations is not mentioned; only small-scale attack operations are described. 
Special Forces operations, larger Air Operations and relatively limited naval activities 
are described.630 
Summary answer U.S.; descriptions of how the military operations are to be carried out 
are based on the Clear-Hold-Build concept, with different variations of offensive, 
defensive, and stability tasks. Each part of the Clear-Hold-Build concept is described 
clearly and with practical examples, however, often with a less tactical but considerably 
more combat technical character. 
Summary answer France: The focus is described in the context of the so-called “Global 
Manoeuvre”, where the population is in the centre against the "anti-organizational 
forces", which indiscriminately use guerrilla tactics and terrorism.631 The aim is to 
neutralize organizations using armed violence in the form of Guerrilla Warfare and 
terror and the emphasis is on people and controlling the environment.632  
The activities focus on preserving the security in physical areas and dismantling the 
insurgency organization.633 The main concept is to establish security for the population 
in some areas. Here, "General protection" with a quick "intervention plan" is 
established, which can be complemented by training local security resources. There is 
obvious emphasis on the activities of the people in secured areas, the Quadrillage 
system and "deterrent pressure" to take the initiative and disrupt / attack in the enemy's 
depth.  
Summary answer Sweden; The Field manual describes a tactical approach based on 
generic principles that more or less are supposed to be suitable in a Regular, as well as 
Irregular Warfare scenario. Combinations of assaults, defence and stabilizing methods 
are to be planned and executed.634 The military function should support the civilian 
efforts and police work in a multifunctional operation.635 The descriptions of stabilizing 
methods are mainly of a defensive character.  
Summary answers to question 6. 
The description of how military operations are supposed to be carried out varies. 
Canada's approach emphasizes the military's subordinate role in civil actions, 
implemented with variations of defensive, offensive and stability operations (full-
spectrum operations with the so-called Comprehensive Operations). Larger and smaller 
operations are described, without connection to the Clear-Hold-Build concept. The 
British approach is based on the framework "Shape-Secure-Develop" and is described 
as a "Joint, Operational Level of Approach".  
                                                 
630 British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency (2009), Chapter  9. 
631 Doctrine For Counterinsurgency At The Tactical Level (2010), p. 9. 
632 Ibid. pp. 9-10. 
633 Ibid. p. 24. 
634Markstridsreglemente, Manöverbataljon (MSR 6)[Field Manual for Ground Forces Manouver 
Battalion, preedition] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, förhandsutgåva, 2010), pp. 52-53. 
635 Ibid. p. 53. 
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Three types of approaches are described; Indirect (mainly Special Forces and 
intelligence), Direct (military forces both from supporting nations and the host nation) 
and Balanced (combined military, political and economic measures). The division of 
offensive and defensive operations/ tasks is not described; only small-scale attacks are 
described. The U.S. description is based entirely on the Clear-Hold-Build concept with 
variations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks/ operations/activities.  
The French concepts are not based on the Clear-Hold-Build concept but on rapid 
intervention to secure key areas and to neutralize organizations using armed violence in 
the form of Guerrilla Warfare and terror. The focus is on the people and control of the 
operational environment. The efforts focus on preserving the security of physical areas, 
and dismantling the Insurgency organization. The principle stated in operational 
planning is Oil-spot Strategy with the "Quadrillage" system (hierarchical area 
organization) in secured areas and counter surveillance measures, "deterrent pressure" 
in the important areas. Substantial operational activities are described with 
simultaneously wide discretion at low-levels. The Swedish view prescribes that the 
military function should support civilian efforts. Clearly COIN-focused tactical 
approaches are not included. Tactical principles, less detailed, seem to be viewed 
contextually similar regarding assault and defence tasks, though a more detailed view is 
presented regarding stabilization tasks and performance. 
Question 7: What characterizes the perception of how the military forces are supposed 
to be used against enemy combatants?  
Summary answer Canada: The view is characterized by restraint in offensive operations 
and larger operations e.g. the risk of security leaks is emphasized. A combination of 
defensive, offensive and stabilizing abilities is described as required. These are 
summarized clearly. The difficulties of Cordon are described and the importance of 
being able to "pin down" and pursue is stressed. By having the freedom of action at 
lower levels and by using covert surveillance a position for "pre-emption, dislocation 
and disruption" can be established and used.636 . 
Summary answer Britain: The doctrine consistently describes an approach that primarily 
focuses on measures that directly affect the people and secondly the insurgents; secure 
the population and neutralize the insurgent.637  An important view is the use of 
"minimum necessary force”, where the keyword is the interpretation of "necessary", 
which sometimes can mean even larger units. As an example, the U.S. operation against 
Fallujah in 2004 is described, where two regimental battle groups of a total of seven 
battalions attacked the city. The principle Find-Fix-Finish-Exploit-Analyse (F3EA) can 
be said to be a description of military engagement against enemy elements requiring 
armed capability638. The importance of precision in efforts is emphasized.639  
                                                 
636 National Defence Headquarters, Counter-Insurgency Operations, B-GL-322-004/FP-003, Ottawa, 
Ontario, December 2008, section 602-604. 
637 British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency (2009), Section 3-8-9. 
638 Ibid. Section 5-6. 
639 Ibid. Section 7-4. 
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Joint Action is stressed where the combinations of hard and soft means/effects are 
coordinated.640 Special Surge and Strike Operations, with risks, are described.641 In 
general, the doctrine clearly describes attack operations, strike / surge actions and 
influence operations. 
Summary answer U.S.: the doctrine consistently describes an approach based on the 
principle that the military units should be able to operate equally well in offensive, 
defensive as well as stabilizing operations. In all these operational types, the enemy 
should be handled humanely and the population should be protected, though also 
controlled. The offensive roles include "movement to contact", "attack", "exploit" and 
"pursuit".642 The offensive mood is characterized by surprise, simple plans - boldly 
executed, concentration (whether they are visible /invisible/kinetic, or non-kinetic 
effects), high speed and flexibility. The doctrine does not describe in detail how the 
enemy combatant elements should be dealt with, other than mainly with the smaller 
combat activities. 
Summary answer France; the doctrine describes a completely tactical system based on 
the principles stated in the answer to question 6. In principle, the military units should 
support the police in security work, sometimes by conducting security operations, 
defensively protecting the population through the "Quadrillage" system (cutting off 
relations for the insurgents), and executing offensive actions in depth, (also using 
guerrilla tactics). COIN must comprise operational planning to neutralize the insurgents 
by taking up the fight against the armed groups.643 The principle known as Oil-spot 
Strategy with the so-called "Quadrillage system” (hierarchical area structure and 
organization) in secured areas and counter surveillance measures, "deterrent pressure" 
of the other key areas.644  
Substantial operational activities with simultaneously wide discretion at low-levels 
(operational latitude) are described.645 The Clear-Hold-Build concept is not mentioned 
at all. Guerrilla tactics are advocated. The divisions of "offensive" and "defensive" 
actions are not described. Indirectly, however, such a focus can be interpreted. Divisions 
are achieved in static / permanent and dynamic activities in the "Quadrillage" and 
"deterrent pressure" concepts.646 "Nomadic behaviour" i.e. units that walk and live 
among the people, can be used for extended operations.647 Skills, especially in 
intelligence capability are stated as being "at the heart of COIN".648 Moreover, 
command and control capabilities are mentioned. Concealed and/or surprising irregular 
behaviour and vital operational secrecy are highlighted as important aspects. Large-
scale operations are only to be carried out when one is sure of success. The highest 
capacity for patrol activities is therefore considered important. 
                                                 
640 British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency (2009), Section 7-8. 
641 Ibid. Section 8-7. 
642 U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3.24-2 Tactics in COIN (2009), Section 5-8. 
643 Ministère de la Défense, Armée de Terre, Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level, Army 
Manual (Paris: Centre De Doctrine dÉmploi Des Forces, April 2010), p. 28. 
644 Ibid. p. 29. 
645 Ibid. p. 28. 
646 Ibid. p. 33. 
647 Ibid. pp. 28-29. 
648 Ibid. p. 55. 
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Summary answer Sweden; The field manual describes operations with combinations of 
offensive, defensive and stabilization activities with the use of indirect or direct 
approaches of manoeuvre warfare.649 A balanced approach can be argued to be implied 
in the text, even if rather a more defensive stabilization method part dominates in the 
descriptions of tactics in COIN (even if that label is not used)650.  Regarding the 
offensive and combat perspective, a view is expressed on its similarity to Regular 
Warfare. The descriptions are in general not very detailed compared to the other 
doctrines.  
Summary answers question 7. 
Descriptions of how military forces are to be used against enemy combatant 
components vary in design and detail, but the main principles are relatively similar. 
Overall, the Canadian approach is interpreted as defensive, the British as balanced, the 
American as more offensive, and the French approach clearly offensive. The Canadian 
vision can be interpreted as prioritizing offensive operations and larger ones to a lesser 
degree, however, a combination of defensive, offensive and stabilizing abilities are said 
to be required. The ability to be able to hide actions is highlighted down to lower 
command and unit levels. The British approach focuses on measures that affect the 
people directly and secondly the insurgents with a "minimum necessary force". The 
doctrine mainly describes attack, strike / surge actions and influence operations with 
clarity. The American approach is based on the principle that the military units are to 
operate equally well in offensive, defensive as well as stabilizing operations. In all, the 
enemy should be encountered and dealt with, as should the population be protected and 
also controlled. The offensive specialization includes "movement to contact", "attack", 
"exploit" and "pursue".  
An offensive approach is characterized by surprise, simple plans - boldly executed, 
concentration (whether it be visible/invisible/kinetic/non-kinetic effects), adapted speed 
and flexibility. Overall, the doctrines do not describe in detail how the enemy combatant 
elements are to be dealt with, but the main norm can be understood as being similar to 
smaller combat operations.  
France describes a complete tactical system where military units support the police in 
security, sometimes implementing security operations, defensively protect the 
population using the so-called "Quadrillage" system to cut off supply and mobility 
freedom for the insurgents. Offensive actions in depth are clearly included and also 
using guerrilla tactics.  Concealed, surprising irregular behaviour and high operational 
secrecy are highlighted as important. Only carrying out large-scale operations when one 
is sure of success, can lead to a requirement for the greatest capacity and skills when 
conducting patrol activities.  
 
                                                 
649 Markstridsreglemente, Manöverbataljon (MSR 6)[Field Manual for Ground Forces Manouver 
Battalion, preedition] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, förhandsutgåva, 2010), pp.  39-50. 
650 Ibid. pp. 135-150. Stabilizing Methods. 
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The Swedish view can, in contrast, be summarized with a less detailed description and a 
balanced approach focusing on stabilization tasks, if necessary however with offensive 
actions. The descriptions are mainly related to traditional warfare tactics involving 
combat and offensive approaches.  
Comprehensive result comparison of COIN doctrines 
Question CAN UK U.S. FR SW 
2. Analysis of 
Insurgency 
contexts 
(Context 
perspective) 
Important. 
Adapted Intel 
on tactical 
level. 
Extensive 
descriptions. 
COG concept 
used. No 
systems 
thinking 
addressed. 
Important. 
Adapted Intel on 
tactical level. 
Extensive 
descriptions. 
COG concept 
used. No systems 
thinking addressed. 
Focus on 
preconditions for 
the analysis work. 
Important. 
Adapted Intel on 
tactical level. 
Concept with 
tools and 
models. Systems 
thinking in use. 
Focus on the 
analysis work. 
Important. 
Adapted 
Intel on 
tactical 
level.  
Limited 
discussion. 
Important but 
little discussed. 
3. How to 
affect the 
Insurgency in 
general? 
(Context 
perspective) 
Influence 
Activities 
superior to 
physical 
effects. 
EBAO and 
Targeting 
concepts. 
A complete 
concept. 
Influence 
Activities, 
including physical 
effects. 
CHB concept seen 
as a tactical 
concept. No 
Targeting concept. 
CHB concept 
with developed 
descriptions of 
tactical/combat 
techniques. 
Targeting, 
no EBAO or 
effects thinking. 
Detailed 
tactical 
concept. 
Static and 
intervention 
units. Effects 
thinking. No 
EBAO and 
Targeting 
concepts. 
Primarily military 
support to 
civilian efforts. 
Mainly kinetic 
effects 
exemplified. 
6. How to act 
in a military 
way  in 
general? 
(Concept 
perspective) 
 
Subordinated 
to civilian 
actions, 
Full Spectrum 
Operations 
concept, 
Comprehensive 
Operations, no 
CHB concept. 
Strategic concept. 
”Shape- Secure -
Develop”, 
Indirect, Direct, 
Balanced approach 
concepts. 
CHB concept 
with off/def/ 
stability 
capabilities. 
Rapid 
intervention 
concept for 
securing 
areas. 
Quadrillage, 
neutralizing 
the enemy, 
deterrent 
pressure, 
guerrilla 
tactics and 
larger units. 
A version of  the 
UK/U.S. 
approach with 
concepts for 
off/def and 
stabilizing 
capabilities. 
7. Tactics 
against armed 
opponents? 
(Concept 
perspective) 
Defensive 
approach 
concept. 
 
Balanced off/def 
concept mainly 
indirect. Still, 
underlines  
significance of 
direct action 
capabilities and 
concepts. 
Balanced 
concept for 
off/def/stability 
operations. 
Offensive 
approach 
with 
complete  
operational 
/tactical 
concepts on 
Brigade 
level. 
A balanced 
concept focusing 
on stability tasks, 
still, with 
offensive 
capability, both 
offensive and 
defence concepts 
from RW 
inspired tactical 
thought.  
Figure 40. Appendix 8. Overview of the result comparison of COIN doctrines. 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
14 
 
 
The result of this general interpretation of the different text articulations on contextual 
and conceptual normative views can be summarized follows. Regarding the contextual 
perspective, all texts confess to a more or less comprehensive approach where military 
tasks are combined with the civilian tasks and efforts (from the most civilian embracing 
Canadian view to the French more militarily articulated view). This is summarized with 
a dominant contextual perspective of expectations and requirements for a broader 
“Hybrid Warfare” contextual perspective in tactical thinking. 
Regarding the differences of conceptual views, they can be interpreted ranging from the 
rather obvious “Small Wars” focused Canadian view to the very detailed French 
descriptions of an adapted Brigade Combat Team with enemy centric capabilities and 
also using Guerrilla Warfare in-depth capacities. Differences might also be possible to 
be interpreted between the British and American descriptions, both describing needs for 
smaller and larger operations and tactics concepts, however, not specifically outlining 
examples. The Swedish conceptual view could be interpreted as a vision of tactics with 
task force organized manoeuvre battalions, still based on a cultural mind set of Regular 
Warfare emphasising assault and defence concepts. The result of the normative analysis 
gives a result where the different nations’ position in the Swedish model of the space of 
tactical standpoints is as follows. In broad terms it can be argued that all normative texts 
outline tactical thinking positions based on a broader military-civilian task context 
perspective, with capabilities in concept perspectives for both smaller and larger 
operations, not only Intelligence-focused but clearly with offensive combat ability as 
well. 
Answer to the question. 
The question; “How can contemporary normative views on context and concepts for 
tactics in COIN in general be characterized compared to the case study descriptive 
result?” is answered as follows. 
In general, the normative views characterize an equal view of Insurgency characteristics 
and challenges to be met contextually and strategically. Descriptions on how to do this 
conceptually in general as well as militarily differ explicitly in terms of offensive-
defensive orientation,  realization of military-civilian cooperation, comprehensive 
approach, operational-tactical principles (e.g. the American Clear-Hold-Build concept 
versus the French intervention principle), staff associations and joint concepts and links 
to fighting style). This might be explained by cultural attitudes and horizons of 
expectations as well as by the nations’ various rooms of experiences.  
In principal, the articulations are quite equal regarding contextual perspectives, 
comprising a blend of military and civilian aspects of an Irregular Warfare environment, 
such as a COIN operation. Such a position explicitly is found in the lower part of the 
descriptive Swedish space of tactical statements. Regarding a conceptual normative 
view of different weightings, all countries highlight smaller unit concepts, often in 
combination with an emphasis on the intelligence function. Still, requirements for larger 
unit concepts are addressed, mainly by France and the U.S.  
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The capability of offensive combat actions is addressed by all nations. Conceptual 
thinking can be argued in general, to be mostly found on left side, in the lower part of 
the Swedish space of statements. In summary, the international and also Swedish 
normative texts mostly fit into one of the theoretical four parts of the descriptive 
Swedish space of tactical standpoints on Irregular Warfare. 
         TACTICAL THOUGHT 
2014 September 29th 
 
 
  
 
1 
 
Appendix 9. Inter-assessment reliability test of axes interpretations 
2013-07-19. 
The Inter-assessments reliability test concerned the interpretations of axis 1 and 2, 
regarding generalized structuring aspects. Based on the result of the distribution of 
answers in the space of statements, logically connecting features are sought, making it 
possible to decide what each axis can be argued to represent. In order to test the 
interpretations made in this study, a test person was selected. A researcher working at 
the War Studies Department at the Swedish National Defence College was chosen, 
someone with long experience of tactical thinking and thought per se. As a lecturer of 
War Studies, Ingvar Sjöblom knew about the dissertation work, however, not regarding 
the analysis methods and results. Sjöblom was presented with two graphs depicting 
results of the standpoint distribution on axis 1 and 2 via e-mail. The pictures with 
questions were the following;  
How can ax 1 be labeled
concerning types of thoughts?
Base your answer from combinatio
of results in the left and right part
of axis 1 viewed to be logically
connected. What results do you
consider particularly prominent?
.
 
Figure 41. Appendix 9. Inter-assessment reliability test of axis 1. 
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How can axis 2 be labelled
Concerning types of thoghts?
Base your answer from 
combinations of results
in the upper and lower parts
of axis 2, viewed to be logically
connected. What results do you
consider particularly prominent?
 
Figure 42. Appendix 9. Inter-assessment reliability test of axis 2. 
A meeting was arranged a day after the graphs had been sent to Sjöblom and he 
presented his interpretations and results. The results can be summarized as follows. 
Axis 1 has the dominating aspects of; terrain and traditional military aspects such as 
time-space-force, geography and units. The operational environment consequently 
determines the military strategy and use of units. The logics of results in axis 1 are not 
as obvious as in axis 2. The results regarding national-international emphasis affected 
the interpretations. The dominating aspects of axis 2 were; objectives, goal-effect based 
focus, ways of thinking in the operational environment. The result was discussed and 
the interpretations made in the study were presented, which corresponded very well to 
the outcome of the test done by Sjöblom. 
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